G. R. No. L-20605. June 30, 1966
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF TANPA ONG ALIAS PEDRO TAN TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. TANPA ONG ALIAS PEDRO TAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE P…
REGALA, J.:
On October 26, 1958, the petitioner, a citizen of
Nationalist China, married, with 7 children, filed with the lower court
a petition for naturalization. Although no formal opposition was filed
against the application for naturalization, the provincial fiscal,
during the hearing, appeared in behalf of the Solicitor General for the
government and cross-examined the witnesses for the petitioner. On
March 9, 1960, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of the
applicant, finding him to possess all the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications to become a citizen.
On April 18, 1962,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 530, petitioner filed a petition for the
execution of judgment in order that he may take his oath of allegiance.
On Mag 9, 1962, the lower court ordered the granting of the petition.
And on May 15, 1962, upon a manifestation filed by the provincial
fiscal of Cagajian that he would not interpose any appeal from the
order of the court, the petitioner took his oath as a Filipino citizen
and a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
The
Office of the Solicitor General, on May 25, 1962, received from the
Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan copies of the
petition for execution of judgment, the court order allowing petitioner
to take his oath as a citizen of the Philippines and for the issuance
to him of a certificate of naturalization, the oath of allegiance, and
the certificate of naturalization.
On June 1, 1962, the said
Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of
May 9, 1962, with a prayer that said order be set aside; to declare the
oath of allegaince to be of no legal effect; and to cancel and render
null and void the certificate of naturalization, on the ground that the
applicant does not have a lucrative trade or occupation. The lower
court denied the motion, hence this appeal.
It is contended
that the lower court erred: (1) in not finding that petitioner has
failed to establish by satisfactory and competent evidence that he
meets all the requirements set forth in section 1 of Republic Act No.
530; and (2) in prematurely administering the oath of allegiance to the
petitioner notwithstanding the fact that the order of May 9, 1962 was
not yet final.
In his main petition, Tanpa Ong stated that he
is employed in the Philippine American Cigar and Cigarette
Manufacturing Co., Pasay City, as promotional salesman for the Cagayan
Valley, from which he derives an annual income of P3,000.00. During the
hearing of the petition for naturalization, he testified that in
addition to his income, his wife is earning P1,440.00 a year as teacher
in the Ke Bing School. When his petition to take his oath was heard, he
also stated that he resigned from the Philippine American Cigar and
Cigarette Manufacturing Co. and got employment with the La Suerte Cigar
and Cigarette Manufacturing Co. with a salary of P3,000.00 a year plus
allowance and per diems at P300.00 a month. So he claims that all in
all he has a lucrative income of P8.040.00 a year.
We cannot
agree with the contention of petitioner that he has a lucrative income.
The additional income of petitioner is wife is immaterial for; under
the law, the petitioner should be the one to possess “some known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation.” (paragraph 4,
section 2, Commonwealth Act No. 473; Li long Pek vs. Republic,
G. R. No. L-20912, November 29, 1965). Also, allowances are not to be
considered in determining the lucrativeness of the income for they may
or may not be given, the employer not being in duty bound to give them.
(Yu Kian Chie vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-20169, February 26,
1965.) Likewise, the considerable increase of petitioner’s income after
the filing of the petition cannot be taken into account for the
requirement of the law in this respect has reference to the time of the
filing of the petition. (See Dy vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-20348, December 24, 1965, and cases cited therein.)
Thus, the income of the petitioner as contemplated in the
naturalization law is only P3,000000 a year. Considering that he has a
wife and seven children to support, this income is not sufficient to
meet the high cost of living at present. In the case of Keng Giok vs.
Republic. G. R. No. L-13347, August 31, 1961, We held that an income of
P9,074.50 per annum is not sufficient for a married applicant with a
wife and five children to support.
We agree with the
Solicitor General that the court below has administered the oath of
allegiance to the petitioner ahead of time. It was on May 9, 1962 that
the court issued the final order allowing the petitioner to take his
oath. Barely six days thereafter, or on May 15, 1962, the petitioner
was allowed to take his oath.
Under section 3, Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, appeal may be taken within thirty days from notice
of an order or judgment. Section 1, Rule 39, provides that a judgment
or order becomes final when no appeal has been perfected within the
prescribed period. Applying the said provisions,[1]
when the petitioner took his oath of allegiance on May 15, 1962, the
time to appeal had not yet expired and the order of May 9, 1962 had not
yet become final.
Petitioner, however, contends that the
provincial fiscal represented the government without intervention from
the Solicitor General from the commencement of the proceedings until
the applicant took his oath and for this reason, being thoroughly
familiar with the case, acted accordingly in filing a manifestation
that he will not interpose an appeal from the order that granted
petitioner’s motion to take his oath and such manifestation waived the
right to appeal; and when a waiver of the right to appeal is made, the
decision becomes inevitably final and executory. He further contends
that the Solicitor General cannot now dishonor what the provincial
fiscal did in this case as it is presumed that the latter was properly
authorized. On this contention, this Court in the case of Republic vs. Chiu, G. R. No. L-20846, October 31, 1964, has ruled:
“There
is no question that the appearance of the City Attorney for the
government, in the hearing, was authorized. This authorization,
however, in the light of the foregoing provision of law, cannot be
construed to have divested the Solicitor General of his control of the
stand or defense of the State, nor did it make of the City Attorney of
Davao the counsel of record for the oppositor Republic of the
Philippines. Note that the law prescribes that the Solicitor General
shall appear on behalf of the government ‘either himself or through his
delegate or the provincial fiscal concerned.’ It did not say, ‘the
Solicitor General or the provincial fiscal can appear on behalf of the
Re|iublic of the Philippines, in order to make of the latter an
alternate of the state counsel. As thus worded, what the law allows is
merely the physical substitution of the Solicitor General in such
proceedings. Consequently, notwithstanding the delegation to the City
Attorney of the duty to appear at and attend the hearing in this case,
the Solicitor General remained the counsel of record for the oppositor.
This is not a case where a party litigant is represented by two
lawyers, notice to the one of whom is notice to the client. Here, the
City Attorney did not appear as counsel for the Republic, but merely as
representative of the Solicitor General who, as stated, remained the
counsel of record for the Republic.”
Fortunately,
it has been the consistent doctrine of this Court that the right or
qualifications of an applicant to become a Philippine citizen may be
inquired into at any stage of the proceedings, and, as a matter of
fact, the State may not only interpose an appeal from the decision
granting the petition, but can object to petitioner’s qualifications
during the hearing of the petition to take oath, [2]
or else the privileges of citizenship will be conferred to those who
lack the necessary qualifications due to the leniency or unawareness of
some representatives of the Government of recent doctrines of this
Court concerning naturalization.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the order allowing the applicant to take the oath of allegiance, as
well as the oath administered pursuant thereto, and the corresponding
certificate of citizenship issued, are hereby declared null and void.
Judgment reversed, with costs against the petitioner-appe1lee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.
[1]
Under Rule 143, the Rules of Court may be applied to naturalization
cases “by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient.”
[2] See Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, G. R. No. L-11499, April 29, 1961; 0no Ching Guan vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-15691, March 27, 1961; Lim Lian v. Republic, G. R. No. L-3575, Dec. 16, 1950; Yap Chin vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-4177, May 29, 1953; Urn Hok Albano vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-10921, Oct. 31, 1958; Dalmacio Cheng @ Benito Lim vs. Republic, G. R. No. L-20013, March 30, 1965; and Ong So vs. Republic, supra.