FELINO SIMPAO, JR., AND GUILLERMA MENDOZA, PETITIONERS-APPELLANTS, VS. REMIGIO M. LILLES AND ANGELITA DIZON, AND HON. RICARDO P. TENSUAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BRA…

On June 1, 1965 the spouses Remigio
Lilies and Angelita Dizon,
owners of a residential lot at the La
Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, together with the
house situated thereon, entered into a “contract to sell” the same to the spouses Felino Simpao, Jr. and Guillerma Mendoza for and in
consideration of the sum of P150,000.00.  The terms of payment and other conditions
agreed upon are as follows:

“1. The sum of
One Hundred Twenty Thousand Six Hundred Fifty (P120,650.00)
Pesos (P58,650 + 32,000.00 + P30,000.00), immediately upon the signing of this
Agreement.

2.  The balance of Twenty Nine Thousand Three
Hundred Fifty (P29, 350.00) Pesos within six (6) months from date hereof,
without interest, and if not so paid, then it shall earn interest at the rate
of twelve (12%) per cent per annum
until fully paid;

3.  The VENDEES hereby assume the payment of the
loan of the VENDORS in favor of the BANCO FILIPINO effective from its inception
as if they were the original borrowers, which assumption will be officially
transmitted for approval to said Bank upon the execution of the Deed of Sale,
at which time, the fixed deposit of the VENDORS will be officially trans­ferred
to the VENDEES;

4.   The VENDEES may take immediate possession of
subject premises.

5.  As soon as the said balance of P29,350.00 is
fully paid, the VENDORS will execute a document sufficient in law to fully
transfer ownership, subject of course to the assumption of the said loan by the
herein VENDEES, to which they are fully agreeable;

6.    If the said balance is not paid on the date
herein specified, and without prejudice to its earning the interest
herein-mentioned, then this Agreement shall become null and void, and the
VENDEES shall vacate the pre­mises within ninety (90) days from said violation
and forfeit the sum of P2,000.00 as liquidated damages, and the VENDORS will
return the P60,000.00 of the P62,000.00 within six (6) months from the time the
VENDEES have fully vacated the subject premises and the above-mentioned loan
shall continue in the name of the herein VENDORS as if this Contract to Sell
has never been executed.”

The initial payment was
made, leaving the balance of P29,350.00 which was to
be paid within six months, or
until December 1, 1965.  Possession of the property was
thereupon delivered to the vendees.  When
they defaulted in respect of the
said balance after it became due
the vendors notified them in writing to vacate the premises, and then filed an
action for unlawful detainer on February
22, 1967 in the City
Court of Quezon City where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. II-14989.

On March
16, 1967 the
defendants filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the Quezon City Court on the following grounds:

(a)  Petitioners’ (defendants) possession exceed
the period of one year;

“(b) That the case is one of simple possession and
not that of unlawful detainer;

“(c) That the
subject matter in controversy is beyond the jurisdiction of the Court because
the amount involves the sum (sic) of P150,000.00 more or less; and

“(d) For the
court to take jurisdiction of the case could be abetting the multiplicity of
suits.”

The motion to dismiss was
denied, as was the defendants’ subsequent motion for reconsideration, whereupon
they filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City.

On December
13, 1967 the said
Court dismissed the petition and ruled that the City Court had jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the unlawful detainer suit.  It is from the order of dismissal that the
defendants came up to this Court for review.

Inasmuch as the issue of
jurisdiction was raised in a motion to dismiss, without
the answer having yet been filed and before evidence as to any facts which
might be alleged by way of defenses had been received, the said issue must be
resolved on the basis of the averments in the complaint alone.

The appellants contend
that since the “contract to sell” is annexed to the complaint and
constitutes the actionable document on which it is predicated, and since under
the said document “there are rights to be determined and obligations to be
performed by both contracting parties enforceable only thru and within the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance”, the unlawful detainer suit is not the proper
remedy and their petition for certiorari and prohibition should have been given due course by the Court of
First Instance.

A reading of the
complaint as well as of the stipulations in the contract between the parties yields
no support for the contention. 
The contract did not transfer ownership of the property to the
appellants.  Besides being denominated a
mere “contract to sell,” it provides that “the vendees hereby
offer to buy,” and that it is only upon payment of the balance of the
purchase price that “the vendors will execute a document sufficient in law
to fully transfer ownership.” The contract then goes on to say that if the
said balance is not paid on the date specified, “then this agreement shall
become null and void, and the vendees shall vacate the premises within 90 days
from said violation.” Even the return of the amount already paid in cash
by the vendees is not a pre-requisite to their obligation to vacate, but is to
be effected only within six months after the premises are fully vacated.

These terms of the contract, with respect to the appellants’
tenure of occupancy, are clear and unequivocal. 
All that need be alleged, as they are alleged in the complaint, is that
the appellants defaulted in the payment of the balance of P29,350;
that demand to vacate was served upon them; that they refused to do so; and
that the action was filed within one year from the time the appellants’
possession became unlawful.  The
situation is undeniably within the scope of Section 1 of Rule 70, which
provides:

“SEC. 1. Who may institute proceedings,
and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth, or a landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue
of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of
any such landlord, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper inferior court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs.  The complaint must be verified.

The provisions of this rule shall not apply to cases covered by the
Agricultural Tenancy Act.”

If, as the appellants point out, there are rights and/or
obligations of the parties which should be determined before they may be
ejected, they certainly do not appear
in the complaint; and if at all, they must be raised in the answer so that the
City Court may consider, first, whether or not they are beyond its jurisdiction
to resolve; and second, whether or not they are so inextricably connected with
the summary question of material possession involved in the unlawful detainer suit as to divest said Court of jurisdiction to
hear and decide the same.

It is not correct to say, as the appellants do say in their
brief, that the appellees have in effect unilaterally
declared the contract to sell as null and void, contrary to the principle that
rescission of a contract must be judicially authorized.  Here the so-called nullity – or automatic
resolution – of the contract is expressly stipulated by the parties upon the
happening of a certain contingency, namely, the non-payment of the balance of
the purchase price upon due date; and since the contingency has occurred the
demand to vacate is in reality by way of enforcing what has been agreed upon.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with
costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Barredo,
and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Dizon, J., on leave.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

Makasiar, J., concurs in this opinion and in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.