CARMENCITA B. PINEDA, ANGELITA B. VELASCO, MILAGROS B. ATIENZA, MELVIN M. BAQUIRAN, BRODERICK M. BAQUIRAN, HENRY M. BAQUIRAN, JOSEPH M. BAQUIRAN, DICK BAQUIRAN AND DESIREE BAQUI…
ELBINIAS, J.:
Addressed here is an Appeal[1] filed under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court from the Decision[2]
dated September 8, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 of Laoag
City (“trial court” for brevity) in Civil Case No. 13971-14 for
“Reconveyance, Partition with Damages.”[3]
The antecedent facts are those as stated in the trial court’s assailed Decision[4] dated September 8, 2011, as follows:
“Filed before this Court is an Amended Complaint praying that the defendant (defendant-appellant here) be directed to reconvey to the plaintiffs (plaintiffs-appellees here)
their rightful share to 9/10 of Lot No. 9823-A and the improvements
thereon covered by TCT No. T-12231. It also prays that the plaintiffs
and the defendant be declared co-owners of the subject property and that
the same be partitioned among them. Finally, it prays that the
defendant be ordered to account for his actual use of plaintiffs’ share
of the property and to pay moral damages and attorney’s fees.
xxx
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs and the defendant are
siblings. It is also undisputed that the subject property has been
registered in the name of defendant alone since 1976 under TCT No.
T-12231. It is disputed, however, that the plaintiffs are co-owners of the subject property.As noted earlier, the plaintiffs presented the testimonies of
Dick Baquiran and Carmencita Pineda and offered several documentary
exhibits. From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
plaintiffs, it appears that the subject property was earlier
registered in the name of plaintiff Carmencita Pineda, the eldest of the
siblings, under TCT No. T-12169. In a letter dated July 17, 1976, their
father asked Carmencita, who was then residing in the United States, to
execute a special power of attorney authorizing defendant George in
Laoag to use the subject property to mortgage the subject property and
obtain a bank loan, which would be used to acquire an adjacent lot and
to expand their business.Unknown to Carmencita, however, George caused the
execution of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 23, 1976, in which
Carmencita purportedly sold to him the subject property. The Deed was
supposedly executed in Laoag City, but Carmencita maintained that she
was then in the US and not in the Philippines. As proof, she cited the
aforementioned letter of her father that was addressed to her in the US.
Subsequently, George Baquiran executed an Affidavit
dated January 31, 1984, in which he (1) admitted that the deed of sale
executed in his favor by his sister Carmencita was merely for the
purpose of obtaining a loan from the DBP in Laoag and (2) acknowledged
the correlative and imprescriptible rights of his siblings to the
subject property.George Baquiran eventually executed a Memorandum
of Agreement and two Deeds of Quitclaim, in which he expressly admitted
that the subject property was co-owned by him and his siblings.In the Memorandum of Agreement executed on July 10, 2000
signed by the plaintiffs and the defendant, they agreed that the
subject property was co-owned equally by them.In a Deed of Quitclaim dated November 7, 2005, George
Baquiran expressly ceded and transferred to his siblings 9/10 of the
subject property. He made the same undertaking in another Deed of
Quitclaim dated December 15, 2006.As George Baquiran subsequently excluded them from the
subject property despite those documents, the plaintiffs filed the
present suit.On the other hand, the defendant George Baquiran
maintained that he had purchased the subject property, as evidenced by
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 23, 1976. Allegedly, the Deed of
Sale was prepared by his parents, brothers and sisters, as shown by the
signature therein of their mother Eulalia Baquiran. Since then, he had
been in possession and had been paying the realty taxes thereon.He also claimed that he had no knowledge of the
Affidavit he allegedly executed acknowledging the rights of his siblings
to the subject property. Likewise, he maintained that he never appeared
before the notary public that purportedly acknowledged the said
document. He insisted that he had no knowledge of the two Deeds of
Quitclaim as well as the Memorandum of Agreement. He insisted that he
never signed them.”[5] (Emphasis supplied)
On September 8, 2011, the trial court rendered the Decision[6]
appealed from, which declared plaintiffs-appellees Carmencita B.
