G.R. No. L-23614. February 27, 1970
PEDRO M. BERMEJO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. ISIDRO BARRIOS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
These two cases,
being interrelated, are decided together.
These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz, rendered on June 3, 1964, dismissing two petitions for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction: one filed by petitioner
Pedro M. Bermejo against City Judge Isidro Barrios and City
Fiscal Quirico Abela of Roxas City, docketed as Special Civil Case No. V-2721;
and the other filed by petitioner Jovita Carmorin against the same respondents, docketed as Special
Civil Case No. V-2723.
In G.R. No.L-23614, petitioner Pedro M. Bermejo
and Julia “Doe” (her identity at the time was unknown) were charged
in the city court of Roxas City, on August 22, 1963, of the crime of falsification of public
or official document in an information filed by the city fiscal. It was alleged in the information that on or
about the 25th day of February 1963, in Roxas City,
the two accused, being private individuals, conspired and confederated together
and mutually helped each other, and willfully and feloniously prepared and
executed a document consisting of an amended petition for habeas corpus entitled “Pedro M. Bermejo
and Jovita Carmorin,
petitioners, vs. Jose M. Bernales and Wilfredo Bernales, respondents”, which petition Pedro M. Bermejo signed while Julia “Doe” placed her thumbmark over the name “Jovita
Carmorin“, which petition was subscribed and sworn to by the two accused before
the Clerk of Court and filed in the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 2669, thus the two accused stated and made
it appear in the amended petition that the same was signed and sworn to by Jovita Carmorin as one of the
petitioners when in truth and in fact the said Jovita
Carmorin never signed and swore to it, because it was in fact the accused
Julia “Doe” who signed and swore to that petition as Julia Carmorin.
Relying on the certification
of the city fiscal that a preliminary investigation had been conducted by him
and that he had examined the
witnesses under oath before filing the information,
the City Judge, Hon. Isidro O.
Barrios, issued, on August 24, 1963,
an order for the arrest of accused Bermejo. To
prevent his incarceration, said accused put up the necessary bond.
Upon arraignment, Bermejo
filed a motion to quash the information, alleging in substance: (1) that the
information did not charge an offense because the amended petition for habeas corpus (in Special Proceeding No. V-2669 of the Court of First
Instance of Capiz), allegedly falsified, is not a
document contemplated under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, and that in a previous judgment of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in
the habeas corpus proceedings it was declared that the thumbmark
in the amended petition was that of Jovita Carmorin; and (2) that the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over his person because the warrant issued for his arrest
was illegal, Judge Barrios having issued the same without first examining the
witnesses under oath and in the form of searching questions and answers as
required under Republic Act 3828.
The city fiscal filed his opposition to the motion to quash,
contending that the petition for habeas corpus is a public
document; that the provisions of Republic Act 3828 are applicable only to
municipal judges and not to city
judges; and that the principle of res judicata, or conclusiveness of judgment, cannot be
invoked by the accused. After Bermejo had filed a supplement to his motion
to quash and a reply to the city fiscal’s opposition,
respondent City Judge, on October 5,
1963, issued an order denying the motion to quash.
On October 14, 1963,
Bermejo filed his motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Thereupon he filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
before the Court of First Instance of Capiz, naming
as respondents City Judge Isidro Barrios and City Fiscal Quirico Abela, contending that
City Fiscal Abela committed a grave abuse of discretion
in filing an information against him without conducting the proper preliminary
investigation, and that the City Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying his motion to quash, raising practically the same issues that he raised in the motion to quash
before the city court, and praying that respondent City Judge be enjoined from
hearing the criminal case against him during the pendency
of the special civil action in the
Court of First Instance.
In G.R. No.
L-23615, Jovita Carmorin was charged by respondent City Fiscal
Quirico Abela with perjury,
on August 23, 1963, in the same city court of Roxas
City (Criminal Case No. 4452) for allegedly having “subscribed and swore
to an affidavit . . . . that she was really the one who signed with her thumbmark as Jovita Carmorin . . . . the
amended petition for habeas corpus . . . . when in truth and in fact, as she very well knew, she had not done such act of signing with
her thumbmark said petition and it was another person, who signed
with a thumbmark said petition as Jovita
Carmorin. . . .” The city fiscal also certified
that he had conducted the preliminary investigation in accordance with law
before filing the information.
