G.R. No. L-24472. July 31, 1968
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. PROSPERO GABATIN, AND PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
FERNANDO, J.:
What has to be passed upon in this petition for review is the correctness
of a decision of respondent Public Service Commission of March 8, 1965,
granting an application of respondent Prospero Gabatin
for a certificate of public convenience to operate an auto-truck service on
the line Caoayan (Ilocos Sur) – Grace Park (Caloocan City)
with the use of six (6) units.
Petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. was one of the oppositors.
According to the relevant facts, respondent Gabatin,
as the applicant, presented himself together with two witnesses and testified to
the effect that public convenience would be served by transportation facilities
provided for passengers from Caoayan to Manila and
back as students, employees, merchants and professionals among others had to
ride in calesas or jeeps up to Vigan
from whence they could take the buses of petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc., which, however, were usually fully loaded. One of his witnesses, the then Municipal
Mayor of Caoayan, asserted that its inhabitants
engaged in weaving, farming and fishing had to take their products to Manila, Dagupan, San Fernando, La Union and other towns the
southern part of Ilocos Sur
and that it was his personal experience that after taking a jeep from Caoayan to Vigan to be able to
utilize the services of petitioner transportation line, he noted that their
buses were quite full, a condition, that similarly existed on his return trip
from Manila. He likewise added that
there was a resolution of the Municipal Council of Caoayan
endorsing the application for a certificate of public convenience of
respondent Gabatin.
It was the contention of the oppositors
on the other hand that there was no such “need for the proposed service;
that on the line Vigan to Manila, there are
sufficient buses of the Philippine Rabbit and other PUB operators who can take
care of the need for the riding public; and that applicant is not financially
capable to operate the proposed service.
The other operators merely adopted the evidence presented by the
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.”[1]
Then, the decision sought to he reviewed, continued: “After
weighing the evidence of both the applicant and the oppositors,
the Commission found out that there is no PUB operator operating a direct
service from Caoayan, Ilocos
Sur to Manila; that by allowing applicant to operate
a direct service from Caoayan, Ilocos
Sur to Manila it would ease the transportation
problem of the people of Caoayan, locos Sur. Although, there
are trips of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. going to Manila, but most of
these trips start from Laoag, Ilocos
Norte, so that passengers from Caoayan, Ilocos Sur, have lesser or no
chance at all to get accommodation on these buses. There are other PUB auto-truck operators
whose trips pass Vigan coming from farther north as
claimed by the oppositors, but these buses do not
enter Vigan and usually these buses are also full
with passengers coming from the north. After going over the
entire evidence of record, the Commission believes that public convenience and
interests will best served if applicant would be allowed to operate Six (6)
units only instead of the twelve (12) units applied for.”[2]
Respondent Public Service Commission, in its decision, further
found “that applicant is a Filipino citizen, legally and financially
capable to operate and maintain the proposed service, the Commission believes
that the oppositions filed in this case may be, as they are hereby [overruled]
and the certificate of public convenience applied for may be as it is hereby
[granted] to the applicant, * * *.”[3]
The usual conditions were attached, which, for the purposes of this opinion,
need not be touched upon. The last
portion of the decision was that
it could take effect immediately, to become final thirty (30) days upon notice
to the parties.[4]
In assailing the above decision, petitioner contends that
respondent Public Service Commission erred in issuing the above certificate of
public convenience as the evidence presented by respondent Gabatin
was “insubstantial, inadequate and spurious”; that moreover again on
the records and evidence of the case, respondent Gabatin
“is unquestionably financially incapable of operating the proposed
service”; that his “irresponsibility” and his “incompetence
to operate a safe, efficient and adequate bus service” is evident on the
records of respondent Commission; and that it was denied the “protection
of the prior operator rule.”[5]
As will be evident, the above errors cannot be deemed persuasive, and the
decision must be sustained.
It is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this Court to set
aside any order, ruling or decision of the respondent Commission is predicated
on it clearly appearing that there was no evidence before it to support
reasonably such order, ruling or decision or that the same is contrary to law
or outside its jurisdiction.[6]
From the assignment of errors, the statutory ground relied upon
is the alleged absence of evidence. What
is the interpretation accorded to such a provision by this Court? From Philippine Shipowners
Association v. Public Utility
Commissioner,[7]
and Ynchausti Steamship Co. v. Public Utility
Commissioner,[8]
to Robles v. Blaylock,[9]
a period of more than forty-five years, this Tribunal has invariably affixed the impress of finality on the
findings of fact under the circumstance herein disclosed. For petitioner to allege the absence of
evidence is to ignore what was testified
to before the Public Utility Commission.
