PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SIMEON N. FERRER (IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF TARLAC, BRANCH I), FELICIANO CO ALIAS LEONCIO CO ALI…

People versus Ferrer

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Judge Simeon Ferrer, in his capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, together with Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag as respondents. The Government asks the Supreme Court to strike down the trial court's ruling that declared the Anti-Subversion Act unconstitutional and dismissed the criminal charges against the two accused. The case matters because it is the Supreme Court's definitive statement on whether a statute that outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines is a bill of attainder, and it teaches how the Court tests a penal law against the constitutional ban on legislative punishment.

Procedural History

Two criminal cases were filed in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. In the first, Feliciano Co was charged with violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act; he moved to quash on the ground that the statute is a bill of attainder. In the second, Nilo Tayag and several others were charged with subversion; Tayag moved to quash, attacking the statute as a bill of attainder, as vague, as embracing more than one subject not expressed in its title, and as denying the equal protection of the laws. The trial court, in a resolution dated September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overbroad, and dismissed the informations against both accused. The Government appealed, and the Supreme Court resolved to treat the appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.

Facts

On March 5, 1970, a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. After preliminary investigation, the twice-amended information alleged that from May 1969 to December 5, 1969, Co became an officer or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed organization aimed at overthrowing the Government by force, violence, deceit, and subversion, by serving as an instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army. Co moved to quash, arguing that the statute is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed in the same court, charging Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. The amended information alleged that the accused knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts organized, joined, or remained as officers or ranking leaders of the Kabataang Makabayan, a subversive organization, and that they conspired to incite the people to rise in arms against the Government. On July 21, 1970, Tayag moved to quash, impugning the statute as a bill of attainder, as vague, as embracing more than one subject not expressed in its title, and as denying the equal protection of the laws.

The trial court resolved the constitutional issues in favor of the accused, declaring the statute void as a bill of attainder and as vague and overbroad, and dismissing the informations. The Government brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
• Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act is vague and overbroad.
• Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act embraces more than one subject not expressed in its title.
• Whether or not the Anti-Subversion Act denies the equal protection of the laws.

Applicable Provisions

Article III, section 1, paragraph 11 of the Constitution provides:

No bill of attainder or ex-post facto law shall be enacted.

This is the constitutional ban against legislative punishment without trial, and it is the standard against which the Court measures the Anti-Subversion Act.

Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act, as the Court construes it, punishes any person who knowingly, willfully, and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes, or remains a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines or any other subversive organization. The Court reads this language to require proof of knowing membership with specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court holds that the Anti-Subversion Act is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial; its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The Court explains that the Act does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or its members for the purpose of punishment. The term is used solely for definitional purposes, and the Act applies not only to that Party but also to any other organization having the same purpose and their successors. Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. The Court distinguishes the Act from section 504 of the United States Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, which was struck down because it designated in no uncertain terms the persons who could not hold union office, namely members of the Communist Party. By contrast, under the Anti-Subversion Act, guilt still has to be judicially established. The Court notes that the statute requires that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party, and that this intent must be shown by overt acts.

On the second issue, the Court rejects the claim of vagueness and overbreadth, because the statute requires proof of knowing membership with specific intent, shown by overt acts, and does not punish mere membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the Party.

On the third and fourth issues, the Court likewise finds no constitutional infirmity, holding that the Act is a valid exercise of the legislative power and does not deny the equal protection of the laws.

Doctrine

A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial; its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining legislatures to rule-making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. But a statute is not a bill of attainder merely because it names an organization, where the name is used for definitional purposes and the law's focus is on conduct rather than on individuals, and where guilt must still be judicially established. A statute prohibiting membership in a subversive organization is valid where it requires that membership be knowing, willful, and by overt acts, with specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization.

Disposition

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Act, reversed the trial court's resolution declaring it void, and ordered the criminal cases against the accused to proceed.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without trial, and its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt. Examiners use this case to test whether a statute that outlaws an organization is a bill of attainder, and the answer turns on whether the law names individuals for punishment or merely defines conduct that must still be proven in court.