THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PABLO EGUAL ALIAS COMMANDER REYES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APP…

Appeals from
three separate decisions of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City Branch) in
Criminal Case No 1147 (now G. R. No. L-13469),
Criminal Case No- 1148 (now G. R. No. L-14240), and
Criminal Case No. 1153 (now G. R. No. L-14209).
On motion of counsel for appellant Pablo Egual in G. R. No. L-13469 and G. R. No. L- 14240, and
appellant Marcelo Mendoza in G. R. No. L-14209 and G.
R. No. L-142-10, and appellant Sancho Diwa in G. II. No. L-14240,
We granted them leave to file a joint brief.
Correspondingly, We granted the prosecution leave to
file only one brief in answer thereto. Appellant Gaudencio Hernandez in G. R. No. L-14240 and G. R. No. L-14209 filed his own brief to which
the prosecution filed its answer. For this reason and the three cases being
intimately related to each other, We now decide them
jointly. To avoid confusion, however, We shall make a
separate statement of each case.

(1) In Criminal Case No. 1147 (G.
R. No. L-134G9), Pablo Egual, alias Commander Reyes,
and Domingo Encallado, alias Commander Doming, were
charged with murder for the killing of Julian Castillo. They entered a plea of
not guilty and after the trial court had denied Egual’s motion to quash the information on the ground that
the crime charged was absorbed by that of rebellion of which he had already been
prosecuted and convicted, they were tried. Egual was
thereafter found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as charged, with the
aggravating circumstances of armed band and abuse of superior strength, but with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the late President Magsaysay, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Julian Castillo in the sum of P6,000.00, to
suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay one-half of the
costs.

Domingo Encallado was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt,
with one-half of the costs declared de officio. Consequently, Pablo Egual is now the only appellant.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 1148 (G.
R. No. L-14240), an information for assault against agents of a person in
authority, with triple murder, was filed against Pablo Egual, Commander Reyes, Gaudencio
Hernandez, Domingo Encallado, alias Commander Doming,
Carlos Logti, alias’ Commander Mailing, Sancho Diwa, alias Commander Badong, and Marcelo Mendoza, alias Commander Oscar. Their
motion to quash the information upon the same ground advanced by Egual in the first case having been denied, they pleaded not
guilty, were subsequently tried and found guilty as charged (except (1) Carlos
Logti, who was still at large and had not been brought
to trial, the case against him having been dismissed, without prejudice and
defendant (2) Encallado, the case as against him
having been provisionally dismissed—with his conformity—on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence, with one-fifth of the costs de officio); and
considering the aggravating circumstance of aimed band, without any mitigating
circumstance to offset it, each of the defendants was sentenced to suffer
reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally
indemnify each of the victims in the sum of P6,000.00, to pay one-fifth of the
costs, and to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by
law.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 1153 (G.
R. No. L-14209), an information charging the murder of Ruperto Rublico was filed against
Gaudencio Hernandez, Marcelo Mendoza, alias Commander
Oscar, and a third person designated therein as John Doe, who was still at
large. After due trial upon a plea of not guilty, the defendants were all found
guilty as charged, with the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, without any mitigating circumstance to offset
it, and each was sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00, each to pay
one-third of the costs, and to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by
law.

A

In the first case (Criminal Case
No. 1147, now G. R. No. L-13469) the prosecution evidence clearly established
the fallowing facts.

At about 7 o’clock in the evening
of October 10, 1955, Appellant Egual, armed with an
automatic carbine, Hilarion Reyes, alias Commander
Malvar, carrying a long firearm, together with about
twenty other armed persons, arrived in front of the house of Julian Castillo—an
overseer of private property at sitio Santo Toribio, Marauoy, Lipa City, Batangas. Upon seeing
him, Egual and Reyes grabbed him, tied his hands and
led him westward towards the railroad trucks. Lucio
Castillo, a fifteen year old son of Julian, tried to follow and help his father,
but on being threatened by one of the armed men, he went back to their house,
and from one of the windows he saw Egual and his companions fire shots at his father and afterwards at their
house, after which they left. Lucio then went to the
place where his father was shot and there found him dead with several gun-shot
wounds.