A set forth in a unanimous decision in one of the later cases, Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Feliciano,[10]
in an opinion by Justice Padilla. “It is a settled rule that the findings
and conclusions of fact by the Public Service Commission after weighing the conflicting
evidence adduced by the parties in public service cases are binding on the
Supreme Court and will not be disturbed unless they appear not to be reasonably
supported by evidence.”
In the Philippine Shipowners‘
Association opinion, this Court expressly affirmed the validity of that
principle even
if “it might be
true that, under the facts presented, this court would reach another and
different conclusion, * * *.”[11]
In the Ynchausti decision,
rendered the next year, this Court could speak of “the whole tenor and
trend of modern legislation” as vesting the Public Utility Commission
“with power to regulate and control the operation of public
utilities” and conferring on such a body “a large, discretionary,
administrative power”, the exercise of which would not be interferred with by this Tribunal.
Subsequently, in a 1926 decision, Philippine Shipowners‘
Association v. The Public Utility Commission,[12]
this Court reaffirmed the principle that only where the record did not show the
decision by the then Public Utility Commission as not sufficiently supported by
the evidence could it alter, modify, or even annul the same.
Then in San Miguel Brewery v. Lapid,[13]
this Court held that it was not justified in substituting its judgment for that
of the Public Service Commission, its power “being limited to reviewing its order
and to see whether or not there is evidence in the case which reasonably supports the
issuance of said order.”
Subsequently, in Calabia v. Orlanes,[14]
a 1931 adjudication this Court made it a condition sine qua non
that an abuse of power be shown before the decision of the Public Service
Commission could be reversed and modified.
In Manila Electric Co. v. Balagtas,[15]
it was the view of Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, that there must be
a showing that “there was no evidence before the Public Service Commission
to support reasonably its orders” before it could be reversed.
The next year, this Court, in Ampil v.
Public Service Commission,[16]
restated the broad scope of the Commission’s authority as to factual matters by
holding that where in a given set of facts it is authorized to grant a
certificate of public convenience, certain limitations imposed by it based on
experience and not merely arbitrary, would not be interfered with by this
Court, such exercise of discretion being respected.
The same year, in Panay Autobus Co. v.
Iloilo Transportation Co., [17]
this Court, again through the then Justice Hull, sustained an order of the
Public Service Commission even if it entertained “fears that the
commission has acted too leniently” inasmuch of “there is evidence in
the record” upon which it could “arrive at the conclusion it did, * *
*.” Again the rule was non-interference.
At the start of the Commonwealth period, therefore, when the
present Constitution became effective, the principle adopted was still such
well-nigh conclusiveness of the findings of facts of the Public Service
Commission. In two 1936 decisions, Aleosan Transportation Co., Inc. v. Public Service
Commission,[18]
and Javel v. La Paz Ice Plant,[19]
the above doctrine was reaffirmed by this Court. Thus in the Aleosan
Transportation Co. case, it refused to modify the conclusion reached by the
Public Service Commission as to what public necessity and convenience
required. In the Javellana
decision, this Court announced that it is not permitted “to substitute its
own decision” for that of the Public Service Commission and “is
constrained by law to sustain the latter.”
In Gillea V. Halili,[20]
this Court was quite explicit in holding that it “is certainly not the
duty of this court to sift the evidence anew to find out for itself whether or
not the preponderance of said evidence is such as will justify the order issued
by the Public Service Commission.”
In Cebu Autobus Co. v. Bisaya Land Transportation,[21]
after stating that in the final analysis the determination of the question as
to the sufficiency of the evidence turned on the credibility of the witnesses
testifying before it, there was an affirmance of the
finding as this Court was unable to conclude that the decision should be set
aside. Then in Manila Electric Co. v. De
Vera,[22]
this Court, through the late Justice Laurel, referring to a report, which was
part of the record elevated to it, with implication of serious character but
not referred to by the Commission in its decision, spoke of “prudence on
[its] part and fairness to all concerned” as demanding that it should
“make no other pronouncement at this time than to affirm” as it did
affirm the decision of the Commission.
In Sambrano v. Red Line Transportation,[23]
this Court stated that the Commission having held “that the public convenience
demanded the establishment of said line” its order “appears to be
justified,” and concluded that it is not authorized to substitute its
judgment for that of the Commission, by determining on its “own account,
whether or not the public convenience demanded the establishment of said line
or whether or not the same should be placed in the hands of the respondent
Northern Luzon Transportation Co., Inc.”
