GALAN REALTY CO., INC. REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, HEIDE YU GALAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. LUIS J. ARRANZ, PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 8, MANILA, RESPONDENT.

In a verified complaint dated September 21, 1993 filed in this
Court, complainant Galan Realty Co., Inc., through its President, Heide Yu
Galan, charged respondent Judge Luis J. Arranz of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Branch 8, Manila, with gross ignorance of the law and incompetence.

Complainant avers that on June 10, 1993, it lodged a complaint
for unlawful detainer against one of its lessees, Edilberto Arazo, Jr., in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as Civil Case No.
141856. This ejectment case was then
raffled to Branch 8 of said court, of which respondent is the presiding
judge. For failure of the defendant
therein to file his answer to the complaint, and on motion of complainant,
respondent judge rendered a summary judgment in the case on July 22, 1993.^[1]

When a copy of said decision was received by complainant, to her
distress she noted that the dispositive part of the same did not order the
defendant lessee and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
premises of the leased property as is required in ejectment cases. An ex
parte motion to amend the decision was accordingly initiated by
complainant the following day and on August 9, 1993, respondent judge, finding
the same to be well taken, modified his earlier decision. After receiving a copy of the order of
amendment, complainant moved for execution of judgment on August 31, 1993.^[2]

Complainant asserts that on September 3, 1993, it caused a
verification of the action taken by respondent judge on said motion to be made
and it was informed that no action had yet been taken because a copy of the
aforesaid order amending the decision had not yet been served on the
defendant. However, on September 17,
1993, complainant’s counsel received
a copy of another order dated September 9, 1993, wherein respondent judge gave
due course to the notice of appeal filed by the defendant.^[3]

Complainant maintains that respondent judge had manifestly acted
with indecent haste in giving due course to the appeal of the defendant since
the latter had not, at that stage, received the amendatory order. Furthermore, respondent exhibited evident
partiality in refusing to act and grant the motion for execution filed by
complainant. Finally, it claims that
Judge Arranz committed grave error in giving due course to an appeal that
lacked the requisite supersedeas bond. Complainant asserts that the foregoing errors of respondent judge are
the result of his gross ignorance of the law and his incompetence.^[4]

By resolution of the Court dated November 22, 1993, respondent
judge was required to comment on the administrative complaint, with which he
duly complied. He argues that he
inadvertently omitted the “order to vacate” portion in the questioned
fallo. Nonetheless, he submits that a reading of the dispositive part in its entirety shows sufficient compliance with the prayer in the
complaint. He also contends that he did
not act on complainant’s motion for execution because it was a mere scrap of
paper since it did not contain a notice of hearing and, the defendant having
perfected his appeal, he had lost jurisdiction to act on the same.^[5]

Complainant having filed a reply
thereto, this administrative matter was then referred to the Office of the
Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. In compliance therewith, a memorandum was
submitted to the Court by said office with the following findings:

“A
perusal of the records disclosed that the copy of the original decision dated
July 22, 1993 was received by the defendant on August 11, 1993 who seasonably
filed his notice of appeal therefrom by registered mail on August 24,
1993. Plaintiff was served (its) copy
thereof on August 12, 1993. Counting
fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the period to appeal by the plaintiff,
defendant is deemed to have perfected his appeal on August 27, 1993.

“Plaintiff
filed its motion for execution on August 31, 1993, after the perfection of
defendant’s appeal from the original decision. However, the said motion did not contain a notice of hearing
particularly setting the date, time and place of hearing in violation of Sec.
5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. It
may, therefore, be considered a mere scrap of paper. For this reason, respondent Judge may not be faulted for not
acting on it. Besides, plaintiff still
had another remedy, that of filing the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
before the RTC, which it actually filed.

