PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND ROAD LEADER MARKETING CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CESAR M. SOLIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 14, MA…

People versus Solis

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the People of the Philippines and Road Leader Marketing Corporation against Judge Cesar M. Solis, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and against the private respondent David C. Tan. The petitioners assail two orders in a criminal case for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law: the order quashing the original information and rejecting the amended information, and the order denying reconsideration. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between two rules that pull in opposite directions — the prosecution's right to amend an information before plea, and the trial court's power to enforce its own deadlines. It is a study in when a judge's strictness becomes grave abuse of discretion.

Procedural History

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed the information in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the case was assigned to Branch 14, presided by Judge Solis. Tan moved to quash on the ground that the facts charged did not constitute an offense under the Anti-Fencing Law. The trial court directed the public prosecutor to amend the information within ten days. The amended information came a few days late, and the trial court, in its order of May 4, 2005, quashed the original information and rejected the amended information. Road Leader moved for reconsideration, which the trial court denied on September 30, 2005.

Road Leader then commenced this special civil action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. Because the petition concerned the criminal aspect of the case, the Court required Road Leader to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failing to implead the People. Road Leader explained, and the Office of the Solicitor General signified its conformity. The Court then directed that the petition be amended to include the People as petitioner, and the amended petition was filed. The case thus reached the Supreme Court as an original special civil action for certiorari.

Facts

In August 2003, the City Prosecutor of Manila charged David C. Tan with violating the Anti-Fencing Law. The information alleged that sometime between January and February 2002, Tan, with intent of gain, received, acquired, and bought from Road Leader Marketing Corporation Kelani and Dunlop tires worth more than four million pesos, which he knew or should have known were the proceeds of theft.

Tan's arraignment was reset eleven times, mostly because his petition for review was pending in the Department of Justice. In February 2005, he moved to quash, alleging that the information did not state an offense. Road Leader opposed. In April 2005, the trial court directed the public prosecutor to amend the information within ten days. Tan then moved to grant the motion to quash because no amendment had been filed within the period. A few days later, the public prosecutor filed the amended information, which now alleged that the tires were the proceeds of theft or were stolen from their owner, Road Leader.

Road Leader opposed Tan's motion, invoking the prosecution's right to amend before plea. On May 4, 2005, the trial court quashed the original information and rejected the amended information, reasoning that the amendment came beyond the period fixed and that rules must be interpreted in favor of the accused and against the State. Reconsideration was denied, and this petition followed.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition is procedurally defective for originally failing to implead the People of the Philippines as petitioner.
• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in rejecting the amended information solely because it was filed beyond the ten-day period fixed by the court, but before arraignment and plea.
• Whether or not the trial court erred in quashing the original information when the prosecution had, in fact, already filed the amended information.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, on amendment of the complaint or information after a motion to quash, provides:

Section 4. Amendment of complaint or information. If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.

This provision defines the only two situations in which the motion to quash may be granted after an opportunity to amend, and neither existed here.

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, on amendment or substitution, provides:

Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

This is the source of the prosecution's absolute right to amend before plea, which the trial court's deadline could not erase.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the procedural defect was cured. Road Leader satisfactorily explained the error, the Office of the Solicitor General expressed its conformity, and the amended petition properly included the People as petitioner.

On the second issue, the Court ruled that the trial court should have admitted the amended information as a matter of course because Tan had not yet been arraigned. The opportunity to amend under Section 4 of Rule 117 must be read in light of the prosecution's absolute right to amend before plea. The prosecution was free to amend without leave of court before arraignment despite the ten-day limit, because the accused would not be prejudiced. The only restriction before plea is that the amendment must not downgrade the nature of the offense or exclude any accused, except upon motion of the prosecutor with notice and leave of court.

On the third issue, the Court held that the motion to quash could be granted only if the prosecution failed to amend or the information still suffered the same defect. Neither applied, because the amended information had already been filed when the assailed order issued. The trial court's reliance on interpreting rules in favor of the accused made it blind to the equally potent principle that the State and the offended party are entitled to due process. The Court defined grave abuse of discretion as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Doctrine

Before arraignment, the prosecution has an absolute right to amend the information in form or in substance without leave of court, provided no prejudice is caused to the accused. A period fixed by the trial court for filing the amendment cannot defeat that right. Under Section 4 of Rule 117, the motion to quash is granted only if the prosecution fails to amend or the information still suffers from the same defect despite amendment. Courts must balance the rights of the accused with the due process rights of the State and the offended party; justice must be done to all parties alike. Grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was granted; the orders of May 4, 2005 and September 30, 2005 were annulled and set aside, and the Presiding Judge was ordered to admit the amended information and conduct further proceedings, with costs against the private respondent.

Remember This

Memorize this line: before plea, the prosecution may amend the information as a matter of right, and no court deadline can take that right away. Examiners use this case to test the interplay of Section 14 of Rule 110 and Section 4 of Rule 117, and to test grave abuse of discretion where a judge enforces a deadline at the expense of the State's due process.