KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA NG ALAK (NAFLU), PETITIONER, VS. HAMILTON DISTILLERY COMPANY AND THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from two resolutions en banc of the Court of
Industrial Relations denying, in effect, two motions, the first of twenty-one
members, in their own respect­ive individual right, of the petitioner union and
the second of the union as such, to reopen the case of un­fair labor practice
originally filed by said union, through its former set of officers and counsel,
purport­edly “for the implementation of (the) decision” of this
Supreme Court of October 30, 1962 in G. R. No. L-18112, entitled “Kapisanan ng mga
Manggagawa ng Alak (NAFLU) vs. Hamilton Distillery Company, et al.,”
the disposi­tive part of which reads thus:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and
another one shall be entered ordering the Com­pany to cease and desist from further
unfair labor practices, to pay the members of the NAFLU who had been dis­criminated
against the difference bet­ween the compensation actually paid to them and that
which they would have re­ceived had there been no discrimina­tion, and to
reinstate the employees named above, with back wages from the time of their
dismissal until their actual reinstatement, with all of the rights and
privileges appertaining thereto, as well as to pay the costs.

“IT IS SO ORDERED.”

In substance, the main ground for the denial of said motions is
that after the above judgment became final and executory
and the proceedings for its execution were be­ing undertaken, the case was
completely terminated when the union entered into a compromise agreement with
re­spondent company as follows:

“PARTIAL
AMICABLE SETTLE­MENT

“COME NOW the petitioner and the respondents in the above
entitled case, assisted by their respective under­signed Counsels and before
this Honor­able Court, respectfully manifest their having entered into an
Amicable Settle­ment as follows to wit:

“1.  That the parties
hereby respect­fully move for the dismissal of any all claims for BACKPAY, and
for acts of dis­crimination (Financial aspect), rendered in this case, on the
ground that the parties herein have already settled their differences amicably
and that they are no longer interested in prosecuting their respective claims
on this matter;

“2.  That the respondent
hereby binds itself to admit any or all members of the petitioner union or­dered
by the Honorable Supreme Court in G. R. No. L-18112 to be reinstated in
respondent’s employ, and who may still want to return back to work not­withstanding
that this matter is still pending determination by the Honorable Court;

“3.  That the respondent
company hereby binds to give continuous work of six (6) days a week to all
members of both the unions existing in the re­spondent company in so far as
they are financially capable to do so, and in all cases, to observe justice and
equal treatment to all of its employee irres­pective of union membership;

“4.  That should respondent
sell any or all of its rights, interests and par­ticipations in the Hamilton
Distillery Company, the respondent company hereby binds itself that all the
above preced­ing agreements shall be incorporated in their Deeds of Sales and
become a part of the conditions hereof;

“5.   That any or all court
fees that may be assessed in the premises shall be borne by the respondent
exclusively;

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the foregoing
Amicable Settlement be approved by the Honorable Court.

“Manila, Philippines,
December 24, 1963.

KAPISANAN
NG MGA MANGGAGAWA                                    HAMILTON
DISTILLERY

NG
ALAK SA HAMILTON                                                                   COMPANY

By:                                                                                    By:

(Sgd.) Francisco Dumlao                                                (Sgd.) Mariano Ang Eng

FRANCISCO
DUMLAO                                                   MARIANO
ANG ENG

HAMILTON
WORKERS’ UNION

By:

(Sgd.) Valentino Kaw

VALENTINO KAW

President

Assisted by:

OLIVEROS AND MALLARE                                            LOPEZ , DE
JOYA, HERMOSO

&
DIMAGUIO

By:                                                                                    By:

(Sgd.) Federico B. Oliveros                                             (Sgd.) Delia L. Hermoso

FEDERICO
B. OLIVEROS                                             DELIA
L. HERMOSO

Counsel
for the Petitioner                                                Counsel
for Respondents

Rm. 405 Laperal Bldg.                                                    424
Regina Bldg.

865
Rizal Ave., Manila                                                     Escolta, Manila”

which agreement
was approved by the trial judge in an order worded thus:

“O R D E R

“On December 26,
1963 counsel of both parties filed a PARTIAL AMICA­BLE SETTLEMENT,
on the grounds that the parties have already settled their differences amicably
and that they are no longer interested in pro­secuting their respective claims
on this matter, and prayed that the said AMICABLE SETTLEMENT be approved by
this Court.

“After due perusal of the plead­ing submitted jointly by
counsel of both parties, the Court finds that it is a complete amicable
settlement of the respective claims of the parties on this matter.

“The reasons for the amicable settlement by the parties, not
being contrary to law, morals or public policy, said settlement is hereby
APPROVED.

“IN VIEW THEREOF, this case is hereby declared closed and
terminated.

“SO ORDERED.”

hence the case
can no longer be reopened even under sec­tion 17 of Commonwealth Act 103 which
reads as follows:

“SEC. 17.  Limit of effectiveness of award.  – An award, order or deci­sion of the Court
shall be valid and effective during the time therein specified.  In the absence of such specification, any
party or both par­ties to a controversy may terminate the effectiveness of an
award, order or decision after three years have elapsed from the date of said
award, order or decision by giving notice to that effect to the Court:  Provided, however, That at any
time during the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, the Court may, on
applica­tion of an interested party, and after due hearing, alter, modify in
whole or in part, or set aside any such award, order or decision, or re­open
any question involved therein.”

The developments that led to this appeal are the fol­lowing:

After Judge Bautista issued the above-quoted order dated December 28, 1963 approving the
compromise agreement and declaring Case No. ULP-1454 closed and terminated, on
January 26, 1964, twenty-one (21) of the forty-nine(49) members of the union
who had filed the original unfair-la­bor practice case, filed in their own
individual names and thru new counsel, the first motion referred to at the out­set
of this decision, as follows:

“INCIDENTAL MOTION TO REOPEN

CASE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF

DECISION

COMES NOW the undersigned Petitioners, as members of the
complainant in the above-entitled case, through their under signed counsel, and
to this Honorable, respectfully state:

“1.  That
in the above-entitled case a decision of the Supreme Court was pro­mulgated in
G. R. No. L-18112 on Decem­ber 20,
1962 dispositive part of which states as
follows:

‘WHEREFORE, the decision ap­pealed from is hereby reversed, and
another one shall be entered ordering the Company to cease and desist from
further unfair labor practice, to pay the members of the NAFLU who had been
discrimi­nated against the difference bet­ween the compensation actually paid
to them and that which they would have received had there been no
discrimination, and to reinstate the employees named above, with back wages
from the time of their dismissal until their actual reinstatement, with all of
the rights and privileges appertaining thereto, as well as to pay the costs.