Hilarion Reyes was not included among the
defendants in this case because he had already been separately prosecuted and
convicted for the murder of Julian Castillo (Criminal Case No. 978 of the Court
of First Instance of Batangas).

The record further discloses that
on February 6, 1957, Egual signed a sworn statement
before the Deputy Clerk, Court of First Instance of Batangas, Lipa City Branch,
admitting therein that he had participated in the killing of Julian Castillo
because he was one of the members of the Hukbalahap
organization ordered to kill the latter due to his alleged participation in the
killing of Commander Recto.

Equal’s main contention is that
his motion to quash the information should have been sustained because the
offense charged therein was absorbed by that of rebellion of which he had
already been convicted on March 28,
1957 by
the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. B-103).

This contention is without merit.
Firstly, because the act Egual is now charged with was
not among those alleged in the Laguna case as constituting the crime of
rebellion. Secondly, because there is no evidence to show that the offense
charged in the present case was committed as a necessary means to commit that of
rebellion or in furtherance thereof. Thirdly, because while the acts
constituting the offense of rebellion covered by the Laguna case were committed
in the province of Laguna, the murder of which Egual
is charged in the present was committed in the province of Batangas—over which the Laguna court had no jurisdiction.
Fourthly, because the deceased Julian Castillo was a mere
overseer of a private property, with no established connection with the
government at the time; and lastly, because Egual
presented absolutely no evidence to show Castillo’s connection with the killing
of Commander Recto.

We find, therefore, that the
defense has failed to prove that the killing of Castillo was a necessary means
to commit the crime of rebellion—of which appellant had already been prosecuted
and convicted.

The crime committed was murder,
qualified by treachery, the evidence showing that when Julian Castillo was
killed, his hands were tied, thus insuring the commission of the crime by his
assailants without any risk on their part arising from any defense the victim
might offer. The aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and
night time duly established by the evidence are deemed absorbed by that of
treachery (People vs. Magsilang, 46 O. G. 1557 and
People vs. Cespeñe, G. R. No. L-9346, October 30,
1957).
There being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
to be considered, the trial court was right in imposing on appellant the medium
period of the penalty prescribed by law, which is reclusion. perpetua.

Modified as above indicated, the
decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects, with
cost.

B

In the second case (Criminal Case
No, 1148, now G. R- No. L-14240), the prosecution evidence shows that in the
afternoon of September 14,
1953,
while Andres Rubico was supervising the harvest of
palay in his farm in barrio San Lucas,
Lipa City,
Batangas,
Philippines, he happened to see three
persons crossing a coconut trunk bridge. Shortly thereafter he heard several
shots. Minutes later, he saw coming from a distance of twenty-five meters
several members of the Hukbalahap organization,
amongst whom were Gaudencio
Hernandez, Marcelo Mendoza and Pablo Egual. After
these persons had passed, Rubico went to the place
from where the shots came and there found the dead bodies of Benito Pagkaliwangan, Santiago Macatangay, and (Benjamin Yason,
subsequently identified as soldiers of the Philippine Constabulary. Barrio
Lieutenant Braulio Paltado
also testified that while supervising the harvest of palay in his rice field, he also heard the shots; that while
on his way to the place from where the shots came, he met a group of thirteen
Huks, amongst them being Gaudencio Hernandez, Domingo Encallado, Marcelo Mendoza, Sancho
Diwa, Pablo Egual, and
Carlos Logti, the first one (Hernandez) having warned
him not to reveal to anybody the killing of the three
soldiers.

On September 14,
1953, the
Municipal Health Officer of Batangas, after
investigating the shooting, issued a certificate of the death of the three
victims (Exhibit A, B and C found in the record).

On May
26, 1957,
Marcelo Mendoza and Sancho Diwa signed separate extrajudicial confessions sworn to
before Justice of the Peace Eulalio Chavez, wherein
they admitted their (participation in the killing of the three constabulary
soldiers (Exhibits D and E).

Before going further, it must be
noted that the case was dismissed provisionally as against Domingo Encallado on October 4,
1957, on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence, while defendant Carlos Logti did not undergo trial because he remained at large
until the case was decided below.

