CIRILA EMILIA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. EPIFANIO BADO (ALIAS PAñO), ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

The relief prayed for but denied
in an order of the court below, now the subject of the present appeal, is that injunction issue to restrain
defendants from continuing with the construction of a house of light materials
on a 48-square meter area on the northern border of plain­tiff’s land.

The suit started on December 12, 1963 with the complaint, as amended,^[1]
that on or about December 1, 1962, defendants, confed­erating and helping one
another, entered plaintiff’s land and commenced the construction of a house of
light materials on the northern boundary of her Lot 1131 in Iligan
City bordering the bank of Salabao Creek, covered by
her Torrens Title 0-267; that the continuance of such act against the will of
plaintiff would cause great and irreparable damage and injury and injustice to
her; and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.  Whereupon, she prayed for
preliminary and final injunction and damages. 
Preliminary injunction was
issued ex–parte.

Plaintiff’s said complaint was met by defendants’ motion to
dismiss upon the ground of lack of cause of action.  They attached to their motion the sketch of a
private land surveyor, Flordelito Aragon, and his
affidavit, both of which were intended to convey the alleged fact that the new
house being constructed was inside defendant Glicerio
Bado’s Lot 2894 (covered by his Torrent Title 9-275)
being held by him.  They averred, too,
that the house did not encroach upon the boundaries of plaintiff’s adjoining
property (Lot 1131).

Obviously of the belief
that procedural niceties should not bar consideration of the equities of the
case,^[2] the trial court, on the face of the conflicting
assertions of fact, called for a summary hearing.

On February 27, 1964,
the trial court came out with an order sustaining the motion to dismiss.  The court gave credence to the testimony of
surveyor Flordelito Aragon (also a deputy public land
surveyor) that the house under construction was within Glicerio
Bado’s Lot 2894 (Torrens Title
0-275) and not on plaintiff’s Lot 1131 (Torrens Title
0-267).  The trial court took the
position that to stop defendants from building a house within Clicerio Bado’s lot “would
be tantamount to depriving” the owner of the enjoyment of his lawful
dominical rights; that even on the assumption that defendant Glicerio Bado’s title to Lot 2894
was obtained through fraud, as plaintiff avers, nonetheless, said title
subsists until declared null and void by a competent court; and that these
circumstances would tie up the hands of the court from granting the relief
prayed for.  Whereupon, the court
dissolved the preliminary injunction theretofore issued, and dismissed the
complaint.

1. The procedural question presented asks of us a ruling as to
whether injunction is the proper remedy in the premises.

Whether defendant Clicerio Bado’s lot is registrable or not, because, as plaintiff avers, that land registered in the name of defendant
Glicerio Bado is a creek – Salabao
Creek – is beside the point here.  Unless
and until plaintiff succeeds in annulling the decree of registration in defendant’s favor which she has sought in the
cadastral proceedings, that title subsists.^[3]  It is
to be presumed that the judicial proceedings leading to the issuance of the decree are valid.

The pivotal facts that the record discloses may thus be sum­marized
this way:  Plaintiff claims that the house
being built is on her land; defendants, on the other hand, say that that house
is on the land of Glicerio Bado.  Both hold Torrens
titles.  The lower court, prima facie
at least, believes that there is factual support for defendants’ averment.

The remedy of injunction has been the subject of numerous
judicial pronouncements.  The court
cannot now afford to depart from the well-ingrained precept that injunctions
are not available to take property out of possession or control of one party
and place it into that of another whose title has not clearly been
established.  Instructive in this respect
is the early 1909 decision in Devesa vs.
Arbes, 13 Phil. 273, where injunction was
sought to recover possession of real property. 
Mr. Justice Carson there pithily summed up^[4]
the limited concept of injunction which may not be availed of “‘while the
rights between the parties are undetermined, except in extraordinary cases
where material and irreparable injury will be done’, which cannot be
compensated in damages.”  To hold
otherwise, Mr. Justice Carson continued to say, “would be to render
practically of no effect the various provisions of the code (of civil
procedure) touching many if not most of the ordinary actions, and the
enforcement of judgment in such actions; for it may well be supposed that if a
complainant could secure relief by injunction in every case where ‘the
defendant is doing or threatens or is about to do, or is procuring or suffering
to be done, some act probably in violation of the plaintiff’s rights’ and could
enforce the judgment granting the injunction by the summary contempt
proceedings authorized in section 172 of the code to punish violations of
injunctions, he would seldom elect to enforce his rights in such cases by the
ordinary remedies, involving as they
do the difficult and ofttimes fruitless labor of
enforcing judgments obtained therein by execution.”^[5]

Long divorced from doubt is
the doctrine that where legal title is
disputed and the possessor asserts ownership over the land in con­troversy, no
injunction can issue to dispossess him.^[6] 
Reason for this is that before the issue of ownership is determined by
evidence, justice and equity demand that the parties be maintained in their status
quo so that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the
other.^[7]

Given the fact that there is the debatable question of where the
house was being erected, we say that adherence to the precept just enunciated
is a forbidding obstacle to the grant of injunction.