“On the other
hand, the Order amending the decision of July 22, 1993, was issued on August 9,
1993. A copy thereof was received by
the plaintiff an August 18, 1993 and by the defendant on September 7,
1993. Respondent Judge actually
received defendant’s notice of appeal from the original decision on September
3, 1993 as evidenced by the date of receipt stamped on the left-hand corner
thereof (Rollo, p. 33). Obviously,
therefore, respondent Judge had amended the decision before he had actual
knowledge of the filing and perfection of the defendant’s notice of appeal. It likewise appears that plaintiff’s motion
for execution was filed on August 31, 1993 or before the actual receipt of the
notice of appeal. x x x.”

On the foregoing factual premises, the Office of the Court
Administrator had these criticisms of the actuations of respondent:

“x x x Respondent Judge should have been mindful of the
fact that the amended decision superseded the original one. This notwithstanding, he still issued an
Order dated September 9, 1993 for the elevation of the records thereof to the
RTC, thus, the charge that he acted with indecent haste in approving the notice
of appeal. Complainant likewise
contends that the notice of appeal was approved without requiring the defendant
to post the required supersedeas bond in order to stay the execution of judgment. The supersedeas bond should, as a general
rule, be filed with the x x x municipal court, but the (regional trial
court) may also allow its filing if the judgment is not yet executed,
and, to this effect, it has the discretion to allow a reasonable time within
which the supersedeas bond may be filed. x x x If only to erase suspicion of partiality on his part, respondent
judge should have required the posting of a supersedeas bond, especially
considering that the notice of appeal he approved was that from the original
and not the amended decision.

“The fact remains that had respondent Judge exercised
greater prudence in issuing the original decision, the ‘order to vacate’
portion could not have been omitted, thus, dispensing with the necessity of
a motion to amend the same. In his
comment, respondent claims that he amended the decision after finding out that
when the draft decision was finalized, the said clause was inadvertently
omitted. Such a reasoning, however,
does not inspire belief as his very Order dated August 9, 1993 amending the
(decision) explicitly states that it was issued on the basis of plaintiff’s
ex-parte motion to amend the same. x
x x” (Citations omitted; corrections in parentheses and emphasis supplied).

Under the Code of Judicial Conduct, every judge is called upon to
strive to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. In fact, these exacting standards of
competence, integrity, moral character, and dedication to public service are much higher than those required of
practicing lawyers.

Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides that immediate
execution in ejectment cases is proper if the judgment is in favor of the
plaintiff.^[6]
In order to stay the immediate execution of the judgment therein, the defendant
should perfect his appeal, file the corresponding supersedeas bond, and
periodically deposit the rentals falling due during the pendency of the appeal.^[7]
As in the case of ordinary civil actions, the appeal should be perfected by
filing a notice of appeal and paying the docket fee of the appellate court
within fifteen days from notice of the judgment.

On the other hand, the supersedeas bond which has to answer for
the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the judgment of the inferior
court appealed from, must be filed in the lower court. However, the regional trial court, in its
discretion and upon good cause shown, may allow the defendant to file such bond
in said latter court.^[8]
Thus, on that account, respondent judge could not be faulted for allowing the
notice of appeal as he believed that the supersedeas bond may still be filed
with the regional trial court.

On another aspect, the rule is that a judgment may be modified
prior to the perfection of the appeal while the lower court still has control
over said judgment.^[9]
In the case involved, there was an actual material amendment of the dispositive
portion of the original decision before an appeal was perfected by the
defendant. It is likewise settled that,
in such a situation and for all intents and purposes, a new judgment has been
promulgated and it is from receipt thereof that the period to appeal must be
reckoned.^[10]

Stated elsewise, the order dated August 9, 1993 changed the
disposition of the case as contained in the decision of July 22, 1993. The intercalation in the decretal part ordering
the defendant therein and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate the
leased premises is a material modification which supersedes the original
adjudication and gives rise to an entirely new judgment. In the case at bar, the defendant received
his copy of the order containing the amended mandate only on September 7,
1993. If we were to reckon the period
within which the defendant may appeal therefrom, he still had until September
22, 1993 to file a seasonable appeal.

