ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, GREGORIO A. EJERCITO, RIZAL DAGA, DIONISIO BARING, DIOSDADO ROQUE, ARTURO T. DE GUIA, AUGUSTO CASIBANG, JOSE…

Villegas versus Subido

The Case

This is a petition for mandamus filed by Mayor Antonio Villegas of Manila and the appointees to the newly created Office of the City Legal Officer against Civil Service Commissioner Abelardo Subido. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to compel the Commissioner to approve and release the appointment of Gregorio Ejercito as City Legal Officer and to act on the appointments of his staff. The case matters because it fixes the limits of the Civil Service Commissioner's power over local appointments: he cannot disapprove a qualified appointee, and he cannot sit indefinitely on appointments submitted to him.

Procedural History

The petitioners went directly to the Supreme Court in an original action for mandamus, after the Civil Service Commissioner returned the staff appointments without action and disapproved the appointment of Ejercito. There were no intermediate rulings below; the Supreme Court resolved the case in the first instance, through a decision penned by Justice Capistrano.

Facts

Manila Ordinance Number 6485, effective January 1, 1968, created the position of City Legal Officer and the positions of his staff, and appropriated the amounts for their salaries. It was passed under Section 19 of Republic Act Number 5185, the Decentralization Act of 1967, which authorizes a city to create such positions so it may avail itself of full time and trusted legal services, and which transfers to the City Legal Officer the functions formerly performed by the city fiscals as legal adviser and legal officer in civil cases.

On January 23, 1968, Mayor Villegas appointed Gregorio Ejercito as City Legal Officer effective January 1, 1968, and appointed the members of his staff on various dates. The appointments were sent directly to the Civil Service Commission shortly after each was made. The Mayor sent letters of justification and follow-up letters, noting that the appointees had been working without salaries. On September 30, 1968, Commissioner Subido returned the staff appointments without action, on the ground that Ejercito had no legal capacity to recommend them because his own appointment had not been approved, and he took the position that the Commission was not limited by law to a period of 180 days within which to act. On October 1, 1968, the Commissioner disapproved Ejercito's appointment, saying that while Ejercito met the education and eligibility standards, he did not meet the standard of four years of trial work in the Court of First Instance and superior courts.

Issues

• Whether or not Section 20 of the Civil Service Act of 1959, with its 180-day rule, applies to appointments submitted directly to the Commissioner of Civil Service.
• Whether or not the Commissioner of Civil Service has the power to impose qualification standards for the office of City Legal Officer.
• Whether or not Ejercito is qualified for the position of City Legal Officer.
• Whether or not mandamus lies to compel the Commissioner to approve and release Ejercito's appointment, and to act on the appointments of his staff.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20 of Republic Act Number 2260, the Civil Service Act of 1959, provides:

All appointments made by city mayors shall, after being attested to by the respective city treasurer, be forwarded within ten days to the Commissioner of Civil Service for review pursuant to Civil Service law and rules. If, within one hundred eighty days after receipt of said appointments, the Commissioner of Civil Service shall not have made any correction or revision, then such appointments shall be deemed to have been properly made.

This provision is the basis of the petitioners' claim that the appointments were deemed approved after 180 days, and the Court holds that it does not cover appointments sent directly to the Commissioner.

Section 23 of the same Act provides in part:

Employees shall be selected on the basis of their fitness to perform the duties and assume the responsibilities of the positions whether in the competitive or classified or in the non-competitive or unclassified service.

The Commissioner invoked this provision as the source of his power to set qualification standards, but the Court found it unnecessary to rule on that power.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that Section 20 does not apply. The statute contemplates an appointment attested by the city treasurer as deputy of the Commissioner; such an attested appointment takes effect immediately. Here there was no attestation, and the law cannot be applied by analogy. The old arrangement sending Manila appointments directly to the Commission for practical reasons did not and could not mean that they were attested by the City Treasurer.

On the second issue, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on whether the Commissioner may prescribe qualification standards, because Ejercito met the standards set.

On the third issue, the Court held that Ejercito is qualified. He met the education and eligibility standards, and a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Manila listing eighteen civil cases from 1959 to 1967 in which he was counsel of record for the City of Manila, together with the Mayor's letter of justification, showed more than four years of trial practice. The Court added that the declared purpose of the law, to secure full time and trusted legal services, is achieved by his appointment, he having rendered such services for more than twenty years.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that mandamus lies. Though no period is fixed for the Commissioner to act on appointments directly submitted to him, public policy and public interest demand action within a reasonable time of 180 days from receipt. Ejercito being qualified, and his appointment having been received on January 26, 1968, mandamus should issue to compel approval and release, and the indorsement of disapproval is of no value and without effect. As for the staff, since the reason for their return no longer holds, mandamus lies to compel the Commissioner to act within 30 days from re-submission. The Court quoted its earlier doctrine:

When the appointee is qualified, as petitioner herein admittedly is, then the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but to attest to the appointment.

Doctrine

First, the 180-day rule of Section 20 of the Civil Service Act applies only where the appointment is attested by the city treasurer as deputy of the Commissioner; it does not apply to appointments sent directly to the Commission, and it cannot be applied by analogy.

Second, where no period is fixed by law, the Civil Service Commissioner must act on appointments directly submitted to him within a reasonable time of 180 days from receipt, because public policy and public interest demand it.

Third, when the appointee is qualified, the Commissioner has no choice but to attest or approve the appointment, and mandamus lies to compel him.

Disposition

The Court granted the petition, commanding the Civil Service Commissioner to forthwith approve and release Ejercito's appointment as City Legal Officer, and to act on the 28 staff appointments within 30 days from their re-submission.

Remember This

Memorize the line that when the appointee is qualified, the Commissioner has no choice but to attest to the appointment. Examiners use this case on the appointing power of local executives, the scope of the Civil Service Commissioner's review, and the availability of mandamus to compel action on appointments.