LORNA ALFON NACION, PETITIONER, VS. RAUL T. TAN, RESPONDENTS.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Nacion versus Tan
The Case
This is the case of Nacion versus Tan. Lorna Alfon Nacion, the petitioner, sues Raul T. Tan, the respondent, in an action for ejectment over a parcel of land with a warehouse in Dolores, Eastern Samar. The petitioner claims she is the owner and possessor of the property and that the respondent occupied a portion of it only on a temporary basis, paying a monthly rental of 4,000 pesos, and refused to leave after she terminated the lease. The respondent, on the other hand, insists that his occupation was never temporary and that he may withhold possession until the petitioner pays a debt she acknowledged in a private document. The case matters to every reviewee because it is a clean lesson on the scope of the Regional Trial Court's appellate power in cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, and on when a remand to the court of origin is proper.
Procedural History
The petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dolores-Maslog. That court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent, declaring him entitled to possession of the property until the petitioner fully pays her debt. The petitioner then appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar. The Regional Trial Court at first rendered a decision reversing the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. It ordered the respondent to vacate the premises, to reimburse legal expenses of 3,000 pesos and attorney's fees of 20,000 pesos, and to pay rentals. On the respondent's Omnibus Motion, the Regional Trial Court issued an Omnibus Resolution granting reconsideration and remanding the case to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dolores-Maslog for further proceedings. The petitioner then came to the Supreme Court through a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal of that Omnibus Resolution.
Facts
The petitioner owned and possessed a parcel of land with a warehouse in Barangay 2, Poblacion, Dolores, Eastern Samar. The property had previously been leased by one Helen Espeso at a monthly rental of 8,000 pesos. Sometime in the last quarter of 2004, the respondent offered to occupy a portion of the property for a monthly rental of 4,000 pesos, and the petitioner accepted. It was understood that the respondent would occupy only on a temporary basis. On May 21, 2010, the petitioner notified the respondent of the termination of his lease and asked him to vacate after one month. The respondent did not vacate and continues to occupy the premises.
The respondent told a different story. He claimed that since February 2008 he had been in peaceful occupation of the property, having approached the petitioner in December 2007 to ask if he could occupy the whole lot for a monthly rental of 4,000 pesos, to which she agreed. He said his occupation was not temporary and not by tolerance, because he paid rentals from February 2008 until March 2009. No rentals were paid beginning April 2009, after the petitioner executed a private document acknowledging that she was indebted to him in the amount of 250,000 pesos. In that document she indicated that no interest would be charged on the loan because she would not be charging him for rental payments, and she even made the warehouse a collateral for her loan. The respondent refused to vacate because the petitioner had not yet paid her monetary obligation to him.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court ruled for the respondent, declaring him entitled to possession of the property until he is fully paid by the petitioner of her debt. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court first reversed, ordering the respondent to vacate and to pay rentals, legal expenses, and attorney's fees. But on the respondent's Omnibus Motion, the Regional Trial Court issued the Omnibus Resolution now on review, finding that the respondent's counsel had not been properly served the Order of pre-trial, which also directed the submission of his pre-trial brief. The Regional Trial Court therefore remanded the case to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court for further proceedings.
Issues
- Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, on appeal from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, may pass upon the issue of whether the respondent was duly notified of the scheduled preliminary conference even though the respondent did not raise it in his appeal memorandum.
- Whether or not the Regional Trial Court correctly ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
Applicable Provisions
Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
This provision is the core of the ruling: it empowers the Regional Trial Court to decide the appeal on the entire record, not merely on the errors assigned in the memoranda.
Section 21 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure provides:
Section 21. Appeal. – The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same in accordance with Section 22 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in civil cases governed by this Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be taken therefrom. Section 10 of Rule 70 shall be deemed repealed.
This confirms that ejectment cases governed by the Summary Procedure reach the Regional Trial Court on appeal, decided in accordance with the law on appeals.
Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Section 7. Procedure in the Regional Trial Court. – (a) Upon receipt of the complete record or the record on appeal, the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court shall notify the parties of such fact. (b) Within fifteen (15) days from such notice, it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit a memorandum which shall briefly discuss the errors imputed to the lower court, a copy of which shall be furnished by him to the adverse party. Within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the appellant's memorandum, the appellee may file his memorandum. Failure of the appellant to file a memorandum shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal. (c) Upon the filing of the memorandum of the appellee, or the expiration of the period to do so, the case shall be considered submitted for decision. The Regional Trial Court shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed.
This carries the same directive into the general rules of civil procedure, reinforcing that the Regional Trial Court decides on the entire record.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the Regional Trial Court correctly passed upon the question of notice of the preliminary conference even though the respondent did not raise it in his appeal memorandum. The Court explained that Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifically allows the Regional Trial Court to render judgment based on the entire records of the case, and not merely on the matters raised in the appeal memoranda. The Regional Trial Court, exercising appellate jurisdiction over the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, was not limited to the errors raised in the appeal memorandum.
On the second issue, the Court held that no error can be imputed to the Regional Trial Court when it ordered the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. Based on the records before it, the Regional Trial Court aptly held that the petitioner had to prove her case for unlawful detainer against the respondent, considering that even in the allegations in her complaint she referred to the fact that the respondent was paying rentals to her for the use of her property. Based also on the respondent's answer, he appeared to have a meritorious defense which may properly be ventilated through further proceedings in the court of origin. The Court thus found the petition without merit.
Doctrine
First, in an appeal from the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court to the Regional Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court decides the case on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda as are filed. It is not confined to the errors assigned in the appeal memorandum. This is the rule of Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 7, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Second, where the records show that a party was not properly served the Order of pre-trial, and that the adverse party appears to have a meritorious defense, the Regional Trial Court may properly remand the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The remand is not grave abuse of discretion; it is a sound exercise of the appellate court's authority to decide on the entire record.
Third, in an ejectment case, the plaintiff must prove her case for unlawful detainer. The fact that the complaint itself refers to the defendant's payment of rentals for the use of the property is a matter that must be threshed out in further proceedings.
Disposition
The petition was denied, and the Omnibus Resolution of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar, was affirmed. The respondent won before the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dolores-Maslog for further proceedings.
Remember This
Memorize this line: on appeal from the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court decides on the entire record of the proceedings, not merely on the errors raised in the appeal memorandum. Examiners like to use this case to test the scope of the Regional Trial Court's appellate power under the Rules on Summary Procedure and the propriety of a remand when a party was denied notice of pre-trial.