ABS-CBN CORPORATION AND JORGE CARIÑO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 96 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY AND…
CRUZ, R.A., J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with applications for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking to (a) annul and set aside Public Respondent the Hon. Afable E. Cajigal’s June 8 2012 and August 14 2012 Orders in Civil Case No. Q-10-67543, entitled Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. v. Lakmodin “”Laks” Saliao, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation and Jorge Cariño, pending before his branch of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and (b) compel public respondent to desist from further proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-10-67543.
The dispositive portion of the Order of June 8 2012 reads:
x x x
“The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.(Ginete v. CA, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998)
Considering the aforequoted pronouncement of the Supreme Court, finding the Affirmative Defense bereft of merit, the same is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let the initial trial proceed as previously scheduled on 14 June 2012.
“SO ORDERED.”
x x x
The dispositive portion of the Order of August 14 2012 reads:
x x x
“In view of the fact that the issues on the Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense had already been resolved by this Court, and considering that there is no cogent reason to reverse the Order dated 8 June 2012, the Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 27, 2012, by the respondents, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation and Jorge Cariño, through counsel, with Opposition and Rejoinder thereto, is hereby DENIED.
x x x
“SO ORDERED.”x x x
Dissatisfied with the aforequoted pronouncements, petitioners are now before us claiming that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for issuing the aforementioned Orders and that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
In their Petition, they argued that the charge of contempt leveled against them failed to state a cause of action and was already moot and academic thus public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for issuing these Orders that denied the dismissal of the case. Petitioners also argued that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inasmuch as their motion for reconsideration of these Orders was likewise denied.
THE ANTECEDENTS
On November 23, 2009 in the Province of Maguindanao, dozens of gunmen stopped a convoy that was en route to file Esmael Mangudadatu’s candidacy for the then upcoming gubernatorial elections. The gunmen executed at least fifty-seven persons. This event is now infamously known as the Maguindanao Massacre.
Criminal cases for murder were filed against one hundred ninety-seven persons, including Private Respondent Datu Andal Ampatuan and other members of his family. These criminal cases are pending before Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On June 23, 2010 Petitioner ABS-CBN through its news program TV Patrol World aired an interview of Lakmodin “Laks” Saliao by Petitioner Jorge Cariño. Claiming to be a former “alalay” of the Ampatuan family, Lakmodin “Laks” Saliao narrated how he was present at two meetings where the Ampatuans allegedly planned the “Maguindanao Massacre” in November 2009. He named members of the Ampatuan family who attended the meeting. He had discovered that he was going to be killed by the Ampatuans as he knew too much about the murders.
Because of this interview and of the pendency of the criminal cases, Private Respondent Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. instituted a Petition for Contempt[1] which was raffled off to Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where he prayed that petitioners be: (a) cited for indirect contempt for conducting and airing the Saliao Interview; and (b) prohibited from making further statements “in any forum or media in violation of the sub judice rule during the pendency of the Maguindanao Massacre murder cases.
Petitioners jointly filed their Answer with Counterclaims[2].They raised the affirmative defense that the Petition failed to state a cause of action.
On February 14, 2011, petitioners filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defense[3]. After an exchange of pleadings, public respondent issued a Resolution[4] dated July 15, 2011, denying petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary Hearing and directing the parties to file their respective position papers.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Alternative Motion To Conduct Trial[5]. Private respondent opposed it. In his Resolution[6] dated October 20, 2011, public respondent granted it and set the preliminary hearing on November 24, 2011.
However, at the hearing, petitioners manifested that they will no longer present evidence relative to their affirmative defense and thereby submits the affirmative defense for resolution.
On June 8, 2012, public respondent issued his first assailed Order, finding unmeritorious petitioner’s affirmative defense and refused the outright dismissal of the case.
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration. After an exchange of pleadings, public respondent denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in his second assailed Order of August 14, 2012.
Hence, this petition.
