LAURENTINO D. BASCUG, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE GRACIANO H. ARINDAY, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 69, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, SILAY CITY, RESPONDENT.

Bascug versus Arinday

The Case

This is an administrative case in which Laurentino Bascug charges Judge Graciano Arinday, Junior, presiding judge of Branch 69 of the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Negros Occidental, with grave misconduct, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, malicious delay in the administration of justice, and violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The complaint, dated the first of December 1997, arises from three matters handled by the respondent judge: two civil cases for recovery that he allowed to languish, a civil case that he submitted for judgment on the pleadings over the objection of a party, and a criminal case in which the complainant alleged irregularity in the service of a warrant of arrest. The case matters because it is a compact lesson on judicial efficiency and on the strict requirements for a judgment on the pleadings, and because it shows how the Supreme Court polices delay and improvident rulings even in the absence of bad faith.

Procedural History

The complainant filed the administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court. The Court required the respondent judge to submit his comment, which he did, refuting the allegations. In reply, the complainant submitted a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Court of Appeals showing that no memorandum for judgment on the pleadings had been filed by the defendants in the civil case that the respondent judge had decided on the pleadings. The Court then referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and recommendation. In its memorandum dated the fifteenth of August 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator found the respondent judge liable for failing to resolve the second motion for reconsideration in the two civil cases within the reglementary period, and for grave misconduct in issuing an order stating that the parties had agreed to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings. It recommended a fine of five thousand pesos. The Court adopted that recommendation.

Facts

Civil Cases No. 1797-69 and No. 1798-69, originally docketed in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Victorias-Manapla, were dismissed on the fifteenth of May 1995 for failure to attach a certificate of barangay conciliation. The plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, and the appeal was assigned to the respondent judge. On the twentieth of October 1995, he reversed the dismissal and ordered the lower court to conduct further proceedings. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied because it did not bear the signature of their counsel. A second motion for reconsideration was filed on the sixteenth of January 1996. The respondent judge gave it due course on the twenty-third of January 1996, but resolved it only on the twelfth of November 1996, when he denied it for lack of merit. Only on the thirteenth of June 1997 did he direct the Clerk of Court to remand the records to the lower court. The complainant attributed the delay to the influence of the municipal mayor of Victorias.

In Civil Case No. 1718-69, the respondent judge, in an order dated the twentieth of December 1994, required the parties to submit memoranda for a judgment on the pleadings. Only the plaintiffs submitted a memorandum. The defendant corporation, of which the complainant was president, never agreed to a judgment on the pleadings. Nevertheless, on the fourth of April 1995, the respondent judge rendered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiffs. His order of the eleventh of December 1995 stated that the parties had agreed to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of the fourteenth of August 1998, set aside the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In Criminal Case No. 4000-69, the complainant, the father-in-law of the complaining witness, alleged irregularity in the service of the warrant of arrest and complained that the respondent judge had failed to commence any prosecution against the persons liable. The respondent judge disowned any irregularity and argued that any problem with the service of the warrant should have been addressed to the Chief of Police of Victorias.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for gross inefficiency for failing to resolve the second motion for reconsideration in the two civil cases within the reglementary period.
• Whether or not the respondent judge is liable for grave misconduct for issuing an order holding that the parties had agreed to submit a case for judgment on the pleadings when the defendant corporation had not so agreed.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 37, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on the period to resolve a motion for reconsideration, provides:

A motion for reconsideration should be resolved within thirty days from the time it is submitted for resolution.

This fixes the period the respondent judge exceeded in the two civil cases.

Section 5, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure provides:

A second motion for reconsideration shall not be allowed.

This shows that the respondent judge ought to have known that the second motion for reconsideration should not have been entertained at all.

Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules on Civil Procedure, on judgment on the pleadings, provides:

Where an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.

This is the rule the respondent judge misapplied when he rendered judgment on the pleadings despite the defendants' objections.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge was guilty of gross inefficiency. The second motion for reconsideration was filed on the sixteenth of January 1996 and given due course on the twenty-third of January 1996, yet it was resolved only on the twelfth of November 1996, and the records were remanded only on the thirteenth of June 1997. The failure to act with reasonable dispatch constituted gross inefficiency. The Court also stressed that the respondent judge ought to have known that a second motion for reconsideration should not be allowed. It reminded that any delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary and brings it into unnecessary disrepute.

On the second issue, the Court held that the respondent judge was guilty of grave misconduct. Under Section 1, Rule 34, a judgment on the pleadings is proper only where the answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. Here, the defendants did not submit a memorandum for judgment on the pleadings, and their motion for reconsideration pointed out that the parties had presented widely opposing contentions in their pre-trial briefs. There was no clear agreement to submit the case for judgment on the pleadings, and no implied admission of each other's factual allegations. The Court adopted the view of the Office of the Court Administrator that the respondent judge had fallen below the circumspection and standard of conduct expected of him.

Doctrine

A motion for reconsideration must be resolved within thirty days from the time it is submitted for resolution, and a second motion for reconsideration is not allowed. Failure to act with reasonable dispatch constitutes gross inefficiency, and any delay in the disposition of cases erodes public faith and confidence in the judiciary. A judgment on the pleadings is proper only where the answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading; it cannot be rendered where the parties have presented widely opposing contentions and there is no clear agreement to submit the case on the pleadings. A judge who issues such a judgment despite the objections of a party is liable for grave misconduct.

Disposition

The Court found Judge Graciano Arinday, Junior, guilty of gross inefficiency and grave misconduct and imposed on him a fine of five thousand pesos, with a warning that any further infraction will be dealt with severely.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that a judgment on the pleadings requires that the answer fail to tender an issue or admit the material allegations, and that delay in resolving motions is gross inefficiency. Examiners like to use this case to test the requisites of judgment on the pleadings under Section 1, Rule 34, and the rule that a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited.