G.R. No. L-49181. March 27, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DAMASO DEL VALLE, CARLOS LACABA AND ROBERTO LACABA, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
DE CASTRO, J.:
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
Branch VI, imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua
for the murder of Mario Cursunada and ordering them
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P 12,000.00 and to pay the costs, Roberto Lacaba,
Carlos Lacaba and Damaso
del Valle interposed the instant joint appeal.
A fourth accused; John Doe, has up to the
present remained at large and unidentified.
The facts, as established by the prosecution, quoting from the appellee’s brief, are as follows:
“On May 5,1971, the municipality
of Bay, consisting, among others,
of the barrios of Calo, Maitim,
San Isidro and Dila,
in the province of Laguna,
was celebrating its annual fiesta (p. 6, tsn, Sept.
8, 1972; p. 5, tsn, Dec.14, 1972; p. 3, tsn, Sept. 17, 1973; p. 5, tsn,
April 29, 1976; p. 4, tsn, July 26,1974). In the morning of that day, Mario Cursunada and his brother, Epimaco
Cursunada, Jr., and their companions, namely Roberto Lacaba, Damaso del
Valle, Carlos Lacaba, Eleng
Gala, and others were on the streets of Bo. San Isidro, distributing tickets
and collecting money from tricycle and jeepney
drivers, for and in behalf of its barrio captain, Melquiades
Algarne, ostensibly for the fiesta celebration and
barrio projects (pp. 7-9, tsn, Sept. 8, 1972; p. 20, tsn,
April 29,1976; pp. 22-23,tsn, July 26, 1978; Exhibit “B”).
“After the said group were through
collecting money from the drivers, they proceeded to the house of the said
barrio captain and turned over to him the collected money. For their cooperation, barrio captain Algarne gave them a family-size bottle of Tanduay Rhum. From there the group went to the house of Mang Mundo Pantas
in the same barrio of San Isidro
where they engaged in a drinking spree.
While they were drinking, Damaso del Valle
ordered Epimaco Cursunada,
Jr. to get “pulutan” of “dinuguan” from the house of Mang
Tomas nearby, which Epimaco, Jr. did and brought the
“pulutan” to the house of Mang Mundo Pantas
where the group continued with their drinking spree, partaking of the said
“pulutan” (pp. 9-10, tsn,
Sept. 8,1972; pp. 8-12,tsn, Dec. 14,1972). Mang Mundo Pantas and Carlito Pantas are father and
son, while the latter is the
brother-in-law of accused Roberto Lacaba. Said father and son resided in the same house
where the drinking spree took place (pp. 31-32, tsn, July 26,1978).
“During the drinking spree in the house of Mang
Mundo Pantas, an
alternation or trouble broke out between Damaso del Valle and Mario Cursunada. Epimaco, Jr. who
was at the barber shop, also located
in the same house of Mang Mundo
Pantas, heard Damaso del
Valle utter the words: “Putang ina mo, pag kami ay napahamak
x x x“, to which Mario
Cursunada retorted:
“Bakit masama ang sinabi mo?” (pp. 12-13,
14-15, tsn, Dec.
14,1972 p.44, tsn,
July. 26,1974). Sensing trouble, Epimaco, Jr. left the place to go home, and he reported the
matter to his mother, Natividad San Gregorio, who
immediately went to the house of Mang Mundo Pantas. On his part, Epimaco,
Jr. left to go to the house of his Ate Mianang where
he took his lunch (pp. 10-12, tsn. Sept. 8,1972;
pp. 13, 16, 23,25, tsn, Dec. 14,1972).
“Upon arrival at the house of Mang Mundo Pantas, Natividad
San Gregorio saw her son Mario Cursunada with his
companions there, still arguing with each other. Among his companions were Damaso
del Valle, Roberto Lacaba
and Carlos Lacaba.
She then told her son, Mario, to go home. Both mother and son left the place to go home
(pp.12-13, tsn, Sept. 8, 1972; p. 10, tsn, Oct. 6,1972).
