THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS. JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ, BASILIO PINEDA, JR., ALIAS “BOY”, EDGARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO AND …

The amended complaint filed in this case in the court below,
reads as follows:

“The undersigned complainant accuses JAIME JOSE Y GOMEZ,
BASILIO PINEDA, JR. alias “BOY”, EDUARDO AQUINO Y PAYUMO alias
“EDDIE” and ROGELIO CAÑAL Y SEVILLA alias “ROGER”, as
principals, WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON Y ROMERO and JESSIE GUION Y
ENVOLTARIO as accomplices, of the crime of Forcible Abduction with rape, committed
as follows:

“That on or about the 26th day of June, 1967, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named principal accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd design,
forcibly abduct the undersigned complainant against her will, and did, then and
there take her, pursuant to their common criminal design, to the Swanky Hotel
in Pasay City, where each of the four (4) accused, by
means of force and intimidation, and with the use of a deadly weapon, have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will, to her damage
and prejudice in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of
the civil code.

“That WONG LAY PUENG, SILVERIO GUANZON y ROMERO, and JESSIE
GUION y ENVOLTARIO, without taking a direct part in the execution of the
offense either by forcing, inducing the principal accused to execute, or
cooperating in its execution by an indispensable act, did, then and there cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts, that is, by
cooperating, aiding, abetting and permitting the principal accused in sequestering
the undersigned complainant in one of the rooms of the Swanky Hotel then under
the control of the accused Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio Guanzon y Romero and
Jessie Guion y Envoltario,
thus supplying material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense.

“That the aforesited offense has
been attended by the following aggravating circumstances:

1.   
Use of a motor vehicle.

2.   
Night time sought purposely to facilitate the
commission of the crime and to make its discovery difficult;

3.   
Abuse of superior strength;

4.   
That means were employed or circumstances
brought about which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act; and

5.   
That the wrong done in the commission of the
crime be deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for the
commission.

“CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Upon arraignment, Basilio Pineda, Jr.
pleaded guilty to the charge imputed in the above-quoted amended complaint;
however, in an order dated July 11,
1967, the court reserved judgment “until such time as the prosecution
shall have concluded presenting all of its evidence to prove the aggravating
circumstances listed in the complaint.” Upon the other hand, the rest of
the defendants went to trial on their respective pleas of not guilty.  After hearing on the merits, the court below
rendered its decision on October 2,
1967, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Jaime Jose, Rogelio Cañal, Eduardo Aquino and Basilio Pineda, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of forcible abduction with rape as described under Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to the death
penalty to be executed at a date to be set and in the manner provided for by
law; and each to indemnify the complainant in the amount of ten thousand
pesos.  On the ground that the
prosecution has failed to establish a prima facie case against
the accomplices Wong Lay Pueng, Silverio
Guanzon y Romero, and Jessie Guion
y Envoltario, the Motion to Dismiss filed for
and in their behalf is hereby granted, and the case dismissed against the
aforementioned accused.

“Insofar as the car used in the abduction of the victim which
Jaime Jose identified by pointing to it from the window of the courtroom and
pictures of which were submitted and marked as Exhibits “M” and
“M-1″, and which Jaime Jose in his testimony admitted belonged to
him, pursuant to Art. 45 of the Revised Penal Code, which requires the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime, the
Court hereby orders its confiscation.”

This case is now before us by virtue of the appeal interposed by Basilio Pineda, Jr., Edgardo Aquino, and Jaime Jose, and for automatic review as regards
Rogelio Cañal. 
However, for practical purposes all of them shall hereafter be referred
to as appellants.

The complainant, Magdalena “Maggie” de la Riva, was, at
the time of the incident, 25 years old and single; she graduated from high
school in 1958 at Maryknoll
College and finished the
secretarial course in 1960 at St. Theresa’s College.  Movie actress by profession, she was
receiving P8,000.00 per picture.  It was part of her work to perform in radio
broadcasts and television shows, where she was paid P800.00 per month in
permanent shows, P300.00 per month in live promotional shows, and from P100.00
to P200.00 per appearance as guest in other shows.

So it was that at about 4:30
o’clock in the morning of June
26, 1967, Miss De la Riva, homeward bound from the ABS Studio on Roxas Blvd., Pasay
City, was driving her bantam car accompanied by her maid Helen Calderon, who
was also at the front seat.  Her house
was at No. 48, 12th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City.  She was already near her destination when a Pontiac
two-door convertible car with four men aboard (later identified as the four
appellants) came abreast of her car and tried to bump it.  She stepped on her brakes to avoid a
collision, and then pressed on the gas and swerved her car to the left, at
which moment she was already in front of her house gate; but because the driver
of the other car (Basilio Pineda, Jr.) also
accelerated his speed, the two cars almost collided for the second time.  This prompted Miss De la Riva, who was
justifiably annoyed, to ask:  “Ano ba?” Forthwith, Pineda
stopped the car which he was driving, jumped out of it and rushed towards her.

The girl became so frightened at this turn of events that she
tooted the horn of her car continuously. 
Undaunted, Pineda opened the door of Miss De la Riva’s car and grabbed
the lady’s left arm.  The girl held on
tenaciously to her car’s steering wheel and, together with her maid, started to
scream.  Her strength, however, proved no
match to that of Pineda, who succeeded in pulling her out of her car.  Seeing her mistress’ predicament, the maid
jumped out of the car and took hold of Miss De la Riva’s right arm in an effort
to free her from Pineda’s grip.  The latter,
however, was able to drag Miss De la Riva toward the Pontiac
convertible car, whose motor was all the while running.

When Miss De la Riva, who was being pulled by Pineda, was very
near the Pontiac car, the three men
inside started to assist their friend: 
one of them held her by the neck, while the two others held her arms and
legs.  All three were now pulling Miss De
la Riva inside the car.  Before she was
completely in, appellant Pineda jumped unto the driver’s seat and sped away in
the direction of Broadway Street.  The maid was left behind.

The complainant was made to sit between Jaime Jose and Edgardo Aquino at the back seat; Basilio Pineda, Jr. was at the wheel, while Rogelio Cañal was seated beside him.  Miss De la Riva entreated the appellants’ to
release her; but all she got in response were jeers, abusive and impolite
language, and threats that the appellants would finish her with their Thompson
and throw acid at her face if she did not keep quiet.  In the meantime, the two men seated on each side
of Miss De la Riva started to get busy with her body:  Jose put one arm around the complainant and
forced his lips upon hers, while Aquino placed his
arms on her thighs and lifted her skirt. 
The girl tried to resist them. 
She continuously implored her captors to release her, telling them that
she was the only breadwinner in the family and that her mother was alone at
home and needed her company because her father was already dead.  Upon learning of the demise of Miss De la
Riva’s father, Aquino remarked that the situation was
much better than he thought since no one could take revenge against them.  By now Miss De la Riva was beginning to
realize the futility of her pleas.  She
made the sign of the cross and started to pray. 
The appellants became angry and cursed her.  Every now and then Aquino
would stand up and talk in whispers with Pineda, after which the two would
exchange knowing glances with Cañal and Jose.

