GUILLERMO T. TAPINIT REPRESENTED BY MARIO R. TAPINIT, PETITIONER, VS. MA. LUISA S. GUZMAN, EUSEBIO “EBIONG” ABUCAY, HELEN OLIMBA AND DONATO DAVIN, RESPONDENTS.

Tapinit versus Guzman

The Case

This is a petition for review of a decision in an ejectment case. Guillermo Tapinit, represented by Mario Tapinit, sues Ma. Luisa Guzman, Eusebio Abucay, Helen Olimba and Donato Davin for unlawful detainer over portions of a parcel of land in Lala, Lanao del Norte. Tapinit claims the respondents occupy the land only by his tolerance, without any lease agreement. The respondents answer that they hold the land under a different title and under the permission of another person. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's clean restatement of the boundaries of an unlawful detainer action: the suit protects possession in fact, not ownership, and the element of tolerance must exist from the very start of the possession sought to be recovered.

Procedural History

Guillermo Tapinit filed a complaint for unlawful detainer before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lala-Salvador, Lanao del Norte. On August 22, 2008, that court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing the complaint for failure to prove his case by preponderance of evidence, and likewise dismissing the defendants' counterclaim. Tapinit appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. On February 27, 2009, the Regional Trial Court affirmed the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in its entirety, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. Tapinit then came to the Supreme Court by a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, assigning several errors against the affirmance.

Facts

Guillermo Tapinit is the registered owner of a parcel of land, Lot Number 25, located at Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, with an area of 14,514 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Number EP-1169 under Emancipation Patent Number A-166-88, issued in 1988. The mother lot was registered in the name of the late Ambrocio Saavedra, and Ma. Luisa Guzman is one of his children.

Tapinit alleged that in 1985 he tolerated Luisa to construct a mechanical dryer on a portion of about 1,050 square meters of Lot Number 25, and that she remained in possession by tolerance without any lease agreement. He likewise alleged that Abucay, Olimba and Davin occupied other portions of about 588, 496 and 330 square meters, respectively, building their houses since 1990, also by his tolerance and without any lease. He said he had been planting and harvesting corn on the lot even before his title was issued in 1988. On June 6, 2007, he sent demand letters for the respondents to vacate, but they refused.

The respondents countered that the original owner was Ambrosio Saavedra; that in 1975 a portion not covered by Presidential Decree Number 27 was sold to Felix Saavedra, who obtained a title that same year; that Felix Saavedra gave Luisa permission to construct a solar dryer building; and that Abucay built his house in 1972, Olimba in 1980, and Davin's parents in 1968. They also alleged that the original farmer beneficiary of the lot was Elegario Villarino, with an awarded area of 0.98 hectares, whose rights Tapinit acquired before obtaining his emancipation patent in 1988.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondents' possession of the disputed land was by the mere tolerance of the petitioner, sufficient to justify an action for unlawful detainer.
• Whether or not the petitioner, whose title was issued only in 1988, could have tolerated the respondents' occupation that began before his title existed.
• Whether or not the affirmance of the lower courts amounted to a collateral attack on the petitioner's Torrens title.
• Whether or not there was substantial evidence that Felix Saavedra is the predecessor-in-interest of respondent Ma. Luisa Guzman.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies Rule 42 of the Rules of Court as the mode of review from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court:

Petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

This fixes the procedural vehicle by which the petitioner brought the case up, and it frames the Court's review of the affirmance below.

The decision also refers to Presidential Decree Number 27, the emancipation of tenants law, under which the petitioner's emancipation patent was issued:

Presidential Decree No. 27, Decreeing The Emancipation Of Tenants From The Bondage Of The Soil, Transferring To Them The Ownership Of The Land They Till And Providing The Instruments And Mechanism Therefor.

This is the source of the petitioner's claim of ownership over Lot Number 25, which the Court weighs only for the limited purpose of priority of possession.

Ruling

The Court denied the petition. On the first issue, it held that ejectment cases are summary proceedings designed to provide expeditious means to protect actual possession or the right to possession. The only question is who is entitled to physical possession, that is, possession in fact and not possession in law, and it does not even matter if a party's title is questionable. To justify unlawful detainer, the plaintiff's supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession later sought to be recovered, and the defendant's possession must have been originally legal, permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract. The Court found the alleged tolerance unsubstantiated.

On the second issue, the Court noted that the petitioner's title was issued only in 1988, while the title of Felix Saavedra was issued much earlier, in 1975. The petitioner could not therefore claim that, before his own title, he had tolerated or assented to Luisa's occupation, since at that time he had no right over the lot. There was no tolerance to speak of when Luisa constructed the dryers, because she was already in possession before the petitioner's title. As to Abucay, Olimba and Davin, the petitioner himself admitted that it was Luisa and her spouse who induced them to build their houses, not his tolerance. The Court added that the geodetic engineers of the parties submitted conflicting findings on whether the improvements overlapped Lot Number 25, so the petitioner's right of possession was not sufficiently proven.

On the third issue, the Court held that the decision below was not a collateral attack on the petitioner's title. The respondents did not dispute the existence of his title; they only claimed that the particular lot they occupy is not part of it and that their possession is not through his consent.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the respondents presented the title in the name of Felix Saavedra, who gave them permission to occupy, and no contrary claim was made by Felix Saavedra or his heirs. In any event, the Court said, whether the respondents are his successors-in-interest is irrelevant, because the focal issue is that the petitioner failed to substantially prove his allegations. The Court closed by stressing that an unlawful detainer case is an accion interdictal, limited to the right to physical possession, and that a judgment therein disposes of no other issue than possession and is no bar to an action for determination of title.

Doctrine

First, an ejectment case resolves only the question of physical possession, that is, possession in fact, and not possession in law; ownership is examined only to address priority of possession. Second, for unlawful detainer, the acts of tolerance must have been present from the very start of the possession sought to be recovered, and the defendant's possession must have been originally legal and permitted by the owner through an express or implied contract. Third, a person cannot tolerate an occupation that began before he acquired any right over the land. Fourth, a judgment in unlawful detainer establishes only who has the right of possession and is not a bar to a separate action to determine ownership.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision of the Regional Trial Court affirming the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: tolerance must exist from the very start of the possession sought to be recovered, and a person cannot tolerate what began before he had any right over the land. Examiners use this case to test the summary nature of ejectment, the possession in fact versus possession in law distinction, and the rule that an unlawful detainer judgment is no bar to a separate action for title.