“It was almost 12:30 o’clock
past noon of the same day, May 5,1971,
when they arrived home, and she caused her son, Mario to sleep on the main
first floor of their house because he was then drunk. After her son, Mario, went to sleep, she
seated for a while (pp. 13-14, tsn, Sept. 8,1972). Their house was low, one storey, about 5 by 6
meters in size, which has a ground floor open on all sides (pp. 29-31, tsn, Sept. 8,1972).
She noticed her husband, Epimaco Cursunada, Sr., lying down on the ground floor of their
house (pp. 14-31,36 tsn,
id). Thereafter, she left their house to
go to the house of barrio captain Algarne, which was
less than a minute walk from their house, to await at
the latter place for her sister, Cayetana San
Gregorio, to deliver to her the “suman“. But after waiting for her sister at the house
of the said barrio captain for about three minutes, and still her sister did
not arrive, Natividad San Gregorio left the place to
return home (pp.14-16 31-34, tsn, Sept. 8,1972; Exhibit “B”).
“While Natividad San Gregorio was just in
front of the house of the barrio
captain, from where she could see clearly her nearby house, she saw four
persons, namely: Roberto Lacaba, Carlos Lacaba, Damaso del Valle, and a fourth
person whose name she did not know, jump from the stairs of her house, carrying
blood-stained weapons. The first to jump
out of her house was Damaso del Valle; followed by
the fourth person whose name she did not know; then Carlos Lacaba;
and followed by Roberto Lacaba as the last person to
jump out of the house. All the four
persons ran towards the backyard of her house, and sped away (pp.16-19, tsn, Sept. 8, 1972;
pp. 12,20, tsn, Oct. 6, 1972; Exhibit
“B”). The distance from where
she stood in front of the barrio captain’s house to her house was about 18
meters, and there was no obstacle to obstruct her view towards the stairs of
her house at that time. It was just past
noon, and the day was bright (pp.
3-5, 7, tsn, Oct
6,1972).
She had known the three persons, namely:
Roberto Lacaba, Carlos Lacaba
and Damaso del Valle, except the fourth person, very
well because they were the “barkada” of her
son, Mario Cursunada, and they were their townmates (pp-. 27-29, tsn,
Sept. 8,1972, Exhibit “B”).
“After she saw them jump from her house, Natividad
San Gregorio ran home and asked her husband, then lying on the ground floor,
what had happened; saying: “Apay, ano bang nangyayari?” She noticed from his face that her
husband had slept. Her husband then
answered, telling her that blood was dripping from the floor of their
house: “Aba, tumutulo
ang dugo.” (pp. 19-20,
38-39, tsn, Sept.8,1972; pp.
11-12, tsn, Oct.
6,1972; Exhibit “B”).
Both went upstairs, and they saw their son, Mario lying unconscious on
the first floor, full of blood, and with stab wounds on his body (pp. 20-22,
40, tsn, Sept. 8,1972; pp.15-16, tsn,
Oct. 6,1972; Exhibit “B”). She
shouted for help. She then told her
husband what she had seen earlier the four persons who jumped off their house,
with blood-stained weapons in their hands, as well as the identities of the
three persons, except the fourth person.
Her husband, however, advised her not to give any information or
statement to anybody, regarding what she had seen telling her that he himself
would kill the perpetrator’s of their son’s death (pp. 40-41, tsn, Sept. 8,1972).
In response to her shout for help, many people arrived at their
house. Immediately their wounded and
unconscious son, Mario, was brought by her husband and a neighbor by the name
of Pedy to the hospital, while Natividad
San Gregorio remained at home. Her son,
Mario died, however, on the way to the hospital (pp. 22, 45-46, tsn, Sept. 8, 1972;
pp. 4, 11, tsn, March 1,1971).
“Soon thereafter, Chief of Police Gerardo Dilla
of the Bay Police Intergrated District arrived at the
place of the incident. When interviewed
by him, Natividad San Gregorio told the said chief of
police that she had seen Roberto Lacaba, Carlos Lacaba, Damaso del Valle and a
fourth person jump out of her house with blood-stained weapons in their hands
just before she and her husband came upon their wounded and unconscious son
Mario, lying on the first floor of their house.