Testifying in his own defense,
appellant Sancho Diwa
admitted that he was a member of the Hukbalahap, an
organization Unit aimed at correcting the wrong administration of the
government; that he was one of the group of thirteen links who killed three PC
soldiers on September 14, 1955, claiming, however, that he did not know at that
time that the victims were PC soldiers because they were in civilian clothes;
that because the soldiers drew their guns, his companions also fired at them,
although he himself fired shots in the air.

For his part, appellant
Mendoza denied participation in the
commission of the offense and claimed that he signed his extrajudicial
confession without even reading it because he was repeatedly hit and maltreated.
He admitted, however, that while confined in the Municipal jail of
Lipa City, he was not maltreated at all by
the police and that he swore to the truth of the contents of his confession
before Justice of the Peace Eulalio
Chavez.

Appellant Egual, on the other hand, after denying participation in the
commission of the crime, testified that he was a member of the Hukbalahap organization for eight years; that in January
1957 he surrendered to the late President Magsaysay in
order to live a peaceful life, but after his surrender he was charged of
rebellion in the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Criminal Case No. B-103),
and was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of one year and six months; that as
a link he had several encounters with PC soldiers whom he considered his
enemies; that inspite of his not having participated
in the commission of the crime, he signed a statement regarding the killing of
Julian Castillo incriminating himself.

Egual also invokes double jeopardy by
reason of his prosecution and conviction of rebellion in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna on March 31,
1957.

Appellant Gaudencio Hernandez did not admit his membership in the
Hukbalahap organization.

Appellant Diwa contends that the offense charged in the present case
was absorbed by that of rebellion of which he was found guilty in Criminal Case
No. 774 of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
the information filed in the latter having charged that the crime of rebellion
alleged therein was committed between June 30, 1950 and August 11, 1954—a period
which includes the date of the commission of the crime subject matter of the
present case.

For his part, appellant
Mendoza contends that the proper charge
against him should have been rebellion and not assault against persons in
authority, with triple murder.

In the case of Diwa and Egual, it appears that
the murder of the three PC soldiers was net mentioned at all in the rebellion
cases filed against them, and the acts constituting rebellion of which Egual was found guilty were committed in the province of
Laguna. Furthermore, the defense evidence does not show that the killing of the
PC soldiers was in furtherance of the crime of rebellion. As a matter of fact,
according to Diwa the victims were wearing civilian
clothes at the time they were ambushed.

Upon the other hand, the mere
denials of appellants can not overcome the positive testimony of Braulio Paltado and Andres Rubico linking them with the killing of the three PC
soldiers mentioned heretofore, their testimony having been substantially
corroborated by the extrajudicial confessions of Diwa
and Mendoza themselves. True these appellants tried to repudiate the voluntariness of said confessions, but after an examination
of the record, We are satisfied that they were freely
made and sworn to later before Justice of the Peace Eulalio Chavez. In fact, in Criminal Case
No. 1153 (now G. R. No. L-14209), appellant
Mendoza testified that he had
voluntarily executed his extra- Judicial confession (Exhibit E, which is marked
as Exhibit A in Criminal Case No. 1153, p. 45 of the record said
case).

The evidence does not show that
the killing, qualified treachery, was committed with
the attendance of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Consequently, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial
court is correct. However, the provision in the appealed decision that indemnity
shall be paid to the victims should be modified by making the indemnity payable
to their heirs.

Modified as above indicated, the
decision appealed from in this second case is affirmed in all other respects,
with costs.

C.

In Criminal
Case No. 1163, now G. R. No. L-14209, the prosecution
evidence has established that at about eight o’clock in the evening of August
22, 1953, while Ruperto Rubico, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio San Lucas, Lipa City, and his family were sleeping in their house in
said barrio, somebody shouted: “Ka Perto, Ka Perto“. This awakened his daughter, Lilia and his wife,
Teodora Marasigan, who in
turn woke him up telling him that somebody wanted to talk to him. Thereafter,
Ruperto, followed by his wife and daughter, went
downstairs where, without warning, he was fired upon by Gaudencio Hernandez and Marcelo Mendoza, this causing his
instantaneous death.

Teodora’s testimony shows that she had
known Hernandez and Mendoza for sometime before this incident. She even
testified that the motive for the killing was Hernandez’ desire, to take the
place of her husband as overseer of a piece of land in the barrio and her
husband’s refusal to give Hernandez five hundred coconut fruits for the
guerrillas.

