KOPPEL (PHIL.), INC., PETITIONER, VS. AURELIO JAVELLANA, SR., AND THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Koppel (Phil.), Inc. prays for
review of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission awarding
compensation benefits to Aurelio Javellana, Sr.

Respondent Javellana started working as salesman for Petitioner on
March 22,
1954
without undergoing pre-employment physical examination. Prior thereto he had
been confined in the Iloilo TB Pavillion, where he was
treated for pulmonary tuberculosis from January 13 to April
29, 1953.
His last fluoroscopic examination in June 1953 revealed “minimal lesions” in the
right lung and a “prominent hilar shadow” in the left.
A few weeks after his employment, however, Javellana
was examined by Dr. Agustin Bencer at the instance of
petitioner’s Davao branch manager, Max Stuessi, and allowed to continue working. Respondent’s
duties as salesman took him through Koronadal, Cotabato, lligan City, northwestern
Mindanao, Misamis Occidental, Lanao, the
northern part of Zamboanga,
Davao City and the
province of Davao. In those travels he took any
available means of transportation although later on he was allowed to use the
company’s pick-up truck, which he drove personally.

Sometime in November 1956, having
driven the truck to lligan, respondent spat blood and
was confined at the Mindanao Sanitarium in
lligan City. Upon Stuessi’s orders he went back to
Davao City, where he was X-rayed and
examined by Dr. Gantioque. He was then sent to the
Quezon Institute in Manila, where he was confined from
December 26,
1956 to
January 24,
1957. A
week after his discharge, again upon Stuessi’s
instruction, he resumed his duties as salesman. Several weeks later, he was
assigned as acting officer-in-charge of petitioner’s Cotabato Office, at the same time continuing to perform his
duties as salesman in the area.

On April
21, 1958
while respondent was driving the company truck to
lligan City, it developed some defect in the
brakes, and fell into a ravine. He sustained injuries in one of his ears and on
his left arm and complained of chest and back pains. He was taken to the Cagayan de Oro Provincial
Hospital, where he stayed three days, after which he was confined for, a week at
the Brokenshire Hospital. Late in May 1958 he again
resumed his duties as salesman in lligan City. On November & 1938 Dr.
Diosdado Tech of the Davao
Chest Center X-rayed him and found that his tuberculosis was active in a far
advanced stage.

On September 30, 1959 respondent
filed in Office No. 3, Department of Labor, a compensation alleging that his
pulmonary illness had been aggravated by the nature and conditions of his
employment. The claim was dismissed by the hearing officer, but reconsidered by
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, which after hearing, ordered petitioner
to pay respondent P4,000.00 as compensation, minus the sum of P1,098.00 which it
had previously paid him. The Commission denied a motion for reconsideration,
whereupon the company filed the instant petition for review.

The first issue raised by
petitioner is the question of compensability. Petitioner contends that the
Commission erred in holding (1) that the claimant’s work and the vehicular
accident which befell him aggravated his pre-existing illness and (2) that the
mere “worsening” of his ailment was equivalent to “aggravation” within the
meaning of Section 2 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

The company maintains that before
an employee may be awarded compensation benefits due to the aggravation of his
disease he must prove that he had a pre-existing dormant or inactive disease;
that an injury which is in itself compensatory lighted up or aggravated the
same; that the aggravation or acceleration must be substantial or material
beyond the natural progress of the disease; and that the injury or accident must
have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. Petitioner points out
that in a number of states in the American Union the laws on Workmen’s
Compensation cover only occupational diseases, while in other states they cover
principally industrial injuries accidentally sustained and arc generally
construed as not including occupational diseases (3 Schneider’s Workmen’s
Compensation Law 497). Citing decisions in this latter group, where only
non-occupational diseases are compensate, petitioner argues that to be
compensable respondent’s illness must be shown to have been aggravated by a
determinate injury or accident sustained at work. The decisions relied upon,
however, are Hot in point here in view of our own law on compensation.

Section 2 of Act No. 3428
provides that when an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other
illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the
result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation.

The conclusion reached by the
Commission that the aggravation of respondent’s illness was attributable to his
Koppel (Phil.) Inc. vs. Javellana, Sr. and WCC
employment is premised on the following findings of fact: The disease was in its
minimal stage when petitioner first employed respondent on March 22,
1954. His
work as salesman took him to different places, traveling over rugged, bumpy and
dusty roads. He would often rise as early as three o’clock in the morning to
catch buses bound for his destination. He underwent considerable physical strain
when driving the company’s pick-up truck. At times, when his destination could
not be reached by any means of transportation, he had to go on foot.