THE ISSUES BEFORE US
In this Petition, petitioners raised the following as grounds for the setting aside of Public Respondent’s Orders:
- PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
1. PUBLIC RESPONDENT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
2. PUBLIC RESPONDENT SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE CASE A QUO BECAUSE THE ISSUE INVOLVED THEREIN HAD ALREADY BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC AFTER SALIAO GAVE TESTIMONY IN THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE CASES.
- PETITIONERS HAVE NO PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY EXCEPT THIS PETITION.
Petitioners argue that the Petition failed to state a cause of action because pretrial news about an ongoing criminal case has the potential to be prejudicial to the accused only in a trial by jury; it failed to allege ultimate facts constituting intent on the part of the Petitioners to abuse or unlawfully interfere with the administration of justice; it failed to allege ultimate facts showing that Petitioners acted with criminal and malicious intent in conducting and airing the Saliao Interview; it failed to allege ultimate facts showing that the airing and conduct of the Saliao Interview is a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice; it failed to allege ultimate facts showing that the airing and conduct of the Saliao Interview constitutes pervasive publicity prejudicial to private respondent that would prevent fair trial; and the Saliao Interview is privileged communication, made in good faith.
Petitioners also claim that the issue of contempt was rendered moot and academic when Saliao testified in open court before Branch 221 of the same Court handling the Maguindanao Massacre cases. His testimony detailed the same facts as those he narrated in his interview with petitioners. Because the statements made by Saliao now form part of the evidence in the Maguindanao Massacre cases, petitioners’ conduct and airing of Saliao’s statements could not have unduly interfered with or influenced the court trying the Maguindanao Massacre cases.
Petitioners ascribe grave abuse of discretion to public respondent for refusing to dismiss the case of contempt on the aforementioned grounds.
Last, and on a procedural point, petitioners asseverate that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. Petitioners have already moved for the reconsideration of public respondent’s June 8, 2012 Order refusing to dismiss the petition on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Public respondent likewise denied said motion in an Order dated August 14, 2012. According to petitioners, a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy against an order denying the dismissal of a petition despite the petitioner’s failure to state a cause of action, especially when such refusal is attended by grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
For his part, private respondent states that for a Writ of Certiorari to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Petitioners have failed to discharge this burden. Petitioners manifested during the November 21, 2011 preliminary hearing that they will no longer present evidence for their affirmative defenses which they could have used to bolster their motion.
Private respondent suggests that a plain, adequate and speedy remedy of petitioners is to go to trial and present evidence to rebut the allegations in the complaint. In the event that petitioners are adjudged liable for indirect contempt they can still appeal the case.
Private respondent also stresses that while the Special Civil Action for Certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction that vitiating error is not attendant in this case.
OUR RULING
The petition is barren of merit.
At the outset, we would like to stress that the merits of the Petition for Contempt lodged against the Petitioners are not before us. The issue before us, distilled from the matters raised in this Petition, is whether there is abuse of discretion, grave at that, when the RTC refused to dismiss the Petition for Contempt filed against them. Petitioners, obviously, would wish to dismiss peremptorily the Petition for Contempt filed against them. We are loath to do so.
Jurisprudence teaches that:
“As to the wisdom or soundness of the trial court’s order dismissing petitioners’ affirmative defense of prescription, this involves a matter of judgment which is not properly reviewable by petition for certiorari, which is intended to correct defects of jurisdiction solely and not to correct errors of procedure or matters in the trial court’s findings or conclusions. We adopt the Court of Appeals’ disquisition in this wise:
“In a very real sense, We see in this recourse a clever attempt on the part of the petitioners to ventilate before this Court their discarded arguments in their Position Paper (Annex “K”, Petition), relative to their affirmative defense of prescription, and in the process, put at issue via this petition for certiorari the merit or lack of it of the respondent judge’s order of September 8, 1997. This cannot be done thru the instant proceeding. For,x x x there is the more important rule in the law of certiorari that this extraordinary remedy is available only to keep a court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The writ is never available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judge’s findings or conclusions (citations omitted) xxx;”[7]
“As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the rule in this light:
When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule. Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari.’