‘IT IS SO ORDERED.’

reversing the
decision of the Trial Court in this case of December 29, 1960 which states as follows:

‘IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS the above-entitled
complaint is hereby dismissed.

‘SO ORDERED.’

“2.  That based on the
decision of the Supreme Court, above-cited which was re­manded to in this
Honorable Court for ex­ecution, this Honorable Court ordered an Examiner of
this Court to make the compu­tation of the back wages due the employees
involved in this case and in a Report rend­ered by the Examiner on June 20,
1963, the total amount of back wages due the employees concerned amounts to
P328,802.00 re­presenting the back wages from Octo­ber 28, 1947 to March 4,
1963 due from the respondent company for pay­ment to the members of complainant
in this case.

“3.  That
when said Report of the Examiner was set for hearing a Mani­festation of
counsel for complainant, dated November 15, 1963 was filed objecting to the
amount of computa­tion of the Court Examiner, and in lieu thereof submitted a
counter pro­posal granting the employees involved in this case, numbering
forty-nine (49) persons the amount of P2,352.00 each as back wages;

“4.  That
before this Honorable Court however, could act on the Report of the Examiner as
well as on the Manifestation of the respondent, a Mo­tion to Dismiss the
complaint was filed by both parties on December
24, 1963 and approved recently, in an Order of this Honorable
Court, in the above-entitled case on December
28, 1963.

“5.  That said Motion to
Dismiss was without the knowledge of most of the members of complainant union
and specially the petitioners in this case, whose names and signatures appear
in the attached authorization Annex ‘A’ of this Motion and made a part hereof,
and who have signed said authorization to the undersigned to act in their be­half
on this Matter, for the reopening of this case under section 17 of Act 103, for
the purpose of implementing or executing the decision of the Sup­reme Court
above-cited so that the petitioners can receive the amount due them under this
case as per computa­tion of the examiner of this Court of June 20, 1963, since
the benefit of back wages under said computation of the Court Examiner has been
denied them up to now.

“WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the above-entitled
case be reopened by this Honorable Court for the purpose of implementing the
decision of the Supreme Court in this case, by paying the petitioners herein
the amount due them under said case based on the computation of the Examiner of
this Court of June 20, 1963.

“Manila, Philippines,
January 26, 1964.

Copy furnished:                                                        (Sgd.) GREGORIO E. FAJARDO

GREGORIO
E. FAJARDO

OLIVEROS &                                                           Counsel
for Petitioners

MALLARE (for                                                           Rm.
311 Palomo Building

Petitioners)                                                                        Recto
Avenue

405 Lopez Bldg.                                                                      Manila

865 Rizal Avenue,

Manila

Manila

January, 1964

SA KINAUUKOLAN:

“Kaming mga
nakalagda sa ibaba nito na
mga manggagawa sa Hamilton Distillery ay di sumasangayon sa kinalabasan ng aming usapin Bilang
1454-ULP Hukumang Industrial at nais
namin na ipatupad ang naging
pasiya o hatol ng Kataastaasang Hukuman at mabayaran kami sangayon sa
kinalabasan ng pagsusuri ng ‘Economist &
Examiner’ ng Hukumang
Industrial na ibinatay sa nasabing pasiya
o hatol ng Kata­astaasang Hukuman.

“At aming pinahihintulotan
ang mananang­gol na si
Gregorio Fajardo na siyang kumata­wan sa paghahabol na
ito sa Hukuman

(SGD.) Severino Martin                                                   (SGD.)
Cirilo Liatigue

            SEVERINO MARTIN

(SGD.) Norma Masiglat                                                   (SGD.)
Angelina Montealegre

NORMA
MASIGLAT                                                         ANGELINA
MONTEALEGRE

(SGD.) Roman Mendoza                                                 (SGD.)
Filomena Castraneo

ROMAN
MENDOZA                                                         FILOMENA
CASTRANEO

(Sgd.) Flavia Esquivel                                                      (Sgd.) Felicisimo Reyes

FLAVIA
ESQUIVEL

(Sgd.) Avelina Maureza                                                   (Sgd.) Eleanora Reyes

AVELINA
MAUREZA

(Sgd.)
Vicente Santos                                                     (Sgd.) Simplicio Avinante

(Sgd.) Leda
Vigo                                                              (Sgd.) Manuel Montevirgen

LEDA VIGO

(Sgd.)
Glecerio Belarmino                                               (Sgd.) Antonino M. Ignacio

(Sgd.)
Laura Yumol                                                         (Sgd.) Jorge Martin

(Sgd.)
Corazon Cabarrubias

(Sgd.)
Nenita Lacsamana“

This motion was opposed not only by the respondent company but
also by the union, thru its counsel then, Atty. Federico B. Oliveros.  The latter’s opposition alleged:

“3.  That it
specifically DENIES the allegations contained in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the
motion, the same being legally un­founded for the following arguments:

“A.  That the
acceptance of the Compro­mise Agreement for the settlement of the financial
disputes between the herein par­ties were entered into after a valid meet­ing
among the members of the petitioner union, and, wherein such meeting, it was
unanimously agreed to accept the offered terms of the respondent and, that for
the reasons set forth in the agreement entered into by the petitioners and the
respondent in this case dated December 24, 1964, a photostat
copy thereof is, hereto attached as Annex ‘A’, and made an integral part of
this opposition, conclusively terminated this case.  As such, the said Compromise Agreement is
valid and conclusive upon all the parties thereto (Art. 2154, 2028, and 2037,
N.C.C.; Gozon vs. Republic, 47 O.G. 699, Aug. 25, 1949, G.
R. No. L-2826; Ser­rano vs. Cabrera, 49 O.G. 3854, Sept. 21, 1953,
No. L-5189; Sajona vs. Sheriff of Ma­nila, G. R.
No. L-5603, Aug. 24, 1954;
and Mercador vs. Manila Polo
Club, 52 O.G. 7272, G. R. No. L-8373, Sept. 28, 1956);

“B. 
More so in this case, when the said Compromise Agreement has been
ex­tended judicial sanction pursuant to Order of the Honorable Court dated De­cember 28, 1963.  For which reason, the said agreement becomes
immediately exe­cutory and legally constitutes a
waiver of an appeal (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505);