The prosecution also presented as
witness Francisco Beltran, another resident of the same barrio, who testified
that after he had heard shots on the evening of the incident, he brought the
members of his family to a dugout from where he saw around seven persons
conversing near his house; that amongst them were his “compadre“, Gaudencio Hernandez,
and Marcelo Mendoza, he having heard the former making the remark that he had
first shot Ruperto Rubico on
the leg; that as the group approached him, Hernandez recognized him and told
him, “Compadre, do not be afraid of me, we killed Ka
Perto.”

Leoncio Pagcaliwangan, also of
Lipa City, testified that at about
7 o’clock in the evening of the incident,
Marcelo Mendoza, with two armed companions, went to his house and asked him
whether Gaudencio Hernandez had already arrived. In
reply he said that Hernandez had not yet arrived, but a little while later,
Hernandez actually came; that a short while after the group had left his house,
Pagkaliwangan heard shots from the direction of the
house of Ruperto Rubico.

In connection with this case, it
appears that on May 25, 1957, after PC Corporal Torres had investigated him,
Mendoza made an extrajudicial confession (Exhibit A, p. 45 of the record in
Criminal Case No. 1153, and Exhibit E, p. 151 of the record of Criminal Case No.
1158) wherein he admitted his participation in the killing of Ruperto Rubico in company of Egual, Hernandez, one Faustino Rochas and others, and stated further that it was Gaudencio Hernandez who ordered the killing of Rubico because of his desire to replace him as overseer and
because of Rubico’s refusal to give coconuts to their
organization.

In his defense, Mendoza testified
that although he had been a member of the Hukbalahap
since June 1950, he surrendered in 1953 to Tarciano
Rizal in Calamba, Laguna;
that as a result of the investigation to which he was submitted by PC soldiers,
he made the sworn statement Exhibit A, claiming, however, that the killing of
Rubico was in furtherance of
rebellion.

Mendoza‘s contentions are without merit.
Although Rubico was a barrio lieutenant, the record
contains m evidence at all that his murder was absolutely necessary to carry out
the purpose of the rebellion. That Mendoza was a member of the Hukbalahap organization is do reason why all his acts and
misdeeds should be considered in furtherance of, or absorbed by
rebellion.

Moreover, appellant
Mendoza has not shown that he had even
been prosecuted and convicted of rebellion. On the other hand, the prosecution
evidence is sufficient to establish that Rubico was
killed by Mendoza and his companions upon orders of Gaudencio Hernandez who had a strictly personal grudge
against the victim.

For his part, appellant Hernandez
claims that the testimonies of Teodora Marasigan and Lilia Rubico are not
worthy of belief and that the extrajudicial confession of appellant
Mendoza should not affect him adversely,
it being admissible only as against the latter. He also tried to establish an
alibi, claiming that at the time of the commission of the crime, he was in his
house attending to a sick child, and that when he went to the house of Rubico, he saw the latter already dead and sprawled on the
ground near the stairs.

After going over the record, we
found nothing sufficient to show sufficient ill motive on the part of Teodora Marasigan and her daughter
to induce them to testify falsely against appellants, nor any other factor
sufficient to discredit their testimonies. Both witnesses knew appellants well
and long before the incident, and they positively testified that they were the
ones who killed Ruperto. Moreover, their testimony is
strongly supported by Francisco Beltran’s uncontradicted testimony to the effect that Hernandez was
his “compadre“, that, on the night in question, he had
heard Hernandez telling Mendoza that he had first shot Ruperto on the leg, and that later Hernandez even told him
not to be afraid as they had already killed Ruperto.

In all these cases it is true
that the witnesses for the state failed to reveal and disclose the identity of
the perpetrators of the crime for almost three years, but we give to this
circumstance little importance considering that at the time of the commission of
the crime and for some time thereafter, the bands of Huks roaming in the locality were still strong and ruthless,
and it was natural for said witnesses to be afraid to tell the truth about what
they knew until they felt that it was safe for them to do
so.

The crime committed by appellants
Mendoza and Hernandez is also that of murder, without the attendance of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance. Consequently, We find the penalty imposed by the trial court to be correct.
Wherefore, the appealed decision is affirmed in toto,
with costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.