ARISTOTLE TUASON, PETITIONER, VS. HON. CALIXTO O. ZALDIVAR, ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

Tuason versus Zaldivar

The Case

This is the case of Tuason versus Zaldivar, an original action for certiorari and prohibition brought by Aristotle Tuason, the Municipal Judge of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, and the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice. Tuason asks the Supreme Court to annul the administrative order that separated him from the service and to restrain its enforcement, claiming that the grounds cited against him are insufficient and that they arose from acts committed while he held a different office, already passed upon when his appointment was confirmed. The case matters because it draws the line between judicial review and the political departments' power to discipline and remove subordinate officials, and because it teaches that a prior confirmation of an appointment does not wipe out the adverse effect of past misconduct on one's fitness to hold office.

Procedural History

Administrative charges were filed against Tuason, first with the Commission on Appointments and then, in a complaint reproducing them, with the Department of Justice. The charges were referred for investigation, report, and recommendation to the Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, who conducted the investigation. Tuason moved twice to dismiss the charges, and both motions were denied. He then filed his answer, and after due investigation the investigating judge submitted a report finding him guilty of some of the acts charged and recommending his separation from the service. The President of the Philippines issued an administrative order concurring in those findings and considering Tuason resigned and separated from the service. Tuason then commenced this original action in the Supreme Court for certiorari and prohibition to annul that order and restrain its enforcement.

Facts

Aristotle Tuason served as municipal judge of San Ildefonso, Ilocos Sur, from July 1957 until October 1960, when he assumed the office of Municipal Judge of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, to which he had been appointed ad interim. In March 1961 the auxiliary Municipal Judge of Vigan filed administrative charges against him with the Commission on Appointments. Despite these charges, his ad interim appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments in May 1961. Earlier, in April 1961, the auxiliary judge had filed with the Department of Justice a complaint reproducing the same charges, which were referred to the Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Sur for investigation, report, and recommendation. Additional charges were later filed and likewise referred to the same investigating judge.

After investigation, the investigating judge found Tuason guilty of some of the acts and omissions charged and recommended his separation from the service. The President then issued an administrative order concurring in those findings, stating that the respondent's proven mistakes and indiscretion reflected adversely on his capacity and preparedness for the important office of municipal judge, and considering him resigned and separated as municipal judge of Vigan, without prejudice to reinstatement in another branch of the government service.

The grounds for separation included: imposing an indeterminate sentence in a case where the Indeterminate Sentence Act was inapplicable; approving a guardian's bond in the form of a criminal bail bond; considering an aggravating circumstance not alleged in the complaint and adding a day to the penalty; discharging the duties of municipal judge of San Ildefonso while serving as municipal councilor of Vigan and collecting the emoluments of both offices; signing, as municipal councilor, a resolution endorsing a presidential candidate during the 1957 elections while acting as municipal judge; and causing a notice of leave to be mailed so that the auxiliary judge received it only on the day he was about to resume his functions.

Issues

• Whether or not the administrative order separating Tuason from the service may be annulled on the ground that the causes set forth are insufficient to warrant his removal.
• Whether or not the fact that most of the acts or omissions took place before he assumed the office of Municipal Judge of Vigan, and that the Commission on Appointments must have considered them when it confirmed his ad interim appointment, detracts from their adverse effect on his fitness to continue in office and from the authority to discipline him therefor.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory provision; it rests on the constitutional principle of separation of powers among coordinate and co-equal departments, each supreme within its own sphere, as applied in the cases it cites.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that although the first, second, third, and sixth counts may singly be considered not serious enough to warrant separation, their collective effect may be such as to induce reasonably minded men to disagree honestly on the sufficiency thereof to justify the action taken. Under these circumstances, the Court said, the administrative order may not be annulled without encroaching upon the functions of a coordinate and co-equal department, which is supreme within its own sphere. The necessity of respecting the conclusion reached becomes more apparent when considering the fourth and sixth counts, involving the discharge of the functions of municipal judge of San Ildefonso and municipal councilor of Vigan during the same period and the collection of the corresponding emoluments for the two positions. Although Tuason claimed there was no conflict in the actual performance of duties and that he later refunded the emoluments received as municipal councilor, the acts performed disclosed a deficiency in the prudence, discretion, and judgment that a member of the judiciary must exercise, if the bench is to command the respect due thereto.

On the second issue, the Court held that neither the fact that most of the acts or omissions took place before Tuason assumed the office of municipal judge of Vigan, nor the circumstance that the Commission on Appointments must have considered such acts or omissions when it confirmed his ad interim appointment, detracts from the adverse effect of his previous behaviour upon his fitness to continue in said office and the authority to discipline him therefor.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate must retain these rules. First, the courts will not annul an administrative order of the President separating a subordinate official from the service where the proven grounds, taken collectively, are sufficient to induce reasonably minded men to disagree honestly on their sufficiency, for to do so would encroach upon the functions of a coordinate and co-equal department, which is supreme within its own sphere. Second, the confirmation of an ad interim appointment by the Commission on Appointments does not erase the adverse effect of prior misconduct on the appointee's fitness to continue in office, nor does it deprive the appointing authority of the power to discipline him therefor. Third, conduct showing a deficiency in the prudence, discretion, and judgment required of a member of the judiciary, such as holding incompatible offices and collecting their emoluments, justifies separation from the service.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the writ prayed for and dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner Aristotle Tuason.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the confirmation of an appointment does not purge prior misconduct, and the courts will not substitute their judgment for the President's where the collective effect of the proven grounds reasonably supports separation. Examiners like to use this case on the scope of judicial review of administrative orders and on the effect of confirmation of an ad interim appointment on subsequent disciplinary action.