HON. PATRICIO CENIZA, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MISAMIS OCC., BENITO BEDAD, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MAGDALENO ATAD, RESPONDENT.

In certiorari proceedings (CA-G.R. No. 11091-R), the Court of Appeals in its
decision declared null and void the order of Judge Ceniza in Civil Case No. 1484
of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, dated February 17, 1955,
appointing a receiver in the said case. Respondents in said certiorari
proceedings filed with us an appeal by certiorari to review said decision of the
Court of Appeals. The appeal was given due course and the parties filed their
corresponding briefs, including a memorandum for the appellee. The facts of the
case are rather complicated but we find it necessary to state them even in
detail, not only those found by the Court of Appeals but also those we gather
from the pleadings of the parties, so as to better understand the circumstances
under which the order appointing a receiver, was issued.

Before the year 1935 appellee Magdaleno Atad filed an application for a
homestead with the Bureau of Lands for a portion of the public domain in
Guinabot, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (H.A. No. 114004 – E106070), which
application included a large parcel with an area of about 17 hectares, later
subdivided into 12 lots, occupied by the appellants Benito Bedad et al. Said
occupants filed a protest against Atad’s application, claiming that the 17
hectares above referred to was not actually occupied by Atad but by themselves
and they asked that that portion be segregated from his application. The
Director of Lands overruled their protest and in an order dated November 10,
1955, he denied their motion for reconsideration. On December 26, 1959, the
Director of Lands issued an order of execution directing the Provincial Land
Officer in Misamis to enforce his previous order, have the oppositors vacate the
entire homestead, and place Atad in possession thereof. When the Land Officer
went to the place to execute the order the oppositors-appellants Bedad et al
refused to vacate their holdings and renewed and continued their protest against
At ad1s homestead application, even with the Chief Executive. As a result of
this persistent protest the Secretary of Agriculture in an order dated September
2, 1941, directed that the application of Atad should be given due course only
for the portion actually occupied by him, and that the remainder occupied by
various, persons (presumably the protestants-oppositors) mentioned in the report
of the ocular inspection submitted by Public Lands Inspector Atilano Villaceran
and Surveyor Delfin Deligero, submitted on July 23, 1941, be adjudicated in
favor of said occupants to be applied for by them under the homestead provisions
of the Public Land Law. It would seem that Atad was far from satisfied with this
order of the Secretary of Agriculture segregating from-his homestead application
the 17 hectares, because he claimed that the oppositors and protestants were
mere croppers working for him; that their protest had been duly overruled and
denied by the Director of Lands and they did not appeal from said order to the
Secretary of Agriculture, and consequently, said order became final. So, he
apparently still claimed the whole area including the 17 hectares. And on
November 11, 1946, Atad filed in the Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental civil case No. 911 entitled UNLAWFUL DETAINER AND DAMAGES against
oppositors- appellants. He also filed, a criminal action against them in the
Justice of the Peace Court of Baliangao for violation of Section 2725 of the
Revised Administrative Code relating to interference with the execution of
decisions, resolutions or decrees of the Bureau of Lands, presumably referring
to the refusal of the appellants to vacate the 17 hectares occupied and claimed
by them, as ordered by the Director of Lands.

In the Justice of the Peace Court, these occupants-appellants were found
guilty and sentenced each to pay P10.00, but on appeal to the Court of First
Instance in Criminal Case No. 2503 the information was quashed and the case
dismissed. Civil Case No. 911 was also dismissed. There is reason to believe
that the dismissal of both the civil and the criminal case was based on the
belief of the trial judge that the order of the Director of Lands overruling the
protest and opposition of Benito Bedad et al., and ordering them to leave the
land, was vacated and set aside by the later order of the Secretary of
Agriculture dated September 2, 1941, excluding the 17 hectares in question from
Atad’s homestead application, and awarding the said 17 hectares to the
occupants-appellants and directing them to apply for it under the homestead
provisions of the Public Land Law.

According to appellants, on December 10, 1951, Atad with his wife and
children and several hired men entered five of the twelve lots occupied by them
(appellants) and harvested coconuts. This invasion of the five lots and the
reaping of fruits was repeated on July 22, 1952 and so the next day on July 23rd
appellants filed Civil Case No. 1484 against Atad for the recovery of the value
of the coconuts taken by him, and for damages. Acting on the prayer in their
complaint for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge
Ceniza granted the same ex-parte upon the filing of a bond of P1,000.00. This
writ of preliminary injunction was later lifted upon Atad’s filing a counterbond
in the sum of P2,000.00. According to appellants, five days after the lifting of
the writ of injunction, Atad and his men on September 10, 1952 again invaded not
only the five lots already mentioned but the remaining seven lots, that is to
say, the whole 17 hectares occupied by and adjudicated to them by the Secretary
of Agriculture; not only this, but instead of picking coconuts every two or
three months as was the practice in coconut plantations, they did it every
month, picking even young, immature coconuts, which act disturbed the fruiting
of the trees and rendered them less fruitful. Atad and his companions are said
to have also carried away other fruits like jackfruits, bananas, coffee,
avocados, etc. Because of all this, appellants filed an amended complaint
alleging the estimated value of the coconuts and other fruits harvested by Atad
and damages, and on February 17, 1953, they filed an ex-parte petition for the
appointment of a receiver in order to take charge of the whole area involved.
Judge Ceniza in his order dated February 17, 1953, granted said petition
thus:

