DOUGLAS B. ALVIR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. RIZALINA B. VERA, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH XXIII, BERNARDO MOLLAT AND TERESA MOLLAT, RESPONDENTS.

Records show that petitioner Douglas B. Alvir filed a complaint for
unlawful detainer against private respondents Bernardo Mollat and Teresa
Mollat, before the then Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal. Basis of
the complaint is that petitioner is the registered owner of a
residential lot, together with the improve­ments thereon situated at No.
299 Verdun Street, San Juan, Rizal and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 328543 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal. After said
property had been adjudicated to him as its new owner during the
settlement of the estate of his late father Dr. Antonio B. Alvir,
plaintiff (herein petitioner) wrote private respondents to vacate the
premises as he and his family are in need of a place to live. This was
followed by another letter reiterating his request which, however, the
private respondents ignored.

In their answer, private respondents alleged that in November 1961 the
late Dr. Antonio B. Alvir entered into a contract of sale with Mr.
Howard J. Weber whereby the latter was given the right to pay the full
purchase price of the property within two (2) years from the date of the
contract of sale; that private respondents were allowed by Mr. Weber to
occupy the premises before the latter left for the United States; and
that they have been occupying the property as tenants of said Mr. Weber.

After trial, the inferior court rendered judgment in favor of herein
petitioner Douglas B. Alvir, ordering private respondents Bernardo and
Teresa Mollat “to vacate the premises occupied by them at No. 299 Verdun
Street, San Juan, Rizal and to return possession thereof to the
plaintiff; to pay to the plaintiff the monthly rental of P300.00 per
month from May 25, 1972 until the said defendants completely vacate the
said premises; [and] to pay to the plaintiff an additional sum of
P500.00 for attorney’s fee plus the cost of this action.” (p. 77, Rollo)

Appeal from the decision of the inferior court was taken by private
respondents to the then Court of First Instance of Rizal which set aside
the decision of the then municipal court of San Juan, Rizal and
dismissed the complaint.

Hence, this petition for review by way of certiorari.

As found by respondent court, subject property with an area of 502
square meters is situated in San Juan, Rizal and covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 328543 in the name of petitioner Douglas B.
Alvir as of May 25, 1971 when the estate of his father who died in 1951
was settled.

As its owner, petitioner contends that he is entitled to the possession
of the premises against the private respondents with whom he has no
contract and, notwithstanding, refused to vacate the same.

On the other hand, the private respondents claim that they were
authorized to stay in the property by Mr. and Mrs. Howard Weber who
purchased it from the Alvirs in 1961. On this point, respondent court
said:

“x x x As early as 1966, the Alvirs and Weber seemed not to agree
as to the amount still due the Alvirs from Weber which prompted Weber to
deposit the amount which he believed was the maximum amount still due
the Alvirs with the Associated Banking Corporation. On December 1,
1967, Weber wrote Antonio Alvir, brother of the plaintiff, with respect
to the fencing of the property covered by the deed of sale between the
Alvirs and Webers Exhibit 6-A). As testified to by Antonio Alvir, Weber
has been pressing Catalina Alvir to deliver the title to the property
but Mrs. Alvir refused to do so on the ground that the payment made by
Weber was delayed.

“From the evidence presented by the defendants, it appears that
defendants are claiming the right to possess the property by virtue of
the authority of Weber who claims to be the owner of the property as per
deed of sale executed by the Alvirs in his favor. The contention of
the Alvirs that they are not duty bound to surrender the title to the
property on the ground that Weber has not complied with the conditions
of the sale are matters which should be threshed out in a separate
proceedings and only until these matters have been clarified can it be
said that Weber has no right to the property and, therefore, the
possession of the defendants under Weber’s authority is not lawful.

“x x x             x x x                 x x x

“As a general rule, a mere allega­tion by the defendant in an
ejectment case, that he is the owner of the real property involved
therein, does not and cannot divest the inferior court of its
jurisdiction over the ejectment suit. However, if it appears during the
trial that by the nature of the proof presented, the question of
possession cannot be properly determined without settling that of
ownership, then the jurisdiction of the court is lost and the action
should be dismissed. (Torres vs. Peña, 78 Phil. 231; Peñalosa vs.
Garcia, 78 Phil. 245; Cruz vs. Garcia, 79 Phil. 1; Ganaynay vs.
Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36; Raymundo vs. Santos, 93 Phil. 395; Dy Sun vs.
Brillantes, 93 Phil. 175; Andres vs. Serrano, 101 Phil. 848; Songahid
vs. Cinco, L-14341, January 29, 1960 as cited in 16 SCRA 677).
Plain­tiff admitted that before this case was filed, he came across the
deed of sale by the Alvirs in favor of Weber while sorting out papers
relevant to this case (tsn, April 6, 1973, pp. 16-17). It is surprising
that Weber was not made a party defendant he being a party in
interest.” (pp. 73-74, 75, Rollo)

In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession
de facto, independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure
that either party may set forth in his pleading. As incidents of the
main issue of possession de facto, the inferior court can decide the
questions of (a) whether or not the relation­ship between the parties is
one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease
contract between the parties, the period of such lease contract and
whether or not the lease contract has already expired; (c) the just and
reasonable amount of the rent and the date when it will take effect; (d)
the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of the
landlord; and (e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial
and valuable building and there is no dispute between the parties as to
the ownership of the land and the building, their rights according to
the Civil Code. Defendants’ claim of ownership of the property from
which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the
inferior court of its jurisdiction over the action of forcible entry and
detainer. However, if it appears during the trial that the principal
issue relates to the ownership of the property in dispute and any
question of possession which may be involved necessarily depends upon
the result of the inquiry into the title, previous rulings of this Court
are that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city court is lost and
the action should be dismissed.

We have at bar a case where, in effect, the question of physical
possession could not properly be determined without settling that of
lawful or de jure possession and of ownership and hence, following early
doctrine, the jurisdiction of the municipal court over the ejectment
case was lost and the action should have been dismissed. As a
consequence, respondent court would have no jurisdiction over the case
on appeal and it should have dismissed the case as appealed from the
municipal court. However, in line with Section 11, Rule 40 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which reads –

“SEC. 11. Lack of jurisdiction. A case tried by an
inferior court without jurisdiction over the subject matter shall be
dismissed on appeal by the Court of First Instance. But instead of
dismissing the case, the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, may try the case on the merits if the parties
therein file their pleadings and go to the trial without any objection
to such jurisdiction.”

this Court held in Saliwan vs. Amores, 51 SCRA 329, 337, that dismissal
“on the said ground of lack of appellate jurisdiction on the part of the
lower court flowing from the municipal court’s loss of jurisdiction
would lead only to ‘needless delay and multiplicity of suits in the
attainment of the same result’ and ignores, as above stated, that the
case was tried and heard by the lower court in the exercise of its
original juris­diction by common assent of the parties by virtue of the
issues raised by the parties and the proof presented by them thereon.”
In a similar case, the Court ruled that-

“As the justice of the peace court of Hagonoy had no jurisdiction
to try the case on the merits, the order appealed from remanding the
case to that court must be, as it is hereby, revoked; and, in accord
with the precedent established in Cruz et al. vs. Garcia et al., 45 Off.
Gaz., 227, and the decisions therein cited, the case is ordered
returned to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for that court to
proceed with the trial in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.”
(Teodoro vs. Balatbat, et al., 94 Phil. 247, 250).

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent judge is hereby REVERSED and the
case is remanded to the Court of First Instance of Rizal for that court
to proceed with the trial in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.