A.M. No. (2170-MC) P-1356. November 21, 1979
HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, COMPLAINANT, VS. DIOSDADO S. FLORES, RESPONDENT.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
In a letter dated July 15, 1976 addressed to the Supreme Court,
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City,
recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy
Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court, on the following grounds:
“1. Conviction for libel on April 28, 1967,
(Criminal Case No. Q-7171), Branch IV, Court of First Instance, Quezon City), a
crime involving moral turpitude. He was
sentenced to pay a fine of
P500.00, which he paid on July 18, 1974, under Official Receipt No. 4736418.
2. Persistent
attempts to unduly influence the undersigned amounting to undue interest in
cases pending before Branch VI as shown by his handwritten notes to the
undersigned and to my present deputy clerk of court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.
On March 8, 1976, Mr. Flores was relieved from his position as
Deputy Clerk of Court upon request of the undersigned primarily to dissociate
myself from these actuations of Mr. Flores, which I strongly disapproved of,
and to avail my Court of the services of a full-fledged lawyer with unquestionable
integrity. After his transfer, as can
be seen from his handwritten notes, he persisted in taking this unwarranted
course of action in at least three (3) cases of Branch VI.
3. Gross
discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and
unjustified use of strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City
Judges, when he wrote a letter, dated March 11, 1976.”[1]
In a resolution of this Court dated July 29, 1976, Deputy Clerk
of Court Diosdado S. Flores was required to file his answer to the letter of
Judge Remigio E. Zari and this case was transferred to the First Division.[2]
The respondent filed his answer[3] on
August 12, 1976 wherein he alleged, among others, that his conviction for libel
did not involve moral turpitude; that the then Commissioner Abelardo Subido,
who was also convicted of the crime of libel and was fined P5,000.00, had
approved his appointment as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City
Court of Quezon City; that the respondent never tried to unduly influence the
complainant in the discharge of the latter’s duties and responsibilities; that
while respondent’s language in his letter dated March 11, 1976 is strong, the
same could not be considered contemptuous either directly or indirectly, in as
much as he was merely expressing the sentiments of an aggrieved employee who
deserves a better treatment from his superior after more than six years and nine months of highly
dedicated and very efficient service in the City Court of Quezon City; that if
ever respondent requested favors from his superior, these were all done in the
spirit of friendship which the complainant professed to him before he left
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City on March 9, 1976; that from October
15, 1975 up to his illegal transfer on March 8, 1976, the respondent was
practically doing the work of the complainant; that the respondent has tutored
the complainant on the fine interpretation and application of the law; that it
was Judge Zari who tried to corrupt him as may be gathered from the following
instances: On January 8, 1976, after
the trial in Criminal Case No. VI-5783 vs. Juanito Chua and two criminal cases
against Emerito Lim, Judge Zari instructed the respondent to conduct an ocular
inspection on the illegal constructions, subject of the cases; that Judge Zari,
likewise, told the respondent to join him for lunch at Alfredo’s Steakhouse in
Quezon City; that after conducting the ocular inspection, the respondent
proceeded to Alfredo’s Steakhouse where he joined Judge Zari, Fiscal Loja and
the defense counsel of Chua and Lim; that thereafter, Judge Zari directed the
respondent not to prepare anymore his report on the ocular inspection of the
site; that up to the time of his illegal transfer, the respondent did not see the records of said criminal
cases anymore; that in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 vs. Corazon and Macaria
Tolentino, for the crime of estafa, the respondent was instructed to convict
both the accused because the complainant was a relative of a certain Judge
Erochi; and that in Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 versus Gerundio
Villanueva Y Elazo, Dominador Garcia Y Orteza and Balbino Domingo Y Ramos, for
the crime of theft, he was instructed by Judge Zari to convict the accused
Dominador Garcia Y Orteza because according to said Judge, the complainant is
AVESCO.