The car reached a dead-end street.  Pineda turned the car around and headed
towards Victoria Street.  Then the car proceeded to Araneta Avenue, Sta.
Mesa Street, Shaw
Boulevard, thence to Epifanio
de los Santos Avenue.  When the car reached Makati, Aquino
took a handkerchief from his pocket and, with the help of Jose, blindfolded
Miss De la Riva.  The latter was told not
to shout or else she would be stabbed or shot with a Thompson.  Not long after, the car came to a stop at the
Swanky Hotel in Pasay
City.  The blindfolded lady was led out of the car
to one of the rooms on the second floor of the hotel.

Inside the room Miss De la Riva was made to sit on a bed.  Her blindfold was removed.  She saw Pineda and Aquino
standing in front of her, and Jose and Cañal sitting
beside her, all of them smiling meaningfully. 
Pineda told the complainant: “Magburlesque
ka para sa amin.” The other three expressed their approval and
ordered Miss De la Riva to disrobe.  The
complainant ignored the command.  One of
the appellants suggested putting off the light so that the complainant would
not be ashamed.  The idea, however, was
rejected by the others, who said that it would be more pleasurable for them if
the light was on.  Miss De la Riva was
told to remove her stockings, in order, according to them, to make the proceedings
more exciting.  Reluctantly, she did as
directed, but so slowly did she proceed with the assigned task that the
appellants cursed her and threatened her again with the Thompson and the
acid.  They started pushing Miss De la
Riva around.  One of them pulled down the
zipper of her dress; another unhooked her brassiere.  She held on tightly to her dress to prevent
it from being pulled down, but her efforts were in vain:  her dress, together with her brassiere, fell
on the floor.

The complainant was now completely naked before the four men, who
were kneeling in front of her and feasting their eyes on her private
parts.  This ordeal lasted for about ten
minutes, during which the complainant, in all her nakedness, was asked twice or
thrice to turn around.  Then Pineda
picked up her clothes and left the room with his other companions.  The complainant tried to look for a blanket
with which to cover herself, but she could not find
one.

Very soon, Jose reentered the room and began undressing
himself.  Miss De la Riva, who was
sitting on the bed trying to cover her bareness with her hands, implored him to
ask his friends to release her.  Instead
of answering her, he pushed her backward and pinned her down on the bed.  Miss De la Riva and Jose struggled against each
other; and because the complainant was putting up stiff resistance, Jose cursed
her and hit her several times on the stomach and other parts of the body.  The complainant crossed her legs tightly, but
her attacker was able to force them open. 
Jose succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the complainant.  He then left the room.

The other three took their turns. 
Aquino entered the room next.  A struggle ensued between him and Miss De la
Riva, during which he hit her on different parts of the body.  Like Jose, Aquino
succeeded in abusing the complainant. 
The girl was now in a state of shock. 
Aquino called the others into the room.  They poured water on her face and slapped her
to revive her.  Afterwards, three of the
accused left the room, leaving Pineda and the complainant.  After some struggle during which Pineda hit
her, the former succeeded in forcing his carnal desire on the latter.  When the complainant went into a state of
shock for the second time, the three other men went into the room, again poured
water on the complainants face and slapped her several times.  The complainant heard them say that they had
to revive her so she would know what was happening.  Jose, Aquino and
Pineda then left the room.  It was now
appellant Cañal’s turn.  There was a struggle between him and Miss De
la Riva.  Like the other three appellants
before him, he hit the complainant on different parts of the body and succeeded
in forcing his carnal lust on her.

Mention must be made of the fact that while each of the four
appellants was struggling with the complainant, the other three were outside
the room, just behind the door, threatening the complainant with acid and
telling her to give in because she could not, after all, escape, what with
their presence.

After the appellants had been through with the sexual carnage,
they gave Miss De la Riva her clothes, told her to get dressed and put on her
stockings, and to wash her face and comb her hair, to give the impression that
nothing had happened to her.  They told
her to tell her mother that she was mistaken by a group of men for a hostess,
and that when the group found out that she was a movie actress, she was
released without being harmed.  She was
warned not to inform the police; for if she did and they were apprehended, they
would simply post bail and later hunt her up and disfigure her face with
acid.  The appellants then blindfolded
Miss De la Riva again and led her down from the hotel room.  Because she was stumbling, she had to be
carried into the car.  Inside the car,
appellant Jose held her head down on his lap, and kept it in that position during
the trip, to prevent her from being seen by others.

Meanwhile, the four appellants were discussing the question of
where to drop Miss De la Riva.  They finally
decided on a spot in front of the Free
Press Building
not far from Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue near Channel
5 to make it appear, according to them, that the complainant had just come from
the studio.  Pineda asked Jose to alight
and call a taxicab, but to choose one which did not come from a well-known
company.  Jose did as requested, letting
several taxicabs pass by before flagging a UBL taxicab.  After they warned again Miss De la Riva not
to inform anyone of what had happened to her, appellant Cañal
accompanied her to the taxicab.  The time
was a little past 6:00 o’clock. 
When Miss De la Riva was a already inside the
cab and alone with the driver, Miguel F. Campos, she broke down and cried.  She kept asking the driver if a car was
following them; and each time the driver answered her in the negative.

It was 6:30 o’clock –
or some two hours after the abduction – when Miss De la Riva reached home.  Her mother, her
brother-in-law Ben Suba, as well as several PC officers,
policemen and reporters, were at the house.  Upon seeing her mother, the complainant ran
toward her and said, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped.  All four of them raped me.” The mother
brought her daughter upstairs.  Upon her
mother’s instruction, the complainant immediately took a bath and a douche.  The older woman also instructed her daughter
to douche herself two or three times daily with a strong solution to prevent
infection and pregnancy.  The family
doctor, who was afterwards summoned, treated the complainant for external
physical injuries.  The doctor was not,
however, told about the sexual assaults. 
Neither was Pat. Pablo Pascual, the police
officer who had been sent by the desk officer, Sgt. Dimla,
to the De la Riva residence when the latter received from a mobile patrol a
report of the snatching.  When Miss De la Riva arrived home from her harrowing experience,
Pat. Pascual attempted to question her, but
Ben Suba requested him to postpone the interrogation
until she could be ready for it.  At that
time, mother and daughter were still undecided on what to do.