Pineda, Angelita B. Velasco, Milagros B. Atienza, Melvin M. Baquiran,
Broderick M. Baquiran, Henry M. Baquiran, Joseph M. Baquiran, Dick
Baquiran and Desiree Baquiran-Stein (“plaintiffs-appellees” for brevity)
and defendant-appellant George Baquiran (“defendant-appellant” for
brevity) as co-owners of Lot No. 9823-A (“subject property” for
brevity). The dispositive portion of the Decision stated:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are declared the OWNERS of 9/10 pro indiviso
share to the subject property (including the improvements thereof)
registered in the name of the defendant;2. The defendant is ordered to RECONVEY to the plaintiffs the said 9/10 portion;
3. The prayer for the partition of the subject parcel of land
and the improvement thereof is GRANTED, such that the subject property
shall be divided into ten equal portions with one-tenth going to the
defendant and each of the plaintiffs;4. Pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 69, the parties are given a
period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof within which to agree to
make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance
submitted for the confirmation of the Court, and that upon their failure
to arrive at such an agreement, the Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule
69 shall appoint competent and disinterested persons as commissioners
to make the partition;5. The defendant is hereby ordered TO PAY the plaintiffs moral damages of P200,[0]00.00 and attorney’s fees of P50,000.00.
Costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.”[7]
As a result, defendant-appellant filed the Appeal[8] at bench, praying that:
“WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, it is respectfully prayed
that this Honorable Court render judgment reversing the appealed
decision of the Lower Court and ruling in favor of Defendant-Appellant
dismissing the complaint for lack of merit.Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.”[9]
The Appeal raised the following assignment of errors:
“I. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND DEFENDANT-APPELLANT CO-OWNERS OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY, HENCE ENTITLED TO 9/10 PRO INDIVISO SHARE THEREIN.II. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE AS SIMULATED AND THEREFORE VOID AND OF NO LEGAL EFFECT.III. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING TO PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.”[10]
To begin with, contrary to defendant-appellant’s arguments in his assignment of error II, defendant-appellant could not properly claim sole ownership of the subject property based on the Deed of Absolute Sale[11]
dated January 23, 1976, which was allegedly executed by
plaintiff-appellee Carmencita B. Pineda, as the representative of the
other plaintiffs-appellees, in favor of defendant-appellant.
On this matter, defendant-appellant had argued that:
“The Lower Court declared the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
January 23, 1976 xxx as absolutely simulated and therefore void. It
ruled that the Deed is absolutely simulated because the parties did not
intend it to produce legal effects or alters (sic) their juridical
situation. With all due respect, the Lower Court’s finding is incorrect.First, the presumption is that an instrument sets out the true agreement of the parties
thereto and that it was executed for valuable consideration. It is also
presumed that private transactions have been fair and regular, and the
ordinary course of business have been followed. It must be noted that
Pineda, et. al. failed to present evidence showing that the Deed of
Absolute Sale did not reflect the true agreement of the parties. In
fact, they never assailed the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale on
the premise that it is simulated or fictitious. Rather they alleged that
the signature of Carmencita Pineda therein was forged. However, the Lower Court found no basis to conclude that Carmencita’s signature in the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged.
xxx
Second, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
notarized before Notary Public Norberto A. Manuel. Being a public
document, it enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie
evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive
presumption of its existence and due execution. To overcome this
presumption, there must be clear and convincing evidence. Absent such
evidence, as in this case, the presumption must be upheld. Moreover, the
Supreme Court ruled that a notarized instrument is admissible in
evidence without further proof of its due execution, is conclusive as to
the truthfulness of its contents, and has in its favor the presumption
of regularity.
xxx
Third, the Lower Court omitted to explain why the Deed of Absolute Sale is absolutely simulated.