Respondent judge appeared to have ignored the aforesaid doctrinal
ruling, as evidenced by his giving due course to the appeal of the defendant
which was directed against the original decision of July 22, 1993. What he should have done, as a matter of
procedure, was to refrain from acting on defendant’s original appeal and,
instead, wait for the latter to take his appeal from the amended judgment.

However, there has been no showing by clear evidence that
respondent judge acted as he did with bad faith, bias or partiality. While he may have erroneously given due
course to the notice of appeal of the defendant, still no clear act of malice
on his part can be clearly inferred therefrom and the presumption of good faith
in the performance of his official duties must, therefore, be conceded to him.

On the other hand, we agree with the observation of the Court
Administrator that had respondent judge exercised the requisite prudence in the
disposition of the original decision, no motion to amend the decision would have
been necessary and thus, needless delay in the speedy disposition of the case
would have been obviated. As it is,
such an improvident omission, while corrected thereafter, had given rise to
additional but avoidable controversies in a simple ejectment case and also
brought about this administrative matter. It is a rule of procedure that a court should always strive to settle
the controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the
seeds of other future litigation^[11]
and, as in this case, additional disputes.

We have held that a judge should not unnecessarily be subjected
to liability for his official acts, no matter how erroneous, as long as he acts
in good faith and without malice.^[12]
These are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer charged with
ignorance of the law from being held accountable for errors of judgment, on the
accepted premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law
in the administration of justice can be infallible.^[13]
The proper remedy of the aggrieved party is not an administrative charge
against the judge but an appeal or a petition for review of his decision.^[14]

However, while judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency
on account merely of occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, yet it is
highly imperative that they should be conversant with fundamental and basic
legal principles in order to merit the confidence of the citizenry.^[15]
The aforecited rulings exculpatory of judicial error should not extend to
mistakes of judgment on legal questions which are already so well settled or
the answers to which are found even in bare codal provisions as to be
elementary matters that should be known to all judges in every rung of the
judicial ladder. After all, a judge is
an arbiter from whom people seek the just and correct application of the law in
regard to their causes and it would not, in the least, be too much for them to
expect that he should apply the law intelligently and impartially.

As found by the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge committed at least two substantial errors, that is, in omitting from the
dispositive portion of his original judgment the necessary and obvious
directive for the defendant lessee to vacate the premises, and in giving due
course to said defendant’s appeal from that original judgment although
respondent could not have been unaware that the same erroneous judgment had
been amended by his own order issued twenty-four days prior to his receipt of
that notice of appeal. These are
regrettable mistakes that could have been avoided by ordinary diligence and
probity. They are blunders that have no
reason for being.

ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, we approve the findings
and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator and hereby impose upon
respondent Judge Luis J. Arranz a FINE of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), with
the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, 1-2.

^[2]
Ibid., 2-3.

^[3]
Ibid., 4.

^[4]
Ibid., 4.

^[5]
Ibid., 23-30.

^[6]
De Laureano vs. Adil, etc., et al., L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72 SCRA 148.

^[7]
Villaroman vs. Abaya, etc., et al., 91 Phil. 20 (1952).

^[8]
Tagulimot, et al. vs. Makalintal, etc., et al., 85 Phil. 40 (1949).

^[9]
De Nuqui vs. Yap, L-25676, March 27, 1968, 22 SCRA 1302.

^[10]
Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, etc., et al., L-16250, June 30, 1964,
11 SCRA 333.

^[11]
Villocino, et al. vs. Doyon, L-28871, April 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 460.

^[12]
Louis Vuitto S.A. vs. Villanueva, etc., A.M. No. MTJ-92-643, November
27, 1992, 216 SCRA 121.

^[13]
Pilipinas Bank vs. Tirona-Liwag, A.M. No. CA-90-11, October 18, 1990,
190 SCRA 834.

^[14]
Martin vs. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-90-495, August 12, 1991, 200 SCRA 469.

^[15]
Libarios vs. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991, 199 SCRA 48.