RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF TOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

Merdegia versus Veloso

The Case

This is an administrative matter that began as a verified complaint by Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and ended with the Supreme Court dismissing the complaint against the Justice but holding the complainant's own counsel, Atty. Homobono Adaza II, in indirect contempt. The case matters for two reasons. First, it draws the line between the lawyer's duty of zeal and the lawyer's duty to respect judicial processes. Second, and more importantly for the Bar, it distinguishes a contempt proceeding from a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer, and explains why one cannot substitute for the other.

Procedural History

Merdegia, through his counsel Atty. Adaza, filed a verified administrative complaint against Justice Veloso before the Supreme Court. On October 8, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint. In that same Resolution, the Court directed Atty. Adaza to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt. Atty. Adaza submitted his explanation, and the Court found that explanation insufficient. The present Resolution is the Court's ruling on that contempt charge, decided in December 2013.

Facts

Atty. Adaza was counsel for Merdegia in a case pending before the Court of Appeals. During the oral arguments, both lawyer and client observed what they believed was partiality on the part of Justice Veloso. Instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint, Atty. Adaza advised his client to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case.

Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, and he penned the resolution denying the motion. Under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, he was allowed to act on that motion. Merdegia then repeated his request to file an administrative complaint against the Justice, and Atty. Adaza acceded. The complaint and the motion for inhibition rested on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments.

The Court also noted Atty. Adaza's pattern of filing motions for inhibition throughout the case. He first sought the inhibition of Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila after she issued an order unfavorable to his client. He then sought the inhibition of all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing the appeal, again for alleged bias during oral arguments. Taken together with the baseless administrative complaint filed after Justice Veloso penned an order adverse to his client, these indicators showed that the complaint was more than a report of legitimate grievances.

Issues

• Whether or not Atty. Adaza is guilty of indirect contempt for preparing and filing the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso.
• Whether or not the contempt proceeding may also impose a disciplinary sanction on Atty. Adaza as a member of the Bar.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, paragraph d, of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court defines indirect contempt. The decision cites it as the basis for the charge:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt: x x x (d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.

This is the provision under which Atty. Adaza's conduct was punished.

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states the duty of zeal:

Canon 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.

The Court used this Canon to show that zeal has limits, and that Atty. Adaza exceeded them.

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states the lawyer's duty to respect legal processes:

Canon 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes.

Rule 1.02 of the same Code supplies the specific prohibition:

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

These provisions bear on the Court's finding that Atty. Adaza failed to impress upon his client the features of the adversarial system and the ethics of respect for the judicial system.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held Atty. Adaza guilty of indirect contempt. His explanation did not convince the Court. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso's bias. If Merdegia and his counsel doubted the legality of that resolution, the proper remedy was a petition for certiorari, not an administrative complaint. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds of the law, and he is duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake. The Court found that the complaint showed an apparent failure to understand that cases are not always decided in one's favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza was the totality of the facts, which showed that the complaint was merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. His acts constituted improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of justice, punishable as indirect contempt.

On the second issue, the Court held that it could not impose a disciplinary sanction on Atty. Adaza through the contempt proceeding. The show cause order of October 8, 2013 asked only why he should not be cited in contempt, not why he should not be administratively penalized. Imposing a disciplinary sanction through a contempt proceeding would violate due process, because a person charged of an offense must be informed of the nature of the charge against him and given ample opportunity to explain his side. The Court explained that the two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. Contempt is an implied and inherent power, penal and summary in nature, so that legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply. A disciplinary proceeding, by contrast, is sui generis, neither purely civil nor purely criminal; its purpose is not to inflict punishment but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. The two proceedings may proceed simultaneously, but neither can substitute for the other.

Doctrine

A lawyer must represent his client with zeal, but only within the bounds of the law, as Canon 19 commands. He must counsel his client against defiance of the law and against any act that lessens confidence in the legal system, as Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 require.

An administrative complaint against a justice cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. A party who doubts an order denying a motion for inhibition must file a petition for certiorari, not an administrative complaint.

An allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case. A litigant's disappointment with an unfavorable ruling is not bias.

The indiscriminate filing of administrative complaints against members of the Judiciary degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work, and constitutes indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraph d, of Rule 71.

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are distinct. They spring from different powers of the Court, follow different procedures, and neither can substitute for the other. A contempt proceeding cannot impose a disciplinary sanction, because due process requires that the respondent be informed of the nature of the charge against him.

Disposition

The Court found Atty. Homobono Adaza II guilty of indirect contempt for filing a frivolous suit against Justice Veloso, sentenced him to pay a fine of 5,000 pesos within fifteen days from promulgation, and warned him that further similar misbehavior may be a ground for disciplinary proceedings. The administrative complaint against Justice Veloso had already been dismissed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an administrative complaint against a justice cannot substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies, and a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding against a lawyer. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between contempt and disciplinary proceedings, and to test the limits of a lawyer's duty of zeal under Canon 19.