It anchored its ruling on an Affidavit allegedly executed by Baquiran
which in part stated that ‘[t]he aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale was
executed in my favor only for the purpose of obtaining a loan with DBP,
Laoag Branch and this affidavit is executed to acknowledge the
correlative and imprescriptible rights of my brothers and sisters named
above [to] share as specified in the above-described property xxx’. On
the other hand, the Deed of Absolute Sale stated that ‘xxx Carmencita
Baquiran for and in consideration of the sum of TEN THOUSAND
(P10,000.00) PESOS, to me paid in hand to my full satisfaction George
Baquiran xxx sell, transfer, cede and assign the following parcel of
land xxx.’ It must be noted, however, that the Deed of Absolute
was already consummated and completed even before the aforesaid
Affidavit was executed. Nowhere in the Deed of Absolute Sale was there a
mention that the Sale was executed for ‘purposes of obtaining a loan.‘
Rather, the Deed was executed in order to ‘sell, transfer, cede and
assign’ to George Baquiran for and in consideration of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS the subject property. On the strength of the Deed alone, the same document is valid, binding and enforceable.”[12] (Emphasis supplied; underscoring made in the original)
Negating defendant-appellant’s arguments however, is that the Deed of Absolute Sale[13] dated January 23, 1976 was a simulated contract. This is because the Deed of Absolute Sale[14]
was executed not for the purpose of transferring plaintiffs-appellees’
rights over the subject property to defendant-appellant, but was
executed in order for defendant-appellant to obtain a loan from the
Development Bank of the Philippines. That such was the intention of
plaintiffs-appellees and of defendant-appellant was shown by
defendant-appellant’s Affidavit[15] dated January 31, 1984, which stated that, among others:
“3. The aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in my favor only for the purpose of obtaining a loan with DBP, Laoag Branch xxx”[16] (Emphasis supplied)
All of these matters were as similarly found by the trial court, as follows:
“Be that as it may, not much significance can be accorded to the
plaintiffs’ failure to prove the alleged forgery of the Deed of
Absolute Sale. Whether Carmencita’s signature was forged or not, there
is no dispute that the Deed of Absolute Sale was simulated and
therefore void. A contract is absolutely simulated if the parties did
not intend it to produce legal effects or to alter their juridical
situation. That is so in this case, as manifest from the Affidavit of
George Baquiran xxx. As an absolutely simulated contract, the Deed of
Absolute Sale was void and did not confer any rights to the defendant,
who held the title to the subject property in trust for his siblings.”[17] (Emphasis supplied)
A contract, such as the Deed of Absolute Sale[18]
here, is absolutely simulated and is therefore void, if the parties did
not intend it to produce legal effects or to alter their juridical
situation. This was as was pronounced by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Dr. Mario Intac and Angelina Intac v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 173211, October 11, 2012, to wit:
“In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract
but it has no substance as the parties have no intention to be bound by
it. ‘The main characteristic of an absolute simulation is that the
apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce effect or
in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties.’ ‘As a result,
an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties
may recover from each other what they may have given under the
contract.‘” (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, contrary to defendant-appellant’s allegations in his assignment of error I, the lower court properly ruled that plaintiffs-appellees and defendant-appellant were co-owners of the subject property.