The same pattern of undeviating adherence to the doctrine of
conclusiveness and finality of the findings of the Public Service Commission is
discernible from the cases decided after independence, starting in 1947 from Halili v. Ice &
Cold Storage Industries of the Phil., Inc.,[24]
to the 1968 decision, Robles v. Blaylock, previously cited.
In Ice & Cold
Storage Industries of the Phil., Inc. v. Valera,[25]
this Court, through the then Justice Ozaeta stated
categorically: “The Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive upon this
Court.” In Espiritu v. Los Baños[26]
the same rule is expressed thus: “These findings of fact are conclusive
upon this Court which cannot weigh the conflicting evidence and substitute its
own conclusions in lieu of those made by
the Commission.” In Lopez v. Batangas
Transportation Co.,[27]
there is a restatement of the above well-settled rule “that the Commission’s
findings as to facts are binding and conclusive upon us as long as they are
reasonably supported by substantial evidence, * * *.”
The doctrine could be negatively phrased, as was done by former
Chief Justice Bengzon with his preference for such
phraseology as that the Commission’s “stamp of approval is not without foundation”[28]
or “is not unsupported by the evidence.”[29]
To the same effect is the following brief summary of some of the
implications of this doctrine of finality.
Where the petition for review disputes merely the sufficiency of the
evidence, the finding cannot be disturbed.[30]
It is not for this Court to determine credibility and preponderance of proof
nor to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether
or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision.[31]
It is not to substitute its discretion for that of the Public Service
Commission on questions of fact.[32]
The lack of wisdom of the conclusion reached by the Public Service Commission
affects neither its authority to decide nor the validity of its decision.[33]
The undeniable force of the above doctrine so consistently
followed suffices to dispose of the first assigned error, namely, the alleged
insubstantial, inadequate and spurious character of the evidence of respondent Gabatin. For a mere
assertion is not the equivalent of proof.
Neither is the second error, dealing with the alleged financial
incapability of respondent Gabatin to operate the
proposed service, meritorious. As was
held by this Court in Sorita v. Public Commission,[34]
the opinion being penned by Justice Regala: “The
attack on the respondent-applicant’s financial capacity cannot be seriously
entertained in this appeal. The finding
of the Public Service Commission thereon is essentially a factual determination
which in a host of cases, this Court said it will not interfere unless patently
unsupported by evidence. A review of the
records of this case do not warrant such an interference.” The third error
imputed to respondent Commission to the effect that it ignored its own records,
which, according to petitioner, “are replete with evidence of the
applicant’s irresponsibility and incompetence to operate a safe, efficient and
adequate bus service, “is not any more persuasive as essentially it is
likewise grounded on factual considerations.
Evidently respondent Commission which could not have been unaware of
what its records contained reached a conclusion opposed to that of
petitioner. Such a finding is binding
upon us.
That leaves the fourth
assigned error, petitioner complaining that respondent Public Service
Commission denied to it the protection of the prior operator rule. In support of the above alleged grievance,
petitioner cited extensively from the opinion in the 1928 decision of Batangas Transportation Co. v. Orlanes,[35]
decided on December 19, 1928. In addition, reference was made to Mejica v. Public Service Commission,[36]
where parenthetically, it may be observed Justice MaIcolm
cautioned against this Court interfering in the exercise of the power conferred
on the Commission which “should not be hampered by technical
obstruction.” Even then as already noted, the principle was for this Court
not substituting its judgment for that of this administrative agency “if
there be evidence before it supporting its order.” The other case cited is
Bohol Land Transportation v. Jureidini.[37]
It is to be admitted that the Batangas
Transportation Co. decision was rather generous
in its appraisal of the preferential right of the first operator and the
need “to protect and preserve investments” already made for that
purpose. However, desirable such an
approach might have been 40 years ago in the light of the then environmental
circumstances, petitioner should be aware that time and the changes brought by
it have eroded the force of the above dictum.
