LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. DELFIN N. JUICO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, DEFENDAN…

Subject of this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809,
dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s complaint for the recovery of certain
properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff’s granduncle,
Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her “su uso y posesion mientras. viva y no
se case en segunda nupcias.”

The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don
Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and
personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don Fausto
Villaflor.

Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows:

“SEXTO:—En virtud de las facultades que me conceden
las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa
Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte,
exceptuandolas Donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea
voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente:

“SEPTIMO:—Lego para
despues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi
amor y cariño, los bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se
expresan;

OCTAVO:—Que estos legados disfrutara mi referida
esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se
case en segundas nupcias; de lo contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos
dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.”

The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and
7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child
with Doiia Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows:

“DUODECIMO:—Quedan anulados los parrafos 6.o y 7.o
de este testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados
que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momenta
que podre tener la dicha de contrar con hi jo o hijos legitimos o
legitimados, pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.”

Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any
child with his wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of
First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband’s estate
and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial administratrix. In
due course of administration, she submitted a project of partition, now
Exhibit “E”. In the order of November 24, 1924, now Exhibit “C”, the
probate court approved the project of partition and declared the
proceeding closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit “E”, now shows,
Doña Fausta Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and
possession of a considerable amount of real and personal estate. By
virtue also of the said project of partition, she received the use and
possession of all the real and personal properties mentioned and
referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The order approving the project
of partition (Exh. “C”), however, expressly provided that approval
thereof was “sin perjuicio de lp dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor”.

On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having
contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any child
with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in
Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the defendant
Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.

The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be
the same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his
will as his “sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor”.

Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February
8, 1958, contending that upon the widow’s death, said plaintiff became
vested with the ownership of the real and personal properties
bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his will,
pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant’s position, adopted by
the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact
that she never remarried.

We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the
testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his
widow with only a usufruct or life” tenure in the properties described
in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition (admitted by
the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights would thereupon
cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow was meant to have
no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did not
remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased,
uso y posesion mientras viva” (use and possession while alive), in which the first half of the phrase (“uso y posesion” instead of “dominio” or “propriedad“) reinforces the second (“mientras viva“).
The testator plainly did not give his widow the full ownership of these
particular properties, but only the right to their possession and use
(or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir
together with the testator’s brother (clause 6).

“SEXTO:—En virtud de las facultades que me conceden
las leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos
mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa
Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me
pertenescan, en iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando
las Donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago
en la forma siguiente.”

The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by
clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow remarried,
has unwarrantedly discarded the expression “mientras viva”, and
considered the words “uso y posesion” as equivalent to “dominio”
(ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article 791 of the
Civil Code of The Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court:

“ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an
interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather
than one which will render any of the expression inoperative; and of
two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will
prevent intestacy.”

“SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to
give effect to all provisions.—In the construction of an instrument
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction
is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”

Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the
conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed
to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which
are ever the primary source in ascertaining his intent. It is well to
note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole condition the
non-remarriage of his widow, the words “uso y posesion mientras viva” would have been unnecessary, since the widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly enjoins the following:

“ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in
their ordinary and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use
them in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained.

Technical words in a will are to be taken in
their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn
solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted with such
technical sense. (675a)”

In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the
doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled
in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator’s words, unless it clearly appears that his
intention was otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court
of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1912; 30 Abril 1913; 16
Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).

“La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y
constantemente expresada al ordenar su ultima voluntad, es ley unica,
imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir fielmente
albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa
voluntad patente, que no ha menester de interpretaciones, pues no
ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de
alguno de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial.” (Tribunal
Supremo of Spain, Sept. 20, March 1918)

The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief are
inapplicable, because they involve cases where the only condition
imposed on the legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already
shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably
provided that his widow should have the possession and use of the
legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that
by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies
should pass to the testator’s “sobrina-nieta”, appellant herein, upon
the widow’s death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime.
Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the reversionary
legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to fortuitous
event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.

Premises considered, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is declared entitled to
the ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the
will or testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court of origin for
liquidation, accounting, and further proceedings conformably to this
decision. Costs against the administrator-appellee.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon JJ., concur.