TAN SENG HOO Y OTROS, RECURRENTES Y APELANTES, CONTRA MANUEL DE LA FUENTE, ALCALDE DE LA CIUDAD DE MANILA, Y OTROS, RECURRIDOS Y APELADOS.

PABLO, J.:

Los recurrentes son ciudadanos chinos y ocupantes de puestos
(market stalls) en los mercados ptiblicos de la ciudad de Manila, con
licencia expedida de acuerdo con la Ley de la Republica No. 37 y la
orden del Departamento de Hacienda No. 32. Se les concedleron dichos
puestos porque no habla solicitantes filipinos.

El 26 de mayo de 1949, cada uno de ellos redbio una notificacion en
virtud de la cual se les requerfa que dejasen sus puestos dentro del
termino de 24 horas, con la advertencia de que la ciudad se valdrla de
la pollcfa para lanzarles de alii si no dejaban dichos puestos de
acuerdo con la orden. En el mismo dia los recurrentes presentaron un
recurso de “prohibition”, causa civil No. 8180, en el Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila, pidiendo que se prohibiese al Alcalde y a
sus agentes a echarles de sus puestos. En 30 de mayo del mismo afio el
Juzgado expidio, a mocion debidamente presentada, una orden de
interdicto preliminar.

En 6 de enero de 1950 y despues de la vista cerrespondiente, el
Juzgado de Piimera Instancia dieto una decision sobreseyendo la
solicitud de interdicto prohibitorio, de la que fueron notificados el
23 del enero de 1950.

Al siguiente dla el Tesorero de la Ciudad, obrando de acuerdo con
la orden del Alcalde, dirigio cartas a los recurrent es,
orden&ndoles que vacasen sus puestos dentro de cinco dias.

En 24 de enero el abogado de los recurrentes envio una carta al
Alcalde de la Ciudad, pidiendo que se suspendiese la orden hasta que la
decision hubiese quedado firme.

En 26 de enero apelaron contra la decision. El 30 del mismo mes se
trasmitio el expediente al Tribunal de Apelacion, y el mismo dla el
abogado de los apelantes presentd una mocion en dicho tribunal pidiendo
que el expediente fuese cursado al Tribunal Supremo porque solamente
trataba de susdtar cuestiones de ley.

El 31 de enero se envio el expediente a este Tribunal.

La moci<5n de los recurrentes en el Juzgado de Primera
Instancia, en que se pedia un interdicto preliminar mientras estaba
pendiente la apelacion, fue* denegada.

El 31 de enero de 1950, alegando que el tribunal inferior abuso de
su discrecion, los recurrentes presentaron a este Tribunal una mocid’n
urgente pidiendo una orden de interdicto preliminar, que file” denegada
en 3 de febrero del mismo año.

En 21 del mismo mes presentaron una mocion de reconsideracion que fue* denegada en 24 de febrero.

El “Annex B” de la solicitud, con fecha 6 de enero de 1949) es un
documento en que consta que Tan Ko Lok, residente en la calle de
Legarda No. 502, Sampaloc, ha pagado al Tesorero de la ciudad la
cantidad de P1 como impuesto de licencia (license fee) para ocupar por
un afio desde el l.o de enero hasta el 31 de diciembre de 1949, el
puesto 443 (Stall 443, 2nd class) del mercado de Sampaloc. Los demas
recurrentes ocupan 7 han obtenido sue respectivos puestos bajo las
mismas condiclones en que Tan Ko Lok ocupa el suyo.

Cuando se dicto por el Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila su
decision en 6 de enero de 1950, los recurrentes ya hablan perdido
automiticamente su derecho a permanecer en sus puestos. Con todo,
pidieron ante este Tribunal la expedicion de un interdicto prohibitorio
preliminar: eso demuestra que querfai aun permanecer en sus puestos
sabiendo que su licencia ya habia expirado.

Los recurrentes contienden que, bajo la licencia expedida a su
favor (parecida al Annex “B”), tienen derecho a permanecer en sus
respectivos puestos como los filipinos pueden continuar ocupando los
suyos. Esta contended es insostenible. Despuls de expirado el plazo de
un aRo, ni el chino, ni el filipino pueden permanecer en su puesto a
menos que se haya renovado su licencia. Si, por el simple hecho de
haber obtenido su puesto, el ocupante puede permanecer por todo el
tiempo que quiera, entonces serfa innecesario poner en la licencia el
plazo de un afio. La fijacion del plazo serla una redundancia.