“C. 
Moreover, the alleged members of the petitioner union who were
signatories in the questioned motion, by their receipt and acceptance of the
amount given them by the respondent company, expressly waived whatever rights
and interests they have in the premises. 
Their acceptance of the a­mount, partly as they may now allege, is
evidenced by a photostat copy of the agreements that
they have signed in the pre­mises and is hereto attached and made an integral
part of this opposition as Annex ‘B’. 
The case being so, there being no­thing in the motion to warrant any
reversal, the said agreement is valid and binding to the alleged members
impugning the agreement already entered into in the premises (Art. 1306, Art.
1159, C.C.; Hanlon vs. Hauser­man & Beam, 41
Phil. 276).  Furthermore, the signatories
to the questioned motion by their acceptance of the payments given them
pursuant to their claim as hereinable clearly shown,
is legally estopped to re­open the said case (Art.
1431, C.C.) “

The Annex “A” referred to reads:

“Manila,
Philippines

Decembre 24, 1963

“DALAWAMPUNG LIBONG PISO (P20,000.00)

“KAMI, na nakalagda
sa ilalim nito ay nag­papatunay na ngayong, ika-24 ng Deciembre, 1963, ay tinanggap ang buong
ka-parte sa nasabing Dalawampung Libong Piso (P20,000.00), na ibinayad
ng Hamilton Distillery Company sa
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa ng Alak sa
Hamilton Distillery (NAFLU), Asunto Numero 1454-ULP, C. I. R.
Ma­nila.  Na kami
ay wala ng paghahabol laban sa nasabing
compania tungkol sa asuntong ito.

“Katunayan nito ay aming pinirmahan
ang kasulatang ito ng buo
naming kasiyahan.

(Sgd.)
Ambos, Avelina

AMBOS, AVELINA

(and the signatures of 48 others)”

Resolving the incident, Judge Bautista granted the mo­tion for
reopening on April 17, 1964
in the following order:

“The above-entitled case has been termi­nated by an Order of
this Court of December 28, 1963 based in turn on an agreement filed by the
parties, dated December 24, 1963.  On January
27, 1964 however, twenty (20) members of complainant filed an
Incidental Motion to Reopen the case for the
implementation of the decision, through another attorney, not of re­cord, Atty.
Gregorio E. Fajardo, basing the Incidental Motion on
the provision of Section 17 of Act 103. 
The Attorney of Record, Fede­rico Oliveros
filed his Opposition to the In­cidental Motion basing his Opposition on said
contract between the parties in the above-entitled case, Annex ‘A’, and also photostatic copy of an alleged agreement of acceptance by
said twenty (20) members of the amount corres­ponding to them as per Annex ‘B’
of said Opposition.  On February 10, 1964, respondents
filed their Opposition to Motion to Reopen Case for the implementation of
decision basing also their Opposition on Annex ‘B’ of complai­nant’s Opposition
and on the allegation that the order of December 28, 1963 has already be­come final and that Section 17 of Act 103 is
no longer applicable in this case.

“From the facts and arguments presented by the parties,
including that of the Movants this Court is of the
opinion and so hold:

“1.  That while this
Court approved, on December 28, 1963, the amicable settlement of the parties,
of December 24, 1963, it was on the assumption that there was no Opposition to
said contract, but it now appears that at least twenty (20) members of
complainant contend that they have no knowledge of nor consent to said
contract, and that the alleged Annex ‘B’ containing their signatures attached
to the Opposition of complainant was secured through fraud, and hence the movants contend that the agreement of the parties on
December 24, 1963 was null and void.

“2.  That
without deciding for the present, in this Order, as to whether the claims of
the movants herein, are true and correct be­cause
said claims have not been ventilated in a hearing before this Court, yet this
Court, being not only a Court of law but also a Court of equity, appears to be
obliged to look deep­er into these claims by making a further in­vestigation
thereon.  After all, such an
investigation, will not prejudice the interest of either parties in this case,
even if movants can prove their case, therein,
because the most that can result in such an investigation against the
respondents maybe an additional payment to movants
based on the decision of the Supreme Court in this case, in G.R. No. L-18112,
which after all is the original decision promulgated by said Court for
compliance by the parties in this case and in so far as the complainant is
concerned, compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision by respondents will
result in more be­nefits to its members than what has been pro­vided in the
contract of the parties of December 24, 1963.

“3.  That
while it may be true that the Order of this Court of December 28, 1963 has
become final and the present Incidental Motion was filed only on January 27,
1964, without a pre­vious Motion for Reconsideration of the Order, still the
Order is in full effect and Section 17 of Act 103 upon which this incidental
Motion is based partly provides as follows:

‘SEC. 17. 
Limit effectiveness of award.  —

x x x Provided,
however, That at any time during the effectiveness of an award, order or
decision, the Court may, on application of an interested party, and after
due hear­ing, alter, modify in whole or in part, or set aside any such award,
order or decision, or reopen any question in­volved therein.’ (Underscoring
ours)

so that the
present Motion is sanctioned by said Section 17 of Act 103 and said provi­sion
of law is applicable in the present case. 
In fact, considering that the agreement of the parties was filed on December 24, 1963 while the Supreme
Court’s decision in the above-entitled case was promulgated on Oct­ober 30, 1962 in G. R. No.
L-18112, the fi­ling of the Motion to close this case on Dec­ember 24, 1963 appears to be contrary to
ano­ther provision of Section 17 of Act 103 which states as follows:

‘SEC. 17. 
Limit effectiveness of award.  —
An award, order or decision of the Court shall be valid and effect­ive during
the time therein specified.  In the
absence of such specification, any party or both parties to a contro­versy may
terminate the effectiveness of an award, order or decision after three years
have elapsed from the date of said award, order or decision by giving notice to
that effect to the Court.’ (Underscoring ours)

because the effectiveness of the decision
of the Supreme Court was being terminated by the parties even before the three
(3) years period for the effectiveness of said decision which should terminate
only in December, 1965.

“In view of the need for looking into the claims of the movants herein, which if true will affect the validity of
the contract of the parties of December 24, 1963, and consider­ing that Section
17 of Commonwealth Act 103, which has been enacted precisely to correct any
mistake or injustice in a final, but still effective decision, award or order
of this Court, as in the instant case, this Court is of the further opinion and
so holds that the Order of December 28, 1963, should be set aside and the case
be reopened for the submission of evidence from the parties in support of their
respective claims for final determination and action by this Court in this
case.

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of this Court closing
this case, dated Decem­ber 28, 1963
is hereby set aside and movants Motion to Reopen case should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED.”
(Annex H, Petition)

With this order came the turn of the respondent
com­pany and the Union to file their motions for reconsideration, which they did on April 24, 1964 and April 28, 1964, res­pectively.  The other party opposed.  On July
22, 1964, the respondent court promulgated the first disputed
resolution en banc granting these motions for reconsideration,
thus set­ting aside the order of reopening of Judge Bautista.  Grounds for this resolution are:  (1) “Petitioners do not dis­pute the
fact that they are signatories to the agreement Annex B which settled the
above-entitled case with the payment of twenty-thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos ….. (as well as) what is stated in that
agreement that ‘Kami ….. ay ti­nanggap ang buong ka-parte sa nasabing Dalawampung
Libong (P20,000.00) Piso na ibinayad ng
Hamilton Distillery Com­pany sa Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa
ng Alak sa
Hamilton Distillery Company (NAFLU)’ ….. “; and (2) “The agreement of
December 24, 1963, which is the basic cause for the ‘Partial Amicable
Settlement’ that was approved by the Court in its Order of December 28, 1963,
shows that the same forty-nine (49) members are all signatories to that
Agreement (Annex ‘B’).  Of the forty-nine
(49) who have settled the case and received payments, only a minority of
twenty-one have asked for its reopening. 
The Agreement being a collective action of all the members, the minority
are bound by it, more so when they, as in this case, received payment in consideration
and in virtue of the same.  The Amicable
Settlement is in the nature of a compromise, and the ‘nature of a compromise
agree­ment is such that a party must give up some of the rights that he has, in
consideration of the same act on the party of the other side.’  The facts as herein analyzed are similar, if
not the same, as the facts obtaining in the Betting Ushers Union (PLUM) case,
G.R. No. L- 9330, and the Vedasto Jessal­va,
et als, cases G. R. Nos. L-11928 – 11930.” 
Copies of this resolution were received by the respective parties on the
same day, July 29, 1964.

On August 6, 1964,
herein petitioner (the union under a new set of officers^[1]
and no longer the twenty-one [21] members only) filed a so-called
“Petition for New Hearing Based on Newly Discovered Evidence on the Motion
to Reopen Case.”  Foundation of this
motion was that in a meeting of the union, under the new officers, but held
after the respond­ent court’s resolution of July 22, 1964, it was resolved to
request Atty. Gregorio E. Fajardo to manifest
“in the name of the Union under its new officers and under the new
counsel”, that “the Union manifests its objection to said agreement
(the Partial Amicable Settlement) and that the Union join in the motion to
reopen by the 20 petitioners, on the ground that only the former President, Mr.
Fran­cisco Dumlao executed said agreement without the
knowledge of the members of the Union”, hence the ruling of the court that
only a minority was seeking the reopening of the case could no longer
hold.  It was also alleged therein that
“this action of the complainant was not submitted in the initial stage of
the Motion to Reopen because it was but recently approved upon a change of
officers of the com­plainant Union and of its counsel” and that “this
motion is based on Rule 40 of the Rules of Court for a new hearing or new trial
x x x.”^[2]

On October 7, 1964, respondent court denied this pe­tition in the
second disputed en banc resolution, holding that (1) a motion for
new trial can be filed only against an order or judgment of a trial judge, and
not of the court en banc; (2) the evidence offered was not newly
dis­covered, since it came into existence only after the reso­lution of July
22, 1964 and was an “afterthought” evidence intended to “cure or
remedy that which the court en banc had ruled was not sufficient
to offset the legal effect of the compromise which settled the case”; and
(3) “the said evidence is intended to undo that which the complainant
union through its former president and the whole member­ship did when they
entered into the compromise agreement, for which they ‘x x x
received payment in consideration and in virtue of the same.’, simply because
complainant union is now led by a new set of officers.  And for a reason, movants
claimed ‘x x x. 
That we did not know any­thing about the agreement
entered by FRANCISCO DUMLAO.  And
we are fooled by him in signing the contract. 
x x x.’ (Annex ‘A’).  A reading of the Resolution of July 22, 1964, will show that this
issue has already been squarely resolved.” 
It thus appears that while the respondent court considered that it was
against its policy not to entertain motions for reconsideration of en banc
resolu­tions, nevertheless, it passed on the merits of petition­er’s latest
motion.

As stated in the opening paragraph of this decision, petitioner
has appealed to this Court from the above en banc resolutions of July 22, 1964 and October 7, 1964 of respondent court.  According to petitioner:

“The Main Issue

“The main issue in the present appeal of the Petitioner Union
to this Honorable Supreme Court of the Resolution of the respondent Court in
banc of July 22, 1964 Annex ‘L’ as well as its Resolution of October 7, 1964
Annex ‘N’ is whether sec­tion 17 of Act 103 is applicable to the facts and
circumstances of Case No. 1454-ULP of said Court and which issue has given rise
to the above 4 legal questions raised in this appeal.”

The legal questions being referred to
above are:

“A.  In the face of the
mystery sur­rounding the acceptance by the former President of Petitioner Union
of the amount of only P20,000.00 out of a claim of P320,789.50 as per
Examiner’s report and a counter-offer of P127,647.50 contained in the
Manifestation of respondent company Annex ‘C’ which mo­vants
for the Reopening of Case No. 1454 of the respondent Court asserted to be
prejudicial to their interest and an injustice on their part, can the
respondent Court refuse to apply Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103 for the
reopening of said Case No. 1454 as prayed for by the movants
in Annex ‘F’ on the allegation in the Resolution of the Respondent Court of
July 22, 1964, (1) that the movants are in the
minority, (2) that they have not denied the signatures to their share of the
P20,000.00 payment made by the respondent company to the herein petitioner in
the alleged con­tract between the parties and (3) that the dismissal of the
case was legal citing the doctrine in ‘Betting Ushers Union (PLUM) case, G. R.
No. L-9330, and the Vedasto Jesalva,
et als, cases, G. R. Nos. L-11928-11930″?

“B.  Is it necessary for
a party who has been prejudiced under a Final Deci­cion
rendered by the respondent Court to be in the majority to entitle said par­ty
to the benefits of the provision of Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103 as
interpreted by the respondent Court in its said Order of July 22, 1964 Annex
‘L’ and even granting, without admit­ting, the correctness of said inter­pretation,
did not the respondent Court of Industrial Relations committed a grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the Motion for New Hearing of petitioner filed
already in the name of full membership of petitioner union Annex ‘M’ precisely
in compliance with said Resolution of the Court in bane and for the correction
of the alleged defect of the minority movants?  and

“C.  In the face of the
allegation in the Motion to Reopen of movants or of
the petitioner union in this Case under Section 17 of Commonwealth Act 103 that
the alleged contract between the parties which provided the basis for the Order
dismissing said case of Presiding Judge Bautista of December 26, 1963 was not
known to the members of the petitioner union and that their signatures were
gathered under fraud and misrepresentation which are grounds for recission of contracts un­der the Civil Code, did not respondent
Court of Industrial Relations committed again a grave abuse of discretion or
even a violation of the provision of the Civil Code in refusing to reopen the
case under Section 17, of Common­wealth Act 103 for verification of pe­titioner
union’s allegations and for remedial action provided by said Sec­tion 17 if
warranted by proof submitted in a hearing of the case?