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court — on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari.”[8]
Indeed, the merit or the lack of it, of Private Respondent’s Petition for Contempt cannot be resolved in this Petition. Absent grave abuse of discretion, it is the RTC which should dispose of it.
We also hold that the issue of indirect contempt is not rendered moot and academic simply because Saliao gave testimony in the Maguindanao Massacre cases. Petitioners’ sole basis for persuading us on this matter is the case of Reghis M. Romero II, Edmond Q. Sese, Leopoldo T. Sanchez, Reghis M. Romero III, Michael L. Romero, Nathaniel L. Romero, and Jerome R. Canlas vs. Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada, and Senate Committee on Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development.[9] The case is absolutely not applicable.
In the Romero case, the sub judice issue was rendered moot and academic by the supervening issuance of an en banc Resolution which denied with finality Chavez’s motion for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court. There was no more case to speak of in Romero, and therefore, the issues subject of the legislative inquiry, assuming they pertained to the Chavez petition, were no longer sub judice or “before a court or judge for consideration.”
The Maguindanao Massacre cases, on the other hand, are ongoing and has been so for five years now as petitioners and their counsels very well know.
But more importantly, we do not discern an element that public respondent acted without or in excess of [its or his] jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction.
The phrase “without jurisdiction” means that the court acted with absolute lack of authority or want of legal power, right or authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or with reference to a particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise authority.“Excess of jurisdiction” occurs when the court transcends its power or acts without any statutory authority;or results when an act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer (to do) is not authorized, and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it are wanting. While that of “grave abuse of discretion” implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as to be equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction; simply put, power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; and such exercise is so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal either to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[10]
This is the Order of public respondent as to the proceedings of the case before he finally denied the affirmative defense of petitioners :
On 14 February 2011 a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses was filed by Respondent ABS-CBN with opposition by petitioner. Respondent ABS-CBN filed its reply on 14 March 2011 and a rejoinder was subsequently filed by Petitioner. On 15 July 2011, a resolution was issued by this court denying the motion. Respondent Abs-Cbn filed a motion for reconsideration with opposition by petitioner. On 20 October 2011, the motion was granted thus the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses was set on 24 November 2011. However, during the said date of preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses, petitioners manifested that they will no longer present evidence relative to their affirmative defenses and thereby submits the affirmative defenses for resolution.
Hence this court rules.
“The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.(Ginete v. CA, G.R. No. 127596, September 24, 1998)
Considering the aforequoted pronouncement of the Supreme Court, finding the Affirmative Defense bereft of merit, the same is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, let the initial trial proceed as previously scheduled on 14 June 2012.
“SO ORDERED.“
Public Respondent afforded petitioners all the avenues to prove their assertions. Public respondent even granted petitioners a preliminary hearing for their affirmative defense, even if it meant reversing his previous ruling when petitioners moved for reconsideration therefor. It was only when petitioners manifested, at this same preliminary hearing they earnestly implored for in the first place, that they will no longer present evidence on their affirmative defenses and that they submit the same for resolution that public respondent finally decided on it.
Petitioners nonetheless also argue[11] that their ground for dismissal is failure to state a cause of action which is a purely legal ground. Resting on the strength of AC Enterprises Inc. and Paredes[12], only the four corners of the Petition need to be examined to determine whether the Petition is dismissible. Petitioners do not need to present any extraneous evidence to show the Petition’s insufficiency.
This posture is inconsistent with their Motion for Reconsideration (with Alternative Motion to Conduct Trial)[13] dated August 31, 2011 of the Court’s denial of their Motion for Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative Defenses. In it, petitioners earnestly implore the RTC to set a preliminary hearing on their affirmative defense because they would want to present evidence and be allowed to confront the witnesses against them.
Based on the circumstances of the case, we are of the view that a Petition for Certiorari is not proper in this case. Petitioners must proceed to trial where they can fully ventilate their issues and arguments and then appeal if an adverse decision is eventually rendered.
