EX-MERALCO EMPLOYEES TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On July 26, 1951, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Solicitor General, filed in the Municipal Court of the City of
Manila (civil case No. 16716 of said court), a complaint against the
corporation, known as Ex-Meralco Employees Transportation Company,
Inc., for the recovery of damages in the sum of P1,332.17, alleging
that:

“. . . the plaintiff is the owner of a Ford Service
Truck bearing Plate No. T.P.L-975 assigned for the use of one of its
instrumentalities, the Bureau of Telecommunications, Manila;

“That
on January 10, 1951, while plaintiff’s service truck was at full stop
near a safety island in the middle of Espana Boulevard, it was bumped
by a passenger truck bearing Plate No. T.P.U.-5112 belonging to and
operated by the defendant corporation and driven by defendant’s
employee one ‘Pakia Adona’ who fled immediately after the collision.”

The defendant corporation filed the following answer:

“What actually happened was that while the
defendant’s bus was heading toward Quiapo along the Espana Avenue, all
of a sudden, the plaintiff’s service truck, without making any sign on
the part of its driver, unexpectedly, and instantly swerved to the left
toward the front of defendant’s bus for a U turn at the safety island
at the intersection of Espana and Miguelin Streets, without first
taking necessary precaution and violating thru street traffic rules and
disregarding the stream of vehicles flowing along the thru Espana
Street or avenue, so sudden and swift and without clear distance that
to evade the collision was physically and materially impossible on the
part of the defendant’s driver, although the latter tried to evade it,
in vain, by immediately applying the brakes and at the same time
swerving to the left as to swerve it to the right was impossible and
fatal to the plaintiff’s truck, so that the collision was absolutely
due to the fault, recklessness, and omission of thru street traffic
rules on the part of the driver of the defendant; and defendant’s
driver fled due to threat of bodily harm shown by plaintiff’s personnel
on the spot.”

On the date set for the trial, the defendant’s (herein petitioner’s)
counsel objected to the trial because, as he alleged, there were
sufficient grounds for the dismissal of the complaint. On January 16,
1952, he filed a formal motion to dismiss on the ground that “the
plaintiff’s complaint was without any cause of action as the driver
concerned had not yet been adjudged liable for the damages, if any,
complained of.” The motion was denied.

The defendant (petitioner herein) filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila a petition for certiorari and preliminary
injunction, praying said court to annul the order of the municipal
court denying the dismissal of the case for the reason that the latter
acted in excess or abuse of jurisdiction.

The court of first instance denied the petition for certiorari in the following language:

“* * * The facts alleged by the petitioner in its
petition, and admitted by the respondents in their answer, cannot be
the basis for the issuance of a writ of certiorari against the
respondents, as prayed for by the petitioner, because it is within the
power and jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to hear and decide Civil
Case No. 16716 of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila, and that
the said respondent Judge committed no abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motion for the dismissal of said
case.”

The above order of the Court of First Instance is correct. The
remedy of the petitioner should be a regular appeal filed in due time
to the court of first instance. The ground that the complaint did not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action is not
jurisdictional. The allegation that a criminal information should have
been filed previously against the driver is, besides not being
jurisdictional, untenable for the reason that the liability of a master
for damages caused by his employee or agent in a business enterprise is
primary and direct and not subsidiary. Subsidiary liability of the
employer takes place only when the action is brought under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from of the Court of
First Instance is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.