On the afternoon of June
28, 1967, the complainant’s family gathered to discuss what steps,
if any, should be taken.  After some
agonizing moments, a decision was reached: 
the authorities had to be informed. 
Thus, early on the morning of June
29, 1967, or on the fourth day after the incident, Miss De la Riva,
accompanied by her lawyer, Atty. Regina O. Benitez, and by some members of the
family, went to the Quezon City Police Department
Headquarters, filed a complaint and executed a statement (Exh.
“B”) wherein she narrated the incident and gave
descriptions of the four men who abused her.  In the afternoon of the same day, the
complainant submitted herself to a medico-internal examination by Dr. Ernesto Brion, NBI Chief Medico-Legal Officer.

During the physical examination of the
complainant by Dr. Brion on June 29, 1967, Pat. Pascual was also at the NBI
office.  There he received a telephone
call from the police headquarters to the effect that one of the suspects had
been apprehended.  That
evening, the complainant and Pat. Pascual
proceeded to the headquarters where Miss De la Riva identified appellant Jaime
Jose from among a group of persons inside the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City as one of the four men who abducted and raped her.  She executed another statement (Exh. “B-1”) wherein she made a
formal identification of Jose and related the role played by him.

At about 9:00 o’clock of
the same evening, appellant Jose executed a statement (Exh.
“I”) before Pat. Marcos G. Viñas.  In his
statement, which was duly sworn, Jose admitted that he knew about, and was
involved in, the June 26 incident.  He
named the other three appellants as his companions.  Jose stated, among other things, that upon
the initiative of Pineda, he and the other three waited for Miss De la Riva to
come out of the ABS Studio; that his group gave chase to the complainant’s car;
that it was Pineda who blindfolded her; and that only Pineda and Aquino criminally assaulted the complainant.

After Exh.
“I” was executed by Jose, an informant furnished Pat. Viñas with a
picture of appellant Edgardo Aquino.  The picture was shown to Miss De la Riva, who
declared in her sworn statement (Exh.
“B-3”) that the man in the picture was one of her abductors and rapists.  The same picture was shown to Jose, who, in
another sworn statement (Exh. “I-1”),
identified the man in the picture as appellant Aquino.

After the apprehension of Jose, the other three soon fell into
the hands of the authorities:  Pineda and
Cañal on July
1, 1967, in Lipa
City, and Aquino
on July 5, 1967, in the province
of Batangas.  On the evening of July 1, 1967, Miss De la Riva pointed to Pineda
and Cañal as among the four persons who abducted and
raped her.  She picked them out from
among several persons in the Office of the Chief of Police of Quezon City.  Later
in the same evening, Miss De la Riva executed a sworn statement (Exh. “B-2”) wherein she made the same
identification of the two appellants from among a group of persons in the Office
of the Chief of the Detective Bureau, adding that appellant Cañal
had tatoo marks on his right hip.  After the identification, one of the
policemen took appellant Cañal downstairs and
undressed him, and he saw, imprinted on the said appellant’s right hip, the
words “Bahala na
Gang.”

Appellant Cañal and Pineda executed and
swore to separate statements on the day of their arrest.  In his statement (Exh. “G”), appellant Cañal
confirmed the information previously given by Jose that the four of them waited
for Miss De la Riva to come down from the ABS Studio, and that they had planned
to abduct and rape her.  Appellant Cañal admitted that all four of them participated in the
commission of the crime, but he would make it appear that insofar as he was
concerned the complainant yielded her body to him on condition that he would
release her.  Pineda executed a statement
(Exh. “J”) stating that he and his other
three companions went to the ABS Studio, and that, on learning that Miss De la
Riva was there, they made plans to wait for her and to follow her.  He admitted that his group followed her car
and snatched her and took her to the Swanky Hotel.  He would make it appear, however, that the
complainant voluntarily acceded to having sexual intercourse with him.

In his medical report (Exh.
“K”), Dr. Brion noted the presence of
multiple contusions and bruises on different parts of the complainant’s body,
as well as of genital injuries.  On the
witness stand the doctor was shown several photographs of the complainant taken
in his presence and under his supervision. 
With the aid of the photographs and the medical report, the doctor
explained to the court that he found contusions or bruises on the complainant’s
chest, shoulders, arms and forearms, right arm index finger, thighs, right knee
and legs.  He also declared that when he
was examining her, Miss De la Riva complained of slight tenderness around the
neck, on the abdominal wall and at the sites of the extra-genital physical
injuries, and that on pressing the said injuries, he elicited a sigh of pain or
tenderness on the part of the subject. 
The injuries, according to Dr. Brion, could
have been caused by blows administered by a closed fist or by the palm of the
hand, and could have been inflicted on the subject while she was being
raped.  It was the doctor’s opinion that
they could have been sustained on or about June 26, 1967.  In
connection with the genital examination, the doctor declared that he found
injuries on the subject’s genitalia which could have been produced by sexual
intercourse committed on June 26, 1967.  He said that he failed to find
spermatozoa.  He explained, however, that
spermatozoa are not usually found in the vagina after the lapse of three days
from the last intercourse, not to mention the possibility that the subject
might have douched herself.

The three appellants who pleaded not guilty (Jose, Aquino and Cañal) took the
witness stand.  We quote hereunder the
portions of the decision under review relative to the theory of the defense:

“Their story is that they and their co-accused Pineda had gone
to the Ulog Cocktail Lounge somewhere in Mabini street in Manila, and there killed time from 9:30 in
the evening of June 25 until closing time, which was about 3:30 in the early
morning of the next day.  At the cocktail
lounge they had listened to the music while enjoying some drinks.  Between them they had consumed a whole bottle
of whisky, so much so that at least Aquino became
drunk, according to his own testimony. 
They had been joined at their table by a certain Frankie whom they met
only that night.  Come time to go home,
their new acquaintance asked to be dropped at his home in Cubao.  The five men piled into the red-bodied, black
topped two-door convertible Plymouth
(Pontiac) car of Jaime Jose, and
with Pineda at the wheel repaired to Cubao.  After dislodging their new friend, Pineda
steered the car to España Extension to bring Aquino to his home in Mayon Street.  But somewhere in Expaña
Extension before the Rotonda a small car whizzed past
them almost hitting them.  They saw that
the driver was a woman.  Pineda gave
chase and coming abreast of the small car he shouted, ‘Putang
ina mo, kamuntik
na kaming mamatay‘.  The woman
continued on her way.  Now Pineda saying,
‘let us teach her a lesson,’ sped after her and when she swerved ostensibly to
enter a gate, Pineda stopped his car behind hers, hurriedly got down, striding
to the small car, opened the door and started dragging the girl out.  Both Jose and Aquino
confirm the presence of another woman inside the girl’s car, who helped the
girl struggle to get free from Pineda’s grip; and that the struggle lasted
about ten minutes before Pineda finally succeeded in pushing the girl into the
red convertible.  All the three accused
insist they did nothing to aid Pineda; but they also admit that they did
nothing to stop him.

“Now the defense contends that Pineda cruised around and
around the area just to scare the girl who was in truth so scared that she begged
them to let her be and return her to her home. 
She turned to Jose in appeal, but this one told her he could not do
anything as the ‘boss’ was Pineda.  Aquino heard her plead with Jose ‘do you not have a sister
yourself?  but
did not hear the other plea ‘do you not have a mother?’ Then Pineda stopped at
the corner of the street where he had forcibly snatched the girl presumably to
return her, but then suddenly changing his mind he said, ‘why don’t you do a
strip tease for us.  I’ll pay you P1,000.00′
and the girl taunted, ‘are you kidding?’; that after a little while she
consented to do the performance as long as it would not last too long and
provided the spectators were limited to the four of them.

“Pineda sped the car until they got to Swanky Hotel where he
and Maggie alighted first, but not before Maggie had borrowed a handkerchief
from one of them to cover her face as she went up the Hotel.  The three followed, and when they saw the
pair enter a room, they quickly caught up. 
All the three accused testify that as soon as they got into the room,
Maggie de la Riva asked the boys to close the windows before she undressed in
front of them.  They themselves also
removed their clothing.  Two of them
removed their pants retaining their briefs, while Boy Pineda and Cañal stripped to the skin ‘because it was hot’.  The three accused declared that they saw Boy
Pineda hand P100.00 to Maggie and they heard him promise her that he would pay
the balance of P900.00 later.  Whereupon,
the show which lasted about 10 minutes began with the naked girl walking back
and forth the room about 4 to 5 times. 
This accomplished, all of them dressed up once more and the three
accused Jaime Jose, Eduardo Aquino and Rogelio Cañal) left the room to wait in the car for Boy Pineda and
Maggie de la Riva who were apparently still discussing the mode of payment of
the balance.  Three minutes later Maggie
de la Riva and Boy Pineda joined them. 
Now, the question of how and where to drop Maggie came up and it is
testified to by the accused that it was Maggie’s idea that they should drop her
near the ABS Studio so that it would appear as if she had just come from her
work.

“Jaime Jose was picked by the police on the morning of June 29
along Buendia Avenue.  Aquino testifies
how, on June 29 Pineda went to him with a problem.  He did not have the P900.00 with which to pay
Maggie the balance of her ‘show’ and he was afraid that if he did not pay,
Maggie would have her goons after him. 
He wanted Aquino to go with him to Lipa City
where he had relatives and where he could help raise the money.  Aquino readily
obliged, and to make the company complete they invited Cañal
to join them.  They used another car of
Jaime Jose, different from the one they had used the day before.  At Lipa, Aquino detached himself from his companions and proceeded
alone to the barrio allegedly to visit his relatives.  In the meantime his two companions had remained
in the City and had, according to Cañal, gone to live
in a house very close to the municipal hall building.  They later moved to another house where the
PC and Quezon City
police posse found and arrested them.  Aquino was the last to be apprehended, when having read in
the newspapers that he was wanted, he surrendered on July 5 to Mrs. Aurelia Leviste, wife of the governor of Batangas.”

The striptease-act-for-a-fee story on which the defense theory is
anchored, defies one’s credulity and reason, and has failed utterly to
counteract the evidence for the prosecution, particularly the complainant’s testimony
and Dr. Brion’s medical report and testimony.  We quote with approval the able dissertation
of the trial judge on this point:

“As main defense in the charge of rape, the three accused
advance the proposition that nothing happened in Swanky Hotel except a
strip-tease exhibition which the complainant agreed to do for them for a fee of
P1,000.00, P100.00 down and the balance to be paid ‘later’.  The flaw in this contention lies in its utter
inverisimilitude. 
The Court cannot believe that any woman exists, even one habitually
engaged in this kind of entertainment (which Maggie de la Riva has not been
proven to be) who would consent (and as easily and promptly as defense claims)
to do a performance, not even for all money in the world after the rough
handling she experienced from these wolves in men’s clothing who now hungered
for a show.  There is no fury to match a
woman stirred to indignation.  A woman’s
pride is far stronger than her yen for money, and her revenge much more
keen.  The Court cannot believe that
after the rudeness and meanness of these men to her, Maggie would in so short
an interval of time forget her indignation and so readily consent to satisfy
their immoral curiosity about her.  The
woman in her would urge her to turn the men’s hankering as a weapon of revenge
by denying them their pleasure.

“Besides, the manner of payment offered for the performance is
again something beyond even the wildest expectations.  Assuming that the woman whom the accused had
abducted was in this kind of trade and assuming that the price offered was to
her satisfaction, what woman would be willing to perform first and be paid
later? It is simply preposterous to believe that Maggie de la Riva should have
consented to do a strip-tease act for a measly down-payment of P100.00 and the
balance to be paid God knows when.  Since
when are expositions of the flesh paid on instalment
basis?  By the very precarious nature of
their pitiful calling, women who sell their attractions are usually very shrewd
and it is to be expected that they would demand full payment before
curtain call.  How was Maggie to collect
later when she did not even know who these men were, where they lived, whether
they could be trusted with a promise to pay later (!) whether she would ever
find them again?  If there is anything
that has struck the Court about the complainant, it is her courage, her intelligence
and her alertness.  Only a stupid woman,
and a most stupid one at that, could have been persuaded to do what the defense
wants this Court to believe Maggie de la Riva consented to do.

“Finally, it is odd that not one of these men should have
mentioned this circumstance during their interviews with anyone, either the press, their police interrogator, the persons who
negotiated their surrender (as in the case of Aquino)
or even their counsel.  One cannot escape
the very strong suspicion that this story is a last ditch, desperate attempt to
save the day for the accused.  It truly
underscores the hopelessness of their stand and projects all the more clearly
their guilt.

“Then there is the incident of the men’s stripping
themselves.  Why was there need for
this?  The Court realizes that in its
desperate need of an explanation for Maggie’s positive identification of Cañal as the man with a tatoo
mark on his right buttock, the defense concocted the sickeningly indecent story
that the four men removed their underclothing in the presence of a woman simply
‘because it was hot’.  What kind of men
were these who were so devoid of any sense of decency that they thought nothing
of adding insult to injury by not only inducing a woman to strip before them,
but of forcing her to perform before a naked audience?  And then they have the gall to argue that
‘nothing’ happened.  For males of cold
and phlegmatic blood and disposition it could be credible, but not for men of
the torrid regions like ours where quick passions and hot tempers are the rule
rather than the exception!

“All of these considerations set aside, notwithstanding, it is quite obvious that the version of the defense has not
been able to explain away a very vital piece of evidence of the prosecution
which, if unexplained, cannot but reduce any defense unavailing.  The result of the physical (external and
internal) examination conducted on the person of Maggie de la Riva in the afternoon
of June 29, the pertinent findings of which are quoted earlier in this decision,
establish beyond doubt that at the time that Maggie de la Riva was examined she
bore on her body traces of physical and sexual assault.

“The only attempt to an explanation made by the defense is
either one of the following:  (1) the
insinuation that when Maggie de la Riva and Boy Pineda were left behind in the
hotel room the bruises and the sexual attack could have taken place then.  But then, the defense itself says that these
two persons rejoined the other three after three
or four minutes! It is physically impossible, in such a short time, for Boy
Pineda to have attacked the girl and inflicted on her all of these injuries;
(2) it was suggested by the defense that Maggie de la Riva could have inflicted
all of those injuries upon herself just to make out a case against the
accused.  The examining physician rules
out this preposterous proposition, verily it does not take much stretch of the
imagination to see how utterly impossible this would be, and for what
purpose?  Was P900.00 which she had
failed to collect worth that much self-torture? 
And what about all the shame, embarrassment and publicity she would (as
she eventually did) expose herself to? If she really had not been raped would
she have gone thru all of these tribulations?

“A woman does not easily trump up rape charges for she
has much more to lose in the notoriety the case will reap for her, her honor
and that of her family, than in the redress she demands (Canastre,
82-480; Medina, C.A. 1943 O.G. 151; Medina y Puno, CA
O.G. 338; CA 55 O.G. 7666; Galamiton, L-6302, August
25, 1954); (3) it could also be argued that the contusions and bruises could
have been inflicted on Maggie during her struggle with Pineda when the latter
pulled and pushed her into the red convertible car.  The telltale injuries, however, discount this
possibility, for the location in which many of the bruises and traumas were
located (particularly on the inner portion of her thighs) could not have been
caused by any struggle save by those of a woman trying to resist the brutal and
bestial attack on her honor.

“In their Memorandun the accused
contend that Maggie’s sole and uncorroborated testimony should not be rated any
credence at all as against the concerted declaration of the three accused.  In the first place, it is not correct to say
that Maggie’s declaration was uncorroborated — she has for corroboration
nothing less than the written extra-judicial statements of Jose and Cañal.  But even assuming
that Maggie stood alone in her statements, the cases cited by the accused in
their Memorandum notwithstanding which the Court does not consider in point
anyway, jurisprudence has confirmed the ruling that numbers is the least vital
element in gauging the weight of evidence. 
What is more important is which of the declarations is the more
credible, the more logical, the more reasonable, the
more prone to be biased or polluted.  (Ricarte 44 OG 2234; Damian CA-GR No.
25523, April 24, 1959).  Besides, it
should borne in mind that in the most detestable crime of rape in which a man
is at his worst the testimony of the offended party most often is the only one
available to prove directly its commission and that corroboration by other eyewitnesses
would in certain cases place a serious doubt as to the probability of its
commission, so that courts of justice are most often placed in a position of
having to accept such uncorroborated testimony if the same is in other regards
conclusive, logical and probable (Landicho, VIII ACR
530).”

We shall now consider the points raised by the appellants in
their briefs.

1.     
Appellants Jose, Aquino
and Cañal deny having had anything to do with the
abduction of Miss De la Riva.  They point
to Pineda (who entered a plea of guilty) as the sole author thereof, but they
generously contend that even as to him the act was purged of any taint of
criminality by the complainant’s subsequent consent to perform a striptease
show for a fee, a circumstance which, it is claimed, negated the existence of
the element of lewd design.  This line of
defense has evidently no leg to stand on. 
The evidence is clear and overwhelming that all the appellants participated
in the forcible abduction.  Miss De la
Riva declared on the witness stand, as well as in her sworn statements, that
they helped one another in dragging her into the car against her will; that she
did not know them personally; that while inside the car, Jose and Aquino, between whom she was seated, toyed with her body,
the former forcing his lips on hers, and the latter touching her thighs and
raising her skirt; that meaningful and knowing glances were in the meanwhile
being exchanged among the four; and that all of them later took turns in
ravishing her at the Swanky Hotel.  This
testimony, whose evidentiary weight has not in the least been overthrown by the
defense, more than suffices to establish the crimes charged in the amended complaint.  In the light thereof, appellants’
protestation that they were not motivated by lewd designs must be rejected as
absolutely without factual basis.

2.     
The commission of rape by each of the appellants
has, as held by the court below, likewise been clearly established.  Jose, Aquino and Cañal contend that the absence of semen in the
complainant’s vagina disproves the fact of rape.  The contention is untenable.  Dr. Brion of the
NBI, who testified as an expert, declared that semen is not usually found in
the vagina after three days from the last intercourse, especially if the
subject has douched herself within that period. 
In the present case, the examination was conducted on the fourth day
after the incident, and the complainant had douched herself to avoid infection
and pregnancy.  Furthermore, the absence
of spermatozoa does not disprove the consummation of rape, the important
consideration being, not the emission of semen, but penetration (People vs.
Hernandez, 49 Phil., 980). Aquino’s suggestion that
the abrasions on the cervix were caused by the tough tip of a noozle deliberately used by the complainant to strengthen
her alleged fabricated tale of rape, is absurd, if not cruel.  It is difficult to imagine that any sane
woman, who is single and earning as much as Miss De la Riva did, would inflict
injuries on her genital organ by puncturing the same with a sharply-pointed
instrument in order to strike back at four strangers who allegedly would not
pay her the sum of P900.00 due her for a striptease act.  Besides, Dr. Brion
testified that the insertion of such an instrument in the genital organ would
not result in the kind of injuries he found in the mucosa of the cervix.

3.     
Other evidence and considerations exist which indubitably
establish the commission of successive rapes by the four appellants.  Upon Miss De la Riva’s arrival at her house
in the morning of June 26, 1967,
she immediately told her mother, “Mommy, Mommy, I have been raped.  All four of them raped me.” This
utterance, which is part of the res gestae, commands strong probative value, considering
that it was made by the complainant to her mother who, in cases of this nature,
was the most logical person in whom a daughter would confide the truth.  Aquino and Cañal would make capital of the fact that Miss De la Riva
stated to the reporters on the morning of June 26, that she was not
abused.  Her statement to the press is
understandable.  At that time the
complainant, who had not yet consulted her family on a matter which concerned her
reputation as well as that of her family, and her career, was not then in a
position to reveal publicly what had happened to her.  This is one reason why the complainant did
not immediately inform the authorities of the tragedy that befell her.  Another reason is that she was threatened
with disfiguration.  And there were, of course,
the traumas found by Dr. Brion on different parts of
the complainant’s body.  Could they, too,
have been self-inflicted?  Or, as
suggested, could they possibly have been inflicted by appellant Pineda alone,
when the story given by the other three is that Pineda and the complainant were
left in the hotel room for only three or four minutes, and that they came out
to join them in what they would picture to be a cordial atmosmosphere,
the complainant even allegedly suggesting that she be dropped on a spot where
people would reasonably presume her to have come from a studio?  Equally important is the complainant’s public
disclosure of her tragedy, which led to an examination of her private parts and
lay her open to risks of future public ridicule and diminution
of popularity and earnings as a movie actress.