On the basis of the certification by the city fiscal that he had
conducted the proper preliminary investigation, respondent City Judge Barrios
issued an order for the arrest of
accused Carmorin.
After posting a bond, said accused, thru her counsel, Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo (the same person accused in the falsification
case), filed a motion to quash the information, alleging substantially, that
the court had not acquired jurisdiction over her person because the warrant of arrest issued for her arrest was improvidently issued, the respondent
City Judge having issued the same without examining the witnesses personally in
the form of searching questions and answers in violation of Republic Act 3828,
and that no offense was committed by the accused because it had already been
declared by the Court of First Instance of Capiz in
the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark
appearing in the petition for habeas corpus was the true thumbmark of accused Carmorin.
After the city fiscal has filed his opposition to the motion to
quash, and the accused, her reply, on October
15, 1963, City Judge Barrios issued an order denying the motion to
quash. Carmorin’s
motion for reconsideration having been denied, she likewise filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of
First Instance of Capiz, also naming as respondents
City Judge Barrios and City Fiscal Abela, imputing
abuse of discretion on the part of City Fiscal Abela
in filing an information against her without conducting the proper preliminary
investigation, and on the part of respondent Judge Barrios in denying her
motion to quash, raising the same questions raised by her in her motion to
quash before the city court, and also praying
that respondent City Judge he enjoined from hearing the case pending
decision of the special civil action.
On November 22,
1963, respondent city fiscal filed answers to the two petitions, admitting some
of the allegations in the petitions, and denying others; and setting up the
affirmative defense that the orders of respondent City Judge in the criminal
cases against the two petitioners can not be the subject of the petitions for certiorari and prohibition before
the Court of First Instance of Capiz
because the city court of Roxas City issued said
orders in the exercise of its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz, so that
the latter court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for certiorari
and prohibition filed before it, pursuant to Section 87, paragraph (c) of Republic Act 296, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 3828.
Herein petitioners filed their replies to respondents’ answers,
asserting that the Court of
First Instance of Capiz has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the two cases for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. After the parties had filed their memoranda
in support of their respective contentions regarding the jurisdiction of the court, the Court
of First Instance of Capiz issued an order, on
January 6, 1964, declaring that it
had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the two special civil actions
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, and the court set
the hearing of the two cases for January 24, 1964.
During the hearing of the
two cases, which was held jointly, Atty. Bermejo
appeared and testified in his behalf and in behalf of his co-accused Carmorin, while Fiscal Quirico Abela testified for the prosecution. Thereafter, the parties filed their
memoranda. On June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Capiz
rendered a decision dismissing the two petitions, without pronouncement as to costs.
Their joint motion for reconsideration having been denied, herein
petitioners brought the present appeals to this Court.
Before resolving the questions posed in these appeals, We
consider it necessary to rule on the matter regarding the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz to take cognizance
of the two petitions for
certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction – a question that was properly raised by the respondents in the court below, although this
question is not now raised in the present appeals. We
hold that the Court of
First Instance of Capiz erred in taking cognizance of
the two petitions. Section 6 of Republic Act 3828, amending Section 87, paragraph (c) of the Judiciary Act of
1948, provides in part, as follows:
“Justices of the peace in the capitals of provinces and
sub-provinces and judges of municipal courts shall have like jurisdiction as
the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed
within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law
does not exceed prision correccional
or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand
pesos or both, and in the absence of the district judge, shall have like
jurisdiction within the province as the Court of First Instance to hear
applications for bail.
“All cases filed under the next preceding paragraph with
justices of the peace of capitals and municipal court judges shall be tried and decided on the merits by the
respective justices of the peace or municipal judges. Proceedings had shall be recorded and decisions
therein shall be appealable direct to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, as the case may be.”[1]
The crime of falsification of a public or official document by a
private individual, of which petitioner Bermejo is
charged in the city court of Roxas City in Criminal
Case No. 4451, is punishable with prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods, while the crime of perjury of which
petitioner Carmorin is charged in Criminal Case No.
