FRANCISCO BATAÑGAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ISIDRA COJUANGCO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

This is the third time appellant has come to this court. The three cases
stemmed from the foreclosure of a mortgage. In the first case, appellant
undertook to compel the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to approve his
record on appeal. There he attacked the validity of the lower court’s judgment
on the ground that the agreement embodied therein was fraudulent. The petition
was denied. The second was an appeal from an order of the trial court refusing
to set aside the sale of the mortgaged property by the sheriff. In that appeal,
the appellant again failed. Now he seeks to have the appellee resell to him the
property. It is a suit in the nature of an action for specific performance based
on a statement in the brief of the appellee in the case for annulment of the
sale. This statement was copied in this court’s decision as a footnote to the
court’s conclusion that “appellant has no right to redeem the property sold
pursuant to the foreclosure of the mortgage thereon.” It reads:

“In order to impress the appellant that appellee is not interested in owning
the mortgaged property and that she was only forced for lack of another buyer to
acquire it in the auction sale, she is willing to resell the property to him for
the same amount in which it was purchased at the auction sale, that is, for
P1,508.28, provided it be in cash.”

Other pertinent facts in this connection are these: Our decision was
promulgated on September 27, 1943. On October 29, 1943, Attorney Marcelino
Lontok, who has represented the herein appellant in the three cases, sent Isidra
Cojuangco a missive with three postal money orders for P800, stating that he was
remitting that amount in behalf of his client “in accordance with your
agreement,” and promising to pay the balance “at the shortest possible time.”
The amount was rejected by Mrs. Cojuangco, who told Atty. Lontok in her answer
that she was surprised because she had not had any agreement with his client. On
January 28, 1944, Atty. Lontok sent a letter through a messenger to Mrs.
Cojuangco’s counsel, Atty. Antonio Lucero, in Manila, enclosing the same money
orders for P800 and P708.30 in paper money. This tender was also refused. On
January 7, 1944, Attorney Lontok came to this court with a motion to order the
appellee to comply with the offer she had made in her brief. That motion was
“rejected” in a resolution dated February 18, 1944, “for having been filed after
the entry of judgment.”

The suit at bar is a reiteration of the motion just mentioned. Because of
their identity, our resolution denying the motion to compel Cojuangco to live up
to her commitment was set up as a bar to the present action. The plea was
overruled by the lower court as not well taken. The lower court also declared
that “the statement contained in the brief of the defendant herein in R. G. No.
48980 and footnoted in the decision of the Supreme Court (was) a promise on the
part of the defendant herein to resell the land in question to the plaintiff
herein.” Nevertheless it found that “the time for him (Batangan) to accept the
promise was from the date of the brief of the defendant herein in R. G. No.
48980 until the entry of judgment,” and that the acceptance having been made
after the judgment had been rendered, it came too late.

The question of the conclusiveness of our resolution referred to is not
pressed in this appeal. Apparently abandoning her plea in this regard, the
appellee makes no reference in her brief to her former contention that this
action is res adjudicata. And she seems to take for granted that the
signification in her brief of her willingness to allow the repurchase of the
property constituted a formal offer that could have served as basis for the
creation of legal relations.

The sole question on which the parties have joined issue in this appeal
relates to whether the appellee’s offer has been duly accepted by the appellant.
We are of the opinion that the acceptance was tardy. An offer of compromise
settlement must be accepted within a reasonable time. (15 C. J. S., Section 7.)
And acceptance or rejection of an offer of compromise may be inferred from
circumstances. (Id.) The appellant’s failure to act on the offer before
the judgment was entered was an implied rejection of said offer. In pushing the
appeal to final conclusion the appellant made it clear that he was not
interested in his creditor’s liberal concession. A compromise has for its
purpose the avoidance or termination of a law suit. (Article 1809, Civil Code.)
With the rendition of judgment the reason which induced the appellee to make her
proposition ceased to exist.

Again, acceptance in order to conclude the agreement must in every respect
meet and correspond with the terms and conditions of the offer. (17 C. J. S.,
378.) Granting that the appellant acted on time, payment of P800 fell short of
the appellee’s requirement. The appellee wanted P1,508.28 in cash. This was the
least she was entitled to, it being the amount which the court below had found
to be due her. In her proposition she did not even include any interest.

The substantial variance between the amount in the offer and the amount
tendered not only made the purported acceptance inoperative but “put an end to
the negotiations without forming a contract unless the party making the offer
agreed to the suggested modification.” (17 C. J. S., 383.) Otherwise, as the
trial judge aptly observed, “promisors would be tied to their promises
indefinitely and would not be able to dispose of the property involved” in the
promise or offer. In addition, the promisor would be placed in a position where
he would always lose without anything to gain. The promisee could wait until
judgment is rendered and accept the offer of compromise if the judgment happened
to be more onerous to him.

Appellant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to make the finding
that there was a new agreement entered into between the appellant and the
appellee whereby the appellee would allow appellant to make a down payment of
P800 and to pay the balance afterward.

This case was submitted and decided on the pleadings. No evidence was
introduced. This assignment of error involves a question of fact which the
plaintiff should have proved by competent evidence. His only reliance is on
Exhibit 4, which is Attorney Lontok’s letter transmitting P800 in money orders
to the appellee. This letter is self-serving and is absolutely incompetent as
proof of the alleged agreement. The reference in Exhibit 4 to an alleged
understanding between the parties might have been made in contemplation of this
suit. The argument which the appellant now adduces, that “we could never believe
that the appellant, who came to Manila purposely to see her, would dare send her
such amount without any agreement,” tends to confirm this possibility. It is of
interest to know that there is not the slightest intimation of such agreement in
the complaint.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed with costs against the
appellant.

Paras, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

TUASON, J.:

I am authorized by Mr. Justice Hontiveros to
certify that he concurs in this decision.

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PERFECTO, J.:

We concur in this decision, except the
statements implying identity between this Supreme Court and the one which
functioned during the enemy occupation. Ours derives its authority from the
sovereign Filipino people, while the other had it from the Emperor of
Japan.