In a resolution dated September 1, 1976,[4] this
Court required Judge Zari to file a reply to the answer of the respondent
within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
The complainant alleged in his reply to the answer of the
respondent that he had not allowed the respondent to interfere in the
preparation of orders and decisions; that while the complainant is aware of his
limitations, he is certainly not so naive as to allow someone not a member of
the Philippine Bar to “tutor” and give him finer interpretation of
the law; that he admits that Criminal Cases Nos. VI-5783 against Juanito Chua
and VI-5788-5789 against Emerito Lim are pending before his court; that he did
not call the respondent to his chamber and instruct him to conduct an ocular
inspection on the illegal constructions; that he did not invite the respondent
for lunch that day; that the truth was that after the trial, he went to
Alfredo’s Steakhouse in the company of his fiscal, Fiscal Guillermo Loja; that
while in the said place, the complainant was surprised to see the respondent in
the company of the accused; that he counseled the respondent to be more circumspect
as these people had cases before his sala; that it is true that from then on up
to the relief of the respondent on March 8, 1976, the records of the aforesaid
case could not be found by the respondent because the complainant had the
records brought inside his chamber in order to forestall any attempt on the
part of the respondent to manipulate the records; that he did not instruct the
respondent to convict the accused in Criminal Case No. VI-166624 and in
Criminal Cases Nos. VI-170682 and VI-170689 just because the complainant is a
relative of a certain Judge Erochi and AVESCO, respectively; and that he requested
Atty. Reynaldo Elcano to affix his initial in all orders, decisions and sentences in order to pinpoint responsibility.[5]
In his reply, the complainant additionally charged that when the
respondent applied for the position of Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, City
Court of Quezon City, he submitted, among others, an affidavit dated June 10,
1969 that contains the following statement “That I am a person of good
moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or police
record”; that the respondent also accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212
(1965) which was subscribed and sworn to before then Judge Oscar A. Inocentes;
that in the aforesaid data sheet, the respondent admits having acted as counsel
for three companies; and that the giving of legal advice by notaries and others
who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the welfare of the
community, because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by
submitting to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law.
This administrative case was referred to the Executive Judge of
Rizal, Quezon City, for investigation, report and recommendation after City
Judge Minerva Genovea and City Judge Aloysius Alday had been allowed to inhibit
themselves from investigating this case.[6]
District Judge Sergio A. F. Apostol who conducted the
investigation of this administrative case recommended that the respondent be
separated from the service on the following findings:
“The first charge is ‘conviction for libel which is a crime
allegedly involving moral turpitude’.
Presidential Decree No. 807, Sec. 36(b) No. 10 provides that one of
the grounds for disciplinary action is ‘conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude.’
Evidence adduced by the complainant which was admitted by the
respondent was that on April 28, 1967 respondent was convicted of the crime
of Libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of Branch IV of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. Respondent was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00 which he paid on July 18, 1974 under Official Receipt No. 276418.
‘Moral turpitude has been defined as including any act done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 1/
‘Some of the particular crimes which have been held to involve moral
turpitude are adultery, concubinage, 2/ rape, arson, evasion of income tax,
barratry, bigamy, blackmail, bribery, 3/ criminal conspiracy to smuggle opium,
dueling, embezzlement, extortion, forgery, libel, making fraudulent proof of
loss on insurance contract, murder, mutilation of public records, fabrication
of evidence, offenses against
pension laws, perjury, seduction under promise of marriage, 4/ estafa 5/ falsification
of public document 6/ estafa thru falsification of public document. 7/
‘Moral turpitude’ has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellow men,
to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and
duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals. 8/ It implies something immoral
in itself, regardless of the
fact that it is
(1/ In re Abesamis, Adm. Case No. 77, Jan. 17,
1958.
2/ In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. In re Isada, 60 Phil. 915.
3/ In
Re Dalmacio de los Angeles, Adm. Case No. 350, Aug. 7, 1959.
4/ In
re Basa, Phil. 275; See also In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263; July 31, 1962.
5/ Medina
vs. Bautista; Adm. Case No. 190,
Sept. 25, 1964; In re Venzon Adm. Case No. 561, April 27, 1967.
6/ De
Jesus Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, 7 SCRA 954, April 12, 1961; In Re
Avanceña Adm. Case No. 407, 20 SCRA 1012, Aug. 15, 1967.
7/ In
Re Basa, 41 Phil. 275. Cited in
Martins, Rules of Court, Vol. 6, pp. 228-229.
8/ Tak
Ng vs. Republic of the Phil., G. R. No. L-13017, Dec. 23, 1959.)
punishable
by law or not. It must not merely be
mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. 9/ Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in the fact of their being positively prohibited. 10/ Hence,
the crime of illegal possession of firearm or ammunition does not involve moral
turpitude for under our laws, what is punishable is the possession
of a firearm or ammunition without a license or authority. 11/
‘Bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude.’
12/
However in another, the Supreme Court seems to imply that libel is
not a crime involving moral turpitude.
‘The mere filing of an information for libel, or serious slander,
against a municipal officer is not a ground for suspending him from office, as such offenses do not necessarily involve
moral turpitude. 13/
When respondent submitted his application for the position of
Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI, City Court of Quezon City, he submitted
among others an affidavit dated June 10, 1969, which reads as follows:
‘That I am a person of good moral character and integrity and
(9/ 41 C.J. 212.