4452 before the city court of Roxas City is
punishable with arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional
in its minimum period.[2]
Undoubtedly, these two cases fall within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court of Roxas
City and the Court of First Instance of Capiz. This Court, interpreting the aforequoted
provision of Republic Act 3828,
ruled that “[w]here the municipal court (city court of Manila) has taken
cognizance of a criminal case in its concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance, appeal must be
taken direct to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court; and where the Court of First Instance has taken
cognizance of such appeal in its appellate jurisdiction and refused to elevate
the case to the Court of Appeals, said Court of First Instance acted without
jurisdiction.[3] And this rule applies even if the order is
not a judgment on the merits because in cases of this nature the Court of First
Instance exercises no supervisory jurisdiction over the city court, and having
concurrent jurisdiction the city court acts with “like jurisdiction”
as the Court of First Instance.[4] It is Our view, therefore, that the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Capiz in Special
Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723, now appealed to this Court, is null and void
because said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of those cases. The two special civil actions against the
City Judge and the City Fiscal of Roxas City should
have been filed with the Court of Appeals in aid of the latter’s appellate jurisdiction over
direct appeals from the decision or order of the city court. We note, however, that the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Capiz is correct insofar
as it had dismissed the two petitions in question.
Be that as it may, however, We believe that the error of the
petitioners in filing their petitions for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction with the Court of First Instance of Capiz and the
error of the latter court in taking cognizance of those petitions should not deter Us from ruling on the
questions raised in the present appeals.
The record shows that these proceedings have been pending for more than
six years, and were We to remand these cases to the courts below so the
petitions for certiorari should be
brought up to the Court of Appeals, our action would only cause further delay.
We shall, therefore,
decide whether herein petitioners are right in assailing the correctness or legality of the
proceedings in the city court of Roxas City in
connection with the two criminal cases
filed against them, as they now contend in the present appeals.
While petitioners
maintain in the court below that the City Fiscal of Roxas
City has no power to initiate the investigation of cases without a previous
complaint by an offended party, they now admit in their brief that under the
existing laws he can commence such preliminary inquiry.[5]
Nevertheless, petitioner Bermejo
contends that before the city fiscal can conduct such preliminary
investigation, there must be a violation of the law, and in the instant case he
avers that there was no violation of law. Basis of his argument is that the petition for habeas
corpus not being a document as contemplated in Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code, the city fiscal is precluded from conducting the
preliminary investigation, much less from filing the information, because Bermejo could not be prosecuted for falsification of the
alleged public or official document.
The contention of Bermejo
is untenable. In the case of U.
S. v. Orera,[6]
a “document” is defined as a deed, instrument or other duly
authorized paper by which something is
proved, evidenced or set forth. In U. S. v. Asensi,[7] this Court held that any instrument
authorized by a notary public or a competent public official, with
the solemnities required by law, is
a public document. Section 38, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court,[8] enumerates the following as public writings:
“(a) The
written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official
bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial and
executive, whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country;
“(b) Public
records, kept in the Philippines,
of private writings.”
The same principle also obtains in the
United States, that “defendant’s pleadings and papers, which were involved
in civil actions and which were in custody of county clerk as ex–oficio clerk
of superior court in which action was pending, were ‘public documents’ and were within scope of subject matter of
statute making alteration of court records an offense.”[9] Considering that the petition for habeas
corpus (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) alleged the illegal confinement,
or deprivation of liberty, of one Soterania Carmorin, and that said petition was duly subscribed and
sworn to before Clerk of Court Leopoldo B. Dorado and
filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz,
forming, therefore, a part of the court records in said proceedings, it
cannot be disputed that said petition is a public or official document as
contemplated in Articles 171 and 172 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Bermejo, therefore, cannot say that he committed no
crime if it can be shown that, as charged in the information, he connived or
conspired with a certain Julia “Doe” in falsifying said petition by
making it appear that Jovita Carmorin
placed her thumbmark therein when in fact she
did not do so.