She told the chief of police, however, of the
earlier instruction of her husband not to give any statement to any person
because, according to her husband he would kill the persons who killed their
son. To these informations,
Chief of Police Dilla did not say anything (pp.
23-24, 43-44, 49-50, tsn, Sept. 8,1972; pp. 6-7, tsn, Oct. 6,1972;
Exhibit “B”).
“Meanwhile, Police Sergeant Brigido
R. Revilla of the same Bay Police Integrated
District, at the police station that same afternoon of May 5,1971 received a
report from Councilor Alhama that a person was
stabbed at his house while sleeping and died on the way to the hospital, which
report was duly entered in the police blotter.
Acting on said report, Police Sgt. Revilla,
together with Judge Perles and Pat. Alvarez, left for Bo. San Isidro to
make a spot investigation of the stabbing incident. Upon arrival at Bo.
San Isidro Police Sgt. Revilla saw Chief of Police Dilla already in the house of the deceased Mario Cursunada, investigating the incident; hence, he no longer
conducted his own investigation of the incident, which fact and other
information he duly entered in the police blotter upon their return from the
scene of the crime to the police station that same afternoon (Exhibits
“F” and “F-1”; p. 9, tsn, Feb.22,
1974; pp. 21-22, tsn Feb. 22,1974; pp. 13-20, tsn, March 1, 1974).
“At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, May 5,1971, Dr. Sergio Gasmen, a physician of the Bay Community Hospital, conducted an autopsy of the body of the
deceased Mario Cursunada the said hospital’s
morgue. This autopsy was requested by
the police department of Bay, Laguna (pp. 7-8, tsn, March 29,1973). He found ten (10) incise
wounds on the body of the deceased which, as narrated in his autopsy report,
with an illustrative diagram an anatomy of a human body (Exhibits
“1”, “D-1”; pp.8-10, tsn, id.)
are as follows:
‘(1) On the second intercostal
space, left, two inches from the middle of the front portion of the chest, 2
inches long and penetrating into the left pleural cavity;
‘(2) Located in the third intercostal
space, left at parasternal line, 3/4 inches long,
quite deep, penetrating the left thorax, perforating the pericardium, which is
the covering of the heart and then through the right ventricle cavity;
‘(3) Located in the third intercostal
space, left, 1,1/2 inches lateral to the sternum, deep, which is close to Wound
No. 2 and directed downward medially, 3/4 inch long pener
trating into the thorax and mediastinum. Penetrating Wounds No one, two and three
caused the hematoma and emphysema of the mediastinum, and hemothorax of
the left pleural cavity of 1500 cc’s causing the collapse of the left lung;
‘(4) Located on the tenth intercostal
space, midaxillary line, left, 1 1/2 inches long,
penetrating the thorax, perforating the left leaf of the diaphragm into the
abdomen, lacerating the lower pole of the spleen continuing into the anterior part of the greater curvature of
the stomach, perforating the stomach at the subsphod area;
‘(5) Located
on the third intercostal space, right two
inches to the right of the sternum, 1/2 inch long, deep, penetrating the right
thorax, puncturing the middle lobe of the right lung, with a hematoma of the lower lobe, and the whole right lung
collapsed with a hematoma of 500 cc’s;
‘(6) Located on the right epigastrium,
1 inch long, deep, penetrating into the abdomen, with the ometum
plugging the wound, and perforating the left lobe of the liver;
‘(7) Located on the left midaxillary
line, two inches above the iliac crest, 3/4 inch long, going into
retroperitoneal area causing a hematoma of 200 cc’s
then lacerated the kidney at the middle portion near the pelvic, about 1/5 inch
deep, and 1/5 inch near the hilus;
‘(8) Located at the left midaxillary
line, immediately above the iliac crest, 3/4 inch long, penetrating the
abdomen, perforating the descending colon, six inches from the splenic flexure, 2 inches in diameter each, through and
through;
‘(9) Located at the dorsum of the index finger,
superficial, 1/2 inch long, left hand;
‘(10) Located
at the dorsum of the index finger, superficial, 1/2 inch long, left hand,’
(Decision, pp. 319-322, Vol. II, id; Exhibits “D”,
“D-1” and “D-2”; pp. 10-24, tsn,
March 29,1973)
“Dr. Gasmen concluded that Wound No. 2 in the heart was fatal,
and death could be instantaneous; that the other wounds could be fatal also if
not treated immediately like Wound No. 1 which perforated the chest and could
produce bleeding inside the chest; that the cause of death was cardiac temporade secondary to hemopericardium;
that Exhibit “D-2” shows the front portion of the body; that Wounds
Nos. 5,7 and 8 are at the midaxillary line but could
be seen from the front; and that the victim had already been dead for about
four to six hours when he conducted the autopsy. He also issued the corresponding death
certificate (Exhibit “E”, Decision, pp. 222-237, Vol. II, id; pp. 17,
23-25, 26 28-29, tsn, March 29,1973). Dr. Gasmen finally declared that from the
nature, number and location of the wounds, it is possible that one or more
weapons were used in inflicting them, and that said
weapons were double-bladed (pp.26, 28-30, tsn, id.).