4.     
Jose and Cañal seek
the exclusion of their extrajudicial statements from the mass of evidence on
the grounds that they were secured from them by force and intimidation, and
that the incriminating details therein were supplied by the police
investigators.  We are not convinced that
the statements were involuntarily given, or that the details recited therein
were concocted by the authorities.  The
statements were given in the presence of several people and subscribed and
sworn to before the City Fiscal of Quezon City, to
whom neither of the aforesaid appellants intimated the use or inordinate
methods by the police.  They are replete
with details which could hardly be known to the police; and although it is
suggested that the authorities could have secured such details from their
various informers, no evidence at all was presented to establish the truth of
such allegation.  While in their
statements Jose and Cañal admitted having waited – together
with the two other appellants – for Miss De la Riva at the ABS Studio, each of
them attempted in the same statements to exculpate himself:  appellant Jose stated that only Pineda and Aquino criminally abused the complainant; while appellant Cañal would make it appear that the complainant willingly
allowed him to have sexual intercourse with her.  Had the statements been prepared by the authorities,
they would hardly have contained matters which were apparently designed to
exculpate the affiants.  It is significant,
too, that the said two appellants did not see it fit to inform any of their
friends or relatives of the alleged use of force and intimidation by the
police.  Dr. Mariano Nario
of the Quezon City Police Department, who examined
appellant Cañal after the latter made his statement,
found no trace of injury on any part of the said appellant’s body in spite of
the claims that he was boxed on the stomach and that one of his arms was burned
with a cigarette lighter.  In the circumstances,
and considering, further, that the police officers who took down their
statements categorically denied on the witness stand that the two appellants
were tortured, or that any detail in the statements was supplied by them or by
anyone other than the affiants themselves, We see no reason to depart from the
trial court’s well-considered conclusion that the statements were voluntarily
given.  However, even disregarding the
in-custody statements of Jose and Cañal, We find that
the mass of evidence for the prosecution on record will suffice to secure the
conviction of the two.

The admissibility of his extrajudicial statements is likewise
being questioned by Jose on the other ground that he was not assisted by
counsel during the custodial interrogations. 
He cites the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Messiah vs. U.S.
(377 U.S. 201),
Escobedo vs. Illinois (378 U.S.
478) and Miranda vs. Arizona (384
U.S. 436).

The provision of the Constitution of the Philippines in point is
Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 1, par. 17 of which provides: “In
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall x x x enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel x x x.” While the said
provision is identical to that in the Constitution of the United States, in
this jurisdiction the term criminal prosecutions was interpreted by this
Court, in U.S. vs. Beecham, 23 Phil., 258 (1912), in connection with a similar
provision in the Philippine Bill of Rights (Section 5 of Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902) to mean proceedings before the trial court from arraignment to
rendition of the judgment.  Implementing
the said constitutional provision, We have provided in Section 1, Rule 115 of
the Rules of Court that “In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall
be entitled x x x (b) to be
present and defend in person and by attorney at every stage of the proceedings,
that is, from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.”
The only instances where an accused is entitled to counsel before arraignment,
if he so requests, are during the second stage of the preliminary investigation
(Rule 112, Section 11) and after the arrest (Rule 113, Section 18).  The rule in the United States need not be
unquestioningly adhered to in this jurisdiction, not only because it has no
binding effect here, but also because in interpreting a provision of the
Constitution the meaning attached thereto at the time of the adoption thereof
should be considered.  And even there the
said rule is not yet quite settled, as can be deduced from the absence of unanimity
in the voting by the members of the United States Supreme Court in all the
three above-cited cases.

5.  Appellant Pineda claims
that insofar as he is concerned there was a mistrial resulting in gross miscarriage
of justice.  He contends that because the
charge against him and his co-appellants is a capital offense and the amended
complaint cited aggravating circumstances, which, if proved, would raise the
penalty to death, it was the duty of the court to insist on his presence during
all stages of the trial.  The contention
is untenable.  While a plea of guilty is
mitigating, at the same time it constitutes an admission of all the material
facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, and
it matters not that the offense is capital, for the admission (plea of guilty)
covers both the crime and its attendant circumstances qualifying and/or
aggravating the crime (People vs. Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964, citing
People vs. Ama, L-14783, April 29 1961, and People
vs. Parete, L-15515, April 29, 1961).  Because of the aforesaid legal effect of
Pineda’s plea of guilty, it was not incumbent upon the trial court to receive
his evidence, much less to require his presence in court.  It would be different had appellant Pineda requested
the court to allow him to prove mitigating circumstances, for then it would be
the better part of discretion on the part of the trial court to grant his
request.  (Cf. People
vs. Arconado, L-16175, February 28, 1962.) The
case of U.S.
vs. Agcaoili (31 Phil., 91), cited by Pineda, is not
in point, for there this Court ordered a new trial because it found for a fact
that the accused, who had pleaded guilty, “did not intend to admit that he
committed the offense with the aggravating circumstances” mentioned in the
information.  We are not in a position to
make a similar finding here.  The
transcript of the proceedings during the arraignment shows that Pineda’s counsel,
Atty. Lota, prefaced his client’s plea of guilty with
the statement that

“I have advised him (Pineda) about the technicalities in
plain simple language of the contents of aggravating circumstances and apprised
him of the penalty he would get, and we have given said accused time to
think.  After a while I consulted him –
for three times – and his decision was still the same.”

Three days after the arraignment, the
same counsel stated in court that he had always been averse to Pineda’s idea of
pleading guilty, because “I know the circumstances called for the
imposition of the maximum penalty considering the aggravating circumstances,”
but that he acceded to his client’s wish only after the fiscal had stated that
he would recommend to the court the imposition of life imprisonment on his
client.  To be sure, any such
recommendation does not bind the Court. 
The situation here, therefore, is far different from that obtaining in U.S.
vs. Agcaoili, supra.