Los recurrentes contienden que, bajo la Ley No. 37, el ciudadano
filipino tiene preferencia al puesto si lo solicitante un filipino y un
extranjero; pero si no hay ningun solicit ante filipino, el extranjero
tiene derecho al puesto. La preferencia que se da al extranjero es
solamente un acto de condescendencia o gracia, y su tenencia es
precaria. Esa ocupacion no es de estricto derecho; puede ser cancelada
en cualquier tiempo por las autoridades de la ciudad. En el caso de que
no haya solicitante filipino, puede provisionalmente concederse el
puesto a un extratfero para que produaca la renta necesaria para la
ciudad. El ocupar un puesto en un mercado publico estfi reservado para
los nacionales, es un privilegio concedido al filipino por disposicion
constitucional. No es un derecho inalienable que’ tiene todo ser
humsaio, como el derecho a la vida, la libertad de pensar, etc.

El Estado de New Jersey prohibe, por medio de una ley, a los
extranjeros utilizar red para la pesca. 2 C. S. (New Jersey), p. 2521,
par. 92.

El Estado de New Jersey prohibe por una ley a los extranjero s
dedicarse a la caza sin licencia. 2 C. S. (New Jersey), p. 252S, pars.
134, 138.

Se prohibe en Filipinas coneeder a los extranjeros la contrata de
obras ptiblicas, (Ley No. 4239) y las leyes del Commonwealth Nos. 108 7
421 castigan la evasion de las leyes de nacionalizacion de ciertos
derechos de franquicias y privilegioa.

Las leyes de los estados de Washington y Nebraska que prohiben a los
extranjeros ejercer la profesion de abogado fueron declaradas legales
en In re Xamashita, 70 Pac., 462 y en In Re Admission to Bar, &4 N. W., 611.

En Filipinas no se permite al extranjero ejercer la profesion de
abogado, y este Tribunal ha denegado ?arias solicitudes presentadas por
ciudadanos americanos.

En Gizzarelli vs. Presbrey, 117 Atl. Rep., 359, el
Tribunal Supremo de Rhode Island declaro que la ordenanza que prohibe a
un extranjero operar un “bus” de carga y pasaje en las calles de la
ciudad no es discriminatoria, no viola la Enmienda 14. ª de la
Constitucion.

En Morin contra Nunan, (103 Atl.-Rep., 378), se declard
constitucional la ordenanza de la ciudad de Weehawken, New Jersey, que
prohibe la operacion por extranjeros de vehicuI08 de motor para pasaje.

Fue declarada constitucional que no viola la enmienda 14»a de la
Constitucion Americana la ley del Estado de Massachusetts, que
restringe para los ciudadanos americanos la expedicion de licencia para
la ocupacion de buhonero. (Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E., 149.)

La ley del Sstado de Pennsylvania que prohibe a los extranjeros
matar pajaros o animales silvestres, excepto en defensa propia y de s u
propiedad, fue declarada constitucional por el Tribunal Supremo de los
Estados Unidos en Patsone vs. Commonwealth, 232 U. S., 13d; 58 L. ed., 539).

Las leyes que no permiten la expedicion de licencia para la venta
de licores por extranderos fueron declaradas constitucionales por el
Tribunal de Apelacion de Maryland en Trageser vs. Gray, 20 Atl. Rep., 905; por el Tribunal Supremo de Ohio en Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E., 309; y por el Tribunal Supremo de Texas en De Grazier vs. Stephens, 105 S. W., 992.

En People vs. Lowndes, 29 N. E., 751, la Corte de
ApeIacion de Nueva York declaro que el artlculo 441 del C6digo Penal,
que castiga con prision y mult a la recolecci<5n o cultivo de ostras
en las aguas del estado de Nueva York por uno quo no es residente del
mismo, se ha dictado con el fin de proteger a los residentes con
exclusion de los no resident es; y es, segun el Tribunal Supremo de los
Estadoa Unidos, en MeCready vs. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, “un ejercicio legal del Poder Legislative sobre la propiedad comun de los ciudadanos del estado.n

Las leyes y decisiones citadas son medidas que fueron adoptadas
para proteger al nacional. Las barreras arancelarias son otras medidas
encaminadas a proteger los recursos nacionales, como la agricultura y
la industria. No son armas de mala ley; son remedios que utilizan las
naciones cuando son necesarios. No deben resentirse los exgranjeros si
con su adopcl6n en Filipinas quedan afectados.