“Subsequently, Natividad San
Gregorio was able to convince her husband to refrain from taking the law into
his hands to avenge the death of their son.
Both then decided to go to the authorities to reveal what they knew about the felonious death of their son. Thus, after the interment of their son, both
went to see Chief of Police Dilla to inquire as to
the status of the police investigation of the son’s case. But the chief of police told them “to
lay low first” (pp. 51-52, tsn, Sept. 8,1972;
p. 14, tsn, Oct.
6,1972). One week later, she
and her husband returned to the chief of police, and this time, the latter told
them that he would accompany them to the CIS-PC in Canlubang,
Laguna, where they were instead instructed to see the PC detachment at Calauan, Laguna. At
the latter place, they appeared, without the chief of police however,
accompanying them, before PC Sgt. Solano on June 18,1971 wherein they
executed their affidavits in connection with the death of their son (pp. 24-27,
tsn, Sept.
8,1972; Exhibit “B”).
PC Sgt. Solano thereafter filed a criminal-complaint for murder against
the abovenamed three accused and a fourth
unidentified person. On learning of the
filing of the criminal complaint, Chief of Police Dilla
confronted Epimaco Cursunada
Sr. and asked him why he gave a statement to the PC when they (police) were
still investigating the case (pp. 17-18, 20, tsn, Feb. 22, 1974).
“Epimaco Cursunada,
Sr. was able to testify in this criminal case in the court below only on direct
examination. He died on August 15,1972
before his cross-examination (pp. 1-16, tsn, June 27,1972; pp. 1-4, tsn, Sept. 8,1972). Consequently, his testimony on direct
examination was not considered by the trial court in passing upon the guilt or
innocence of the accused in this
criminal case (Decision, p. 212, Vol. II, Records).”[1]
Filing a single brief,
all appellants had made only one assignment of error, that
“the trial court erred in convicting the accused of the crime charged in
the information.[2] In support of this lone assignment of error,
appellants, however, submit several contentions, which are that: (1) they had no motive in committing the act
imputed to them;[3] (2) the testimony of the only principal eyewitness
is beset with unbelievable assertions
and insinuations;[4] (3) said witness’ identification of the four
assailants of her son was belied
by the Chief of Police;[5] and (4) despite her complaint, no action was
taken by the Chief of Police or the Sergeant of Police.[6]
From their contention as
above-stated, appellants’ defense is essentially one of alibi, with the
assertion that they were not properly identified as the culprits, vaguely
hinting that the killing could have been a case of suicide.
As repeatedly held in innumerable cases, motive is not essential when the culpability of one
accused for murder has been established beyond reasonable doubt.[7] In the present case, the testimony of the
state eyewitness, Natividad San Gregorio, established
appellant’s guilt beyond the peradventure of any doubt. It is she who had no motive to falsely charge
appellants, as to entitle her testimony to full faith and credit.