10/ State Medical Board vs. Rogers, 79 S. W. 2d
83.
11/ See Opinion No. 210, Secretary of Justice,
series of 1948; see also opinion of Secretary of Justice, April 16, 1940.
12/ 7 C.J. S. 736; 5 Am. 428; In Re de los
Angeles, Adm. Case No. 350, Aug. 7, 1959.
13/ Burguetta vs. Mayor, G. R. No. L-6538, May 10,
1954; 50 O. G. 2447.)
have no administrative, criminal or police
record.’
On blank space of a personal data sheet opposite question No. 10,
which asked if applicant has previously been convicted of a criminal offense,
accused placed no. It was later
discovered that accused was previously convicted of theft. Accused was acquitted of falsification of
public document under Art. 171, par. 4, because there is no legal obligation to
reveal previous conviction. 14/ However he maybe guilty of perjury under Art. 183. 15/
One of the grounds for disciplinary action under PD 807, Sec. 36(b)
under No. 13 is ‘falsification of public documents.’
The second charge is ‘persistent attempts to unduly influence the
complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI as
shown by his handwritten notes to the complainant and to his present Deputy
Clerk of Court, Atty. Reynaldo Elcano.’
Respondent admitted that in writing the four (4) notes (Exhibits
‘F’, ‘F-1’, ‘F-2’, & ‘F-3’), he intervened for and in behalf of Gaw Chin in
Criminal Case No. VI-6196 pending before the sala of the complainant because
the accused was a compadre of his
friend, Salvador Estrada.
On the other hand, the defense of the respondent is that he was
practically doing the work of the complainant and tutoring him in the finer
interpretation and application of the law, and he was preparing the decisions
in both criminal and civil cases. Thus he was not trying to influence the
complainant.
(14/ People vs. Poserio, C.A. 53 O.G. 6159.
15/ People
vs. Cruz, 108 Phil. 255; Bermejo v. Barrios, 31 SCRA 704.)
The notes marked as Exhibits ‘F’, ‘F-1, ‘F-2’, & ‘F-3’ speak
for themselves. There is no need for the undersigned to quote the
same.
‘A proposition by an attorney to his client to visit with his wife
the family of the judge before whom the client’s cause is to be heard, and to
endeavor, in conversation thus to be had in advance of the hearing, to commit the
judge to an expression of opinion favorable to the client’s case warrants his
dismissal from the bar. 16/
The acts of the respondent amounts to conducts prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. 17/
The Third charge is ‘discourtesy to superior Officers as manifested
by respondent in calling for and unjust use of strong and contemptuous
language in addressing the city judges when he wrote the letter, dated March
11, 1976.’
To quote the pertinent provisions of Exhibit ‘D’:
‘By the tenor of your reply, you have made the change of heart and
have developed cold feet. You have
badly shaken my belief in your credibility. Indeed, you are truly a woman, very fickle and unpredictable, but very
impulsive.’
‘I take this as a clear indication of your desire to enlist the
sympathies and, if possible, like the other five (5) judges, involved them in
the mess originally of your own making and design and align them with you
against me, hoping to impress upon me that by the tyranny of numbers, I will be
convinced that mine is a lost cause.’
‘However, I regret to inform the six of you that by your conduct, you
have dismally failed to live up to your oaths, x x’
(16/ Exp. p. Cole, 6 F. Cas. No. 2793, 1 McCrary,
405.
17/ Sec.
36 (b) No. 27, PD 807.)
‘Kindly pardon me if I say that, the six of you must be out of your wits when you all decided to lay
the blame on me and condemned without trial for the alleged inefficiency.’
‘Yes, when you all decided to sacrifice me you are all laboring
under deep and nagging hallucinations, induced and prompted by your serious concern
to save the face of a colleague.’
‘By the way, could any of
the Honorable Judges of Branches
I, III, V & IX honestly and truthfully say the public service in their
respective branches is efficient, so that they could now come to the succor of
a colleague and are also competent to promote the efficiency in Branch
VI. My God, if that is true, promotions
of Judges in the City Court would be fast, the Purge in the Judiciary would not
have affected Quezon City and the unprepared and the inexperienced would not have come to the Bench.’