Petitioner Bermejo
likewise complains that notwithstanding his request to be present at the preliminary
investigation, the same was conducted in his absence or behind his back thus
denying him his day in court. We find,
however, in the record – and the court a quo so found too – that
on March 11, 1963, a subpoena
was issued to Atty. Pedro M. Bermejo requiring him
to appear at the office of the city fiscal of Roxas City
on March 14, 1963 in an
investigation. This subpoena was
received by Bermejo on March 12, 1963, and on the same day he sent a letter
to the city fiscal, which was received by the latter in the afternoon of the
same day, requesting that the investigation be postponed to March 19, 1963
because he (Bermejo) had to attend to another case
which was scheduled to be heard on the
same date. The city fiscal
acceded to his request, but
because the fiscal’s office failed to notify him of
the hearing on March 19, 1963,
Bermejo was not present when
the investigation was conducted on that day.
The preliminary investigation was conducted on the very day requested by
Bermejo, and after finding
that there was a prima facie case the city fiscal filed the
information against him on August 22,
1963.
It appears, therefore, that
while the city fiscal failed to notify petitioner Bermejo
that his request for postponement was granted, which should have been done, it
can also be said that Bermejo was not entirely blameless it the preliminary
investigation was conducted in his absence.
It was he himself who set the date of the investigation in his request
for postponement, but he did not bother to come on the date he fixed. Neither did he try to find out what action
the city fiscal had taken on his request for postponement, on any day before the date of the hearing set by him, although he is living in Roxas City
where the city fiscal holds his office.
Moreover, the information was filed five months later, and this
petitioner never inquired, at least as to the status of his case. This behavior of petitioner cannot merit Our
approval. It is obvious that he failed
to employ the standard of care
or reasonable diligence that is expected of
him. His unwarranted absence on
the day of the hearing which he himself requested, coupled with his seeming indifference or unconcern about his
case, is a clear indication that he was guilty of gross negligence in the
protection of his rights. If he did not
have his day in court, it was because of his own negligence. If he was really interested
to attend the investigation, as he now pretends, he should have taken pains to communicate with the city fiscal. This Court had ruled that in the application
of the principle of due process, what is sought to be
safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of
opportunity to be heard.[10] Since petitioner Bermejo was afforded the opportunity to appear at the preliminary investigation but did not take advantage of it, he has no
one to blame but himself. Anyway, said
petitioner’s rights can still be amply protected in the regular trial of the case against him in the city court where he can cross-examine the
witnesses and present his evidence.[11]
Furthermore, even assuming that the city fiscal did not notify
petitioners, but had conducted the preliminary investigations ex parte, their rights to due, process could
not have been violated for they are not entitled as of right to preliminary
investigation. The numerous authorities[12]
supporting this view are not rendered
obsolete, as claimed by petitioners, because Section 14, Rule 112 of the new Rules of Court invoked by them has no application in their
cases, it appearing that the new Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964
while the preliminary investigations conducted by the city fiscal were
conducted in 1963.[13] The Rules of Court are not penal statutes, and they cannot be given retroactive
effect.[14]
Having arrived at the conclusion that respondent city fiscal did
not abuse his discretion in conducting the preliminary investigations and that
he filed the informations against herein petitioners
in accordance with law, there is, therefore, no merit in the assertion of petitioners that the warrants of arrest issued for their arrest were illegal. Besides, granting arguendo that
the orders of arrest were tainted with irregularity, still the posting by
petitioners of their bail bonds amounted to a waiver of the effect of said
defects.
“There is merit in the assertion that the warrant of arrest
was irregularly issued. Section 87 of
the Judiciary Act as amended by Republic Act 3828 requires that the Municipal
Judge issuing the same, personally, examine under oath the witnesses,
and by searching questions and answers which are to be reduced to
writing. Here, instead of searching
questions and answers, we have only the affidavits of respondent and her one
witness. Moreover, said affidavits were
sworn to before Judge Cabungcal, not before Judge Juntereal who issued the warrant of arrest.
