GEORGE GARCIA, PETER GARCIA, PAUL GARCIA, ROBERT GARCIA AND CARMEN GARCIA, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. JUDGE JOSE G. PANEDA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL C…
GUARIÑA III, J.:
The case in which these orders were issued is an action for injunction filed in June 1996 by the petitioners George, Peter, Paul, Robert and Carmen, all surnamed Garcia and docketed as Q-96-27877.[1] Brought in as defendants were the National Housing Authority as represented by its Administrator, and the Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat represented by their attorney-in-fact Hernani Magbanua. The officer’s return shows that on June 26, 1996, he caused the service of the summons on the NHA through the NHA Legal Department and on Hernani Magbanua who refused to acknowledge receipt.[2] To the summons was attached a notice of hearing presumably in connection with the application for preliminary injunction.
A year later, on July 3, 1997, a pre-trial hearing was called in which plaintiff George Garcia with his counsel Atty. Alvin Dysangco and Atty Ma. Magdalena De Leon-Siacon for defendant NHA appeared before Branch 220 to which the case was raffled. Atty. Dysangco reported that the Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat were already served with summons through Hernani Magbanua and had yet to file a responsive pleading. Since the reglementary period for filing the answer was apparently over, he moved for a declaration of default of the heirs. The court was then presided over by Judge Prudencio Castillo Jr. He issued an open-court order declaring in default the Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat as represented by Hernani Magbanua for failure to file the responsive pleading within the reglementary period.[3]
After five years, the case was still pending. On October 14, 2002, Helen Fuentebella Magbuhat, who claims to be the widow of Leonardo Magbuhat, one of the heirs of Santiago Magbuhat, filed a motion to set aside the order of default with motion to admit answer with counterclaim.[4] The plaintiffs opposed the twin motions, leading the court to issue its first disputed ruling – the order of May 13, 2003 penned by Judge Jose Paneda.[5]
The court applied Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in recalling and setting aside the July 3, 1997 order of default. The cited rules were a thoroughgoing revision of the 1964 Rules of Court that came into effect only two days before the default order was handed down, and the provision on default was one of the major changes carried out therein. The court discerned that under these rules, it may no longer declare a defendant in default motu proprio. There must be a motion to the effect by the plaintiff with proof of failure of defendant to file the answer despite notice. Unlike in the old rules when a defendant need not be served with notice of the motion, he must now be notified of the motion. The court also noted that in order for it to acquire jurisdiction over the defendants-heirs, the summons should be served on all of them or the administrator or executor of the estate. There was no showing that Hernani Magbanua on whom the summons was served either represented the heirs or was the executor or administrator of the estate. In the same breath that it set aside the default order, the court refused to admit the answer of movant Helen Magbuhat and instead ordered her to secure the proper representation from the heirs or the estate. These pronouncements were reaffirmed in the order of July 10, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs.
Now as petitioners, the Garcias seek the long arm of certiorari to reverse these issuances and reinstate the initial July 3, 1997 default order. They maintain their opinion that Hernani Magbanua is a representative or agent of the Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat and service of summons on a representative party is allowed under Section 3, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules. The heirs were, therefore, required to file the answer on pain of being declared in default if they failed to do so within the reglementary period. The petitioners also posit that the court erroneously acted on the motion of Helen Magbuhat who is not a party defendant. They press the view that under Section 3, Rule 9, only a party declared in default may file a motion to set aside the order of default.
These contentions are not grounded on a proper understanding of the rules. Verily, the summons for the defendants-heirs was served only on Hernani Magbanua whose name appears in the compliant in one introductory sentence – defendant Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat are represented by their attorney-in-fact Hernani Magbanua with address at 4 Maningning Street, Sikatuna Village, Quezon city where he may be served with summons.[6] An attorney-in-fact is but an agent to whom a general or special power of attorney is issued by his principal. Laviña vs Court of Appeals 171 SCRA 691. Nothing in the complaint or its attachments reveal to us the full scope of the agency of Hernani Magbanua, not even its Annex B[7] which is a letter of Magbanua to the NHA and in which he seems to be only acting out the role of a negotiator for the Magbuhats.
