MILAGROS F. VDA. DE FORTEZA, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal taken by Milagros P. Vda.
de Forteza from the decision
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in WC Case No. R04-1115 dated November
19, 1962, and its resolution entered on July 1, 1963, reversing the decision of
the Hearing Officer, Regional Office No. 4, Department of Labor, of February 12, 1962 which awarded
claimant P2,515.36 as death compensation benefits
under Act 3428, as amended.

The facts, as found by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission are as follows:

“AMADEO R. FORTEZA, the deceased in this case, worked as
watchman in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from July 1, 1950 up to January 17, 1955, with a salary of P1,320.00 a year.  He was more than 60 years old and was
suffering from hypertension when he entered the respondent’s service, for which
reason he was considered
by the Government Service Insurance System as “a poor insurance risk.”  As watchman, he was assigned to the PCSO,
Manila Jockey Club, Manila, and his duties consisted in (1) guarding the
properties of the respondent therein kept; (2) recording the pass slips of
employees and the properties which were brought in and out of the premises; (3)
closing the windows of the administration building located at the third floor
at the close of office hours; and (4) going around the building for
check-up.  He had table and a chair which
he ordinarily used as his
sta­tion post.  His tour of duty was from
3:00 p.m., but, as correctly stated by the hearing officer, he ‘continue his
duty up to the follow­ing day’ in case his ‘substitute fails to report, On
January 17, 1955, at about 11:00 in the evening, he was found slumped on the
floor, near his table, and unconscious. 
He was brought to the North General
Hospital for treatment, but every
effort to revive him was in vain as he died of ‘CEREBRAL HEMORRHAGE SECONDARY
TO ARTERIOSCLEROTIC HYPERTENSION VASCULAR DISEASE’ at 2:00 a.m., the following day.  He was survived by his widow and five
children who are of age.  For his death,
his widow received from the respondent benefits provided for under Section 699
of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, including reimbursement of
burial expenses (Annex E attached to the Petition for Review).”

On November 22, 1960,
petitioner, the surviving spouse, for herself and in behalf of her children,
filed a claim with the Regional
Office No. 4 (Manila), Department
of Labor, for the recovery of death compensation benefits under Act 3428, as amended, and burial expenses in the sum of P312.00.

After due hearing, the Hearing Officer rendered judgment ordering
the respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to pay petitioner, through
Regional Office No. 4, the amount of P2,575.36 as total death compensation benefits under Act 3428, as amended,
and to pay the Office the amount of P24.00 as fees under Section 55 of said
Act.

A petition for review on the grounds of:  (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) that the
ailment causing employee’s death had no
causal relation with the nature of his work, and (3) that the claim had prescribed under Section 24 of the law
(failure of claimant to notify within the 3-month period) was denied by the
Hearing Officer on March 28, 1962. 
Thereafter, the case was properly elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission for review.  On November
19, 1962 the latter
rendered judgment reversing that of the Hearing Officer, thereby absolving the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes office from paying
petitioner any compensation under Act 3428. 
A motion for reconsideration subsequently filed by petitioner was denied
by the Commission on July 1, 1963. 
Hence, the present appeal.

The only issue to be resolved is whether or not, under the facts
of the case, petitioner end her children are en­titled to death compensation
benefits under Section 2 of Act 3428, as amended, which provides:

“When an employee x x x contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused
by such employment or either aggravated
by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay
compensation in the sums and to the persons herein specified x x x.”

Petitioner claims that her deceased husband’s
illness-hypertension – at the time be was employed by respondent was aggravated
by the nature of his work, thus hastening the cerebral stroke which caused his
death.

Upon the other hand, respondents contend that the disease of
hypertension – characterized by the thickening, hardening and loss of
elasticity of the arterial walls, with inflamatory,
degenerative or hyperplastic changes, the Etiology of
which has been variously attributed to abnormal metabolism of fats, toxin and
infection – cannot be considered as an occupational disease in the particular
trade the deceased was engaged in the course of his employ­ment and as understood
under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, i.e., disease which is due to
causes and conditions which are characteristics of and peculiar to a trade,
occupation, process or employment.  They
further argue that from the fact that the deceased employee had been working
for five years without a stroke, it may be inferred that his work did not any
way cause his death.

