MANUELA ADVINCULA, REPRESENTED BY HER GUARDIAN-ADLITEM, PURA BORBON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MANUEL, ADVINCULA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Advincula versus Advincula

The Case

This is the case of Advincula versus Advincula, decided by the Supreme Court in January 1964. Manuela Advincula, acting through her guardian-ad-litem, Pura Borbon, sued Manuel Advincula for acknowledgment and support. The defendant moved to dismiss on the ground that an earlier suit between the same parties, for the same relief, had already been dismissed, and that such dismissal barred the second complaint. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must carry: when a dismissal at the plaintiff's instance is deemed with prejudice, and why a judgment for support is never truly final.

Procedural History

Manuela first filed a complaint for acknowledgment and support against Manuel before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo sometime in 1956. On motion of both parties, that case was dismissed. On January 16, 1961, she filed a second complaint for the same relief before the same court. Instead of answering, Manuel moved to dismiss, arguing that the earlier dismissal barred the new suit. The trial court granted the motion, holding that because the first dismissal was made without any reservation, it was with prejudice. Manuela appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which raised the lone question of law of whether the earlier dismissal was with prejudice.

Facts

Sometime in 1956, Manuela Advincula sued Manuel Advincula for acknowledgment and support. On motion of both parties, the trial court dismissed the case. The order of dismissal, dated June 1, 1956, granted the motion on the grounds stated therein, with no objection from the defendant's counsel, and ordered the dismissal of both the complaint and the counterclaim, without costs. Nowhere in that order did the court state that the dismissal was without prejudice.

On January 16, 1961, Manuela filed a second complaint for acknowledgment and support against the same Manuel. He moved to dismiss, invoking the earlier dismissal as a bar. The trial court agreed and dismissed the second complaint, reasoning that because the first dismissal carried no reservation of "without prejudice," it was with prejudice and the case could not be revived.

On appeal, the Supreme Court noted that the motion for dismissal in the first case had itself used the expression "with prejudice," but the order of dismissal did not. The Court also observed that the first dismissal was predicated upon a compromise between the parties.

Issues

• Whether or not the dismissal of the first case, made at the plaintiff's instance without any reservation, operated as a dismissal with prejudice that barred the second complaint.
• Whether or not the action for acknowledgment and support may be brought again notwithstanding the earlier dismissal, considering the nature of the right to support.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, on dismissal at the plaintiff's instance, provides:

Except as provided in the preceding section, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a prior counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion, the action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise specified in the order a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court.

This is the rule the Court applied, because the first case was dismissed precisely upon the plaintiff's own motion.

Section 4 of Rule 30, on the effect of dismissal on other grounds, provides:

Effect of dismissal on other grounds. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.

The Court held that this section does not apply, because the dismissal was one provided for in Section 2.

Article 2035 of the Civil Code, on what cannot be compromised, provides in its first and fourth paragraphs:

The following cannot be compromised: (1) Civil status of persons; x x x (4) Future support.

This bears on the case because the first dismissal rested on a compromise touching acknowledgment, which affects civil status, and future support.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the dismissal was without prejudice. Section 2 of Rule 30 states that unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal at the plaintiff's instance shall be without prejudice. The order of dismissal in the first case specified nothing. The Court rejected the argument that the words "with prejudice" in the motion carried over into the order. The most that could be said of the omission is that the trial court chose to keep silent, and the expression "with prejudice" is not a ground but merely an effect the movants hoped to produce. The Court also held that Section 4 of Rule 30, which makes other dismissals an adjudication on the merits, applies only to dismissals on grounds not provided for in the rule, and so finds no application here.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the action for support may be brought again. A judgment for support does not become final, because the right to support is essentially provisional and may be modified or altered as the needs of the recipient and the means of the giver change. The Court also held that the first dismissal, being predicated on a compromise, cannot bar the new action, since acknowledgment and future support cannot be the subject of compromise. Once the plaintiff's needs arise, her cause of action accrues, and the right to ask for support is demandable from the date she was in need of it.

Doctrine

First, a dismissal at the plaintiff's instance, granted by order of the court, is without prejudice unless the order itself specifies otherwise. The silence of the order controls, not the wording of the motion.

Second, Section 4 of Rule 30, which treats a dismissal as an adjudication on the merits, applies only to dismissals on grounds not provided for in the rule. A dismissal under Section 2 is governed by Section 2 alone.

Third, a judgment for support is not final. It is essentially provisional and may be increased or decreased according to the needs of the recipient and the means of the giver.

Fourth, civil status and future support cannot be compromised, so a dismissal resting on such a compromise cannot bar a later action for the same relief.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, with costs against Manuel Advincula. Manuela won the appeal.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a dismissal at the plaintiff's instance is without prejudice unless the order says otherwise, and a judgment for support is never final. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 30, and the provisional, non-waivable, non-compromisable character of the right to support.