Defendant-appellant had argued that:
“It is clear that no co-ownership exists in the instant
case. The subject property solely and rightfully belongs to George
Baquiran whose name appears as the registered owner in the certificate
of title.The Trial Court gravely erred when it did not give
weight and credence to the certificate of title issued in favor of
Baquiran. As early as Legarda, et al. v. Saleeby, the
certificate of title has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
evidence of ownership over the property described therein. xxx
xxx
A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible
evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name
appears therein.As can be gleaned from the Records, the subject property is
covered by TCT No. T-12231 which is registered in the name of ‘George
Baquiran,’ as owner thereof in fee simple, xxx’. The term ‘owner’ serves
to underline the nature of Baquiran’s right and claim over the
property.xxx
The Trial Court also committed an error when it did not
give weight and credence to the Tax Declaration of Real Property issued
under the name of Baquiran. The Tax Declaration of Real Property
indicated Baquiran as the owner of the subject property. Although tax
declarations or realty tax payments are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the
concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not his (sic) actual or at least constructive
possession. It was Baquiran who paid the real property tax over the lot
in question as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 02-038-00324 dated
December 27, 2006.”[19] (Emphasis supplied)
Defeating defendant-appellant’s allegations however, is that, as
the records revealed, the subject property was only held by
defendant-appellant as trustee, in trust for plaintiffs-appellees as
trustor. This is because even if the title over the subject property was
registered under the name of defendant-appellant, defendant-appellant
had acknowledged that plaintiffs-appellees were co-owners of the subject
property. Such acknowledgment was shown by the following documents
submitted by plaintiffs-appellees: defendant-appellant’s Affidavit[20] dated January 31, 1984, where he acknowledged the “correlative and imprescriptible rights”[21]
of his brothers and sisters, plaintiffs-appellees here, over the
subject property; defendant-appellant’s Deeds of Quitclaim dated
November 7, 2005[22] and December 15, 2006,[23] where he “CEDE[D], TRANSFER[RED], WAIVE[D] and QUITCLAIM, the NINE-TENTH (9/10) PORTION”[24] of the subject property to plaintiffs-appellees, and; the Memorandum of Agreement[25]
dated July 10, 2000 executed between defendant-appellant and
plaintiffs-appellees where it was stated that the subject property was
“co-owned equally by the parties.”[26]
All of these matters were as also found by the trial court, to wit:
“In this case, the transfer certificate of title for the subject
property shows that defendant George Baquiran is the registered owner. Under
the proven circumstances, however, the certificate of title does not
vest exclusive title to the defendant. The pieces of plaintiffs’
documentary evidence show that the property was registered in
defendant’s name merely in trust for his siblings and fellow co-owners.
This is clear from George Baquiran’s Affidavit and two Deeds of
Quitclaim and the parties’ Memorandum of Agreement.Defendant’s Affidavit subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Gil Baclig on November 22, 1984 (sic) pertinently states as follows:
‘1. I am the VENDEE of a certain parcel of land xxx as per
Deed of Absolute Sale ratified before Notary Public Norberto A. Manuel
as doc. no. 1176, page no. 56, Book No. III, Series of 1976, the VENDOR
being my sister Carmencita Baquiran.
xxx
3. xxx [T]his affidavit is executed to acknowledge
the correlative and imprescriptible rights of my brothers and sisters
named above to share as specified in the above-described property, including all improvements that are now existing thereon;
xxx
The third paragraph of George Baquiran’s Affidavit is
particularly significant. First, it shows that the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale by his sister Carmencita in his favor was merely
simulated, it was done not for the purpose of transferring title to
George, but for obtaining a loan from the DBP. Indeed, their respective
residences at that time meant that it was more convenient for George in
Laoag rather than for Carmencita in the United States to attend to the
myriad requirements of applying for a loan from a bank located in Laoag.
Second, the equally important, George acknowledged therein the
imprescriptible right of his siblings to the subject property.
Consequently, George Baquiran expressed in the fourth paragraph his
willingness to execute the proper documents for the distribution of the
subject property to his siblings in equal parts.The said Affidavit was confirmed by George Baquiran and
his siblings in a Memorandum of Agreement signed and acknowledged by
them on July 10, 2000 before Notary Public Lope Velasco. Pertinent portions of the MOA read as follows:‘1. Although the property is registered under the name
of GEORGE M. BAQUIRAN, the same is co-owned equally by the parties who
are the children and successors-in-interest of the late MAXIMO and
EULALIA M. BAQUIRAN, as attested to by GEORGE M. BAQUIRAN in an
affidavit executed on 31 January 1984 and ratified before Notary Public
Gil B. Baclig as Doc. No. 2466, appearing on page No. 35 of Book No.