Petitioner’s contention
must he upheld.  It is a fact that
because he had to work at nightime, Forteza was exposed to colds, inadequate rest/relaxation,
proper sleep, and tension due to his duty to guard the premises of his
employer.  It is also a fact that he had
to go up and down the 3-story building (without elevator) where the offices of
his employer were located, to check up the premises.  These working conditions and factors, coupled
with the fact that the deceased was afflicted with minimal tuberculosis in
1954-1955 – just before his death – could have certainly caused or materially
contributed to produce the stroke that caused his death.  The fact that the deceased suffered the
stroke near his working table in the third floor of the office building while
performing his routinary duties further justifies
petitioner’s claim that the death of her husband was in the course of his
employment and was s brought about – in part, at least – by the strenuous
nature of his work.  This makes such
death compensable under the law.  Along
this line is our ruling in the Naira case, as follows:”

“x x x.  In demanding that the claimant should
establish that the cause of death was directly brought about by the employment,
or aggravated by the nature of the employment, the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission has chosen to ignore the
presumption expressly established in. 
Section 43(1) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act (No. 3428), as amended by Republic Act 772:

‘SEC. 43. Presumption.
– In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for compensation under
this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence
of substantial evidence to the contrary –

1.   That the claim comes within the provisions of
this Act.’

“In other words, in the absence of proof that the injury or
death supervening in the course of employment has arisen because of the nature
of the same, the death or injury is, by
law, compensable, unless the employer clearly establishes that it was not
caused or aggravated by such employment or work.  Mere absence of evidence that the mishap was
traceable to the employment does not suffice to reject the claim; there must be credible showing that it was not
so traceable (Batangas Trans. Co. vs. Vda. de Rivera, G. R. No. L-7658, Nay 8,
1956; Bohol Land Trans. Co. vs. Vda.
de Madanguit, 70 Phil. 685).
 In fact, in the Batangas
Transportation case, we held that where
the cause of death supervening
in the course of employment is unknown, the death is compensable.  In the case now
before, the fact that the illness followed closely the exertions of the
deceased in unloading the employer’s barge strongly supports the inference that
the thrombosis leading to his death was at least
precipitated by strain.  (Naira vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-18066,
Oct. 30, 1962).”

Furthermore, it is
the rule in Workmen’s Compensation
cases that it need not be proven that his employment was the sole cause of the
death or injury suffered by the employee, it being enough, to entitle him or
his heirs to compensation benefits under the law, that there be a showing that
his employment had contributed to the aggravation or acceleration of his death
or ailment.  This has been sufficiently
proven to be the case in the one before Us.

With respect to the
amount of compensation due to be petitioner, the pertinent portion of the
decision rendered by the Hearing Officer on February 12, 1962 (Annex C of the Petition for Review) reads
as follows:

“Under Section 8(a) of the Act, the claimant widow is entitled
to 45 per centum of the average weekly wage of the deceased for 208 weeks.
Forty Five per centum of the average weekly wage of the deceased which was
P25.38 (P1,320.00 to 52 weeks) equals P11.42 and for
208 weeks, the claimant widow is entitled to P2,375.36, as death compensation
benefits.

“Pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 8 of the Act, as
amended, the herein claimant widow is
entitled to reimbursement of
burial expenses not to exceed P200.00. 
In the instant case, said claimant widow spent P312.00, hence, she is entitled
to reimbursement by the respondent of P200.00 only.

“All in all claimant Milagros F. Vda. de Forteza,
is entitled to an amount of P2,575.36,
as total benefits under the Act.

“WHEREFORE, the respondent PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, is hereby
ordered:

‘1.   To
pay in lump sum MILAGROS F. VDA,
DE FORTEZA, through this Office,
the amount TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE PESOS AND 36/100 (P2,575.36), as total death
compensation benefits under the Act.

‘2.   To
pay this Office the amount of TWENTY-FOUR PESOS (P24.00) as fees pursuant to
Section 55 of the Act.'”

We agree with the above.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and, as a
result, another is rendered sentencing the respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office to pay the amounts awarded to petitioner in the decision of the Hearing Officer reproduced above.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, Angeles, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.