6.  Two of the appellants –
Jose and Cañal – bewail the enormous publicity that
attended the case from the start of investigation to the trial in spite of the
said publicity, however, it appears that the court a
quo was able to give the appellants a fair hearing.  For one thing, three of the seven (7)
original accused were acquitted.  For
another thing, Jose himself admits in his brief that the Trial Judge “had
not been influenced by adverse and unfair comments of the press, unmindful of
the rights of the accused to a presumption of innocence and to fair trial”

We are convinced that the herein four appellants have conspired
together to commit the crimes imputed to them in the amended information quoted
at the beginning of this decision.  There
is no doubt at all that the forcible abduction of the complainant from in front
of her house in Quezon City, was
a necessary if not indispensable means which enabled them to commit the various
and successive acts of rape upon her person. 
It bears noting, however, that even while the first act of rape was
being performed, the crime of forcible abduction had already been consummated,
so that each of the three succeeding crimes of the same nature can not legally
be considered as still connected with the abduction – in other words, they
should be detached from, and considered independently of, that of forcible
abduction and, therefore, the former can no longer be complexed
with the latter.

What kind of rape was committed? 
Undoubtedly, it is that which is punishable by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, under Paragraph 3, Article
335, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 which took effect on June 20, 1964, and which provides as
follows:

“ART. 335. When and how rape committed. – Rape is
committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

“1. 
By using force or intimidation:

“2. 
When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
and

“3.  When the woman is
under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned
in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

“The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

“Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has
become insane, the penalty shall be death.

“When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is
committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be likewise
death.

“When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death.”

As regards, therefore, the complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape, the first of the crimes committed, the latter is definitely the more
serious; hence, pursuant to the provision of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its maximum period.  Consequently, the appellants should suffer
the extreme penalty of death.  In this regard,
there is hardly any necessity to consider the attendance of aggravating
circumstances, for the same would not alter the nature of the penalty to be
imposed.

Nevertheless, to put matters in their proper perspective and for
the purpose of determining the proper penalty to be imposed in each of the
other three crimes of simple rape, it behooves Us to make a definite finding in
this connection to the effect that the commission of said crimes was attended
with the following aggravating circumstances: 
(a) nighttime, appellants having purposely sought such circumstance to
facilitate the commission of these crimes; (b) abuse of superior strength, the
crime having been committed by the four appellants in conspiracy with one
another (Cf. People vs. De Guzman, et al., 51 Phil., 105, 113); (c) ignominy,
since the appellants in ordering the complainant to exhibit to them her
complete nakedness for about ten minutes, before raping her, brought about a
circumstance which tended to make the effects of the crime more humiliating;
and (d) use of a motor vehicle.  With
respect to appellants Jose, Aquino and Cañal, none of these aggravating circumstances has been
offset by any mitigating circumstance. 
Appellant Pineda should, however, be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty, a factor which does not in the least
affect the nature of the proper penalties to be imposed, for the reason that
there would still be three aggravating circumstances remaining.  As a result, appellants should likewise be
made to suffer the extreme penalty of death in each of these three simple
crimes of rape.  (Art.
63, par. 2, Revised Penal Code.)

In refusing to impose as many death penalties as there are
offenses committed, the trial court applied by analogy Article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides that “the maximum duration of all the
penalties therein imposed upon the appellant shall not be more than three-fold
the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon the appellant, which should not exceed forty years.” The said court
is of the opinion that since a man has only one life to pay for a wrong, the
ends of justice would be served, and society and the victim would be vindicated
just as well, if only one death penalty were imposed on each of the appellants.

We cannot agree with the trial court.  Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code can only
be taken into account in connection with the service of the sentence imposed,
not in the imposition of the penalty (People vs. Escares,
55 Off. Gaz., 623).  In holding
that only one death penalty should be imposed because man has only one life,
the trial court ignored the principle enunciated in the very case it cited,
namely, U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil., 260, where this
Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court, found the accused guilty
of two murders and one homicide and imposed upon him two death sentences for
the murders and a prison term for the homicide. 
In not applying the said principle, the court a quo said that the
case of Balaba is different from the present case,
for while in the former case the accused was found to have committed three
distinct offenses, here only one offense is charged, even if complex.  As We have explained
earlier herein, four crimes were committed, charged and proved.  There is, therefore, no substantial difference
between the two cases insofar as the basic philosophy involved is concerned,
for the fact remains that in the case of Balaba this
Court did not hesitate to affirm the two death sentences imposed on the accused
by the trial court.  In People vs.
Peralta, et al., L-19060, October 29, 1968, in which this Court imposed on each
of the six accused three death penalties for three distinct and separate crimes
of murder, We said that “since it is the settled rule that once conspiracy
is established, the act of one conspirator is attributable to all, then each
conspirator must be held liable for each of the felonious acts committed as a
result of the conspiracy, regardless of the nature and severity of the
appropriate penalties prescribed by law.” In the said case (which was
promulgated after the decision of the court a quo had been handed
down) We had occasion to discuss at length the
legality and practicality of imposing multiple death penalties, thus:

“The imposition of multiple death penalties is decried by some
as a useless formality, an exercise in futility.  It is contended, undeniably enough that a
death convict, like all mortals, has only one life to forfeit.  And because of this physiological and
biological attribute of man, it is reasoned that the imposition of multiple
death penalties is impractical and futile because after the service of one
capital penalty, the execution of the rest of the death penalties will
naturally be rendered impossible.  The
foregoing opposition to the multiple imposition of death penalties suffers from
four basic flaws:  (1) it fails to
consider the legality of imposing multiple capital penalties; (2) it fails to
distinguish between imposition of penalty and service of sentence; (3) it
ignores the fact that multiple death sentences could be served simultaneously;
and (4) it overlooks the practical merits of imposing multiple death penalties.

“The imposition of a penalty and the service of a
sentence are two distinct, though related, concepts.  The imposition of the proper penalty or penalties
is determined by the nature, gravity and number of offenses charged and proved,
whereas service of sentence is determined by the severity and character of the
penalty or penalties imposed.  In the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, the court does not concern
itself with the possibility or practicality of the service of the sentence,
since actual service is a contingency subject to varied factors like the
successful escape of the convict, grant of executive clemency or natural death
of the prisoner.  All that go into the
imposition of the proper penalty or penalties, to reiterate, are the nature,
gravity and number of the offenses charged and proved and the corresponding
penalties prescribed by law.

“Multiple death penalties are not impossible to serve because
they will have to be executed simultaneously. 
A cursory reading of article 70 will show that there are only two moves
of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: 
simultaneously or successively.  The first rule is that two or more penalties
shall be served simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so
permit.  In the case of multiple capital
penalties, the nature of said penal sanctions does not only permit but actually
necessitates simultaneous service.

