EMETERIO A. BUYCO AND HUGO B. DAGUMAN, COMPLAINANTS, VS. HON. MARIANO A. ZOSA, RESPONDENT.

This is an administrative
case instituted on May 30, 1966 against the respondent judge of the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Occidental. 
After giving due course to the complaint, We referred it to Mr. Justice
Ruperto G. Martin of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.  After a thorough
investigation of the charges, His Honor submitted the report now before Us.

Regarding the nature of
the charges, the report contains this summary statement:

“The charge specifies six (6) different counts, to wit:  first – falsification of public
documents under Article 171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, consisting
of untruth­ful statements in a narration of facts made in certifications
prepared by the respondent relative to his ownership over vehicles for the use
of which he filed claims for gasoline allowance from Ozamis City; second
-violation of complainant’s consti­tutional right to bail in ordering said
complainants’ arrest and detention, with­out immediately fixing the amount of
their bail bond, as an incident to a contempt proceedings the respondent
himself insti­tuted against said complainants; third – arbitrary
detention under Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code in ordering, in the same
contempt proceedings heretofore ad­verted to, the detention of complainants
allegedly without legal ground; fourth – conduct unbecoming of a judge
in connection with allegedly irrelevant statements of the respondent in the
contempt proceedings aforesaid respecting the circumstances which led to said
respondent’s appointment to the judiciary; fifth – indiscretion, also in
reference to other statements made by said respondent in the contempt
proceedings which are claimed to be ‘socially futile and value­less’,
‘ridiculous’ and uttered merely ‘to hide his lack of resourcefulness’ and ‘lack
of patience’; and sixth – vindictiveness in having subjected
complainants to humiliating acts such as speaking to them in ‘forceful, angry
and demanding voice’ and ordering the confinement of complainant Buyco in jail
for allegedly ‘sneering in ridicule of this Court’ – which complainants
deny.”

In the light of the evidence presented by the parties, the
investigator submits the following considerations in relation to the different
charges:

“Re:- Count No. 1 –

The gravamen of the falsification imputed upon the respondent Judge
under Count No. 1 consists in his having ‘maliciously and in­tentionally
falsified the facts contained in vouchers marked as Annexes ‘B’ and ‘C’ (Ex­hibits
Q and R herein) by making it
appear that his gasoline allowance is commutable when in truth and in fact his
privilege to claim such gasoline allowance as authorized by the President of
the Philippines is only ‘payment on reimbursement basis’ and not a commutable
allowance’, as well as having likewise wil­fully, intentionally and maliciously
falsified the statements in the said vouchers relative to his supposed
ownership of the Lincoln Sedan and the jeep supposedly used by him and for
which he was claiming the gasoline allowance subject of the vouchers aforesaid.

Respecting the first point,
it is at once apparent
that complainant’s charge cannot be sustained. 
The vouchers aforesaid were pre­pared pursuant to Resolution No. 72 of
the City Council of Ozamis City long before said reso­lution was ever brought to the attention of the proper
department head for approval.  Nothing in the resolution aforesaid as
much as suggests that the allowance granted was either on a com­mutable or on a
reimbursement basis.  The ap­proval of
that resolution upon the condition that the payment of the allowance granted be
merely on the ‘reimbursement’ basis come only on January 28, 1966.  Accordingly,
whatever may have been stated by the respondent in the vouchers prepared
prior thereto cannot be denounced as malicious falsification of a fact.  At the very least, the statement that the
claim is ‘commut­able’ amounts to no more than a mere conclusion on the part of
the claimant.

x x x                                                                     x
x x                                                                             x
x x

