JOSEFINA MARQUEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. AIDA CLORES-RAMOS, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, RESPONDENT.

Marquez versus Clores-Ramos

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Josefina Marquez, the lawful wife of Florencio Marquez, charged Aida Clores-Ramos, a Court Stenographer III assigned to a regional trial court branch in Libmanan, Camarines Sur, with unethical, illicit, and highly immoral acts for maintaining an amorous relationship with the complainant's husband, out of which a child was born. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's own disciplinary proceeding over a judicial employee, and it fixes the standard that court personnel are judged by their private morals as well as their official conduct.

Procedural History

The complaint began as a sworn letter complaint dated October 10, 1995, sent to the Supreme Court. The Office of the Court Administrator also received indorsements from the Department of Justice and from the Office of the Ombudsman referring the same matter for appropriate action. In a resolution dated February 14, 1996, the Court referred the case to Executive Judge Salvador Cajot of the regional trial court of Libmanan, Camarines Sur, for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In the meantime, the Office of the Court Administrator received a letter purporting to withdraw the complaint. Before acting on it, the Court required the respondent to comment. The complainant then filed a manifestation denying that she authored the withdrawal letter and insisting that she wished to pursue the case, asking that Judge Cajot inhibit himself because he was a good friend of her husband. The case was then referred to Judge Lore Bagalacsa of another branch of the same court for investigation, report, and recommendation. On June 22, 1998, Judge Bagalacsa submitted her report finding the respondent guilty and recommending suspension for one year. The matter then came before the Supreme Court for decision in its administrative jurisdiction.

Facts

Josefina Marquez married Florencio Marquez in religious rites on January 5, 1955, at Libmanan, Camarines Sur. In their later years both went to the United States, but Florencio returned to the Philippines ahead of his wife as a balikbayan, and there he met Aida Clores-Ramos, a court stenographer. The respondent claimed that Florencio introduced himself as a widower since 1954, showed her certifications of a prior marriage and of the death of that wife, courted her persistently, and promised marriage in the United States. She claimed that after a dinner in March 1993 he took advantage of her, that the relationship became frequent, and that she bore a son on December 8, 1993, baptized Florencio Marquez, Junior, on February 11, 1994.

While in the United States, Josefina learned of the affair and confronted her husband, who admitted it in a letter dated September 7, 1993, naming the woman and describing her as his sexual playmate while his wife was abroad. When Josefina returned in September 1994, she found in their closets letters between her husband and the respondent, addressed to Mrs. Aida Ramos of the regional trial court branch in Libmanan, referring to each other as Papa and Mama and to the child as their boy.

The investigating judge found abundant corroboration. Witnesses testified that the respondent and Florencio lived together in 1993 and 1994, that they were seen riding a motorcycle together, hearing mass together, going to market together, and going to Manila together with the child, that the affair was known throughout Libmanan, that the respondent managed a shoe store jointly with him, and that the relationship continued even after she learned he was married. When the complainant approached her at the church and asked whether the child was Florencio's son, the respondent answered in the affirmative and said, in the local tongue, that she was not the only whore, there were a lot of them.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent, a court stenographer, is guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct for maintaining an illicit relationship with a married man.
• Whether or not the respondent's claim that she was deceived into believing her lover was a widower, and that she kept meeting him only because he was supporting their son, excuses her conduct.
• Whether or not the private life of a court employee may be made the basis of administrative discipline.

Applicable Provisions

The Court cites the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of the ground for discipline, and the provision reads:

Section 46(5), Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292)

This is the provision under which disgraceful and immoral conduct is a ground for disciplinary action against a civil servant such as the respondent.

The Court also invokes the Code of Judicial Ethics, which it quotes through its earlier ruling in Burgos versus Aquino:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but also to his behavior outside the court as a private individual.

This is the standard of conduct the respondent is measured against, extending the demand for propriety beyond official duties into private life.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found the respondent guilty. It adopted the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the investigating judge, holding that the evidence, testimonial and documentary, showed she maintained an illicit relationship with a married man, the husband of the complainant.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the defenses. It agreed with the investigating judge that her continued relationship with Florencio Marquez even after she learned that he was already married is condemnable. It refused to accept that her constant meetings with him were a necessity because he was fulfilling his obligations as a father to their son, reasoning that prudence dictated that if she were serious in severing the relationship she should have discreetly kept a distance from him. The investigating judge had put it sharply: the deception might explain the beginning, but the years after her knowledge of the man's marital status and her continued dalliance with him could no longer be justified.

On the third issue, the Court held that the private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life. It stressed that every employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness, and honesty, and must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of official duties but in personal and private dealings, because the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work there, from the judge to the least and lowest of its personnel. The Court declared that this public display of an illicit relationship is disgraceful and immoral conduct calling for disciplinary action, and reiterated that there is no dichotomy of morality, for a court employee is also judged by his private morals.

Doctrine

First, disgraceful and immoral conduct is a ground for disciplinary action against a public servant under the Administrative Code of 1987, and maintaining an open illicit relationship with a married man falls squarely within it.

Second, the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff of impropriety, not only in the performance of official duties but also in behavior outside the court as private individuals. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court employee is judged by private morals as well.

Third, the private life of a public employee cannot be segregated from public life, because any misconduct in private life reflects on public existence and vice versa, and the image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct of all who work there, from the judge to the lowest personnel.

Fourth, deception at the outset does not excuse a continued relationship after knowledge of the man's married status, and the duty to support a child does not justify public displays of intimacy with the child's married father.

Disposition

The Court found the respondent Aida Clores-Ramos guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and suspended her for one year without pay, with a copy of the decision entered in her personal record.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that there is no dichotomy of morality, for a court employee is judged by private morals as well as official conduct. Examiners use this case to test the expanded scope of administrative liability of judicial personnel and the rule that disgraceful and immoral conduct, even in private life, warrants discipline.