G.R. No. L-40462. July 31, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GIL MUNAR, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch IX, on August 20,
1971, which sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (l) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, to indemnify the offended party, a mentally retarded girl of
19 years of age, in the sum of P5,000.00, and to pay the costs of suit.[1]
In a Resolution, dated December 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court) where the appeal was initially brought,
certified the case to this Tribunal on the ground that since the lowest
penalty prescribed for rape is reclusion perpetua, the same is within our exclusive appellate jurisdiction.[2] However, on January 30, 1984, in conformity with our ruling in People vs. Daniel,[3]
we returned the records of the case to the Intermediate Appellate
Court for the determination of the proper penalty as the circumstances
warrant, with a comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and
discussion of the law involved, but the Intermediate Appellate Court
shall refrain from entering judgment, and shall thereafter certify the
case and elevate the entire records thereof to this Court for review.
Conformably to that directive, on March 21, 1984, the Appellate Court,
in a Decision penned by Justice Lorna S. Lombos-de la Fuente and
concurred in by Justices Emilio A. Gancayco and Isidro C. Borromeo,
found that the appealed judgment should be modified such that the
imposable penalty shall be reclusion perpetua inasmuch as the
rape was committed with the use of a deadly weapon, and its commission
was not attended by any modifying circumstances.[4] The case is with us now for review, without any judgment having been entered in the Appellate Court.
Upon a careful review of the evidence, we sustain the factual findings
and conclusions of law embodied in the Appellate Court’s judgment, and,
therefore, adopt the same and append it as an integral part of this
Decision (Annex “A”).
The fact that complainant was feeble-minded, whose actual age at the
time of the incident was 19 years but whose mental age was that of a
5-year-old child, does not affect her credibility. As stated by the
Trial Court, her answers were intelligible enough to be understood.[5]
She could convey her thoughts by words and signs. And as the
examining physician of the National Mental Hospital testified, the
mental deficiency does not prevent her from recalling painful
experiences.[6] She is a competent witness.[7]
There may have been inconsistencies in her testimony, but the same are
minor and do not detract from the vital fact that she had, in fact,
been abused by the accused in the manner that she had narrated. Neither
the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court, therefore, erred in giving
weight and credence to her testimony, there being no improper motive
shown.[8]
The denials by the accused, specifically, that the complainant did not
go to his store on the day the incident allegedly took place, and that
he never had sexual intercourse with the complainant[9]
do not deserve credence in the face of the positive and unwavering
identification of the accused by the complainant. She testified that on
March 2, 1967 when she went to buy starch from the accused in his
store, the latter asked her to go inside and then with a knife in hand,
forced her to lie down, then raised her dress, threw her panty away and
had sexual intercourse with her.[10]
That the carnal assault did take place is corroborated by the genital
examination made by the Municipal Health Officer on the complainant.[11]
The accused’s testimony that the motive of the complainant’s family in
filing the trumped-up case against him was that the mother owes him
P133.00 while the brother owes him P250.00 for goods taken on credit,
for which he demanded payment,[12] was belied by complainant’s mother, who declared that they do not owe money to the accused.[13]
In fact, the accused himself testified that he stopped extending
credit to complainant’s family since 1964 and did not collect the debt
anymore.[14]
Considering that the rape was committed with the use of a knife, a
deadly weapon, and in the absence of any modifying circumstances
attending its commission, the penalty of reclusion perpetua conforms to Article 335 in relation to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the judgment of conviction imposed upon the accused, Gil Munar, and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
with the modification that the indemnification to the offended party is
hereby increased to P15,000.00. Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., (Chairman), in the result.
De la Fuente, J., no part.
[1] Original Record, pp. 260 & 261.
[2] Rollo, p. 55.
[3] 86 SCRA 511 (1978).
[4] Rollo, p. 66.
[5] Decision, p. 10; Original Record, p. 259.
[6] T.s.n., September 10, 1969, pp. 42, 44 & 47.
[7] vide People vs. De Jesus, G.R. No. L-39087, April 27, 1984.
[8] People vs. Coderes, 104 SCRA 255 (1981); People vs. Blas, 106 SCRA 305 (1981).
[9] T.s.n., September 24, 1970, pp. 21 & 22.
[10] T.s.n., March 18, 1969, continuation of Hearing pp. 1-4 & 15-17.
[11] Exhibit “A”, Original Record, p. 3.
[12] T.s.n., September 24, 1970, p. 19.
[13] T.s.n., September 10, 1969, p. 56.
[14] T.s.n., September 24, 1970, pp. 26 & 27.