ARTEMIO CASTILLO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FILTEX INTERNATIONAL CORP., DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

This appeal, certified to this Court by the defunct Court of
Appeals, challenges the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal which
dismissed the complaint of appellant Artemio Castillo for reinstatement and
payment of back wages, and ordered him to pay defendant Filtex International
Corporation, hereinafter referred to as FILTEX, the sum of P1,000.00, as
attorney’s fees, plus costs.

The facts culled from the pleadings and the stipulation of facts
entered into at the pre-trial are as follows:

Artemio Castillo, an employee of FILTEX and a member of the Samahan ng Malaya
Manggagawa sa Filtex (FFW), SAMAHAN for
short, was charged together with others in the Municipal Court of Makati with
the offense of slight physical injuries, for his alleged involvement in a
mauling and stoning incident which occurred sometime in July 1964
at the height of a strike called by the SAMAHAN.  During the pendency of the case, Castillo was
suspended from his job.

On July 8, 1964, FILTEX and SAMAHAN entered into a “Return
to Work Agreement”, paragraphs 3 and 4 of which read as follows:

“3. That all
employees of the company who struck and committed violence and other unlawful
acts and against whom court cases are filed or to be filed, shall be suspended
by the company upon filing of such cases by the fiscal with the proper courts
for as long as the said cases shall remain pending in court;

“4. That in the event the employees referred to
in the preceding paragraph are found innocent by the courts, then the COMPANY
agrees to reinstate them to their res­pective jobs with back wages minus
whatever earnings they earned during the period of suspension; otherwise, if found guilty they shall remain dismissed;”

After trial, the Municipal Court
of Makati rendered a decision, convicting Castillo of slight physical
injuries.  However, on appeal, the Court
of First Instance of Rizal
dismissed the case in an order dated November 28, 1966.

Thereafter, Castillo asked for reinstatement to his former job
and payment of back wages.  When FILTEX
paid no heed to his demands, Castillo insti­tuted the corresponding action in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
claiming that the dismissal of the criminal case justified his reinstatement
and payment of back wages, pursuant to paragraph 4 of the
Return of Work Agreement.”

FILTEX filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of cause of
action and want of jurisdiction of the court, the case being allegedly within
the exclusive jurisdic­tion of the Court of Industrial Relations.

Upon denial of the motion to dismiss, FILTEX filed its
answer.  At the pre-trial, the parties
defined the principal issue thus:  Is the
plaintiff entitled to re-instatement
and back wages after the dismissal of the criminal charge against him in
accordance with paragraph 4 of the “Return to Work Agreement”?

On the bases of the parties’ memoranda and the facts stipulated
at the pre-trial the case was submitted for decision.  Thereafter, the lower court rendered the
aforestated decision, dismissing the case. 
It rationalized its judgment as
follows:

“The plaintiff in this case was found guilty by the Municipal Court
of Makati.  With the dismissal of the
case by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, could it be inferred that the plaintiff was
found innocent?  The Court cannot but
rule otherwise in view of the fact that the dismissal of the case was only be­cause
of the failure of the complainant to appear at the scheduled trial.  It must be noted that the agreement to re-instate an employee in the category of the
plaintiff expressly states that there must be a finding of innocence by the courts.  It did not stipulate
that the case should be dismissed.”

Hence, this appeal.

We find the appeal impressed with merit.  While it is true that appellant was convicted
in the Municipal Court of Makati of the offense of slight physical injuries, it
is undisputed that on appeal, the Court of First Instance of Rizal dismissed
the case for failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear.  Section 7 of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court,
the rule in force at the time of the perfection of the appeal, reads as
follows:

“Trial de novo on appeal.- An appealed case
shall be tried in all respects anew in the courts of first instance as if it
had been originally instituted in that court.”

Applying the foregoing rule, the judgment of conviction rendered
by the municipal court was vacated upon perfection of the appeal, to be tried de
novo in the court of first instance as if it were originally instituted
therein.  The phrase “to
vacate” applied to a judgment means “to annul, to render void.”^[1]

Since the criminal case was ultimately dismissed, the
constitutional presumption of innocence^[2]
in favor of the appellant should be applied. 
The following disquisition on this constitutional guarantee in People
vs. Dramayo^[3]
is enlightening.

“Thus: 
‘It is to be admitted that the starting point is the presumption of
innocence.  So it must be, according to
the Constitution.  That is a right safe­guarded
both appellants.  Accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt.  It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies. 
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their
behalf.  Their freedom is for­feit only if the requisite
quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence.  Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable
doubt.  To such a standard this Court has
always been committed.  There is need, therefore, for the most
careful scrutiny of the testi­mony of the state, both oral and documentary,
independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused.  Only if the judge below and the appellate
tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed
precisely by person on trial under such an exacting test could sentence be one
of conviction.  It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account.  The proof against him must survive the test
of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.  The conscience must be satisfied that on the
defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a
crime.  So it has been held from the 1903
decision of Uni­ted States v. Reyes.”

It seems needless to state that the innocence of the appellant
need no longer be proved, since under the fundamental law his innocence is
presumed.

But the appellee argues that the Return to Work Agreement
requires an express finding of
inno­cence by the court in order to entitle an employee to reinstatement and
back wages; that no such finding
of innocence had been made because the criminal case was dismissed on a mere
technicality, i.e, the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear at the
trial; and that the interpretation of said agreement should not be stretched to
include a “mere presumption of innocence under the law.”

The argument is incompatible with the basic tenet embodied in the
constitutional provision on protection to labor.^[4] Cognizant of this State policy, this Court is constrained to interpret the agreement in
question in favor of the claim of the laborer and against that of
management.  As empha­sized by Chief
Justice Fernando:

“If it were not thus, there is no fealty to the truism that
the state exists to promote the welfare of all. 
It is to be judged then, to paraphrase Laski, by the extent to which it
contributes to the substance of man’s happiness.  Necessarily, the whole citizenry is
included.  It follows likewise that those
who are less fortunate in terms of economic well-being should be given
preferential attention.  For if such be
not the case, then the policy marks it­self as failing in its basic
objective.  Neg­ligence on its part to do so may
well cause a tear in the fabric of unity that binds a people together.

“It is easily understandable then why there should be this
state policy.  It dispels any doubt that
in weighing the claims of labor as against that of manage­ment, it is to be
preferred.  x x x The obligation to protect labor
is incum­bent on the state.  It is a
command to live up to.  In the final
analysis, it is as simple as that.  That
is the welfare state concept vitalized.”

Upon these premises, We declare that appellant Artemio Castillo
is entitled to reinstatement and pay­ment of back wages.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside.  Let the records be remanded to
the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission for determination
of the amount appellant is entitled to as back wages.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Abad Santos, and Relova, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., no part.

Concepcion, Jr., on leave.

Guerrero, J., in the result.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.

^[1] Bautista vs. Johnson, 2 Phil. 230.

^[2] “In all criminal prosecution, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x.” Article 3, Section 17 of the 1935 Cons­titution;
Article 4, Section 19 of the
1973 Constitution.

^[3] 42 SCRA 59.

^[4]
Art. XIV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution provides:

“The State shall afford pro­tection to labor especially to working
women and minors and shall regulate the relationship between landowners and
tenants, and between labor and capital in industry and agriculture.” x x x

Art. II, Section 9 of the Constitution reads:

“The State shall affored
protection to labor, promote full employ­ment and equality in employment,
ensure equal work opportunities, regardless of sex, race, or creed, and
regulate the relations between workers and employees.  The State shall assure the rights of workers
to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure and just and
humane conditions of work.” x x x