ELIGIO T. LEYVA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCO LAIZ AND MANUELA JANDOC, RESPONDENTS.

Leyva versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by Eligio Leyva against the Court of Appeals, Francisco Laiz, and Manuela Jandoc. The action began as a petition by Laiz for the cancellation of an adverse claim that Leyva had annotated on the back of Laiz's transfer certificate of title over a parcel of land. The case matters because it fixes, in a single controversy, who between two competing claimants holds the preferred right of ownership over the same lot, and because it illustrates how the Supreme Court treats the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the relative weight of expert testimony against the positive testimony of attesting witnesses.

Procedural History

Private respondent Francisco Laiz originally filed the case in the then Court of First Instance of Cotabato as a petition for the cancellation of the adverse claim annotated at the instance of petitioner Leyva on Transfer Certificate of Title Number T-7225. The trial court, the then Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, rendered its decision on July 6, 1977 in favor of Laiz. Leyva appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court, which, in its decision of April 14, 1981, affirmed the trial court in all respects. Leyva moved for reconsideration, and the Intermediate Appellate Court denied the motion in its resolution of August 21, 1985. Leyva then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari. The Court gave the petition due course in a resolution dated April 8, 1987 and required the parties to file their memoranda. Laiz filed his memorandum, Leyva filed his, and Jandoc failed to file hers.

Facts

The land in dispute is Lot 1-H-3, a portion of a bigger parcel known as Lot 1-H PSU 124647, AMD-2, registered in the name of Manuela Jandoc. On April 2, 1959, Jandoc executed an agreement of sale over the lot in favor of Francisco Laiz, who paid two hundred pesos as earnest money, considered part of the price and proof of the perfection of the contract. Laiz had in fact been occupying the lot since 1954, although his possession was disturbed off and on by Eligio Leyva. Jandoc later confirmed the transfer in a deed of transfer executed on February 2, 1970. When Jandoc failed to deliver the necessary documents, Laiz sued for specific performance, and the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City, in a final judgment, compelled Jandoc to execute the documents, which led to the issuance of a transfer certificate of title over the lot in favor of Laiz.

For his part, Leyva anchored his claim on an alleged compromise agreement with Jandoc. The agreement was undated, claimed to have been executed in 1963, but actually notarized only on September 4, 1972. Under it, the Leyva spouses would withdraw their opposition to Jandoc's land registration case on the condition that, upon issuance of the title in Jandoc's name, certain properties covered thereby, including Lot 1-H-3, would automatically belong to the Leyvas. Leyva caused an adverse claim to be annotated on Laiz's title, and that annotation gave rise to this case.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the compromise agreement infirm. It was undated and belatedly notarized. It lacked a subject matter, since Jandoc had already sold the lot to Laiz in 1959. Leyva's own letter of February 6, 1968, demanding that Laiz vacate the premises, mentioned no compromise agreement and spoke only of conflicting claims between Leyva and Jandoc. In Jandoc's application for registration, Laiz was named as an adverse possessor but Leyva was not. Leyva's opposition to the registration, based on a foreshore lease contract with the government, had been disallowed by the trial court, sustained by the Court of Appeals, and finally by the Supreme Court. Leyva himself testified that despite the compromise agreement he continued to oppose the registration in Jandoc's favor. The two courts likewise upheld the agreement of sale in favor of Laiz, confirmed by the deed of transfer, and testified to by Provincial Fiscal Jose Sarinas, corroborated by Jose Catolico, one of the signatories, and by Notary Public Victorio Versoza.