Si el Gobierno, por necesidad, tuviera que ceder a un extranjero
Una contrata de obras publicas por no haber ningun filipino que quiera
hacerse cargo de ella, eso no es razdn para que despue’s el extranjero
reclamase, como de estricto derecho, la obtencion de otras contratas.

Si, a falta de abogado o persona competente, un Juzgado nombra a un
abogado extranjero para encargarse de la defensa de un acusado, eso no
es razdn para que el abogado extranjero reclame despue’s, como de
estricto derecho, el privilegio de ejercer la profesion ante los
tribunales de Filipinas. Los recurrentes, que obtuvieron licencia para
ocupar un puesto en un mercado publico a falta de solicitantes
filipinos, deben comprender que por cortesla ae les concedi<5 dicho
puesto, y no porque tienen derecho a 61; no deben reclamar si se les
echa del puesto porque lo ocupan en contravencion de la prohibicion
constitucional.

La nacionalizacion de los mercados publicos ha quedado definitivamente establecida al aprobarse la Constitucion.

En Co Chiong y otros contra Hon. Miguel Cuademo, Sr., y otros, (46 O. G., 4833), este Tribunal dijo:

“Public markets are public services or utilities *
* *. Under the Constitution, the operation of all public, services are
reserved to Filipino citizens and to corporations or associations sixty
per centum of the capital of which belongs to Filipino citizens.

* * * * * * *

“Foodstuffs sold in public markets demand, at least, as much official
control and supervision as the commodities sold and distributed in
other public utilities. They affect the life and health of the people,
the safeguarding of which is one of the basic obligations of a
constituted government. Official control and supervision can be
exercised more effectively if public market stalls are occupied by
citizens rather than by aliens.”

En el asunto de The Aranque Market Extension Chinese Vendors Association contra Hon. Manuel de la Fuente, etc. y otros (48 Off. Gaz., 94)^[*], este Tribunal dijo:

“Petitioners alleged that the Aranque Market
Extension is not a public market within the meaning of all laws,
ordinances, orders and regulations governing public markets because
said market stands on private property and its building was erected
with private funds. This contention is not well taken. A market is a
‘public market’ when it is dedicated to the sendee of the general
public and is operated under government control and supervision as a
public utility, whether it be owned by the government or any
instrumentality thereof or by any private individual. It is settled
doctrine that “public market may be the object of individual ownership
or lease, subject to municipal supervision and control.” (43 C. J.p.
394) Thus, if a market has been permitted to operate under government
license for service to the general public, it is a ‘public market’
whether the building that houses it or the land upon which it is built
be of private or public ownership. This is not different from public
vehicles or vehicles of public utility which are so classified whether
they be owned by private individuals or by government
instrumentalities. The factors determining a ‘public market’,
therefore, are the purpose or use to which such a market is dedicated
and the authority under which it operates, and not the fact or status
of ownership.”

Y es porque el artlculo 3, titulo XIII, dispone asi:

“No se concederd franquicia alguna, certificado u
otra forma de autorizacion para operar un servicio publico, excepto a
ciudadanos filipinos o a corporaciones u otras entidades organizadas
segun las leyes de Filipinas, el sesenta por ciento de cuyo capital sea
de la propiedad de ciudadanos filipinos; 7 tales franquicia,
certificado o autorizacion no tendr&n caracter exclusivo ni serfin
para un periodo mayor de cincuenta affos. No se concederd franquicia o
derecho alguno a cualesquier individuo, razon social o corporacion
excepto bajo la condicion de que tal franquicia o derecho estarin
aujetos a enmienda, modificacion o derogacion por la Asamblea Nacional
cuando el interes publico asi lo requiera.”

Se contiende que un “stall” o un puesto en un mercado publico puede
ser ocupado por un extranjero de la misma manera como 6ste puede ocupar
un “taxicab”. No existe similitud en los dos casos. El que usa un
“taxicab” es un comprador del servicio’ de transportacion. El que ocupa
un “stall” no es un comprador: explota el negocio de vender en un
mercado publico, que es lo que se prohibe precisamente. El extranjero
puede comprar efectos de un “stall” como puede ser pasajero de un
“taxicab”; pero no puede ocupar el “stall” para dedicarse al negocio de
vender, como no puede, directa ni indirectamente, explotar el negocio
de transporter pasajero s por medio de un “taxicab”. Un extranjero que
paga determinada cantidad al Yellow Taxicab Co., por ejemplo, para que
bajo el nombre de esta 7 por medio de un taxi de su propiedad explote
el negocio de transportar pasajeros, indirectamente infringe la ley.