These circumstances affected his
health; his minimal tuberculosis become moderately advanced and caused him to
spit blood. In spite of this petitioner allowed him to resume work after a short
rest and treatment at the Quezon Institute, Because of
the accident he had while driving the company’s pick-up truck he was again
hospitalized. And although he complained of chest and back pains he was
permitted by petitioner to resume his work as salesman. There can be no doubt
that his illness was aggravated by his employment, so much so that when he was
X-rayed on November 6, 1958, it was discovered that his tuberculosis was already
in a far-advanced stage. It is significant likewise that on December 8, 1959,
that fat after respondent retired from his employment, his physical condition
improved and his tuberculosis regressed to a moderately advanced stage only.

“Another situation arises when
the disease antedates the injury or the exposure to unfavorable conditions. If
the employee has tuberculosis in an inactive or dormant form, and the injury or
exposure lights up or activates the disease, that constitutes a compensable
injury. This is on the theory that the injury or exposure set in motion a force
or disease that possibly would never have manifested Us presence had it not been
activated by injury or exposure. The same rule applies when there is an active
tubercular condition and the injury or exposure aggravates the malady and
possibly accelerates the demise of the victim. This is compensable when the
increased intensity of the disease is traceable to the injury or exposure. In a
word, every employee is taken as he is, with his infirmities, whether few or
many, and those infirmities are not to he aggravated or accelerated
unnecessarily during his employment. And to the extent they are aggravated or
accelerated by accidental injuries and in some states to exposures to hazardous
conditions not necessarily constituting an accident, compensation may be
awarded.” 5 Schneider’s Workmen’s Compensation Law
501.

The next issue is with respect to
the amount which, prior to the award, petitioner paid to respondent and which
must therefore be deducted from the amount of compensation due the latter. The
Commission allowed the deduction of only P1,098.00,
this being the amount which petitioner mentioned in its “Employer’s
Supplementary Report” dated April 4,
1959.
However, on June 13,
1959, it
submitted to the Commission another “Employer’s Supplementary Report,” wherein
it stated that the amount it had paid respondent was really P1,199.00. The first report, as now pointed out, must have been
a mistake. It refers to payment of P1,098.00 for 15
weeks and 5 days or 3 months 19 days,” but the correct amount for such period of
time, at respondent’s salary of P330.00 a month, is P1,199.00. This is the
amount that should have been deducted from the compensation due to respondent.

We now come to the amount of
P1,237.50 which respondent had likewise received from
petitioner. The Commission refused to subtract this amount from respondent’s
compensation award on the ground that it constituted retirement pay. The ruling
is based on the fact that in the voucher covering the payment it is referred to
as retirement pay” and as “retirement credits of Salesman A.E. Javellana from March 22, 1954 to March 31, 1959 at 6.25% of
P330.00 (monthly salary) per month, or P20.625 x 60 months.” But it appears that
on the same day the amount was paid the parties executed on “Agreement and
Release,” out of the provisions of which was that “all claims of whatever nature
and kind which employee has or may have against employer and its officer be
considered fully satisfied upon payment of the Catapang vs. WCC and Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. sum of one thousand two hundred thirty seven pesos and fifty
centavos (P1,237.50), provided that, with respect to any Workmen’s compensation
to which employee may be entitled and in the event that the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission awards employee an amount greater than P1,237.50, said
sum of P1,237.50 shall be considered as an advance against the amount so awarded
to employee.”

The terms of the agreement are
quite clear. Should the Commission grant compensation to respondent said amount
would be deemed as an advance on the award. This does not run counter to Section
7 of our Compensation law, which says that any contract, regulation or device of
any sort intended to exempt the employer from all or part of the liability
created by the law shall be null and void the agreement does not in any way
exempt petitioner from paying compensation should respondent be declared
entitled thereto. It merely provides that the payment voluntarily made shall be
deemed as an advance payment on any compensation to be awarded. There is nothing
illegal in this agreement and it must be given effect.

The decision appealed from is
modified, by allowing the deduction of the sums of P1, 199.00 And P1,237.50 from the award of P4,000.00 in favor of respondent,
leaving balance of P1 ,563.50, which petitioner should pay respondent Javellana. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Bengzon, J.P.
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.