“D. 
Can a case which has already been under final judgment or decision
of the respondent Court, as in case No. 1454-ULP as well as by this Honor­able
Supreme Court under G. R. No. L­-18112 be validly dismissed by agreement of the
parties to the case and thus terminate the effectivity
of the final decision even when the 3 year period allowed by Section 17 of Com­monwealth
Act 103 for the effectivity of a decision of the
respondent Court has not yet expired as was done by the parties in this case
even if the case was dismissed by the Union and sanc­tioned by the respondent
in its said Resolution Annex ‘L’ of July 22, 1964 by citing the cases of
‘Betting Ushers Union (PLUM) case, G. R. No. L-9330 and the Vedasto Jesalva, et al., cases,
G. R. Nos. L-11928-11930′, in its said
Resolution?”

We have taken pains to recite in detail the material facts and
circumstances of this case because, as this is a labor case and We find this
appeal to be without sufficient merits, We can do no less than lay down clearly
and as ex­haustively as possible the bases of Our judgment.  The Cons­titution of the Philippines
ordains that “the State shall afford protection to labor” (Sec. 6,
Art. XIV) and Article 24 of the Civil Code enjoins
that “in all contractual, pro­perty or other relations, when one of the
parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection.”  More often than not labor is in such disadvantageous position.  This is not saying that other cases deserve
less attention and consideration, but where labor has to suffer an unfa­vorable
judgment, it is best that there be no silent pre­mises.  It is but consonant with the solicitous
concern for the interest of labor embodied in the constitutional and statutory
principles just quoted that if the courts find themselves in no position under
the law to grant what labor seeks, the reason or reasons for such a conclusion
should at least appear in black and white so that every­one may understand
them.  There is, indeed, more reason to
adhere to these views in this case where there is a strong suggestion that the
parties interested in this appeal are allegedly victims, not only of respondent
company but, what is worse, by the former officers and counsel of petitioner
Union, who had entered into a compromise agreement allegedly disadvantageous to
the monetary interests of its members.

Upon this background of facts and considera­tions, the position
of petitioners is substantially as follows:^[3]

1.  The respondent court
erred in not giving them the opportunity contemplated in Section 17 of
Commonwealth Act 103, to prove, even after the fi­nality of a judgment
approving the compromise in question, that said compromise “was not known
to them and that their signatures (thereon) were gathered under fraud and
misrepresentation”, only be­cause they are in the minority in the union
and they did not deny their signatures in the said com­promise, considering,
specially, that their total claim for back wages could amount to P320,789.50,
as allegedly reflected in the court examiner’s report or, at least,
P127,647.50, as allegedly contained in the counter-offer made by respondent
company, and, on the other hand, the only compromise settlement of their claim
respondents could show was for no more than P20,000;

2.  The respondent court
erred even more when it maintained its refusal to reopen the case even after
petitioners had filed a motion for new trial “in the name of the full
membership of the petitioner-union”; and

3.  The approval of the
compromise in question to terminate the case before the expiration of three
years from October 30, 1962, the date of the decision of this Court in the main
unfair labor practice case, was illegal and contrary to the provisions of the
same Section 17 of Com. Act 103.

No doubt, these issues are impressive and would connote a clear
injustice, if the circumstances alleged were true, but a careful review of the
records does not bear out the accuracy of the premises of petitioners’
grievances.

In the main, what petitioners are here urging is exactly what the
reversed order of Judge Bautista of April
17, 1964 contemplated.  The
said order dis­posed that “in view of the need for looking into the claims
of the movants herein, which if true, will affect the
validity of the contract of the parties of December 24, 1963 x x x the order of December 28,
1963 should be set aside and the case reopened for the submission of evidence
from the parties in support of their res­pective claims for final determination
and action by this Court in this case”. 
As already stated, however, the court en banc viewed the
matter differently.  Ins­tead of
postponing the “looking into the claims of the movants”
to await further hearing, it immediately looked into said claims practically on
their merits and arrived at the fundamental findings that:  (1) petitioners, meaning the individual ones
who filed the initial plead­ing in the incident herein involved, did not deny
having signed the compromise agreement; (2) much less did they deny having
received their share of the P20,000 paid by the respondent company in virtue of
the said compromise; and (3) said petitioners are only a minority of the
original signers of the compromise agreement which was a collective act of the
union.  These are findings of fact which We are not to take lightly, much less at liberty to
disregard.  On the contrary, they are
binding upon this Court unless clearly shown to be unsup­ported by substantial
evidence.  There is no such showing in
this case.  Consequently, the question before
Us now is whether or not in the light of these facts,
the respondent court committed an error of law in overruling petitioners’
persistent efforts to reopen the proceedings.

To resolve this main issue, it may be necessary to also resolve
in the same discussion the claim of petitioners that after the respondent court
belittled, as it were, their capacity as a minority to secure relief against
the finality of the compromise agreement, they tried to ask for a new trial
“in the name of the full membership of the petitioner-union and still the
respondent court remained adamant in refusing to reopen the case.  The points related to these two matters are
so intertwined that to discuss them separately may un­duly extend this opinion
and perhaps, even make the dis­cussion repetitious.

Petitioners’ motion for new trial was denied by respondent court
in its order reading as follows:

“There is no question that this Motion seeks for the
reconsidera­tion of the en banc Resolution of July 22, 1964. 
This was even ad­mitted by Atty. Fajardo at
the hear­ing on August 27, 1964
(pp. 29 to 30, t.s.n., August 27, 1964). 
It is, however, the policy of the Court sitting en banc
not to enter­tain such kind of motions, having consistently ruled that only
deci­sions and/or orders of the trial court may be subjects of a motion for
reconsideration.  But even as said
counsel has himself recognized (p. 30, t.s.n. of
August 27, 1964) this to be the policy, still he con­tends that the motion is
cognizable by the Court en banc pursuant to Rule 40 of the Rules
of Court.