Si un “stall” puede ser ocupado por un extranjero, todos los
“stalls” podran serlo igualmente por extranjeros. Entonces la
nacionalizacion de los. mercados publicos serla una verdadera irrision.
Es evidente que no se nacional iz6 la administracion de los mercados
publicos porque va estd a cargo de los gobiemos municipales; lo que se
nacionallzd es el negocio al por menor quese realiza en los “stalls”.

Ese negocio es rudimentario, es comercio en su estado embrionario;
apenas se emplearla un capital de veinte o treinta pesos; es migaja de
pan comparado con los comercios en que hay concurrencia libre de
nacionales y erbranjeros. Si se encomend6 a los ciudadanos filipinos la
explotacion de los “stalls” en los mercados ptLblicos es porque se
deseaba evitar que en las transacciones que se hacen precipitadamente
por exigencias del momento se sirviera al publico gato por liebre. No
hay raejores y mis celosos guardianes de la salud del pueblo que los
mismos nacionales. Asi razonaron los varios tribunales supremos de los
Estados Unidos al sostener la constitucionalidad de las varias leyes
proteccionistas que fueron impugnadas de nulas.

Se confirma la decision apelada con costas contra los apelantes.

Bengzon, y Jugo, MM., estan conformes.

Paras, Pres., Feria, Padilla, y Buatista Angelo, MM., conformes con el resultado.

DISSENTING

TUASON, J.,

The main basis of this Court’s decision is Annex “B”, a sample of
the licenses issued to the petitioners. The decision holds that these
licenses being for one year, ending December 31, 1949, the petitioners
had already lost automatically their rights to their stalls when the
trial was held.”Con todo—says the decision pidieron—ante este Tribunal
la expedicion de un interdicto prohibitorio preliminary eso demuestra
que querian atin permanecer en sus puestos sabiendo que su licencia ya
habfa expirado.”

This statement takes for granted several things none of which the
court below or the Ci ty Fiscal himself has dared insinuate. Nor do the
petitioners contend, that “bajo la licencia expedida a su favor
(parecida al Annex fB), tienen derecho a permanecer en sus respectivos
puestos como los filipinos pueden continuar ocupando los suyos.”
Neither the court below in its decision, nor the City Fiscal in his
brief, nor the petitioners in their brief so much as mention Annex “B”.

But inasmuch as this Court has dwelt on Annex “B” I am going to explain what I think this annex is.

To begin, the petitioners’ asserted right to keep their respective
stalls is not founded on Annex B; it is the lease, with which the
decision of this Court seems to confound the license, that is the
petitioners’ cause of action. The licenses of which Annex B is one, are
provided for in Ordinance No, 2995, as amended by Ordinance No, 3051,
and are nothing more than a sort of tax on business. Sections 1 and 3
of Ordinance No. 2995 as amended reads

“Section 1. License.—No stallholder shall
. engage or conduct his business in the City public markets without
first having obtained a license therefor from the City Treasurer.

“Section 3, Fees.—
There shall be paid in advance to the City Treasurer for every license
granted under the provision of this ordinance an annual fee as
enumerated below.”

Such licenses or license fees are classified by Section 8,
depending on the markets and the kinds of merchandise sold. They vary
in amount from as low as P0.10 to P1.50 a year.

It is hardly necessary to remind ourselves that these license fees
are not different, except perhaps as to amount, from license fees
imposed on all similar businesses outside the markets. They are paid
yearly as a matter of convenience; they can be divided into monthly,
quarterly, or semi-annual installments. We also know that the period to
which a license fee corresponds is not the measure of the time the
licensee may run a business. The business continues as long as the
business man is willing to pay the necessary license fee. In a special
sense, the license follows the .business and not vice versa..

