ASUNCION ABORDO, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND ROMAN ABORDO, RESPONDENTS.
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Abordo versus Abordo
The Case
This is a case about a family land dispute that turns on a single, decisive procedural point. The widow and children of the late Isidoro Abordo sued his brother, Roman Abordo, to recover a parcel of land in La Paz, Leyte, claiming that Isidoro had entrusted Roman with the filing of an answer in the cadastral proceedings, and that Roman betrayed that trust by securing the title in his own name. The case matters to a Bar candidate because it shows how a finding of fact by the Court of Appeals binds the Supreme Court, and how the failure to prove an express trust clears the way for the ordinary rules of adverse possession and prescription to operate.
Procedural History
The plaintiffs, Asuncion Abordo, Jose Abordo, and Mercedes Redoña, filed a complaint for reconveyance in the Court of First Instance of Leyte. The trial court found for the defendant, Roman Abordo, and declared him the owner of the lot. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
Facts
Isidoro Abordo was the brother of the defendant, Roman Abordo. The plaintiffs are Isidoro's daughter, son, and widow. Isidoro died in 1929, while his children were still minors. The plaintiffs alleged that before his death, Isidoro had entrusted to Roman the task of filing, in Isidoro's name and behalf, the answer concerning the lot in the cadastral survey of La Paz, Leyte. Instead, according to the plaintiffs, Roman filed the answer in his own name and, on 9 June 1936, obtained Original Certificate of Title Number 18962 over the lot in his own name.
The Court of Appeals found that Roman took possession of a portion of the lot in 1929 and of the whole land in 1939, against the will of Isidoro's widow and children. Isidoro had been the declared owner of the land for taxation purposes, and the real estate taxes were paid in his name from 1922 to 1940. Except during the Japanese occupation, the land taxes from 1941 to 1949 were paid in Isidoro's name by his daughter, Asuncion. It was only in 1959 that Roman declared the land in his own name for taxation purposes.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the evidence insufficient to establish an express trust created by Isidoro in favor of the plaintiffs, with Roman as trustee. They cited contradictions between the allegations in the complaint and the testimony of Asuncion Abordo, and the lack of a written instrument to prove the alleged trust. They also upheld the finding that Roman had been in exclusive and adverse possession of the land since 1939, based on an admission by the widow, Mercedes Redoña, in a prior reinvindicatory action that was subsequently dismissed.
Issues
- Whether or not the forcible possession of the land by Roman Abordo in 1939 was a valid repudiation of the trust, justifying his acquisition of ownership by acquisitive prescription.
- Whether or not the action for reconveyance filed in February 1959 was barred by prescription.
Applicable Provisions
The decision does not quote any statutory provision. Its reasoning rests on the rules of adverse possession and prescription, and on the finality of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, which the Supreme Court applied without quoting a specific article.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the question assumed the existence of an express trust, which the Court of Appeals had found was not established. The Court ruled that this finding of fact is final and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. As the Court put it, if there was no trust, there is no trustee, and there is no legal obstacle to the application of the rules of adverse possession in favor of the appellee.
On the second issue, the Court held that the plaintiffs misread a paragraph in the Court of Appeals' decision, in which that court said it was possible that there was really an express trust, but that the widow and children had slept on their rights for more than twenty years before bringing the action in 1959. The Supreme Court explained that this was not a finding of fact, since the Court of Appeals referred only to a possibility. The Court of Appeals was merely stressing the laches on the part of the appellants and the staleness of their claim.
Doctrine
A finding of fact by the Court of Appeals is final and not reviewable by the Supreme Court. Where the existence of an express trust is not established, there is no trustee, and the rules of adverse possession and prescription apply in favor of the possessor. A statement in a decision that something is possible is not a finding of fact, and it cannot be the basis for relief. Laches and the staleness of a claim may bar an action for reconveyance.
Disposition
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with costs against the appellants.
Remember This
Remember that a finding of fact by the Court of Appeals is final and binding on the Supreme Court, and that without a proven express trust, there is no trustee and adverse possession may run. Examiners use this case to test the finality of factual findings and the interplay of trust, prescription, and laches in actions for reconveyance.