It would be too far-fetched to assert now that in each and every case
the prior operator rule as thus understood automatically call for application,
the public interest as determined by the Public Service Commission to the
contrary notwithstanding. Only recently,
in Teresa Electric Power Go. v. Public Service Commission,[38]
Justice Dizon succinctly restated the doctrine thus:
“While it is true that operators of public convenience and service deserve
some protection from unnecessary or unlawful competition, yet the rule is that
nobody has any exclusive right to secure a franchise or a certificate of public
convenience. Above any or all
considerations, the grant of franchises and certificates of public convenience
and service should be guided by public service and interest; the latter are the
primordial considerations to be taken into account.” Clearly then, this
last error assigned cannot be deemed meritorious. The correctness of the decision under review
has not been successfully impugned.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Public Service Commission of March 8, 1965, granting respondent Prospero Gabatin a certificate
of public convenience for the operation of six (6) auto-trucks on the
line Caoayan (Ilocos Sur) – Grace Park (Caloocan City)
via Vigan subject to the conditions imposed therein, affirmed. With costs against petitioner Philippines
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, JBL, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[1]
Annex A, Brief for Petitioner, p. 38.
[2]
Ibid, pp. 38-39.
[3]
Ibid p. 39.
[4]
Ibid, p.47.
[5]
Ibid, p. 6.
[6]
Section 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, approved on November 7, 1936 reads: “Section 35. The Supreme Court is hereby given
jurisdiction to review any order, ruling, or decision of the Commission and to
modify or set aside such order, ruling or decision when it clearly appears that
there was no evidence before the Commission to support reasonably such order,
ruling or decision, or that the same is contrary to law, or that it was without
the jurisdiction of the Commission. The
evidence presented to the Commission, together with the record of the
proceedings before the Commission, shall be certified by the Secretary of the
Commission to the Supreme Court, Any order, ruling, or decision of the
Commission may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon a writ of
certiorari in proper cases. The
procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be prescribed by rules
of the Supreme Court.” To the same effect was a provision in Article 35 of
Act 3108 approved on March 19, 1923. In Act 2307, a 1913 statute, the two grounds
provided for were the absence of evidence to support reasonably the order of
the Board of Public Utility Commission or that the same was without his
jurisdiction.
[7]
43 Phil. 328 (1922).
[8]
44 Phil. 363 (1923).
[9]
L-24123, March 27, 1968.
[10]
L-14401, August 31, 1962.
[11]
43 Phil. 328, 332 (1922).
[12]
51 Phil, 957
[13]
53 Phil. 539, 543 (1929).
[14]
55 Phil. 659.
[15]
58 Phil. 429, 435 (1933).
[16]
59 Phil. 556 (1934).
[17]
60 Phil. 135, 137 (1934).
[18]
63 Phil. 523.
[19]
63 Phil. 621. The following cases all
decided in the Commonwealth era show that the above principle was constantly
and uninterruptedly followed: Gilles v.
Halili, 65 Phil. 738. (1938); Manila Electric Co. v.
Pasay Transportation Co., 66 Phil. 36 (1938); Cebu Autobus Co. v. Bisaya
Land Transportation Co., 66 Phil. 63 (1938); Manila Electric Co. v. De Vera,
66 Phil. 161 (1938); Bulacan Bus Co. v.
Enriquez, 66 Phil. 454 (1938); Sambrano v. Red
Line Transportation Co., 68
Phil. 652 (1939); A. L. Ammen Transportation Co. v.
Weber, 70 Phil. 33 (1940) and San Miguel Brewery v. Espiritu,
72 Phil. 344 (1941).
[20]
65 Phil. 738, 742 (1938).
[21]
66 Phil. 63 (1938).
[22]
66 Phil. 161 (1938).
[23]
68 Phil. 652 (1939).
[24]
77 Phil. 823.
[25]
85 Phil. 7 (1949).
[26]
L-7121, July 30, 1955.
[27]
105 Phil. 649, 653 (1959).
[28]
Halili v. Balane, 88
Phil. 450, 452 (1951).
[29]
Red Line Trans. v. Jurado, 94 Phil. 1045
(1954).
[30]
Red Line Trans. v. Taruc, 95 Phil. 73 (1954).
[31]
Santiago Ice Plant Co. v. Lahoz, 87 Phil. 221
(1950).
[32]
Batangas Transportation v. Laguna. Trans. Co. L-9185, December 27, 1957.
[33]
Zarate v. Rizal-Manila
Transit, 105 Phil. 1334 (1959). A by no
means complete list of cases follows: Halili v. Ice & Cold Storage Industries, 77
Phil. 823 (1947); Joson v. Santos, 79 Phil.
381 (1947); Cebu Transit Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 79 Phil. 386 (1947); Corpuz v.
Public Service Commission, 79 Phil. 444 (1947); Limjoco
v. Intestate Estate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776
(1948); Pampanga Bus Co. v. Ablaza, 83 Phil. 905 (1949); Mateo v. Public Service
Commission, 84 Phil. 482 (1949); Ice & Cold Storage Industries v.