“The imposition of multiple death penalties, far from being a
useless formality, has practical importance. 
The sentencing of an accused to several capital penalties is an indelible
badge of his extreme criminal perversity, which may not be accurately projected
by the imposition of only one death sentence irrespective of the number of
capital felonies for which he is liable. 
Showing thus the reprehensible character of the convict in its real
dimensions, the possibility of a grant of executive clemency is justifiably
reduced in no small measure.  Hence, the
imposition of multiple death penalties could effectively serve as a deterrent
to an improvident grant of pardon or commutation.  Faced with the utter delinquency of such a
convict, the proper penitentiary authorities would exercise judicious restraint
in recommending clemency or leniency in his behalf.

“Granting, however, that the Chief Executive, in the exercise
of his constitutional power to pardon (one of the presidential prerogatives
which is almost absolute) deems it proper to commute
the multiple death penalties to multiple life imprisonments, then the practical
effect is that the convict has to serve the maximum forty (40) years of
multiple life sentences.  If only one
death penalty is imposed, and then is commuted to life imprisonment, the
convict will have to serve a maximum of only thirty years corresponding to a
single life sentence.”

We are, therefore, of the opinion that in
view of the existence of conspiracy among them and of our finding as regards
the nature and number of the crimes committed, as well as of the presence of
aggravating circumstances, four death penalties should be imposed in the
premises.

–           –           –

Before Us is a petition for intervention
filed by Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation asking for reversal of
that portion of the judgment of the court below ordering the confiscation of
the car used by the appellants in abducting the complainant.  The aforesaid car is a 1965 two-door Pontiac
sedan with Motor No. WT-222410, Serial No. 2376752110777, Plate No. H-33284,
File No. 11584171, alleged by the intervenor to be in
the custody of Major Ernesto San Diego of the Quezon
City Police Department.  The car is
registered in the name of Mrs. Dolores Gomez.

On April 4, 1967, Mrs. Dolores Gomez, mother of appellant Jaime
G. Jose, bought the car from the Malayan Motors Corporation and simultaneously
executed a chattel mortgage thereon to secure payment of the purchase price of
P13,200, which was stipulated to be payable in 24 monthly installments of P550
beginning May 4, 1967 up to April 4, 1969. 
The mortgage was duly registered with the Land Transportation Commission
and inscribed in the Chattel Mortgage Registry. 
The mortgage lien was annotated on the motor registration
certificate.  On April 17, 1967, for value received and with
notice to Mrs. Gomez, the Malayan Motors Corporation assigned its credit
against Mrs. Gomez, as well as the chattel mortgage, to the intervenor.  The assignment was duly registered with the
Land Transportation Commission and annotated on the registration certificate.

Mrs. Gomez failed to pay any of the installments due, in view of
which the intervenor filed on July 5, 1967, an action for replevin
against her (Civil Case No. 69993, Court of First Instance of Manila) as a
preliminary step to foreclosure of the chattel mortgage.  On July
7, 1967, the court issued an order for the seizure of the car.  The sheriff, however, could not enforce the
writ of replevin because the car was not in Mrs.
Gomez’ possession, the same having been used by her son, appellant Jaime G.
Jose, together with the other appellants in this case, in the abduction of Miss
De la Riva, as a result of which the car was seized by the Quezon
City police and placed in the custody of Major San Diego, who refused to
surrender it to the sheriff on the ground that it would be used as evidence in
the trial of the criminal case.

During the pendency of that criminal
case in the court below, or on July
26, 1967, the intervenor filed with the
said court a petition for intervention. 
The said petition was not, however, acted upon.  On October
2, 1967, the trial court rendered its judgment in the present case
ordering the car’s confiscation as an instrument of the crime.  Although not notified of the said decision,
the intervenor filed, on October 17, 1967, a motion for reconsideration
of the order of confiscation; but the same was denied on October 31, 1967, on the ground that the trial
court had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the automatic elevation
thereof to this Court.  The intervenor then filed a petition for relief from judgment,
but the same was also denied.

On February 5, 1968, judgment was rendered in the replevin case ordering Mrs. Gomez to deliver the car to the
intervenor so that the chattel mortgage thereon could
be foreclosed, or, in the alternative, to pay the intervenor
the sum of P13,200 with interest thereon at 12% per
annum from July 5, 1968, the premium bond, attorney’s fees, and the costs of
suit.  The judgment became final and executory.  Attempts
to execute the judgment against the properties of Mrs. Gomez were unavailing;
the writ of execution was returned by the sheriff unsatisfied.  On July
26, 1968, the present petition for intervention was filed with this
Court, which allowed the intervenor to file a
brief.  In his brief the Solicitor
General contends, among others, that the court a quo having found that
appellant Jose is the owner of the car, the order of confiscation is correct.

Considering that the car in question is registered in the name of
Mrs. Dolores Gomez, who, in the absence of strong evidence to the contrary,
must be considered as the lawful owner thereof; that the only basis of the
court a quo in concluding that the said car belongs to appellant Jose
were the latter’s statements during the trial of the criminal case to that
effect; that the said statements were not, however, intended to be, nor could
constitute, a claim of ownership over the car adverse to his mother, but were
made simply in answer to questions propounded in court for the sole purpose of
establishing the identity of the defendant who furnished the car used by the
appellants in the commission of the crime; that the chattel mortgage on the car
and its assignment in favor of the intervenor were
made several months before the date of the commission of the crimes charged,
which circumstance forecloses the possibility of collusion to prevent the State
from confiscating the car; that the final judgment in the replevin
case can only be executed by delivering the possession of the car to the intervenor for foreclosure of the chattel mortgage; and
that Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture
of an instrument or tool used in the commission of the crime if such “be
the property of a third person not liable for the offense,” it is the
sense of this Court that the order of the court below for the confiscation of
the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should be ordered
delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as
decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the replevin case, Civil Case No. 69993.

–           –           –

Before the actual promulgation of this decision, this Court
received a formal manifestation on the part of the Solicitor General to the
effect that Rogelio Cañal, one of the herein
appellants, died in prison on December
28, 1970.  As a result of
this development, this case is hereby dismissed as to him alone, and only
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, with one-fourth (1/4) of the
costs declared de oficio.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified as
follows:  appellants Jaime G. Jose, Basilio Pineda, Jr., and Edgardo
P. Aquino are pronounced guilty of the complex crime
of forcible abduction with rape, and each and every one of them is likewise
convicted of three (3) other crimes of rape. 
As a consequence thereof, each of them is hereby sentenced to four (4)
death penalties; all of them shall, jointly and severally, indemnify the complainant
in the sum of P10,000.00 in each of the four crimes, or a total of P40,000; and
each shall pay one-fourth (1/4) of the costs.

Insofar as the car used in the commission of the crime is
concerned, the order of the court a quo for its confiscation is hereby
set aside; and whoever is in custody thereof is hereby ordered to deliver its
possession to intervenor Filipinas Investment &
Finance Corporation in accordance with the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 69993 thereof.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Villamor,
and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
did not take part.