There is a string cite in support of this view. In Boston Equity Resources, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Lolita G. Toledo [14]citing Indiana Aerospace University v. Comm. on Higher Education[15] cited in Bonifacio Construction Management Corporation v. Judge Perlas-Bernabe, [16] it was held that:
“x x x Well settled is the rule that the special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial by the trial court of a motion to dismiss. The order of the trial court denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory, as it neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case and still leaves something to be done by the court before a case is finally decided on the merits. Therefore, “the proper remedy in such a case is to appeal after a decision has been rendered.”
In the same breath, in Alfredo Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank (formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the Honorable Herminia V. Pasamba, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court- Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan[17] citing Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation[18], it was held that:
“Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact — a mistake of judgment — appeal is the remedy.”
Meanwhile, incorporated in the Petition is an application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. Petitioners aver that without such TRO they will be compelled to litigate on the basis of a defective and baseless petition. As a result, they will certainly suffer great and irreparable injury. Petitioners also pray for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. According to petitioners, public respondent will undoubtedly proceed and is, in fact, proceeding with Civil Case No. Q-10-67543 despite the failure of the Petition a quo to state a cause of action. Any decision rendered in said civil case would thus work injustice to petitioners and effectively render the instant Petition moot, academic and ineffectual. Such would occasion grave and irreparable injury to petitioners.
Then as now, an application for injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.[19] There is no clear showing that petitioners have sufficiently alleged a clear and unmistakable right to, and that there is an extremely urgent and paramount necessity for, said injunctive reliefs. At any rate, their arguments for the issuance of these provisional remedies are subsumed in our earlier finding. They are perforce denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition, for being unmeritorious, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Salazar-Fernando, R.A., Chairperson, and Gonzales-Sison, M., JJ., concur.
[1] Civil Case No. Q-10-67543; Rollo, marked as Annex B, page 39
[2] Rollo, marked as Annex C, page 46
[3] Rollo, marked as Annex D, page 56
[4] Rollo, marked as Annex E, page 61
[5] Rollo, marked as Annex E, page 68
[6] Rollo, marked as Annex E, page 80
[7] Sps. Arturo Refugia and Aurora Refugia vs. Hon. Floro P. Alejo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court , Br. 172, Valenzuela, M.M., Rodolfo Refugia, Candelaria Refugia, Teresita Nejal, Ricardo Refugia, Francisco Violeta Legal and Rosario Velasco (alleged representative of private respondents), as substitute parites of deceased Sps. Mamerto and Feliza Refugia (G.R. No. 138674, June 22, 2000)
[8] Alfredo Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank (formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the Honorable Herminia V. Pasamba, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court- Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan G.R. No. 172299 (April 22, 2008) citing Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation G.R. No.156067, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 134-136.
[9] G.R. No. 174105 (April 02, 2009).
[10] Alfredo Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank (formerly Philippine Commercial International Bank) and the Honorable Herminia V. Pasamba, Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court- Branch 82, City of Malolos, Bulacan G.R. No. 172299 (April 22, 2008) citing Alafriz v. Nable, 72 Phil. 278, 280 (1941). See also Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 27 at 785. Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at 785. Cuison v. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 1089, 1102 (1998); Lalican v. Hon. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 495 (1997); Pure Foods Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 78591, 21 March 1989, 171 SCRA 415, 426; Palma v. Q & S Inc., 123 Phil. 958, 960 (1966).
[11] See Reply at page 629, Rollo
[12] Paredes et al v. IAC, 185 SCRA 134 (1990); AC Enterprises, Inc. v. Frabelle Properties Corp. 506 SCRA 625 (2006)
[13] Rollo, marked as Annex E, pages 69 and 77
[14] G.R. No. 173946, June 19, 2013
[15] 408 Phil. 483, 501 (2001)
[16] G.R. No. 185011, 501 Phil. 79, 84 (2005)
[17] G.R. No. 172299 (April 22, 2008)
[18] G.R. No.156067, 11 August 2004, 436 SCRA 123, 134-136
[19] Marquez v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 141849, February 13, 2007