Anent the certifications relative to res­pondent Judge’s ownership
of the vehicles used by him, we find that the explanation given is quite
reasonable.  That there was an original
agreement for the purchase of the jeep is amply demonstrated.  And, we find nothing unusual in the claim
that thereafter that agreement was revised to substitute the Lincoln Sedan in
place of the jeep and that, pending the overhaul and repair of the car, the use
of the jeep would still remain with the respondent.  True, the jeep was never registered in
respondent Judge’s name; while the car was registered in his name only on
August 6, 1965.  But he did not certify
that said vehicles were so registered. 
He mere­ly said that they were respectively
his ‘per­sonal property’.  And, he very
well could have claimed
ownership over property even if it was not registered in his name.  Of course, while it is true that title over
the jeep never passed actually to him because his use thereof was temporary and
only in lieu of the car while the latter was undergoing re­pairs, still it is a
fact that he actually possessed and used the same pursuant to an arrangement
with the registered owner which undoubtedly vested in him some rights, short of
ownership though they may have been. 
There was thus, at least, a colorable truth in his claim respecting the
ownership over the vehicles in question and, accordingly, the discrepancy in his certifications com­plained of cannot
be denounced as a falsifi­cation
inasmuch as to be such, the falsity should be absolute.”

x x x                                                                     x
x x                                                                             x
x x

“Re: Counts 2 and 3

The charges of violation of complainants’
right to bail and of arbitrary detention sprang from actuations taken by
the respondent judge in the contempt proceedings he proferred against said
complainants.

Without going into the legality of the con­tempt charge, it is to
be noted that, under the Rules, it appears within the power of the court to
detain an alleged contemner and within its discretion to allow the release
thereof upon filing a bond to insure his appearance when the cause is
heard.  In the case at bar, while the
respondent Judge did not forthwith fix any amount as bail bond for the
complainants when he ordered their detention – and, there is nothing that makes
it his mandatory duty to do so – he
readily approved the petition of counsel for com­plainants for the
fixing of that bail bond, approved the bond filed thereupon, and forthwith
ordered the release of the detainees. 
Offhand, nothing in the proceedings thus taken smacks of a violation of
any right to bail or of arbitrary detention.”

x x x                                                                     x
x x                                                                             x
x x

“Re: Count 4 and 5 –

We see nothing condemnably unbecoming or particularly indiscreet in
the utterances made by the respondent Judge which are the subject of Counts 4
and 5 of the charge herein.  Con­sidering
the nature of the matter involved be­low and, as aforesaid, the pitch to which
the tempers and emotions have risen in the course of the proceedings, the
statements in question appear to be pertinent to the matter then be­fore the
court.”

“Re: Count 6 –

Relative to the charge of vindictiveness, we are not prepared –
after perusing the whole record – to recommend that the respondent Judge be
dubbed as vindictive.  Had he been so, he
would not have reconsidered his order for the detention of City Auditor Buyco
for sneer­ing and laughing in court barely 15 minutes after it was made; he
would not have allowed complainants to be released on bail after or­dering
their detention to assure their appear­ance. 
But, he did – and, without much ado, at that.  He may have been adamant, it is true.  But, as insisted by him, only in his desire to uphold the dignity of his office.  Perhaps, he was wrong; he could have
been wrong.  But, that would merely be an
error of judgment which can­not,
by the standard heretofore set forth, rise to the category of ‘serious
misconduct’.

On the basis of the foregoing, the investigator makes the
following recommendation:

“In the main, we are of the considered view that the charges
have not been established by a preponderance of evidence, much less be­yond
reasonable doubt.  The worst that can be
said is that the respondent Judge may have, somehow, allowed himself to be
carried away in his desire to uphold the dignity of his office and may have
given the impression that he was disposed to take advantage of his lofty po­sition
to have his way.  But, there is extant
absolutely no clear and convincing evidence that he had acted partially, or
maliciously, or corruptly, or arbitrarily, or oppressively.

“Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends the
exoneration of the respondent Judge from the charges imputed to him.”

UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD, We are of
the opinion that the findings of the investigator are entirely correct, and, as
a result, the respondent Judge is hereby exonerated.

Reyes, Acting Chief Justice, Makalintal, Bengson, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando,
JJ., concur.