JULIO LUCERO, MOVANT-APPELLEE, VS. JAIME L. LOOT, ET AL., OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS.

The order of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, the former Judge Wenceslao
L. Fernan presiding, dated September 21, 1959, now on
appeal before this Court, speaks to this effect: “Regarding the writ of
possession, once the final decree has been issued the issuance of a writ of
possession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in
favor of the registered owner.  There is
no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession, and inasmuch as the final decree has already been entered, it
follows that a writ of possession should be issued in favor of the registered
owner.”^[1]

Accordingly, it granted a
writ of possession in favor of movant, now appellee, Julio Lucero. 
There was an opposition on the part of oppositors,
all surnamed Loot, now appellants.  The
lower court failed to see merit in the opposition interposed.  It explained why:  “The opposition interposed by the oppositors to the effect that there are defects in the
reconstitution of the records and that the motion is not under oath is trivial
in its nature and consequently untenable.”^[2] Accordingly, the writ of possession, as
prayed for, was issued.

There was an urgent motion to quash the writ of possession filed
by the oppositors on September 25, 1959,^[3]
followed by a motion for reconsideration on October 10, 1959,^[4]
which was denied in an order of October
23, 1959.^[5]
As set forth in such order of denial: 
“After weighing the arguments adduced by the movant
represented by Atty. Gonzales and the oppositor represented by Atty. Loot, this
Court adheres to the previous ruling that inasmuch as no writ of possession has
been issued in this case, it is the ministerial duty of this Court to issue one
in compliance of the provisions of Act 496 as amended.” There was a second
motion for reconsideration filed by oppositors on November 3, 1959,^[6]
which was denied in an order of December
10, 1959.^[7]
Not satisfied, there was still another motion for reconsideration of the above
order filed by oppositors on December 28, 1959,^[8]
which similarly met the same fate, an order
of denial being issued on February
20, 1960.^[9] The appeal was taken direct to us.

The sole issue,
therefore, is whether on the above facts, the order granting the writ of
possession was in accordance with law. 
The answer must be in the affirmative. 
This appeal cannot prosper.

No other view would be
compatible with the pertinent provision of the Land Registration Act,^[10] as uniformly interpreted by this Court.  As was noted in the order Of September
21, 1959, there was
a final decree in a land registration case which arose from a decision
promulgated in 1938, the filial decree being issued on October
29, 1941.  It was not incorrect for the lower court to
state, therefore, that “the issuance of a writ of possession is only a
matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the
registered owner.”^[11] It is equally true, as likewise mentioned
therein, that there is “no period of prescription as to the issuance of a
writ of possession, * * *.”^[12] In Pasay Estate
Co. v. Del Rosario,^[13] it has been made clear that the purpose of
the statutory provision empowering the then Court of Land Registration, now the
ordinary courts of first instance to enforce its orders, judgments or decrees
in the same way that the judiciary does so that the winning party could be
placed in possession of the property covered by such decree.  Thereby, there would be an avoidance of the
inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful litigant would be
subjected if he were compelled “to commence other actions in other courts
for the purpose of securing the fruits of his victory.”

There was a restatement
of the above principle in Demorar v. Ibañez,^[14] the closest in period of time to the
challenged order of the lower court. 
Thus:  “We have heretofore
held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who
has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration
proceedings * * *.  The issuance of the
decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings.  In fact, it is supposed to end the said
proceedings.  Consequently, any person
unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the
final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by
means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to
issue said writ when asked for by the successful claimant.” As a matter of
fact, in a 1948 decision,^[15] it was held by us that “the fact that
the petitioners have instituted, more than one year after the decree of
registration had been issued, an ordinary action with the Court of First
Instance attacking the validity of the decree on the ground of fraud, is not a
bar to the issuance of the writ of possession applied for by the registered
owners.”

A few months after the
issuance of such a challenged order of September 21, 1959, Marcelo v. Mencias was decided,^[16] where this Court went so far as to hold that
“if the writ of possession issued in a land registration proceeding
implies the delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein,
* * * a writ of demolition must, likewise, issue, especially considering that
the latter writ is but a complement of the former which, without said writ of
demolition, would be ineffective.”

It is clear, therefore, to repeat, that on the facts as found,
the validity of the challenged order cannot be impugned.  It is equally clear that this being a direct
appeal to us, no questions of fact may be raised.  As was held recently in Perez v. Araneta:^[17] “Nothing is better settled than
that where the correctness of the findings of fact of the lower court is
assailed, the Court of Appeals is the proper forum.  If resort be had directly to us, then
appellant must be deemed to have waived the opportunity otherwise his to
inquire into such findings and to limit himself to disputing the correctness of
the law applied.”