VII, Series of 1984, a copy of which is made part hereof as Annex ‘B’.’ (Underscoring made in the original)The MOA signed by George Baquiran himself is clear that
though the subject property was registered in his own name, it was
‘co-owned equally’ by him and his siblings.In a subsequent Deed of Quitclaim dated November 7, 2005
and acknowledged before Notary Public Melchor Guillen in Laoag City,
George Baquiran averred that ‘for and in consideration of the LOVE and
AFFECTION that I have unto my siblings, xxx, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER,
WAIVE and QUITCLAIM, the NINE-TENTH (9/10) PORTION of the
afore-described parcel of land in favor of the said QUITCLAIMEES, their
heirs, assignees, and successors-in-interest, free from all liens and
encumbrances of any kind and nature.’ The same undertaking was
made by George Baquiran in another Deed of Quitclaim dated December 15,
2006 and acknowledged before Notary Public Marcelino M. Quitoras Jr.All of these documents prove the existence of an express trust in favor of herein plaintiffs.”[27] (Emphasis supplied)
Besides, the documents submitted by plaintiffs-appellees were
valid bases for proving the existence of an express trust over the
subject property. This is because those documents were public documents,
which have in their favor the presumption of regularity. Such
presumption in turn, defendant-appellant failed to rebut by clear and
convincing evidence,[28] however. This was as also found by the trial court in its assailed Decision, to wit:
“It is a well-settled rule that forgery is not presumed and the
party alleging it has the burden of establishing it by clear, positive
and convincing evidence. xxxxxx
This Court has examined the questioned signatures of the
defendant in the Affidavit, the MOA and the Deeds of Quitclaim and
compared them with his undisputed signatures in his Answers to the
original Complaint as well as to the amended Complaint, but has found no
clear basis to believe the perpetration of forgery. The Court finds it
difficult to conclude that the signatures allegedly made by the
defendant in the questioned documents executed in 1984, 2000, 2005 and
2006 were different from those he unquestionably made in 2007 and 2008
in his Answers to the original and amended Complaints. Indeed, the wide
gap in the dates of execution of the said documents in 1984, 2000, 2005,
2006, 2007 and 2008 can ‘possibly account for the variance of the
signatures to be expected and inevitable due to the passage of time.’
Under the foregoing the Court finds no sufficient reason to sustain
George Baquiran’s unsubstantiated allegations of forgery.In any event, it must be emphasized that the Affidavit,
the MOA and the two Deeds of Quitclaim were all notarized. It is a
settled rule that one who denies the due execution of a deed where one’s
signature appears has the burden of proving that, contrary to the
recital in the jurat, one never appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. It is equally settled that
documents acknowledged before notaries public are entitled to the
presumption of regularity, which may be overcome only be evidence that
is ‘clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.’Defendant George Baquiran failed to present such
evidence. To repeat, he relied merely on his bare allegation that he
never appeared before the concerned notaries public Gil Baclig, Lope
Velasco, Melchor Guillen and Marcelino Quitoras[,] Jr. That bare
allegation cannot constitute ‘clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant’ evidence. Hence, the Court must affirm the validity of the
Affidavit, the MOA and the Deeds of Quitclaim.”[29] (Emphasis supplied)
That a trustee, such as defendant-appellant here, could not
repudiate the existence of an express trust over a property held by him
in trust by relying on the Certificate of Title obtained by him, as was
the situation here, is pursuant to the following pronouncement of the
Supreme Court in Spouses Gomez v. Duyan, et al., G.R No. 144148, March 18, 2005:
“Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the disputed
property and the corresponding issuance of a certificate of title in
their name as vesting ownership on them simply because an express trust
over the property was created in favor of respondents. It has
been held that a trustee who obtains a Torrens title over the property
held in trust by him for another cannot repudiate the trust by relying
on the registration.” (Emphasis supplied)
Given that plaintiffs-appellees were co-owners of the subject
property, then, they had the right to recover such property from
defendant-appellant, pursuant to the ruling of the Supreme Court in Spouses Gomez v. Duyan, et al., G.R No. 144148, March 18, 2005, as follows:
“Reconveyance is precisely the proper action for
respondents to take against petitioners since the former are claiming
that they are the rightful owners of the property in question, not
petitioners. By filing an action for reconveyance, a party
seeks to show that the person who secured the registration of the
questioned property is not the real owner thereof.” (Emphasis supplied)
As co-owners, plaintiffs-appellees also had the right to demand
partition of the subject property. That this is the consequence is
pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
states:
“Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned. xxx”
Given all these, defendant-appellant’s refusal to recognize the
rightful shares of plaintiffs-appellees over the subject property
indicated bad faith on his part. As a result, contrary to
defendant-appellant’s allegations in his assignment of error III,
plaintiffs-appellees were entitled to Moral Damages and Attorney’s
Fees. Plaintiffs-appellees’ entitlement for Moral Damages and Attorney’s
Fees was as also found by the trial court, to wit:
“The plaintiffs also prayed for the award of moral damages and attorney’s fees. These prayers must be sustained.