Valero, 85 Phil. 7 (1949); Santiago
Ice P1 ant Co. v. Lahoz, 87 Phil. 221 (1950); Interprovincial Autobus Co. v. Mabanag,
88 Phil. 66 (1951); Ablaza Trans. Co. v. Ocampo, 88 Phil. 412 (1951); Halili
v. Balane, 88 Phil. 540 (1951); Interprovincial Autobus Co. v. Lubaton,
89 Phil. 516 (1951); Everett Steamship Corp. v. Chuahiong,
90 Phil. 64 (1951); Negros Ice Storage v. Public Service Commission, 90
Phil. 138 (1951); Manila Yellow Taxicab v. Public Service Commission, 90
Phil. 301 (1951); Raymundo Trans. v. Cervo, 91 Phil. 313 (1952); Javellana
v. Barilea, 92 Phil. 60 (1953); Pangasinan Trans. v. F. F. 95 Phil. 694 (1954);
Transport Contractors v. Public Service Commission, 95 Phil. 744 (1954);
Raymundo Trans. v. A. G. Tanchingco,
97 Phil. 105 (1956); Vda. de Medina v. Cresencia,
99. Phil. 506 (1956); Dagdag v. Public Service
Commission, 104 Phil. 162 (1958); Manila Railroad v. Pangasinan
Trans., 104 Phil. 238 (1958); Batangas Trans. v.
Laguna Trans., 104 Phil. 992 (1958);
Lopez v. Batangas Trans., 105 Phil. 648 (1959); Jugueta
v. Public Service Commission, 105 Phil. 721 (1959); Pangasinan
Trans. v. Times Trans. Co., L-13080, Dec. 29, 1959; Pangasinan Trans. v. Nastor, L-14417, April 30, 1960; Manila Yellow Taxicab v. Castelo,
L-13910, May 30, 1960; Valdez v. Public Service Commission, L-13837,
May 30, 1960; Pangasinan Trans. v. Feliciano, L-14401, Aug. 31,
1962; Flash Taxicab Co. v. Cruz, L-15464, March 30, 1963; La Mallorca v. Mendiola,
L-19558, Nov. 29, 1963; Red Line Trans. v. Barrizo,
L-19304, Aug. 31, 1964; West Leyte Trans. Co. v.
Salazar, L-15418, Sept. 30, 1964; Halili v. Daplas,
L-20282, May 19, 1965; Caseñas v. Caliguen,
L-19807, Aug. 10, 1965; Del Pilar Transit v. Silva, L-21547, July 15, 1966; Bachrach Trans. v. Camunayan,
L-21168, Dec. 16, 1966; Red Line Trans. v. Santo Tomas, L-18584, Jan.
30,1967; Tan v. Public Service Commission, L-22306, Mar. 18, 1967; and
Robles v. Blaylock, L-24023, Mar. 22, 1968.
[34]
L-20965, October 29, 1966. See also Robles v. Blaylock, L-24123,
March 27, 1968, which
speaks to this effect: “First.
Implicit in the PSC decision is its finding that Robles is financially
fit to increase its taxicab service by ten units only. This cannot be disturb by this Court, unless
unsupported by substantial evidence.” Valle Bros., Inc. v. Public
Service Commission, L-18694, January 31, 1966; Del Pilar
Transit, Inc. v. Silva, L-21547, July 15, 1966; A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Japa, L-19643, July 26, 1966; Mandaluyong
Bus Co. v. Enrique, infra;
Sorita v. Public Service Commission, L-20965,
October 29, 1966; Bachrach Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Camunayan, L-21168, December 16, 1966; Red Line
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Santo Tomas, 1967A Phil. 126, 128-129,
citing Mindoro Transportation Co., Inc. v. Torcuator, L-18479, February 28, 1963, and Pangasinan Transportation
Co., Inc. v. Tambot, 95 Phil. 661.
[35]
52 Phil. 455.
[36]
49 Phil. 774 (1926).
[37]
53 Phil. 560 (1929).
[38]
L-21804, Sept. 25, 1967. In Robles v. Blaylock, L-24123, March 27, 1968, this Court likewise
stated that existing operators “cannot be given preference to increase
their equipment if ‘they fail in their obligation to apply for such increase at
the time when necessity arose.”‘ The quoted portion comes from Mandaluyong Bus Co. v. Enrique, L-21964, Oct. 19, 1966. It was likewise held by us that a prior
operator who as in this case denied the need for more units may not invoke the
prior operator rule. Republic v. Macondray & Co., L-19558, April 29, 1966.