It is not disputed that Natividad knew the appellants very well. The Lacabas are the
“barkada” of his son, Mario, the deceased,
a fact established by admission of appellant Roberto Lacaba
himself. The other appellant, del Valle, also admitted knowing Natividad,
and the latter knowing him very well. In
broad daylight, Natividad could not have been mistaken
in identifying the appellants as the assailants of her son, and her candor in doing so, and charging them with an
extremely grave offense, is shown by her admission of not knowing the identity
of a fourth companion of appellants whom she saw jumping down their house,
holding blood-stained weapons, running towards their backyard in a hurried
escape.
The testimony of Natividad is very natural and positive. She testified having seen earlier in the day
his son, Mario, with appellants and other persons collecting money from jeepney and tricycle drivers just 80 meters from her
house. She saw her son next in the house
of Mang Mundo Pantas in a drinking spree, engaged in an altercation with
appellant del Valle, when she repaired in haste to said house on being informed
by her other son, Epimaco, about the trouble going on
in the house of Pantas involving his son, Mario, who
was already so drunk that she, brought him home with her. Once at their house, Natividad
had Mario go to sleep, after which she left to go to the house of the barrio
captain but returned home after only a few minutes. It was on her way back home that she saw four
persons jump out from her house
with blood-stained weapons, three of whom are the herein appellants, the fourth
one not being known to her. The sight of
those persons jumping out from her house and escaping hurriedly through her
backyard prompted her to run towards her house, and seeing her husband
lying on the ground floor just awakened, asked him what was happening. The latter looked up and noticed blood
dripping from the first floor and exclaimed:
“Aba,
tumutulo ang dugo.” When the spouses went up, they saw their son
lying unconscious with many stab-wounds, bleeding profusely.
Contrary to appellants’ contention there is nothing unbelievable
in the testimony of Natividad, mother of the
deceased. She told the Chief of Police
exactly as she saw the events unfold themselves from the time she saw the three
appellants jumping out from their house with a fourth companion unknown to her,
with blood stained weapons, her brief and shocked talk with her husband just
awakened from sleep who noticed the dripping of blood from the first floor, and
on going up the house, seeing their son lying unconscious and bleeding from
many stab wounds.
Strangely, however, the
Chief of Police, testifying as a defense witness, declared that the father and brother of the
victim told him that the latter committed suicide, and
that nobody told him who could have killed the deceased. It is this testimony of the Chief of Police
which is clearly unbelievable. From the
number and nature of the wounds, the Chief of Police should have readily
discounted suicide. The father and
brother of the victim could, therefore, not have told him that the deceased
killed himself. The mother, Natividad, categorically stated that when the Chief of
Police arrived at their house, she told him (Chief of Police) that she saw the
appellants and a fourth unidentified person jump out from their house
with blood-stained weapons. She
cautioned the Chief of Police, however, about her statement because her husband
instructed her not to make such revelation to any person because he would like
to avenge the death of his son himself.
Further discrediting the Chief of Police is his Sergeant’s
testimony, also testifying for the defense, that when he saw his Chief at the
scene of the stabbing incident, when he arrived thereat, he no longer proceeded
with the investigation which was his very mission in repairing to the scene,
which appears contrary to the testimony of the Chief of Police that he
instructed the Sergeant to investigate the case.
As to the testimony of
the Chief of Police about suicide having been allegedly stated to him by the
victim’s father and brother as the cause of death, same is plainly belied by
the entry in the police blotter which was presented as evidence by the defense
that “on or about 3:25 p.m., Councilor Aljama
arrived station and reported to this office that a person was stabbed at his
house while sleeping and died on the way to the hospital.” From the entry
in the police blotter, it could be inferred that what had been stated by the
victim’s kin in reporting to Councilor Aljama is that
the deceased was stabbed while he was sleeping, a fact that would rule out
suicide, specially as no suicide weapon was ever found
which ought to be with, or just beside, the victim. Appellants’ contention as stated earlier that
the Chief of Police has belied Natividad’s claim of
having identified the four assailants cannot, therefore, but meet with Our outright rejection.