“This cited Rule of the Rules of Court is not in point, a fact
admit­ted by counsel for movants at the hearing on August 27, 1964, after counsel for
respondents pointed out that what probably was meant was Rule 37 of the Rules
of Court.  But the provisions of Rule 37
of the New Rules of Court are appli­cable only to trial courts and not to the
Court sitting en banc. 
Besides, the newly discovered evi­dence (Annex ‘A’) relied upon to
reopen the case is not such kind of evidence contemplated in Sec­tion 1(b) of
the said Rule.  In the first place, the
evidence (Annex ‘A’) is nothing but an attempt to cure or remedy that which the
Court en banc had ruled was not sufficient to offset the legal
effect of the compromise agreement which settled the case.  It is an ‘after-thought’ evidence, to say the
least.  In the second place, the said
evidence (Annex ‘A’) is intended to undo that which the complainant union
through its former president and the whole membership did when they entered
into the compromise agree­ment, for which they ‘x x x
re­ceived payment in consideration and in virtue of the same’, simply because
complainant union is now led by a new set of officers.  And for a reason, movants
claimed ‘x x x. 
That we did not know anything about the agreement
entered by FRANCISCO DUMLAO.  And
we have been fooled by him in signing the contract. x x
x.’  (Annex
‘A’).  A reading of the Reso­lution of July 22, 1964, will show that this
issue has already been squarely resolved.”

Thus, in spite of the policy of the industrial court not to
entertain motions for new trial after an appeal from a decision, award or order
of a trial judge has been resolved by the court en banc, peti­tioners’
motion was nevertheless acted upon albeit it was found to be without merit as a
motion for new trial.  In the first
place, the court held that the evidence sought to be offered was not
“newly discovered” but merely “an ‘after-thought’
evidence”.  In the second place, it
found that the purpose of the evidence offered was to prove a supposed act
“intended to undo that which the complainant union, through its former
president and the whole membership, did when they entered into the compromise
agreement, for which they ‘x x x received payment in
consideration and in virtue of the same’, simply because complainant union is
now led by a new set of officers.” 
It held that the same point had already been “squarely
resolved” in the first en banc resolution of July 22, 1964 also here on appeal.

As to the point that the evidence being offered by petitioners in
the motion for new trial is not “newly discovered”, as such term is
understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We hold that such
criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations.  Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act 103,
“The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its rules of procedure and
shall have such other powers as general­ly pertain to a court of justice:  Provided, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in
exercising any duties and power under this Act, the Court shall act according
to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evi­dence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.”  By this provision, the
industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities
applicable to ordinary courts.  Said
court is not even restricted to the specific relief de­manded by the parties
but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the
purpose of set­tling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise to
future disputes.  (Ang
Tibay v. CIR, G. R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila
Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.)  For these reasons, We
be­lieve that this provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent
court to consider whether or not its previous ruling that petitioners
constitute a mi­nority was founded on fact, without regard to the tech­nical
meaning of newly discovered evidence. 
After all, the original motion for reopening was filed in the name of
the union.  The evidence being offered
was for the purpose of showing such capacity. 
In other words, this is in the nature of a move to show who is the real
par­ty-in-interest.  Technical objections
to matters of this kind have gained no favor from the courts.  (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong
v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578.)

We deem it, however, that what weighed upon the court a quo
is the apparently doubtful evidentiary va­lue of the certification, Annex A of
petitioners’ motion, and its appended minutes of an alleged meeting of the
union held on August 4, 1964.  We have gone over these documents, and apart
from the fact that they bear patent earmarks of having been made to order,
there is nothing in them that would concretely and clearly prove that as a
matter of fact, the majority of the union members were really supporting the re­quest
for reopening.  Much less is there any
faith-bearing indication therein that the petitioners had really been fooled by
the former officers and coun­sel of the union into signing the compromise agree­ment.  The statement in the said minutes that the
former President of the union “executed said agree­ment without the
knowledge of the members of the union” cannot obviously stand against undisclaimed signatures of all the members thereon as well
as the undenied receipt by them of the consideration
there­in stated.  Besides, it strikes Us
as significant that inspite of specific allegations
made by the re­spondents in their pleadings in the court below and here that
even the twenty petitioners have already dwindled in number, no denial of any
kind whatsoever has been made of such an important assertion.

In other words, in the mind of the respondent court the granting
of petitioners’ motion would not alter the result.  As We see it, the
court, without any dissenting vote, was convinced that petitioners have not
been deceived and that the petitioners cons­tituted a minority who could not
speak for the union that had entered into the compromise as such.  On this premise, it held that under settled
precedents the motion for reopening could not legally prosper.  We find no error in such holding.

In the case of Filemon
Dionela, et al vs. Court of Industrial Relations, G.
R. No. L-18334, August 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 832, Our eminent Chief Justice
who, inci­dentally, was the ponente of the
decision in the main case herein involved, spoke for the Court thus:

“The main question for determina­tion in this case is whether
the com­promise agreement pursuant to which the complaint in Case No. 598-ULP
had, inter alia, been withdrawn and then dismissed is
binding upon petitioners herein.  The
latter maintain that it is not, but the lower court held other­wise, upon the
ground that ‘it is an accepted rule under our laws that the will of the
majority should prevail over the minority’ citing Betting Ushers Union (PLUM)
v. Jai-Alai, L­-9330, June 29, 1957 and Jesalva, et
al. v. Bautista, L-11928 to L-11930, March 24, 1959 – and that the action taken
by the petitioners herein as minority members of the Union ‘is contrary to the
policy of the Magna Carta of Labor, which promotes
the settlement of differences between management and labor by mutual agree­ments,’
and that if said action were tolerated, ‘no employer would ever enter into any
compromise agreement for the minority members of the Union will always dishonor
the terms of the agreement and demand for better terms.’  The view thus taken by the lower court is
correct.  Indeed, other­wise, even
collective bargaining agree­ments would cease to promote industrial peace and
the purpose of Republic Act 875 would thus be defeated.”

In the case cited by the Chief Justice, this Court held:

“Lastly, the parties in the cases which were the subject of
the compro­mise agreement were the Premier Produc­tions, Inc. and the Union.  The peti­tioners in these cases are merely
mem­bers of the Union and are bound by the actions of
the Union, that is to say, a majority of the members of
the Union.  If the
petitioners feel that they have been deprived of their personal rights under
the judgment that they have ob­tained, which judgments had become exe­cutory, because the sums to which they are entitled
under the judgments object of the compromise had been reduced, the remedy does
not lie in questioning the validity of the compromise agreement, but in
compelling the Union of which they are members to give them a share in the
proceeds of the compromise agree­ment equal or equivalent to that recog­nized
in the judgments.” (Vedasto Jesal­va,
et al. v. The Hon. Judge Bautista, et al., 105 Phil. 348, 352-353.)

