EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. FEDERICO M. CHTJAHIONG AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

This alternative petition either for review of an order of the
Public Service Commission or for certiorari to annul the same poses the
question of first impression whether or not said Government institution
may validly require a common carrier to refund transportation charges
collected by it in excess of the rates previously fixed by the
Commission.

The controversy arose upon a complaint submitted by Federico M.
Chua Hiong of Manila against the Everett Steamship Corporation,
operating a number of vessels in the inter-island trade. Complainant
alleged that for certain shipments of logs, the steamship collected
from him a total of P40,490 exceeding the authorized rates by the
amount of P18,064.75.

“It appears from the evidence” said the Commission after a hearing
“that complainant is a lumber dealer in the City of Manila with a
branch office in the port of Aparri, Cagayan; that complainant used to
load lumber in the boats of respondent from said port of Aparri to
Manila; that from July 6, 1946 to April 2, 1948, complainant actually
loaded 1,939.90 cubic meters of lumber of different sizes in the boats
of respondent; that respondent collected for said load the sum of
P40,490 as freight charge, and that on the basis of the special
commodity rate of P8.50 per cubic meter plus 35 per cent authorized by
the Commission, respondent should have collected only the sum of
P22.425.25.

The special commodity rate of P8.50 per cubic meter is equivalent
to the basic rate of P6.80 prior to the War plus the surcharge of 25
per cent also authorized before the War, which rate of P8.50 was
further authorized to be increased by 35 per cent on July 29, 1946 in
Case No. 12113. The two increases of 25 per cent and 35 per cent are in
effect equivalent to an increase of approximately 70 per cent of the
basic rate of P6.80 per cubic meter. The present rate as already
increased is P8.50 per cubic meter for all shipowners including
respondent.

The evidence further shows that complainant did not know of the
existing rates authorized the respondent’s vessels; that he came to.
know about them only on April 15, 1948, when he received the reply of
the Commission, Exhibit “G”, to his letter of January .9, 1948,
informing him of the rates authorized the respondent and of the
difference between his payments and the payments he ought to have made
for the shipments specified in said letter.”

On the basis of the foregoing findings’ the Commission imposed upon
the Steamship a fine of P200 and ordered it to refund to the
complainant the sum of P18,064.75 representing the overcharges.

The petitioner maintains that: (a) it has not demanded payment in excess of the authorized rates; (b) the complainant’s remedy has prescribed; (c) the Commission has no legal power or jurisdiction to compel the carrier to repay the overcharges and (d)
anyway the whole proceeding is void because, in violation of law, the
Commission entrusted the reception of evidence to one Tomas Canehela,
an assistant to the Public Service Commissioner.

A. There seems to be no question that the transported materials
required for application of the so-called special commodity rates
binding on the petitioner. Measured by those rates, the charges were
excessive. Petitioner, however, pleads that inasmuch as upon
application of the De la Rama Steamship Co. those rates were
temporarily suspended in an order authorizing such steamship line to
collect ordinary rates (which are higher) the petitioner may also
impose such “ordinary” rates. Otherwise petitioner avers, there would
be an instance of discrimination. Petitioner then proceeds to
demonstrate that applying those “ordinary rates” there was no excessive
collection.

The argument must be overruled. The rates allowed to De la Rama
were applicable to its vessels alone, as the Commission says. In
permitting those rates, the Commission must have considered special
circumstances favoring the De la Rama Steamship Co. The mere fact that
for certain commodities some vessels are allowed to charge more than
others does not constitute discrimination; because the difference might
be due to disparity of operating and maintenance expenses, to hazard of
the routes, or to other factors taken into account in determining the
proper rates to be exacted by a particular public utility.

B. On the second point, it appears that the complaint was filed on
June 2, 1948. According to the Commission’s findings the complainant
came to know the violations committed by the respondent only on April
15, 1948 when he received a reply to his letter of inquiry addressed to
the Commission, informing him of the rates the respondent had been
authorized to demand. The complaint was therefore submitted vithin the
sixty-day period prescribed by section 28 of Commonwealth Act No. .146,
or the greater period of one hundred and eighty days, inasmuch as such
period does not begin to run until the violation is discovered
(Pangasinan Transportation Co. Inc. vs. Phil. Farming Co., 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. 1, 55).^[*]

C. The third proposition of the petitioner is that the Public
Service Commission has no legal authority to order the carrier or
public service to return freight overcharges. It invokes our decisions
holding that said Commission possesses only such powers as are
expressly or impliedly conferred on it by constitutional or statutory
provisions and such incidental powers as may be requisite to carry out
those granted. Those decisions are good law, and we see no reason to
depart from them.

However, when the Commission is empowered by law to fix the rates
of freight which vessels may charge, it is implied that the vessels may
not legally demand more than those rates. The petitioner has collected
more than those rates, and profited to the tune of P18,064.75. It is of
course liable to a maximum fine of P200 which the Commission is
expressly empowered to impose under section 21. But if that is all the
sanction for violation of the rate schedule, a situation would arise
placing the Commission in a ridiculous predicament. Surely, after
pocketing more than eighteen thousand pesos (P18,064.75) the carrier
could very well laugh when ordered to pay P200. Does the law
contemplate such untenable position? Certainly not. Section 17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146 expressly grants the Commission power to
enforce compliance with any of its directives. To insure compliance
with its order fixing rates, the Commission believes it should have
power to direct a reparation or the return of the excessive rates
collected. It has exercised the power in previous cases. That view does
not seem to be unreasonable. As .a matter of fact in the United States
it is not unusual for Public Service authorities to’ require the refund
of overcharges collected.