Issues

• Whether or not Leyva's claim of ownership over Lot 1-H-3, based on his compromise agreement with Jandoc, prevails over Laiz's claim based on the agreement of sale and the deed of transfer.
• Whether or not the compromise agreement of 1963 between Leyva and Jandoc validly bound Jandoc to recognize Leyva's claim over the property.
• Whether or not the land could be the subject of a contract between Jandoc and Leyva when it was then still government land.
• Whether or not Laiz has a better right to the property because he has been a possessor therein in good faith since 1954.
• Whether or not Leyva's 1963 compromise prevails over Laiz's 1970 deed of absolute sale.
• Whether or not Jandoc should be ordered to reconvey Lot 4, PSU-124647-AMD to Leyva.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court and in not rendering judgment in favor of Leyva.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision. It rests on the Court's settled doctrines on the finality of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and on the weight of expert testimony against the positive testimony of attesting witnesses. The governing rule on the first point, as the Court states it, is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in certain instances which have no application here. The governing rule on the second point is stated in the Court's own quotation from Vda. de Roxas versus Roxas:

the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over the expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise but which on the contrary, are subject to inherent infirmities.

That rule bears directly on the case because Leyva relied on a handwriting expert and a chemistry officer to attack the sale agreement, while the courts below gave more weight to the attesting witnesses who testified to its due execution.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is without merit and that Laiz has the preferred right of ownership over Lot 1-H-3. The pivotal issue, as the Court framed it, is who, as between Leyva and Laiz, has a preferred right of ownership over the property, and the Court answered it in favor of Laiz.

On the second issue, the Court upheld the finding that the compromise agreement between Leyva and Jandoc cannot prevail over the agreement of sale between Laiz and Jandoc. The agreement was undated, belatedly notarized, and belied by Leyva's own conduct, including his letter of February 6, 1968 and his continued opposition to the registration despite the alleged compromise.

On the third issue, the Court sustained the finding that the land could not be the subject of a contract between Jandoc and Leyva because it had already been sold by Jandoc to Laiz on April 2, 1959, before any compromise could have attached to it.

On the fourth issue, the Court upheld the finding that Laiz has a better right to the property because he has been a possessor therein in good faith since 1954, his possession having been established although disturbed off and on by Leyva.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that Leyva's 1963 compromise does not prevail over Laiz's 1970 deed of absolute sale. The sale agreement of 1959 was a valid and binding contract, duly executed with the receipt of earnest money, confirmed by the deed of transfer of February 2, 1970, and given effect by a final judgment in the specific performance case.

On the sixth issue, the Court declined to order Jandoc to reconvey Lot 4, PSU-124647-AMD to Leyva, since the petition as a whole was denied.

On the seventh issue, the Court held that what Leyva sought was a review of the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the findings of the trial court. On this point the Court was emphatic:

it has long been established to the point of being elementary, that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by this Court except in certain instances which have no application here.

The Court also disposed of Leyva's reliance on the handwriting expert and the chemistry officer by giving more weight to the testimony of Fiscal Sarinas, corroborated by Catolico and Versoza, and by quoting the rule from Vda. de Roxas versus Roxas that the positive testimony of the three attesting witnesses ought to prevail over expert opinions which cannot be mathematically precise and are subject to inherent infirmities.

Doctrine

First, the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially when they affirm those of the trial court, are final and may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court except in certain instances, none of which applied here. A Bar answer should state this as a rule of finality, not as a discretionary courtesy.

Second, the positive testimony of attesting witnesses to a contract prevails over the opinion of a handwriting or chemistry expert, because expert opinions cannot be mathematically precise and are subject to inherent infirmities. This rule, drawn from Vda. de Roxas versus Roxas, governs the contest between Leyva's expert witnesses and the attesting witnesses to the Laiz sale agreement.

Third, a compromise agreement that is undated, belatedly notarized, and contradicted by the party's own conduct cannot prevail over a prior valid sale of the same property. The earlier sale binds the property, and the later compromise lacks a subject matter to operate upon.

Fourth, a possessor in good faith since 1954, whose rights are confirmed by a final judgment in a specific performance case and by the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in his name, holds a preferred right of ownership over a later claimant whose only basis is an infirm compromise.

Disposition

The petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, with Laiz prevailing over Leyva.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court except in certain instances, and that the positive testimony of attesting witnesses prevails over expert opinions subject to inherent infirmities. Examiners use this case to test the finality of factual findings and the weight of expert evidence against attesting witnesses in contract disputes.