The problem thus confronting oppositors-appellants
in bringing the matter direct to us was to show that the above two-page order
on the meager but sufficient facts as found, was vitiated by error or errors in
law.  It was far from easy, therefore,
considering as above shown, that on the authority of applicable decisions, the
lower court was left with no choice but to issue the writ of possession sought.

Resolute and undaunted, oppositors did
their best to accomplish a task formidable in its complexity.  It seemed they overdid it.  They
assigned twenty-one errors, a great many of them factual, and, therefore, not
for us to consider, and the remaining, except the last, far from decisive in
view of the rather settled state of the law concerning the issuance of a writ
of possession.  Nor did the twenty-first
error assigned suffice to call for a reversal, as will be more fully explained.  That is why, as earlier stated, the appeal
was doomed to futility.

It would not be amiss, though, to discuss even briefly one of
them, the fourteenth.  Invoking three of
our previous decisions,^[18]
they would impugn the issuance of the writ of possession on the ground that
they were not oppositors and defeated parties in the land
registration proceeding.  They would
ignore the fact, however, that in the above decisions relied upon, the basis
for the impropriety of issuing a writ of possession was that the parties
adversely affected entered the property in question after the issuance of the
decree.  There is nothing in the
challenged order that such is the case here. 
Thus, they would raise a factual issue – a matter not properly
cognizable by us.

A reminder may not be out
of place.  The apparent ease with which oppositors-appellants could conjure up so many alleged
errors, while it may be a tribute to their ingenuity in making a two-page order
yield so many instances of the rankest violation of legal precepts, hardly
contributes to the persuasiveness of their brief.  As a matter of fact, the suspicion could be
legitimately entertained that in thus attempting to paint the highly
unrealistic picture of a terse and brief order being so sadly riddled with
errors, oppositors-appellants were trying in vain to
bolster what inherently was a weak case.

That is all that needs be
said about this appeal except for the disposition of the twenty-first error
assigned, referring to the existence of a pending case between the parties for reconveyance.^[19] There was no denial in the brief for movant-appellee that such a case was then pending at the
time the respective briefs were filed.  What is decided here cannot affect whatever final decision might
possibly have been rendered by this time in the aforesaid reconveyance
action.  Nonetheless, the mere fact that
such a suit was then pending did not oust the lower court of its jurisdiction
to issue the writ of possession.  As
stated by our present Chief Justice in Agreda v.
Rodriguez:^[20] “Besides, it is clear that respondent
Judge had jurisdiction to pass upon the motion of Santiago Agreda
for the issuance of a writ of possession. 
Whether or not the motion should have been denied, in view of
institution of said Civil Case No. 6267, is a matter that does not affect said
jurisdiction.”

WHEREFORE, the order of September 21, 1959, granting the writ of possession in favor of
movant-appellee, and the orders of October
23, 1959, December
10, 1959 and February
20, 1960, deny­ing
the reconsideration thereof, are affirmed. 
With costs against oppositors-appellants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., on official leave.

^[1]
Order of September 21, 1959,
Record on Appeal, pp. 75-76.

^[2]
Ibid, p. 76.

^[3]
Ibid, pp. 82-85.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. 88-119.

^[5]
Ibid, pp. 126-127.

^[6]
Ibid, pp. 128-135.

^[7]
Ibid, pp. 165-166.

^[8]
Ibid, pp. 167-177.

^[9]
Ibid, p. 178.

^[10]
Section 17. Act No. 496.

^[11]
Record on Appeal, p. 76.

^[12]
Ibid.

^[13]
11 Phil. 391 (1908).  See also: 
Manlapas v.
Llorente, 48 Phil. 298 (1925).

^[14]
97 Phil. 72, 74-75 (1955).

^[15]
Soroñgon v. Makalintal,
80 Phil. 259 (1948).

^[16]
L-15609, April 29, 1960.

^[17]
L-18414, July 15, 1968.

^[18]
Manuel v. Rosauro, 56 Phil. 364 (1931);
Rodriguez v. Tirona, 68 Phil. 264 (1939) and Maglasang v. Maceren, 83
Phil. 637 (1949).

^[19]
Civil Case No. 5019, Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
Branch V.

^[20]
L-21695, April 29, 1966.