2. To be sure, there are recognized exceptions to the rule, as
where defendant is clearly a mere intruder,^[8]
or where the action seeks to prevent a purchaser at an auction sale from
molesting the debtor’s co-owners whose rights have not been affected by the
sale.^[9]  But these, generally upon
hearing and not upon ex–parte
application for injunction.^[10]

3.  Upon well-entrenched
jurisprudence, plaintiff’s principal suit for injunction cannot, at bottom,
prosper because there is an adequate remedy in law open to her.  It is elementary to the point of triteness
that the special remedy of injunction may not issue where there is a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

It is in line with the
principle just enunciated that in affirming Devesa
vs. Arbes, supra, Palafox vs. Madamba, 19 Phil. 444, 446, declared in no uncertain
terms that injunction is not the appropriate remedy where “there exists
the ordinary remedy of action for property of possession, which may be either
plenary or summary, according to the method by which she may have been deprived
of her alleged pos­session.”  A long
line of cases has since then stabilized the principle.^[11]

Under the present state of the law, there are three kinds of
actions available to recover possession of real property:  (a) the summary action for forcible entry
(where preliminary mandatory injunction may be sought within ten days from the
filing of the com­plaint under Article 539 of the Civil Code) or illegal detainer, which seeks the recovery of physical possession
only and is brought within one year in the municipal court; (b) the acción publiciana,
which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary action in an
ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First Instance; and (c) acción de reivindicación,
which seeks the recovery of ownership, which includes the jus utendi and the “jus fruendi,
also brought in the Court of First Instance.^[12]

Plaintiff Cirila Emilia
claims ownership of a 48-square meter portion of land, which she avers is
covered by Torrens title in her name.  Defendant Clicerio Bado, on the other hand, also professes ownership over the
same portion of land backed up, too, by a Torrens title
in his name.  From these two directly
opposing positions, a legitimate issue of ownership emerges.  This guides us to no other conclusion than
that plaintiff Cirila Emilia
should have brought suit for ownership (acción
de reivindicación).  Correctly did the trial judge dissolve the
preliminary injunction wrongfully issued and refuse the grant of a perpetual
injunction sought by her.

4. In a situation like the present, it was suggested in Devesa vs. Arbes,
supra, that it would not be improper if the record were to be returned
to the court of origin with instructions to further amend the complaint,^[13]
such that the question of ownership and possession (acción
reivindicatoria) may bring about a head-on
contest between plaintiff and Glicerio Bado in the same injunction case.  As we make an appraisal of the record before
us, however, we are constrained to say that con­fusion may arise because of the
so many pleadings filed and court actuations taken before this decision.  With the voluminous record, difficulty may
arise in pinpointing the exact issue between the parties.  Administration of justice could suffer thereby.  And then, there is the continued pendency of this case which has been started since nearly
five years ago.  A final decision on the
validity of Clicerio Bado’s
title in the cadastral proceeding could yet prevent further controversy between
the parties.

Upon the view we take of
this case, we vote to affirm the order of February 27, 1964, dismissing the complaint.

With costs against plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Civil Case 751, Court of First Instance of Lanao del
Norte, entitled “Cirila Emilia,
Plaintiff, vs. Epifanio Bado
(alias Paño), Roque
Marianas, Simplicio Marianas and Mario Marianas, Primitivo Aranas, Eustiquio Sabihon, Alfredo Salim and Glicerio Bado, Defendants.”

^[2]
The procedural rule, it is to be
recalled, is that where a motion to dismiss is grounded on lack of
cause of action, resolution of said motion should be determined on the basis
only of the facts alleged in the complaint, and on no others.  1 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., p. 429, citing Asejo vs. Leoncio,
78 Phil. 467.

^[3]
See: 
Plaintiff’s petition for review and/or to cancel Glicerio
Bado’s Certificate of Title No. 0-275 filed on November
21, 1963 in
Cadastral Case N-4 (LRC Cadastral Record N-267), Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, and the answer thereto of defendant Glicerio Bado.  Record on Appeal, pp. 55-60, 82-84.

^[4]
At p. 278.

^[5]
At p. 279.

^[6]
Gordillo vs. Del Rosario, 39 Phil. 829, 835, citing
Devesa vs. Arbes, supra;
Golding vs. Balatbat,
infra; Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 229.  See
also:  Asombra vs. Dorado, 36 Phil. 883, 885; Tiongson vs. Martinez, 36 Phil. 948, 952; Rustia vs. Franco, 41 Phil. 280, 283; Santos vs.
De Leon, 60 Phil. 573, 575.

^[7]
3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of
Court, 1963 ed., p. 68, citing Calo vs.
Ortega, L-4673 and L-4675, January 25, 1952.

^[8]
Rustia vs. Franco, supra;
Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, supra; De
Garcia vs. Santos, 79 Phil. 365, 369-370; Barrameda vs. Gontang,
L-24110, February 18, 1967.

^[9]
Cabuhat vs. Ansay,
42 Phil. 170, 176.

^[10]
Golding vs. Balatbat, 36 Phil. 941, 946; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra,
at p. 952; De Leon vs. Director
of Lands, 60 Phil. 203, 205.
 Section 5, Rule 58, Rules of Court,
categorically provides that “[n]o preliminary injunction shall be granted
without notice to the defendant unless it shall appear from facts shown by
affidavits or by the verified complaint that great or irreparable injury would result to the
applicant before the matter can be heard on notice.  x x
x.”

^[11]
Evangelista vs. Pedreños, 27 Phil. 648, 650-651; Gilchrist vs.
Cuddy, 29 Phil. 542, 550-551; Asombra vs.
Dorado, supra, at pp. 885-886; Golding vs.
Balatbat, supra, at pp. 945-947; Liongson vs. Martinez, supra, at pp.
951-953; Rustia vs. Franco, supra;
Kabankalan Sugar Co. vs. Rubin, 54 Phil. 645,
654; Piit vs. De Lara, 58 Phil. 765, 767; De
Leon vs. Director of Lands, supra, at p. 205; Santos vs.
De Leon, supra, at pp. 574-575; Wagan vs.
Sideco, 60 Phil. 685, 688; Coronado vs. Tan,
96 Phil. 729, 732.

^[12]
See:  3 Moran, op. cit., p. 272, citing cases.

^[13]
Affirmed in Evangelista vs. Pedreños, supra, at p. 651, where the
complaint therein was considered amended.