What are closely related to the poihts at issue, though also
undecisive thereof, are the rentals on market stalls. The rentals are
fixed in Section 25 of the Market Code, Ordinance No, 2898, as amended,
and there is another schedule of payments different from that of
license fees both as to amount and interval. Thus Section 4 of
Ordinance No. 2995, as amended by Ordinance No. 3051, stipulates that
“in addition to the license fee provided in the preceding section, each
licensee or stallholder shall pay the rental fees provided in
Section 35 (337) of Ordinance No. 2898, known as the Market Code as
amended.” These rentals are payable daily, and graduated at rates which
range from P0.10 in the Pandacan market to P0.50 in the Divisoria
market.

The collection of rentals daily, like the collection of license
fees annually, was devised as a matter of ex-Jpediency. The stallholder
might abandon his stall; he might die without leaving any heir, or be
expelled for cause before the end of the year, quarter or month. By no
means is the daily collection of rentals intended to be the duration of
the lease. Otherwise, and under the theory of this Court’s decision,
the stallholders would be subject to ejectment at the close of each
day. It should be observed that the rentals may be paid in advance for
a longer period at the stallholder’s option. And so may the licensee
pay the license fee in advance for more than a year if the system of
accounting permits.

The duration or term of the lease of a market stall is treated in
Section 25 of the Market Code and Section 8 of Ordinance No. 2995.
According to these sections the lease is “continuous” and permanent,
and by the firstmentioned section a regular lease of a market stall may
be revoked by the City Mayor only “for any reasonable or just cafrse,
or for any violation of the provisions of this or any other ordinance,
or any rules and regulations relating to the administration of the
public markets.” The permanent character of the lease is more
particularly emphasized by the fact that the leasehold is made
hereditary; under Section 20 of the Market Code, upon the death of the
lawful stallholder, or in case of his physical disacbility for work,
the surviving spouse or the eldest legitimate son or daughter, as the
case may be, is entitled to succeed the deceased or incapacitated
stallholder to the lease.

These ordinances partake of the nature of a contract between the
city and the stallholder, and it would take strong reasons of national
policy, as declared by the legislature, and public welfare, for even
the City Council to impair its (contract’s) obligations. At any rate,
the City Mayor can only execute the provisions of the above ordinances;
he has no express or implied power to eject any stallholder except for
any of the causes specified in those ordinances. This rule is”
elementary, too familiar to all students of constitutional and
municipal governments to be elaborated ujbon.

The next question that naturally crops up is, have the appellants
violated any of the provisions of the Market Code or of the rules and
regulations governing the administration of public markets? Not in the
least. It is alleged by the petitioners, and the allegation is
expressly admitted by the respondents, that “the petitioners had always
been pursuing peacefully and lawfully their business in said stalls,
complying with all lawful orders and regulations above mentioned plus
their paying the required daily stall fees.”

The leases under consideration were terminated for no other reason
than that the stallholders are aliens and markers are public utilities.
Indeed it is suggested that this is only an ostensible reason, the true
reason being politics. Our attentions drawn to the coincidence that the
ousting was carried out, and in a peremptory and summary manner, few
months before the 1949 elections.

But let us brush aside this little burst of cynicism and confine
the discussion with the territory of the respondents1 and this Court’s
argument.

It is said that, as aliens are prohibited by the Constitution from
operating public utilities and markets are public utilities, therefore
aliens.may not occupy market stalls. To begin with, I dissented from
this Court’s decisions holding that markets are public utilities, and I
still do adhere to this belief. Public utilities are enumerated in
Section 13(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146. Public markets are
not included in the list. Turning to American definitions of public
utility I find no characteristic of public markets that comes within
the description.

But for the present purposes of this dissent, I may and do assume
that public markets are public utilities; so what? I still maintain
that the majority confuses public markets with stallholders.
Stallholders are not public utilities simply because they do business
in public markets not any more than a person is a public utility who
rides in a public bus or hires a vehicle from a public utility company
for his exclusive and personal use. By the same token a retail merchant
is not a market. The largest department store on the Escolta is not a
market, and that store would not be a market if it were moved into a
market compound. A market in the sense in which the term is used in
Republic Act No. 37 and the Market Code means “the territorial area in
which goods are bought and sold or the gathering dft such area for the
purpose of buying or selling goods. (26 Words and Phrases 530.)