Be that as it may, the critical question of whether he can receive summons for his principals will have to be resolved within the framework of the 1997 Rules. One of the first principles in the institution of civil actions, whether under the past or present rules, is that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. The sacramental phrase real party in interest is defined in the present Section 2, Rule 3 as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit. Under settled pronouncements of the Supreme Court, an attorney-in –fact or apoderado is not a real party in interest who may sue or be sued independently of the party he represents. Arroyo vs Granada 18 Phil 484. As reaffirmed in Salmon and Pacific Commercial Company vs Tan Cueco 36 Phil 556, actions must be brought by the real parties in interest and against the persons who are to be bound by the judgment obtained therein. A judgment for or against a party who is only an apoderado will in no way bind or affect his principals. Hence, the action against him alone is futile. To use the felicitous language of Arroyo vs Granada, a decision rendered therein touches no interest, settles no question, binds no party and quiets no litigation.
To be sure, there are actions which may be brought or defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity for another. Under the old rules, these parties may sue or be sued without joining the person for whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended. Lichauco vs Limjuco 19 Phil 12. The present Section 3, Rule 3 more studiously requires the inclusion of the beneficiary as the real party in interest. But representative parties, under the old or new rules, are limited in number. They are identified as the trustee of an express trust, a guardian, executor or administrator or party authorized by law or the rules. An agent may sue or be sued without joining his principal only when he acts in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal and the contact does not involve things belonging to the principal. Where the principals are disclosed or identified, as in the instant case, the agent or apoderado must be joined by the principals as the real parties in interest. Lichauco vs Limjuco, ibid., at 14.We may notice that the complaint does implead both the Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat and the attorney-in-fact Hernani Magbanua. Thus, as we have taken pains to explain, the summons must be issued to the heirs who are the principals of Magbanua and the real parties in interest.
There are two modes of service of summons on the defendants – personal and substituted. They are implemented under strict conditions stated in Section 6 and 7 or Rule 14. Generally, summons must be served personally on the defendant, and substituted service is allowed only when personal service cannot be effected within a reasonable time. Substituted service is effected (a) by leaving copy of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person of suitable age and discretion residing therein, or (b) leaving a copy at defendant’s office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The service of summons on the agent Hernani Magbanua did not comply with the modes necessary to bring the defendants into this action. It was not shown through the return that summons was served personally on the defendants, or if this was not reasonably possible, at their place of residence through a person residing therein or at their office or place of business through someone in charge. It does not appear that Magbanua resides in the house or is in charge of the office of any defendant such as to be vested with the authority to receive the summons for another.
There being no summons served on the defendants, they may not be declared in default. At root, the court has acquired no jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs and, hence, cannot proceed in any way against them. In Laus vs Court of Appeals 219 SCRA 688, all acts of the court against a party who had not been validly served with summons, such as the order of default, judgment and execution were declared null and void. Similarly, the order of July 3, 1997 declaring the defendants-heirs in default is a nullity.
Against the hollow disclaimers of the petitioners, movant Helen Magbuhat must be considered a real party in interest, being the surviving spouse of a son of Santiago Magbuhat. She belongs to the collectivity of the heirs who have been sued under the nomenclature Heirs of Santiago Magbuhat. She comes under the category of a party declared in default who, under Section 3 (b), Rule 9, may at any time before judgment file a motion to set aside the order of default. Even assuming that she is not a party in interest and hence not authorized to file the motion, a court may still motu proprio set aside any order that is void for lack of jurisdiction. Andaya vs Abadia 228 SCRA 705.
The lower court has acted correctly in neutralizing the obvious contretemps in the July 3, 1997 default order before any real damage is done.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Barrios, (Chairman) and Romilla-Lontok, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, at 19-26
[2] Ibid., at 30.
[3] Ibid., at 31.
[4] Ibid., at 33-35.
[5] Ibid., at 16-17.
[6] Ibid., at 19-20.
[7] Ibid., at 28.