“However, the giving of bail bond by petitioner constitutes a
waiver of the irregularity attending her arrest. Besides, by her other personal appearances before the municipal court and the
court a quo, petitioner voluntarily submitted herself to the
court’s jurisdiction. Hence, the
absence of preliminary examination becomes moot already, the court having
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and could therefore proceed
with the preliminary investigation
proper.” (Doce v. Branch II, Court of First
Instance of Quezon, et al., supra; Luna-v. Plaza,
L-27511, November 29, 1968).
The other point raised by petitioners in their contention that
the respondent City Judge abused his discretion in denying their motion to
quash is that there was a judicial declaration in the habeas corpus case (Special Proceedings No. V-2669) that the thumbmark appearing in the petition was the genuine thumbmark of Jovita Carmorin, and that pronouncement is now conclusive so that
they cannot be prosecuted for falsification or perjury, as the case may be. This particular question should rather be
submitted and threshed out in the city court during the
trial. The record of the habeas corpus proceeding is
not before Us, and We have no means of knowing what actually
transpired in that proceeding. The
proper determination of this question will involve not only
the introduction and consideration of evidence, but also calls for a detailed
inquiry on the principle of estoppel by, or
conclusiveness of, judgment.
Also devoid or merit is the
other error pointed to by petitioners with respect to the alleged admission by respondents that they acted
illegally, capriciously, or in excess of jurisdiction. A cursory examination of their answers would
reveal that what was admitted by respondent was the fact of the filing by
petitioners of their pleadings, but not the allegations contained therein,
for, as shown in the record,
respondents have staunchly defended their acts and insisted that their
actuations are legal or in accordance with law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Capiz in Special Civil Cases Nos. 2721 and 2723 is set
aside for having been rendered by the court without jurisdiction, and the
instant appeals are dismissed. We declare that the warrants of arrests issued, and the informations
filed, in CriminaI Cases Nos. 4451 and 4452 of the
City Court of Roxas City, are in accordance with law,
and these cases should be remanded to the City Court of Roxas
City for trial on the merits. No
pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.
[1]
The term “municipal court” should now be under stood to mean
“city court” and “municipal judge” as “city judge”. The “justices of the peace” are now
known as “municipal judges.”
[2]
Articles 172 and 183, Revised Penal
Code.
[3]
Andico v. Roan, 23 SCRA, 93; L-26563, April 16, 1968.
[4]
Pinza v. Aldovino,
et al., L-25226, September 27, 1968,25
SCRA 220; People v. Valencia,
et al., L-29396, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 252; Esperat v. Avila, et al., L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 296.
[5]
And this must be so for, as consistently held by Us the city or provincial
fiscal can commence an investigation of a crime within his jurisdiction without
waiting for the filing of a complaint by the police agency or an aggrieved
party when the offense can be prosecuted de oficio. (Briñen v. Consolacion, et al., L-16060, July 31, 1962; Hernandez v.
Albano, et al., L-17081, May 31, 1961; Nicomedes, et al. v. Chief of Constabulary, et al.,
L-16022, November 1969).
[6]
11 Phil., 596.
[7]
34 Phil., 750.
[8]
Now Section 20, Rule 132, new Rules of Court.
[9]
35 Words and Phrases, 146, citing People v. McKenna, 255 P. 2d 452, 116 C.A.
2d 207.
[10]
Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Castillo, L-24657, November 27, 1967, 21 SCRA 1071,
citing Fuentes v. Vinamira, L-14965, August 31, 1961.
[11]
Doce v. Branch II, Court of First Instance of Quezon, et al., L-26437, March 13, 1968, 22 SCRA 1028.
[12]
Santos, et al., v. Flores,
et al., L-18251-2, August 31, 1962;
People v. Pervez, L-15231, November 29, 1960; Rodriguez v.
Arellano, L-9037, July 31, 1955.
[13]
Acts or events are governed by laws at the time they took place (Members of the
Cult of San Miguel Arcangel v. Narciso, L-24843, July 15, 1968, 24 SCRA 52).
[14]
Rilloraza v. Arciaga, L-23848,
October 31, 1967; See also Rule 144, new Rules of Court.