Assuming, as I do for the sake of argument, that markets are public
utilities, the governmental agency or instrumentality charged with
regulating public utilities would deal with the owner or owners of the
place, prescribe how and where the stalls should be arranged, how much
should be charged for each stall, etc. It would not deal with
individual stallholders or stallowners just as it does not deal with
individual passengers of public service vehicles, or with hirers of
public busses for private use. On the contrary, the regulations would
have an eye single to the convenience and protection of stallholders
and the prevention of discrimination against applicants for stalls. It
is the interest of the merchants wherewith the Publid Service
Commission would be concerned. The prices of commodities, the fitness
of merchandise for human consumption, and the like are matters for
other agencies of the government to look into.

We have seen that Republic Act No, 37 excludes with some
exceptions, aliens from the privilege of renting stalls in ptiblic
mfcrfcfeis. This exclusion is not in obedience to any constitutional
mandate but is predicated upon entirely different considerations. Proof
of this is that the exclusion is not absolute but conditional on lack
of Filipino bidders for stalls. Incidentally, this permission, although
conditional, for aliens to occupy market stalls is an illustration of
the belief, at least, of Congress that individual merchants in or
outside public markets are not public utilities. At any rate, the
Congress has spoken, and the Mayor whose position was created by
Congress is duty bound to respect legislative enactments. This Court
has not declared Act Ho. 37 unconstitutional and does not pretend to do
so in this case.

The passage quoted from this Court’s decisions and relied upon now
by this Court, by the court below, and by the respondents, to the
effect that governmental functions and privileges may be denied to
aliens, is correct. There can be no doubt that those functions and
privileges may be confined to Filipinos by the Legislature and most of
them are as a matter of fact. But so may the Congress allow aliens to
enjoy and exercise any of them, And as already stated, the Congress
does allow by incontrovertible implication if not by e xpress
provisions of A ct No. 37 aliens to hold public market stalls. The
control over the functions and privileges referred to is derived from
the principle of sovereignty and not from the fact that they are public
utilities, for no one would claim that they are.

From what has been said there stand out these, unassailable facts,
which in reality are the only factors that matter in this case. The
Congress has authorized the lease to aliens of stalls which Filipinos
don’t want. The City Council by ordinance has followed suit. And the
petitioners were awarded the stalls in question because these are in
remote and dark corners of the market and no Filipinos were interested
in them. The validity of Act No. 37, of the ordinance, or of the lease
is unchallenged.

How can we get around these facts? The Court has found a way out
and here it is a wLa preferencia que se da al extranjero es solamente
un acto de condescendencia o gracia, y su tenencia es precaria. Esa
ocupaeicn no es ade estricto derecho; puede ser cancelada en cualquier
tiempo por las autoiidades de la ciudad. En el caso de que no haya
solicitante filipino, puede provisionalmente concederse el puesto a un
extranjero para que produzca la renta necesaria para la ciudad. El
ocupar un puesto en un mercado publico esta reservado para los
nacionales, es un privilegio concedido al filipino por disposicion
constitucional. No es un derecho inalienable que tiene todo ser humano,
como el defecho a la vida, la libertad de pensar, etc»tt

But this theory runs headlong against the express provision of the
Market Code, that, subject to the exceptions specified in that by-law,
the lease is not only for life but hereditary. Aside from these
specific provisions, common sense positively abhors the idea that the
Mayor, the City Treasurer or even the City Council itself could bring
the lease to an end at will. Moreover, no sensible merchant would think
of bidding for a space or stall in a public market, investing capital
and making other preparations to set up business, with the knowledge
that the next day, next month, next year, or on the approach of the
next election he might be ousted.

The decision meets this observation, which was made in the course
of the deliberations, with this one; “Ese negocio es rudimentario, es
comercio en su estado embrionario; apenas se emplearfa un capital de
veinte o treinta pesos; es migaja de pan comparado con los comercios en
que hay concurrencia libre de naci onales y extrageros.”

One thing I am certain I understand in this remark is that only 20
or 30 pesos is needed for capital to operate a store in a market. My
reply is that from common observation the figures given are an extreme
understatement, to say the least, unless we are thinking of peddlers
who bring to market on their head fruits, greens or vegetables from
their yards.

This is not a brief for aliens or against nationalization of
industries and the retail trade. That is the concern of Congress,
Courts are constituted for another and distinct purpose; to interpret
the law and administer justice according to law» Over and above race,
creed and nationalism, are law, humanity, and decent respect for the
sanctity of contracts and commitments.

Wherefore, I dissent.

DISSENTING

REYES, J.,