MAMASAW SULTAN ALI, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. BAGUINDA-ALI PACALNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, HON. PUNDAYA A. BERUA, ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, HADJI IBRA DARIMBANG, CLERK OF COURT AND MANDAG U…

Pacalna versus Sultan Ali

The Case

This is a petition for judicial clemency filed by Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna, a former presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Balindong in Lanao del Sur, against the administrative penalties earlier imposed on him by the Supreme Court. He does not challenge the findings of guilt; he asks the Court to reduce the fine and, in effect, to clear the way for his return to the judiciary. The case matters because it gathers into one ruling the Court's settled standards for judicial clemency and shows how strictly those standards are applied to a judge twice disciplined for dishonesty and grave misconduct.

Procedural History

The case began as an administrative complaint filed by Mamasaaw Sultan Ali against Judge Pacalna, docketed as an administrative matter before the Supreme Court. In a decision dated September 25, 2007, the Court found the respondent administratively liable for dishonesty, serious misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law or procedure, and also for violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Court fined him 20,000 pesos, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely, and reprimanded Court Stenographer Mandag Batua-an with a similar warning. The respondent filed no motion for reconsideration and paid the fine on December 3, 2007.

One week after that decision, a second administrative complaint was filed against him by members of the Marawi City Police. On August 17, 2011, the Court's First Division adopted the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Court Administrator, held him liable for grave misconduct, and imposed six months of suspension, converted to forfeiture of the corresponding amount of his salary. That administrative matter was indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office for the filing of criminal charges for violation of Presidential Decree Number 1829, on obstruction of justice. His motion for reconsideration was denied on January 23, 2013. A criminal complaint for obstruction of justice was then filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao on September 4, 2013.

The respondent resigned on December 1, 2009, while the second administrative case was still being investigated. He later applied for a seat on the Regional Trial Court of Marawi City, Branch 9, and was interviewed by the Judicial and Bar Council in Cagayan de Oro City in November 2012. He then filed this petition for judicial clemency directly with the Supreme Court, asking that the 20,000 peso fine be reduced to 10,000 pesos.

Facts

In the first administrative case, the Court found that the respondent exhibited gross ignorance of procedure in handling election cases involving petitions for inclusion of voters in the barangay elections. The delays were such that the complainant's name was not timely included in the master list, and he was consequently not considered a candidate for barangay chairman. The Court held that such failure to observe fundamental rules on petitions for inclusion could not be excused.

The Court further found that the respondent intentionally fabricated an order supposedly granting a motion for intervention by the counsel for the incumbent mayor, whose re-election the complainant and his co-petitioners were allegedly not willing to support. That act of fabricating an order to cover up his official shortcomings constituted dishonesty, which the Court described as a reprehensible act it would not sanction.

In the second administrative case, the Court found that the respondent misused his authority when, over the vigorous objection of the complainant police officers, he took custody of an accused detained on carnapping charges by merely issuing a signed handwritten acknowledgment receipt, with an undertaking to present the accused to the court when ordered. The accused was never returned to jail, and although the case against him was dismissed, no order for release was issued by the court. The respondent tried to justify his act as aid given by virtue of his position as Sultan in his hometown, but the Court found him liable for grave misconduct. Because he had already resigned, the penalty of dismissal could no longer be imposed, and he was instead meted six months of suspension converted to forfeiture of the corresponding salary. As certified by the Office of the Court Administrator on October 25, 2013, the amount of 209,810 pesos and 70 centavos, corresponding to six months of his salary, was deducted from his terminal leave benefits.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent's petition for judicial clemency should be granted, or at least the fine reduced to 10,000 pesos.
• Whether or not the respondent has shown proof of remorse and reformation sufficient to justify clemency under the guidelines laid down by the Court.

Applicable Provisions

The Court applied its own guidelines in the resolution of requests for judicial clemency, laid down in the matter of the letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz appealing for judicial clemency, which provides:

There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

This first guideline bears directly on the case because the respondent offered no independent proof of remorse and reformation, and his second administrative offense creates the very presumption the guideline warns against.

Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reformation. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

This guideline frames the inquiry into whether enough time has passed for genuine reform, a matter the Court weighs together with the applicant's remaining productive years.

There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

This guideline requires the applicant to demonstrate promise and potential for public service beyond his own assertions.

There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

This catch-all guideline allows the Court to consider any other circumstance that might justify mercy, of which the Court found none in this case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court denied the petition for lack of merit. It held that clemency, as an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the courts, and that the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.

On the second issue, the Court found that the petition was not supported by any single proof of the respondent's professed repentance. His appeal rested solely on his avowed intention to return to the judiciary, on his personal belief that he could be an effective instrument in the delivery of justice in Lanao del Sur because of his seventeen years of experience, and on his promise before the Almighty God and the Court that he would never repeat the acts or omissions he had committed as a judge. He claimed to have learned enough lessons during the three years he was jobless and that his family had suffered so much because of his shortcoming. Apart from his own declarations, there was no independent evidence or relevant circumstance to justify clemency.

The Court stressed that, given the gravity of his transgressions, it became more imperative to require factual support for his allegations of remorse and reform. It recalled that a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice, that he must comport himself in a manner free of a whiff of impropriety both in the performance of his official duties and in his behavior outside his sala and as a private individual, and that his character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The Court also noted that his second administrative offense had led to the filing of a criminal complaint for obstruction of justice against him.

Doctrine

Judicial clemency is an act of mercy that removes a disqualification, but it is never a matter of right. The Court grants it only upon a showing that it is merited, and the applicant bears the burden of proving remorse and reformation by independent evidence, such as certifications or testimonials from officers or chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations, and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. Bare declarations of repentance, promises to reform, and claims of experience and good intention do not suffice.

A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct gives rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. The gravity of the applicant's transgressions increases the need for factual support for his allegations of remorse and reform. Clemency must always be balanced against the preservation of public confidence in the courts, because a judge is the visible representation of the law and of justice and must be free even of the appearance of impropriety.

Disposition

The Court denied the petition for judicial clemency filed by former Judge Baguinda-Ali A. Pacalna for lack of merit, leaving the 20,000 peso fine and the earlier penalties in place.

Remember This

The one line to memorize is that clemency is granted only upon proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise, and that a second administrative offense for the same or similar misconduct raises a strong presumption of non-reformation. Examiners use this case to test the judicial clemency guidelines and the ethical standard that a judge's conduct must be free of even a whiff of impropriety.