It is indeed hard to
explain how the Chief of Police ever got to inject the theory of suicide,
except to suspect his absolute impartiality and entire want of bias as demanded
of his position. This suspicion is heightened
by how the police investigation got nowhere, and the Chief of Police advising
the victim’s parents when they inquired about the progress of their
investigation “to lay low first.” With the manifestly questionable
inaction of the Chief of Police and his Sergeant, the victim’s parents found no
recourse but to approach the PC detachment in Calauan,
Laguna, which actually filed the
criminal complaint. Thus is the delay in
filing the complaint explained by the police dragging their feet, coupled with Natividad’s husband’s initial reaction to the violent death
of his son of wanting to take the law in his own hands to exact vengeance from
the four killers, three of whom none other than appellants herein.
When the PC filed the complaint instead of the Chief of
Police doing so, the latter must have been conscience-striken and wanted to save his face by joining the
defense in trying to show that there was no real case
against appellants he must have also resented the act of the victim’s parents
in going to the PC without previously informing him of their move which
reflected on his competence and trustworthiness.
It is not quite true, as
claimed by appellants, that there was no motive on their part to kill the
deceased. As testified to by the
victim’s brother, Epimaco, Jr., and his mother, Natividad, the victim, while in a drinking spree with
appellants and other persons, got into a heated altercation with appellant del
Valle. It was while Mario was engaged in
such altercation in the house of Mundo Pantas that his mother arrived to take him home, upon being
informed by her other son, Epimaco Jr. of the trouble
her slain son Mario was involved in.
Soon after falling asleep in his house, Mario was stabbed fatally by
assailants identified by Natividad as appellants with
whom he had a drinking spree at the house of Mang Mundo Pantas, and an altercation
with one of them shortly before the stabbing.
The distance from the house of Mundo Pantas to the victim’s house was only 400 meters that there was no impossibility
for them to be the assailants of the deceased at the time and place of the
assault. In the light of this fact[8] coupled with appellants having been
positively identified as the assailants by the victim’s mother, the alibi
interposed by appellants as their only defense, aside from the theory of suicide
as was sought ridiculously to be injected by the Chief of Police and appellant
Roberto Lacaba, cannot but be futile.[9]
The information alleges
evident premeditation and treachery to have attended the commission of the
crime. Evident premeditation, however,
has not been duly proven as the three elements thereof, to wit: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an act
manifestly showing that they clung to the determination to commit the crime; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the said determination and the
execution of the crime to allow them time to meditate and reflect on the
consequences of their acts[10] are evidently absent.
Treachery was neither shown to be present beyond any doubt. The deceased might have been awake when his assailants
attacked him, fully aware and expectant of the assault. What may be clearly present from the number
of his assailants as well as of the wounds inflicted, was abuse of superior
strength. This aggravating circumstance
is usually held absorbed by treachery if the latter circumstance is found
attendant independently of the former, but it does not constitute treachery
itself, which is distinct from that of abuse of superior strength, both as a
generic aggravating and as a qualifying circumstance. (See Art. 14 Revised Penal Code). The qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, however, has not been alleged in the information, so it can
only aggravate the killing, not qualify it to murder.
Dwelling was also clearly
present but only as aggravating circumstance of the crime committed, which is
that of simple homicide, as the killing would be, in the absence of any
qualifying circumstance, as none was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be modified
by finding that the crime committed is homicide, not murder as charged,
aggravated by abuse of superior strength and dwelling. The penalty to be imposed should be only the
maximum period of reclusion temporal.
Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants should
each be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Modified as herein indicated, the judgment is affirmed in all other
respects, with cost.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), took no part.
De Castro, J., was designated
to sit with the First Division under Special Order No. 225.
[1]
pp. 3-14, Appellee’s Brief; p. 170,
Rollo.
[2]
p. 151, Rollo.
[3]
p. 152, Rollo.
[4]
pp.152-153, Rollo.
[5]
p. 153, Rollo.
[6]
p. 154, Rollo.
[7]
U.S. vs. McMann, 4 Phil. 561; U.S. vs. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47;
[8]
People vs. Racca, 3 SCRA
828; People vs. Condemena, 23 SCRA 810; People
vs. Ali, 29 SCRA 756.
[9]
People vs. Selfaison, 1 SCRA
235; People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759; People vs. Marquez, 30 SCRA
442.
[10]
People vs. Tison, 66 SCRA
372; People vs. Mendoza, et al., 91 Phil. 58.