THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GUILLERMO I. VENTURA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal finding Guillermo I. Ventura guilty of illegal practice of
medicine under Section 770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and sentencing him, this being his second offense, to pay a
fine in the sum of P500.00, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and to pay costs.

Appellant, the accused, was charged with the above offense in an information
which alleges that in February 1955, he did,

“willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and for compensation and reward,
practice medicine in the said City (Pasay) by treating and applying electrical
appliances to patients for the purpose of curing them with their ailments,
diseases, pains, and physical defects from which they are suffering and by
holding out himself to the public by means of signs, advertisements, and other
means, to be a Doctor of Medicine.”

The lower court found, as facts, the following:

“* * * in the year 1949, the accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, was
convicted by the court of First Instance of Rizal of a ‘similar offense’ or
illegal practice of medicine in the municipality of Pasay, now Pasay City and
sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 under the same legal provisions, or Section
770 in connection with Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code.

“* * * by reason of certain complaints the National Bureau of Investigation
had received from the President of the Philippine Federation of Private Medical
Practitioners and from the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners, the
National Bureau of Investigation on December 16, 1955, sent its morgue attendant
Jose Natayan to the clinics of the accused at No. 2454 M. de la Cruz Street,
Pasay City. Natayan was at that time suffering from pains in his back and he
asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to Natayan; wrote
something on a piece of paper; and then he told him that he (Natayan) ‘was sick
of lumbago’. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then asked
him to pay the amount to a lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the
request of the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic
where he was given an enema of hot water by a male attendant. Then Natayan was
asked to lie down on a table where his back was exposed to a big bulb for around
fifteen minutes and afterwards to a red colored bulb for another ten minutes.
Thereafter Natayan went back to the accused, who told him to come back to his
clinic for six consecutive days. After that Natayan went back on the same day or
December 16, 1955 to his office in the National Bureau of Investigation.

The following day, Natayan returned to the clinic of the accused with the
National Bureau of Investigation raiding party composed of two agents, two
attorneys and one photographer. After he was dropped by the National Bureau of
Investigation agents about seven meters away from the clinic of the accused,
Natayan proceeded to the office of the accused, who then and there told him that
another treatment would be applied to him and that he would pay P3.00. After
paying this amount and while Natayan was lying on a table about to be given
treatment the National Bureau of Investigation agents raided the place.

The accused herein, Guillermo I. Ventura, is not a duly registered masseur or
a physician qualified to practice medicine.”

Appellant seeks a reversal here of aforementioned judgment
of conviction on the grounds: (1) that the offense charged in the information
had already prescribed; (2) that the laws involved are unconstitutional and
void; (3) that granting that the said laws are valid the accused should not have
been prosecuted thereunder because he was not engaged in the practice of
medicine (4) that Congress, in passing House Bills Nos. 2405 and 357 recognized
and believed in the efficacy of the drugless systems of healing and although
said bills were vetoed by the President of the Philippines and thereby did not
become regular statutes, they may be considered as concurrent resolutions
formally establishing the drugless system of healing as a separate and distinct
profession, not covered by Section 770 of the Medical Law; (5) that the
complainants and the Government are estopped from prosecuting the accused under
Section 770 because they were the ones who induced him to practice drugless
healing after his conviction in 1949; and (6) that the accused has an implied
license to practice drugless healing from the people of the Philippines and the
Chairman of the Medical Board of Examiners.

Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for
the past 35 years, he had been practicing as a naturopathic physician, “treating
human ailments without the use of drugs and medicines” and employing in his
practice “electricity, water and hand”, without a license to practice medicine;
that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more or less, about 90%
of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the American
University, Chicago, Illinois for about four years.

Invoking prescription, he argues that in view of the fact that he had begun
the alleged practice of medicine thirty-five years ago without the required
license, the crime charged in the information had already prescribed.^[1]

The records reveal that the accused begun practicing his method of drugless
healing 35 years ago. This practice was first discovered by the authorities in
1949. He was prosecuted and convicted therefore the same year. Sometime after he
again set up a clinic. He had a lucrative clientele and nobody bothered him.

However, at about February, 1955, the President of the Philippine Federation
of Private Medical Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of
Investigation that appellant was advertising himself as capable of treating
human ailments without drugs. Upon investigation, apellant was found to be
without certificate of registration to practice such profession either from the
Board of Medical Examiners or from the Committee of Examiners of Masseurs. So,
this prosecution started in 1956. It is clear that the four-year period of
prescription of the offense charged should be computed from February, 1955 when
the National Bureau of Investigation discovered appellant’s alleged illegal
practice of Medicine.

Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 in relation to
Section 775 of the Revised Administrative Code. It is appellant’s theory that to
require, of any person whose business is merely to stimulate by mechanical means
the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical schools, taking up
obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and many other sciences,
is curtailment of the exercise of one’s calling, a violation of the
constitutional principle that all men have the right to life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness and are entitled to the equal protection of the law. It is
furthermore theorized that inasmuch as drugless healing is not taught in any
of the medical schools prescribed, how could the members of the Medical Board of
Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless healers?

This same contention was presented to and settled by this Court in the case
of People vs. Buenviaje who was convicted of illegal practice of medicine for
practicing chiropractor.^[2] It held:

“There is very little force in this argument. The subjects in which an
examination is required relate to matters of which a thorough knowledge seems
necessary for the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human body and it is
within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote
themselves to the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge.”

In the instant case, we must again uphold those immutable concepts of the
police power of the State. Under this power, the State may prescribe such
regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare
of the people, to protect them against the consequences of ignorance and
incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has
been the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in any
pursuit, profession or trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon which
the community may confidently rely, their possession being generally ascertained
in an examination of parties by competent persons, or inferred from a
certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an institution
established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with
which such pursuits have to deal.^[3]

Appellant claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the
patients without use of any drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that
“practice of medicine” is confined only to the systems taught by the medical
schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and the electric schools or
systems.

Section 770 of the Revised Administrative Code in no uncertain terms covers
appellant’s acts. The statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal
practice of medicine as provided in said Section 770 includes the acts and
practices performed by appellant. By his own statements, he admitted to have
continuously diagnosed aad treated more or less 500,000 instances of different
kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor.

As regards the contention that there are at least two concurrent resolutions
declaring formally that Congress has recognized the drugless methods of healing,
we need not elaborate further than to say that not until such recognition is
actually embodied in a statute, shall we extend consideration of such
method.

Appellant pleads that the lower court erred in not holding that the
complainants and the government are estopped from prosecuting him because they
were the ones who induced him to practice drugless healing after his conviction
in 1949. He tried to show that medical practitioners, members of Congress,
provincial governors, city mayors and municipal board members wrote to him
requesting his help for persons suffering from all kinds of ailments; that
municipal ordinances and resolutions were also passed authorizing him not only
to practice his method of healing hut also to put up clinics in some
municipalities; that he was even extended free transportation facilities to work
in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal.

Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does
not apply to the government.^[4] It is
never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, even assuming
without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant’s practice.
We cannot allow the bargaining away of public health and safety for the
semblance of benefit to a few government officials, people or even
municipalities.

Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless
healing by the mere fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had
permitted appellant to serve free in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala,
Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people persisted in engaging his services.
For one thing, these people might have contracted his services on the mistaken
notion that he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for another, a
repetition of illegal acts can never make them legal.

As additional argument, appellant urges acquittal under the new Medical Act
of 1959^[5] wherein the practice of
physiotherapy is recognized as a distinct science. He claim coverage of said law
on the ground that he practices physiotherapy by massage through physical
devices and upon the recommendation of duly registered physicians.

The above argument has no merit because there is strong evidence to the
effect that appellant alone diagnoses his patients’ ailments and applies that
remedies therefor^[6] without written order
or prescription by a registered physician.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed
in all parts and respects. Costs against appellant.

Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] SEC. 1 (Act 3673). — Violations
penalized by special acts shall unless otherwise provided in such Acts,
prescribe in accordance with the following rules: 

(b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month but less than two years.

^[2] 47 Phil. 536.

^[3] U.S vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil.
225-233

^[4] Republic vs. Go Bon Lee, 111 Phil. 805; Koppel-(Phil.) Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 113 Phil., 17.

^[5] Republic Act 2383, Sec. 11.
Exemptions. — The Preceding section shall not be construed to affect (a)
any medical student duly enrolled in ay approved medical college or school under
training, serving without any professional fee in any government or private
hospital, provided that the renders such service under the direct supervision
and control of a registered physician; (b) any legally registered dentist engage
exclusively in the practice of dentistry; (c) any duly registered masseur or
physiotherapist, provided that he applies massage or other physical means upon
written order or prescription of a duly registered physician or provided that
such application of massage or physical means shall be limited to physical or
mascular development.

^[6] See Exhibit “A”.