EUNILA MARAPO, FOR HERSELF AND FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, NAMELY, SAMUEL, ELIZABETH, BERNADETTE, CARMILITA, WILLIAM, LYDIA, MYRNA, LEOPOLDO AND MERCEDITA, ALL SURN…

This is a petition for review^[1]
of the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission affirming the order of
the Referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Regional Office No. XI of the
Department of Labor, Cagayan de Oro
City dismissing the claim for death compensation benefits of petitioners.  The claim is being considered under the
Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act No. 3428) before its amendment by the new Labor
Code (P.D. No. 442).

Eliseo Marapo
was employed by the respondent Philippine Packing Corporation on June 14, 1954 up to the time of his
death on April 20, 1971 or
approximately for a period of 16 years and 10 months as Security Guard.  He used to work for six (6) days a week for
eight (8) hours a day with a monthly salary of P400.00 and overtime pay for
working at night.  Respondent
corporation, however, claims that Eliseo Marapo used to receive a weekly salary of P59.52.

On April 4, 1971
Eliseo Marapo complained of
an illness which necessitated his confinement at the Philipps Memorial
Hospital owned by the respondent
corporation where after examination he was found to be suffering from amoebic
liver abscess.  He was operated on April 17, 1971 and three days
thereafter he died.  Surviving him are
his legitimate wife Eunila Marapo
and their nine (9) minor children, the petitioners herein, who filed a claim
for death compensation benefits with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit, Regional
Office No. XI, Cagayan de Oro
City.  On June 11, 1971, Eunila Marapo filed a Notice of Death and Claim for Compensation
arising from the death of her husband with the Workmen’s Compensation Unit,
Regional Office No. XI, Cagayan de Oro City.  On August 21,
1973 an ocular inspection of the premises of the deceased was conducted by the
Referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit and considering all the evidences
submitted, he rendered a decision dismissing the claim for compensation on the
ground that the illness that caused the death of the deceased Eliseo Marapo was not compensable
per se and that the said illness was not caused nor was it even
aggravated by the nature of the deceased’s work.  Petitioner appealed to the respondent
Workmen’s Compensation Commission imputing two errors allegedly committed by the
Referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit:

1.     
THAT THE REFEREE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT AMOEBIC
LIVER ABSCESS IS NOT COMPENSABLE PER SE.

2.     
THAT THE REFEREE ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF CLAIMANT, EUNILA MARAPO

The respondent Commission affirmed the
decision of the Referee by holding that amoebic liver abscess is not an
occupational disease and therefore not compensable per se.

Hence, this petition for review.

The main thrust of petitioner’s argument is that the deceased
acquired the disease during the course of his employment and therefore falls
within the legal presumption that it arose out of the employment or was at
least aggravated by such employment invoking a long line of cases to this
effect, more particularly the case of Lourdes Vda. de
Magalona vs. WCC,^[2]
which held:

“It is now unquestionable that once the illness supervened at
the time of the employment there is a rebuttable
presumption that such illness arose out of the employment or was at least
aggravated by such employment.  The
claimant is relieved from the burden of proving causation once the illness or
the injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment.  Thus the precise medical cause of the illness
is not legally significant, as long as the illness supervened in the course of
the employment.  The presumption of causation
or aggravation then applies.  The
function of the presumption is precisely to dispense with the need for
proof.” (Citing Justiniano vs. WCC, L-22774,
November 21, 1966; Agustin vs. WCC, L-19957, September 29, 1964).

Respondent Philippine Packing Corporation however contends that
the legal presumption of compensability is a rebuttable
one and the burden of proof is on the respondent to show that while the
deceased’s illness and subsequently his death supervened in the course of his
employment, it did not follow that it arose out of employment or was at least
aggravated by the nature of his employment. 
According to respondent Commission the respondent corporation has
adduced substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of
compensability.  Obviously the respondent
Commission gave credit to the testimony of Dr. Alberto Sison
to the effect that after a periodic laboratory examination of the source from
where the deceased got his water, he found the same to be potable without
considering the claim of the petitioners that the toilet system provided by the
respondent corporation was in a poor sanitary condition and that the faucet
from where they got their water was only three (3) feet away from the open
toilet bowls in the toilet and laundry area. 
It might be true that the source from where petitioners got their supply
of water was potable but not necessarily the water from the faucet where they
obtained water which was only three (3) feet from the open toilet bowls in the
toilet and laundry area.  According to
the evidence the faucet from where the deceased got his supply for drinking was
not brought direct to the house of the deceased but only near his
house.  This made the faucet exposed to
contamination.  Besides, the illness of
the deceased could not have come only from the water supply, but also from the
food that he ate.  Since the area where
the deceased lived was exposed to contamination, it is not improbable that he
could have been exposed to any kind of illness. 
Even conceding that respondent corporation had done its best to keep the
place in a sanitary condition, this does not preclude the possibility that any
of its employee could get the disease of the liver due to infected food.  The fact is the deceased acquired the illness
while living in the area provided by respondent corporation for its employees
and during the course of his employment, in which case the legal presumption mandated
by Section 44^[3]
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission that the illness arose out of or was
at least aggravated by the nature of his employment, holds true in favor of the
deceased.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the respondent
Commission denying the claim of petitioners is hereby reversed and set aside
and another one rendered ordering the respondent corporation to pay the
petitioners the amount of P6,000.00 as death compensation benefits plus the
amount of P200.00 as burial expenses for the deceased, with costs against
respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma, and Concepcion, Jr.,
JJ.,  concur.

^[1]
Treated as Special Civil Action as per Resolution this Court dated August 6, 1976.

^[2]
G.R. No. L-21849, December 11, 1967;
See also Talip vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-42575, May 31, 1976; Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA 228.

^[3]
“SEC. 44.  Presumption.  – In any proceeding, for the enforcement of
the claim for compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary –

1.      
That the claim comes within the provisions of
this Act;

2.      
That sufficient notice thereof was given;

3.      
That the injury was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the injured employee to bring about the
injury or death of himself or of another;

4.      
That the injury did not result solely from the
intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; and

5.      
That the contents of verified medical and
surgical reports introduced in evidence by claimants for compensation are
correct.