The same principle was upheld in the other cited case of Betting
Ushers Union (PLUM) v. Jai-Alai Corpo­ration, et al., 101 Phil. 822, 826-27:

“The record shows that the dis­missal was decreed upon motion
filed by the petitioning union itself, through its board of directors, acting
in de­ference to the wishes of all the mem­bers of the union except one as ex­pressed
in their resolution.  Attys. Rafael and Ilustre tried to show by means of a resolution purportedly
signed by 40 members of the union that the said 40 signers had not authorized
the dis­missal of the case, alleging that the resolution for dismissal had been
‘im­posed’ upon them and that they were made to believe that they would be
fully paid their claim for minimum wages. 
But it appears from the sworn statements of more than three-fourths of
the 40 sign­ers of the resolution presented by the attorneys that their
signatures were affixed thereto under a misapprehension in that they had been
made to believe that the object of the said resolution was only to secure
reimbursement for one-half of the cost of their original uniforms, whereas,
their real desire was to have the case dismissed because it lacked merit since
they were not em­ployees of the corporation. 
It appear­ing then that the dismissal was sought by the union itself
acting through the instrumentality of its governing body and also in accordance
with the wishes of an overwhelming majority of the mem­bers of the union, we do not think the lower court abused its discretion
or violated any legal rule in dismissing the case.  Surely, the will of one or several members of
an association can­not be allowed to prevail over the will of the great
majority.  And it may well be questioned
whether Attys. Rafael and Ilustre could still be
deemed authorized to ask for a reconsideration of the dis­missal after they had
been notified by the union that their services had al­ready been dispensed
with.  It is true that, as already held
in several cases, once the case is in court with the re­quisite jurisdictional
number of em­ployees involved, jurisdiction over it is not lost upon the
withdrawal of some of those employees from the union.  But such is not the situation in the instant
case, it not appearing that any of the dissenting mem­bers has withdrawn from
the union.  And as already stated, it was the union itself that asked for the dismissal of
the case.”

Indeed, there should be no doubt as to the pur­pose of Section 17
of Commonwealth Act 103.  It is mainly to
furnish the parties to a case before the industrial court in which the judgment
has already be­come final the means by which such judgment may be ad­justed in
order to be consonant with relevant circums­tances arising after such
finality.  It is already settled,
however, that it would not be good judicial policy nor conducive to public interest
to allow a re­opening on grounds related to matters which could have been
raised or are necessarily included in those that have been actually raised
before the judgment became final.  To
allow such a procedure would undermine the very nature of the judicial process
as a machinery for the final determination of
controversies and would correspondingly produce uncertainty and instability in
the relations between labor and management thereby impairing the economy of the
country.  Of course, be­fore its judgment
becomes final, the industrial court has, in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
powers, the inherent power to reopen cases on grounds of fraud, accident,
mistake, excusable negligence and/or newly discovered evidence.  On the other hand, the nature of the
functions of the industrial court makes it necessary to leave it free to modify
its final awards, deci­sions or orders whenever subsequent circumstances so
demand.  The said court fixes the terms
and conditions of employment, but as the fairness and adequacy of such terms
and conditions are dependent on ever changing economic and social factors, it
is only natural and logical that as the arbiter created by law for the pur­pose,
the court should be clothed with the power to make adjustments, even after its
judgment is already final, when needed to maintain the harmonious relations
between the two economic factors sought to be promoted in its original
decision.  To this end, the provision in
question fixes the periods within which this power of adjustment may be
exercised to be:  (1) the period agreed
upon by the parties for the effectiveness of an award, order or decision, and
(2) in case there is no such agreement, before notice has been given by any
party or both parties to the court for the termination of such effectiveness,
which notice may be given not earlier than three years from the date of such
award, decision or order.  It goes
without saying that the adjustments to be made by the court are to be deter­mined
in the same manner as the original award, decision or order.

It is thus clear that the only awards, orders or decisions
contemplated in Section 17 are those of such a nature that they are supposed to
be carried out within an extended period. 
We do not believe that said pro­vision contemplates decisions, orders or
awards for the outright payment of back wages, as these are expected to be
complied with at one time only.  Since
they are con­sidered to be the equivalent of services supposed to have been
already rendered, all that remains after the decision becomes final is for such
wages to be computed and paid.  Once the
amount thereof is determined, the payment can be enforced by execution.  There is no pos­sible adjustment that can be
envisaged; so if the pur­pose of the reopening sought is to change or modify
the amount, either because it is inadequate or is incorrectly computed, such
reopening has to be denied after the judgment, order or award has already
become final.  All matters regarding
adequacy or correctness of the back-salaries are supposed to be settled before
such finality.  The exception is when a
decision or order is alleged to be the product of extrinsic fraud.  In such an event­uality, however, the
reopening would depend on the suc­cessful showing of the existence of such
fraud.

In the present case, it is as if by agreement of the parties, the
court had fixed the amount of the back wages herein involved at P20,000.  Generally, once
said amount is paid, that should be the end of the case.  Here, however, it is alleged that the petitioners
were fooled into accepting such amount which is more than three hundred
thousand pesos less than what was supposedly computed by the court examiner to
be due to them and more than one hundred thousand pesos less than the amount
allegedly counter-offered by the respondent company.  Unfortunately, however, such allegations did
not earn the sanction of the respondent court. 
Going over the records just to see how equitable or otherwise the res­pondent
court’s conclusions are, since We have no power to set
aside its findings of fact, We find that it was not without basis for such a
reaction.  According to the said court in
its answer, the court examiner’s report referred to by petitioners was not yet
final and subject to further disposition by the court in view of the numer­ous
objections thereto of respondent company, which objections do appear to Us to
be worthy of serious consideration, (See Annex 5, Amended Supplemental Motion
for Dismissal); and with respect to the alleged counter­-offer of respondent
company, the same court also found that there was no such counter-offer and
that what res­pondent had filed was only its manifestation regarding the pay
basis that should be used in computing the back wages of petitioners.  It is explained that from this pay basis,
there are still many substantial deductions that have to be made regarding
incomes of petitioners from work in other places, the back wages of those who
have already gone abroad as well as those who are no longer willing or are
unable to return to work, etc. (Annex C, Petition).  Besides, it appears that there were other
considerations recited in the compromise agreement aside from the P20,000, such as –