To support their prayer for moral damages under Article 2220 of
the Civil Code, it is not enough for the plaintiffs to show that the
defendant failed to comply with his contractual obligation, they must
also show that he acted fraudulently or in bad faith. In this
case, it was shown that the defendant refused to recognize the rightful
shares of his fellow co-owners to the subject property. To act in such
manner against another person is bad enough, to do so against one’s own
siblings as in this case is much worse. Indeed, the defendant did so in
spite of his 1984 Affidavit, the 2000 MOA and the 2005 and 2006 Deeds of
Quitclaim acknowledging that his siblings had their respective shares
to the subject property. Clearly, his subsequent failure to abide by his
previous and repeated acknowledgments of the rights of his own siblings
can only be the product of fraudulent intent and bad faith. Because of
defendant’s willingness to act fraudulently and in bad faith against
members of his own family, the Court finds it just to hold him liable
for moral damages in the sum of P200,000.00.The Court also grants the prayer for attorney’s fees. As a rule,
attorney’s fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
Corollarily, the award of attorney’s fees is the exception and not the
rule. Such award is justified in this case, however. To repeat,
it is manifest from the evidence presented that the plaintiffs had to
institute the present suit because of the defendant’s refusal to
recognize his earlier acknowledgements (sic) of their rights to the
subject property. Clearly, considerations of equity dictate that the
defendant be directed to pay attorney’s fees in the sum of P50,000.00.”[30] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, the findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight and respect on appeal, and are in fact accorded finality when
supported by sufficient evidence on the record,[31] as in this case.
After careful consideration of all the facts, arguments, and
issues appearing on the records as well as of the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and, in accordance with what is best determined to be
proper under the circumstances, the following disposition is therefore
made on these matters.
BECAUSE OF ALL THESE, the Appeal is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Dicdican (Chairperson) and Paredes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 19-40
[2] Rollo, pp. 42-56.
[3] Records, pp. 1-4.
[4] Rollo, pp. 42-56.
[5] Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[6] Rollo, pp. 42-56.
[7] Rollo, pp. 55-56.
[8] Rollo, pp. 19-40.
[9] Rollo, p. 40.
[10] Rollo, p. 22.
[11] Records, p. 93.
[12] Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[13] Records, p. 93.
[14] Records, p. 93.
[15] Records, p. 175.
[16] Records, p. 175.
[17] Rollo, p. 51.
[18] Records, p. 93.
[19] Rollo, pp. 27-29.
[20] Records, p. 175.
[21] Records, p. 175.
[22] Records, pp. 178-179.
[23] Records, pp. 95-96.
[24] Records, p. 178; p. 95.
[25] Records, pp. 181-183.
[26] Records, p. 182.
[27] Rollo, pp. 45-47.
[28] Calma v. Santos, et al., G.R. No. 161027, June 22, 2009.
[29] Rollo, pp. 48-50.
[30] Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[31] Spouses Patricio and Myrna Bernales vs. Heirs of Julian Sambaan, et al., G.R. No. 163271, January 15, 2010.