Respondent reasoned out that the use of strong language by him in
his letter was justified and very much
called for it being the indubitable manifestation of the indignation and
disgust of the respondent, urged upon him by the complainant who engineered the respondent’s illegal transfer from Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City which he holds a valid
and subsisting appointment to the Appeal and Docket Division, by virtue of a
letter of the Executive Judge (Exhibit ’43’), to quote the pertinent provision
of which;
‘as a measure to promote more efficient public service, after due
and circumspect deliberation by and among the judges.’
pursuant to the authority granted to the
executive judge under Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court which
provides as follows:
‘To re-assign temporarily the personnel of one branch (sala) to
another branch (sala) or to the Office of the Clerk of Court, in case of vacancy
in the position of Presiding Judge of a branch (sala), or when the Interest of
the service requires. In the latter
case, the assignment shall be made in consultation with the Presiding Judge of
the branch (sala) concerned; and in case of disagreement, the assignment of
the Executive Judge shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the
Supreme Court.’
The transfer was made in consultation with the presiding judge of
the branch concerned who is the complainant in this case.
‘A detail is the movement of an employee from one agency to another
without the issuance of an appointment and shall be allowed, only for a limited
period in the case of employees
occupying professional, technical and scientific positions. If the employee believes that there is no
justification for the detail, he may appeal his case to the commission. Pending appeal, the decision to detail the
employee shall be executory unless otherwise ordered by the commission.’ 18/
‘An employee may be reassigned from one organizational unit to
another in the same agency. Provided: That such reassignment shall not involve reduction in rank, status or
salary.’ 19/
In the instant case there was actually a reassignment of employee
from one branch to the Office of the Clerk of Court in accordance with
Administrative Order No. 6 of the Supreme Court and in consonance with PD 807.
(18/ Sec. 24 (g), PD 807.
19/ Ibid.)
‘The language of attorney in his motion for reconsideration
referring to the Supreme Court as a ‘Civilized, democratic tribunal,’ but by innuendo would suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing the Court’s decision as ‘false, erroneous and illegal’ and accusing
two justices for being interested in the decision of the case without any
basis in fact; asking the other members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or benefits received from any of the petitioners
including the President — constitute disrespectful language to the
Court. It undermines and degrades the
administration of justice.’
‘The language is necessary for the defense of client is no
justification. It ill behooves an
attorney to justify his disrespectful language with the statement that it was
necessary for the defense of his client. A client’s cause does not perment
an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must always keep in perspective the
thought that ‘since lawyers are administrators of justice, oathbound servants
of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to
the administration of justice; to this their client’s success is wholly subordinate;
and their conduct ought to and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics.’ 20/
Thru the use of uncalled language, respondent had committed
insubordination, a ground for disciplinary action. 21/
(20/ Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA, Jan. 9, 1970.
21/ Sec.
36(b) No. 25, PD 807.)”[7]
The evidence of record supports the findings of the investigating judge.
It is a fact that the respondent was convicted of libel in
Criminal Case No. Q-7171 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, at
Quezon City. While this fact alone is
not sufficient to warrant disciplinary action, the respondent’s conviction for
libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others. His letter dated March 11, 1976 to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then
Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon City[8]
contains defamatory and uncalled for language.
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases
pending in Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City, presided by the
complainant, Judge Remigio E. Zari, show that the respondent had exerted undue
influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.[9]
It is true that conviction for libel does not automatically
justify removal of a public officer.[10]
However, the fact of conviction for libel of the respondent, taken together
with the letter he wrote to then Executive City Judge of the City Court of
Quezon City, Judge Minerva C. Genovea, shows the tendency of the respondent to
malign people.
Respondent’s act of interfering in the cases pending before
Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon City presided by the complainant is
inimical to the service. This alone
warrants severe disciplinary measures.
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge
Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10, 1969, the respondent stated “That I am a person
of good moral character and integrity and have no administrative, criminal or
police record.” This averment is not true because the respondent had been
convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is
another ground for serious disciplinary action.
The removal from the service of the respondent is warranted by
the evidence adduced during the investigation conducted by Judge Sergio A. F.
Apostol of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVI, Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is hereby
DISMISSED as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the City Court of Quezon
City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any
government instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled
corporations effective upon the finality of this decision.
Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal record.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 3-4.
[2]
Rollo, p. 33.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 35-39.
[4]
Rollo, p. 46.
[5]
Rollo, pp. 47-53.
[6]
Rollo, p. 71.
[7]
Rollo, pp. 188-194.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 188-194.
[8]
Annex “D”, Rollo, pp. 30-32.
[9]
Annex “B” and Annex “C”, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[10]
Villanos vs. Subido, 45 SCRA 299.