1. United Gas Public Service Co. vs. State et al,
   (Tex.) 89 S. “W. (2d) p. 1094 at p. 1104. “The rule is settled that a
   public utility commission has the power to make its rate order
   retroactively effective as of any date after it has actually acquired
   jurisdiction of the cause, and, in consequence, may order tho refund of
   excessive rates paid from and after the retroactively effective date of
   the rate order.” See State ex rel. Eoynton vs. Public Service Commission of Kansas, P. U. E. 1933a, 415; State ex rel. Kansas City Terminal It. Co, vs. Public Service Com. 308 Mo. 359, 272 S. YV. 957-; 111. Cent. E. R. Co. vs. Vest (D. C.) 39 F. (2d) 658.

2. (Ark.) “The Department, upon exercising its power to make Si rate order
   effective on any date prior to its issuance subsequent to acquiring
   jurisdiction, can require a public utility to refund any amounts which
   it may have collected in excess of the newrate .between its effective
   date and that of its issuance.” Re Arkansas Power & Light Co.
   (1942) 4G P. TJ. R. (NS) 226.

3. (Cal.)
   “The Commission may order a reparation award only when it has found,
   after investigation, that the public utility has charged an
   unreasonable, excessive, or discriminatory amount.” Mettler vs. Southern P. Co. (1941) 40 P. TJ. R..(NS) 405.

4. (Pa.) “The Commission may not rest quiescent and permit a proceeding
   pending before it to be used for the collection of money by those not;
   morally entitled thereto; and its duty is to advise the public that if
   reparations are due to consumers the Commission will order them paid in
   accordance with, law, and that it is not necessary for any consumer to
   divide with anyone else that which is legally due him.” Public Utility
   Commission vs. Lipko (1940) 32 P. U. E. (NS) 268.

5. (Colo.)
   “The power conferred upon the Commission, p. 56 of Public Utilities
   Act, to award reparation of excessive or discriminatory charges made by
   a public utility, is inherent in its power to regulate and supervise
   the rates of such utility.” Copeland Ore Sampling Co. vs. Midland Terminal E. Co. P. U. R. 1917F, 182.

6. (La.) “The power and authority of the Commission under it;s rule (No.
   68) with respect to refunding overcharges on freight movements within
   the state adopted pursuant to the provision of the state Constitution
   (1921) is superior to that of a law (Act 223 of 1914) fixing a
   prescriptive period of two years as a bar to the recovery of
   overcharges.” Howard Kenyon Dredging Co. vs. Louisiana R. & Nav, Co. P. XJ. E. 1928E, 511.

7. (Okla. Sup. Ct.) “The Commission is vested with the power of a court of
   record to determine: First, the amount of refund due in all eases where
   any public service corporation, person, or firm, as defined by the
   Constitution, charges an amount for any service rendered by such
   public. service corporation, person, or firm, in excess of the lawful
   rate in force at the time such charge was made, or may thereafter be
   declared to be the legal rate which should have been applied to the
   service rendered; and, second, to whom the overcharge should be paid.”
   Section 1, Chap. 10, Laws 1913. Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. vs. State, P. U. E, 1922D, 450, 85 Okla. 223, 206 Pac, 236; Muskogee Gas & E. Co. vs. State, P. U. E. 1922E, 514, 86 Okla. 58, 206 Pac, 242.

There appears to be no cogent reason to regard this power as beyond
the scope of the administrative and quasi-judicial function of the
Public Service Commission, because the question involved in a
proceeding to demand reparation would merely be, whether the rate
charges were excessive, and whether such charges had been actually
received, questions’ which may properly be handled with its
quasi-judicial facilities.^[1]
If the order to return is not complied with, the Commission may choose
either to revoke any acquired right of the offending public service,^[2]
or else advise the offended party to initiate action in the courts to
compel specific performance of such order. Hence, there is no merit in
the third proposition of the petitioner.

D. The fourth is still less meritorious. It does not appear that at
any stage of the proceedings in the Commission the petitioner has
suggested or indicated any opposition to the introduction of evidence
before the Commission’s agent designated to receive the evidence. On
the contrary it presented such proofs as it deemed convenient. And only
when the findings turned out to be adverse did it choose to object on
the ground that the proceeding was invalid due to such procedural
defect. Applying our views in La Paz Ice Plants contra
Comision de Utilidades Publicas, 89 Phil., 109 we have to dismiss this
belated claim. The doctrine must be reiterated that in the conduct of
its hearings and investigations the Commission, is not strictly bound
by the rules of procedure established for judicial litigations
(Batangas Transportation Co. vs. Ochoa, G. R. No. 35345,
April 27, 1932, Public Service Act Annotated by Almario) nor by the
technical rules of legal evidence (Sec. 29 Public Service Law).

Wherefore, finding no prejudicial error in the order under review, we hereby deny the petition.

With costs.

Paras, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

^[1] Some
states deny such power to their public service officials. Yet our law
discloses no tendency to line up with them. On ths contrary it points
in the other direction, if we are to. judge from its ‘section 17 (d).

^[2] Section 16 (N) Public Service Law.