DIRECTOR OF LANDS, PETITIONER, VS. LORETA S. CIANO AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the 3-2 split decision of a Special Division of the defunct Court of Appeals^[*]
in CA-G. R. No. 38077-R reversing the trial court’s dismissal of the
petition and instead ordering the registration in the name of private
respondent Loreta S. Ciano of a parcel of land located in sitio Irisan,
Residence Section “H”, City of Baguio, with an area of 4, 976 square
meters, more or less.

In a petition dated April 3, 1964 and filed on August 2, 1964 in the
Court of First Instance of Baguio City, said respondent sought the
reopening of the judicial proceedings had in Civil Reservation Case No.
1, G. L. R. O. Record No. 211, relying on the provisions of Republic Act
No. 931, as amended, and prayed that she be adjudged as rightful owner
of the land subject of the petition and that title thereto be ordered
issued and registered in her name. As summarized by the trial court,
the petition alleged that “in a decision of this Honorable Court dated
November 13, 1922, or within forty years next preceding the approval of
Republic Act No. 931, amended, all lands included in, and covered by,
the Baguio Townsite Reservation, excepting those granted titles in favor
of private land applicants, were declared public lands; that among
those which were declared public land in the said decision is the parcel
of land now sought to be regis­tered; that prior to, and at the time of
the pendency of the above-entitled case, herein petitioner had been,
and is still in actual, open, adverse, peaceful and continuous
occupation and possession as owner of the above-mentioned parcel of land
by herself and thru her predecessors-in-interest, utilizing the same
for residential and agricultural purposes, having acquired the same from
her parents who, in turn have been occupying, utilizing and cultivating
the same since Spanish time thru the latter’s deceased parents; and
that all taxes due and in favor of the government up to the filing of
the petition have all been paid for by petitioner and by her
predecessors-in-interest.”

The trial court, in a decision dated August 12, 1965, dismissed the
petition, finding as follows: “(T)he allegations are not sufficient to
convince the Court of the merit of this petition. First, petitioner
claims that she inherited the property from her father, Stanley Inso,
and that father and daughter claim possession and occupation of the land
for quite a long time already but they have never shown any piece of
documentary evidence to support this allegation. The father claims that
he declared the land for taxation in his name and that the paper was in
the possession of his lawyer. This supposed paper was not presented in
evidence. If father and daughter, through their
predecessors-in-interest, were really in actual, open, adverse, peaceful
and continuous occupation and possession as owners since Spanish time,
it is unbelievable that they could not produce any piece of documentary
evidence to support this claim. Exhibit ‘F’ which is a tax declaration
issued in the name of the petitioner indicates that it is new and that
tax thereunder begins with the year 1964 the very year when the
peti­tion was filed. Again, petitioner’s claim of having been paying
taxes is not supported by any official receipt. Proof of long
possession and payment of taxes are wanting.”

Respondent filed her appeal in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
trial court’s decision and ordered the registration of the land in
ques­tion in the name of respondent Ciano after ruling that she “has
established her right to a government grant of a certificate of title to
the parcel of land in question under Republic Act No. 931, as amended.”

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, which the Court finds to be meritorious.

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 931 speaks of reopening declarations of
public land as to “parcels of land that have been the object of
cadastral proceedings.” The Court sustains the State’s submittal that
the appellate court should have affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of
respondent’s “Petition for Reopening of Judicial Proceeding” because
said court has no jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 931 to order the
registration of the subject parcel of land in the instant Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 LRC Record No. 11 of the City of Baguio, which
was not a cadastral proceeding. The case, which established the
townsite reservation of Baguio was instituted pursuant to the provisions
of Act No. 926 in relation to Act No. 627, which reservation was
finally decided by the Court of First In­stance of Baguio on November
13, 1922 (See Zarate and Zarate vs. Direc­tor of Lands, 58 Phil 156).
This can be gleaned from the opening portion of the decision which
states, “En de 12 Abril de 1912, de conformidad con el Art. 62 de la Ley
No. 926 x x x.” Also, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the
Cadastral Act which took effect on February 11, 1913, had not yet been
enacted when the civil reservation case was initiated in 1912.

In the leading case of Republic vs. Marcos (29 SCRA 517)
wherein a similar petition was filed in the same Civil Reservation Case
No. 1 LRC Record 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, invoking
the same statute, Republic Act No. 931, the Court, through the now Chief
Justice, categorically ruled:

“Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It
is quite explicit and categorical. Only persons ‘claiming title to
parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral proceedings’ are
granted the right to petition for a reopening thereof if the other
conditions named therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of
doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not the object of
cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application.
Considering that as far back as October 10, 1910, the then President of
the United States, William H. Taft, issued an executive order reserving
for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have been the
object of the cadastral proceeding involving the Baguio townsite
reservation, decided only on November 13, 1922.

“The Cadastral Act was enacted on February 11, 1913, taking effect
on its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when
public interest re­quires that titles to any land be settled and
adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the Governor General,
he could order the Director of Lands or a private surveyor named by the
landowners, with the approval of the Director of Lands, to make a
survey and plan of such lands. Clearly, it does not include the survey
of lands declared as reservations.

“An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903, specifically governs the subject matter of reservations.
As provided therein: ‘All lands or buildings, or any interest
therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of
the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military
reservations shall be forthwith brought under the operations of the Land
Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests
therein as shall not be determined to be public lands shall become
registered land in accordance with the provisions of said Land
Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated.’ The
validity of this statute was sustained as against the allegation that
there was a violation of the due process clause, in a 1910 decision,
Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron (216 Phil 62).

“In a 1918 decision (Archbishop of Manila v. Barrio of Santo
Cristo, 39 Phil 1, 19), this Court had occasion to indicate clearly that
the proceeding under this statute, while analogous too, is not covered
by the Cadastral Act. Thus: ‘It will thus be seen that Act No. 627
contemplates a sort of cadastral proceeding wherein private owners may
be forced to come in and register their titles, under penalty of
forfeiture of all right in the land included in the reservation in case
they fail to act. The validity of a law of this character cannot be
questioned; and this court has uniformly upheld the Act now under
consideration.’

“What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right
on the part of the private respondents to seek a reopening under
Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling in Government v. Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision (49 Phil 495, 498). We there
explicitly held: ‘The defendant’s contention that the respondent
court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the registration
of portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be
sustained. The establishment of military reservations is governed by
Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act
provides that ‘All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within
the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or
hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration Act, x x
x.'” (Italics supplied)

Prescinding from the fact that respondent failed to show any convincing
evidence of being qualified to petition for reopening by actual, open,
adverse, peaceful and continuous occupation and possession as owner
since the Spanish time, as held by the trial court and also stressed in
the dissent­ing opinion of the minority in the appellate court,
respondent appellate court erred in ordering the registration of the
parcel of land in dispute in the name of respondent Ciano
notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction and authority under Republic
Act No. 931 to reopen a civil reservation proceeding and order the
registration in favor of private individuals of portions of existing
townsite reservations.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is hereby reversed and another one
entered dismissing the petition of respondent Loreta S. Ciano for the
“Reopening of Judicial Proceedings” in Civil Case No. 1, LRC Record No.
11 of the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

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^[*] Composed of Justices Edilberto Soriano, Ramon C. Fernandez, ponente, and Luis B. Reyes, with Justices Ruperto G. Martin and Cecilia Muñoz Palma, dissenting.