“2.  That
the respondent hereby binds itself to admit any or all members of the
petitioner union ordered by the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-18112 to
be reinstated in respondents’ employ, and who may still want to return back to
work notwithstanding that this matter is still pending determination by the
Honorable Court;

“3.  That the respondent
company hereby binds to give continuous work of six (6) days a week to all
members of both the unions existing in the respondent company in so far as they
are financially capable to do so, and in all cases, to observe justice and
equal treatment to all of its employee irrespective of union membership;

“4.  That should respondent
sell any or all of its rights, interests, and partici­pations in the Hamilton
Distillery Company, the respondent company hereby binds itself that all the
above preceding agreements shall be incorporated in their Deeds of Sales and
become a part of the conditions hereof;

“5.  That
any or all court fees that may be assessed in the premises shall be borne by
the respondent exclusively;” (Annex D, Petition)

In other words, the respondent court was
of the opinion that in the light of these circumstances, the settlement of P20,000 was not as inadequate as petitioners would would make it appear; that, moreover, there were addi­tional
substantial considerations offered by respondent company; and that inasmuch as
a compromise involves give and take, under the circumstances revealed in this
case, the claim of petitioners that they were fooled has not been successfully
sustained.

The last question raised by petitioners deserves very little
discussion.  It is contended that Judge
Bautista’s order approving the compromise and, by impli­cation, the en banc
resolutions reviving the same, are violative of the
same Section 17 aforementioned because the effect of such order and resolutions
was to terminate the case even before the end of three years from October 30,
1962, the date of this Court’s decision in the main unfair labor case.  As already explained, the invoked provision
can apply only to orders, awards and decisions which need time to implement or
which imply an extended period of enforcement, such as one that lays down terms
and conditions of work.  Now, as will be
noted, the deci­sion of this Court of October 30, 1962 did not lay down any
such terms and conditions; all that it ordered was for the respondent company
to reinstate all the dismissed members of the union with backpay
and for the said respondent to cease and desist from committing the acts of
discrimination complained of against said members.  As far as reinstatement and backpay are concerned, they were supposed to be implemented
immediately.  And as to the
cease-and-desist-order, this could not have any spe­cific period, for the
simple reason that by its nature, it is an ever existing injunction against all
employers at all times, whether there is a case or not.  In conse­quence, We hold that obviously, the
three year period mentioned in Section 17 is not applicable to the mentioned
decision of this Court even as, perchance, it should apply to the order of
Judge Bautista approving the compromise, since, as may be seen from the
above-quoted terms approved by said order, the respondent company bound itself
to certain conditions which have extended periods of enforce­ability.  Otherwise stated, contrary to the impression
of petitioners, the said order of Judge Bautista revived by the en banc
resolutions on appeal did not terminate the case between petitioners and
respondent company; ra­ther it would precisely serve as the starting point of
the applicability of said Section 17.

The foregoing should be sufficient to dispose of this appeal and
to justify the affirmance of the decision of the
respondent court.  It is not amiss,
however, to additionally mention one procedural deficiency from which
petitioners’ last motion for “new trial” suffered.  This motion was filed beyond the period
ordinarily allowed by the rules of the industrial court for the purpose.  Ac­cording to the record,
counsel for petitioners, as well as all the other parties, received notice of
the first en banc resolution of respondent court of July 22, 1964
on July 29,
1964.  Petitioners’ motion in question was filed on August 6, 1964, the eighth day after
such no­tice.  The rules of the Industrial
Court provide that mo­tions of such nature must be
filed within five (5) days only.  There
is no way of interpreting said rules otherwise. 
Accordingly, even without going into the merits, the res­pondent court
could have ignored petitioners’ motion for new trial, but We
deem it unnecessary to make a definite ruling on this point, in view of the
above conclusions regarding the merits of petitioners’ cause.

Along the same line of reasoning, respondent court as well as
respondent company are raising, in their respective answers, the issue that the
resolu­tion of respondent court of July 22, 1964 is already final, inasmuch as
petitioners’ motion for new trial of August 6, 1964 did not suspend the period
for filing a certiorari by way of appeal to this Court within the period
provided for in Rule 43.  On this point, We ad­here to the liberality of the law with respect to pro­cedural
matters enunciated, as already stated above, in Section 20 of Com. Act
103.  It appearing that the res­pondent
court did actually act, for the reasons stated by it, on the merits of the
motion for “new trial” of petitioners, We see nothing wrong in
holding that motions for new trial or reconsideration of en banc
orders, awards and decisions of the Court of Industrial Rela­tions suspend the
period for the appeal of the same, provided the said motions are filed within
the regular five (5) days period stipulated in its rules.  It is when no such motion is filed at all,
that the period for appeal to this Court is uninterrupted.  It may be suggested, however, that generally,
only one such motion may be filed.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the resolutions appealed
from are affirmed, without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Castro, Fernando, and Villamor, JJ., in the result.

Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.

---

^[1]
According to the petition (par. 12) and it is not denied by the other parties,
an election of officers took place some­time in May, 1964; the former ones were
changed and so also was the counsel.

^[2]
It appears that at the hearing of the petition, counsel corrected the
allegation by referring instead to Rule 37 and still later conceded that the
petition was vir­tually a motion for reconsideration of the en banc
re­solution of July 22, 1964.

^[3]
The assignment of errors in the brief of peti­tioners states:

“I

“THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE
REQUIREMENT AS WELL AS THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 17 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 103 FOR
THE REOPEN­ING OF SAID CASE NO. 1454-ULP OF THE RESPONDENT
COURT; ON THE OTHER HAND, IT FURTHER ERRED IN
CONSTRUING THE PARTIAL AMICABLE AGREEMENT OF THE PAR­TIES WITHOUT REGARD OR IN
VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF THE CIVIL CODE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS;

II

“THE RESPONDENT COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE
BAUTISTA OF APRIL 17, 1964 ANNEX ‘H’ OF THE PE­TITION AND IN REFUSING TO APPLY
SECTION 17 OF ACT 103 FOR THE REOPENING OF CASE No. 1454-ULP OF THE RESPONDENT
COURT IN ITS RESOLUTION OF JULY 22, 1964 ANNEX ‘L’ OF THE PETITION; AND

III

“LASTLY, THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE CLOSING AND
TERMINATION OF CASE NO. 1454-ULP IN VIOLATION OF THE PROVISION OF SAID SECTION
17 OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 103 AND IN.DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW HEARING.”

---

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