“It appearing from the ex-parte urgent motion of the herein plaintiffs
supported by affidavit that the herein defendants, after the writ of preliminary
injunction had been lifted thru the filing of the counterbond, have been and are
wantonly harvesting the nuts from the coconut tress on the land in question such
that the plantation would be greatly damaged unless a receiver is appointed to
preserve the litigated property in good condition;

“Finding the said urgent motion just and reasonable, Vicente Roa, the Clerk
of Court is hereby appointed receiver to take care of the property and to
administer the same during the pendency of this litigation upon filing a bond in
the amount of P5,000.00 with solvent sureties.

“The receiver shall render an accounting of his receivership from time to
time or not loss than once in every six months. He is further ordered to deposit
the proceeds of the products from the land in question after all incidental
expenses have been paid with the Philippine National Bank Agency of this
province.”

This is the order which was the subject of the certiorari proceedings brought
by Atad before the Court of Appeals and which order was declared null and void
by said Court. In annulling the said order the court of Appeals says that there
was a counterbond of P2,000.00 filed by Atad which could respond for any damages
that may have been caused by him, and that there was no proof that this bond was
not sufficient for the protection of appellants. The Court of Appeals added that
the respondent Judge should not have hastily granted the ex-parte petition for
the appointment of a receiver, evidently relying upon his previous knowledge and
information about the matter in litigation, presumably referring to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 911 and his quashing of the information in Criminal
Case No. 2503.

After a careful study of the case, we regret our inability to agree the Court
of Appeals in its decision annulling the order of the trial court of February
17, 1953, appointing a receiver. Appellants have explained satisfactorily the
reasons and circumstances under which they filed their petition for the
appointment of a receiver. They say that Atad filed a petition in the trial
court to dismiss the original Civil Case No. 1484 and when his motion was denied
he filed a notice to appeal to the Supreme Court from the order denying his
motion to dismiss and he duly perfected his appeal. Believing that his appeal
was going to take its regular course in the Supreme Court which would take some
time to decide, and that in the meantime Atad and his companions would be
reaping the fruits of the whole area in question, to say nothing of damaging the
coconut trees, appellants decided to file on February 17, 1953, an urgent motion
for the appointment of a receiver in the belief that it was the most convenient
or feasible means by which further destruction of the plantation and removal of
its fruits could be avoided while the case remained pending in court. According
to appellants, Atad withdrew his appeal only on March 7, 1953, that is, after
the issuance of the order appointing of a receiver.

The Court of Appeals does not approve of the action of the respondent Judge
in relying upon his personal knowledge of the case in granting the petition for
the appointment of a receiver. Frankly, we do not see any impropriety in
respondent Judge making use of his knowledge of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case, assuming that he did so, in considering the merits of the
petition for the appointment of a receiver. We must remember that as a Judge of
the Court of First Instance, he was authorized by law to grant meritorious
petitions for the appointment of a receiver, even ex-parte (Rule 61, Sec. 3).
Respondent Judge Ceniza must have been quite aware of the facts and
circumstances obtaining in the case before him, namely, that the case involved
about 17 hectares claimed by Atad on the one hand as included in his homestead
application as decided by the Director of Lands in his orders of November 10,
1935 and December 26 , 1939, but equally claimed by protestants-appellants, and
actually occupied by them and which they had planted to fruit trees, especially
coconut trees, actually bearing fruit, which 17 hectares had been adjudicated to
them, correctly or wrongly, by the Secretary of Agriculture in his order of
September 2, 1941; that the criminal case filed in Court by Atad against
appellants for refusing to comply with the order of the Director of Lands for
them to vacate the 17 hectares occupied by them was dismissed; so was Civil Case
No. 911 also filed by Atad against them for unlawful detainer and damages for
supposedly illegally withholding said 17 hectares from him. Both dismissals were
ordered by his court. Then, according to the complaint against Atad in Civil
Case No. 1484, he and companions illegally invaded these 17 hectares being held
by appellants, collected the fruits not only from fruit trees like coffee,
banana, avocado, but from the more valuable coconut trees, even collecting young
coconuts thereby damaging the trees, and the only security put up by Atad was
his counter- bond in the amount of P2,000.00. Not only this, but Atad threatened
to take the case on appeal to this Court and actually perfected his appeal,
thereby leading appellants to believe that they – were due for a long wait,
considering not only the time required for the determination of his appeal but
also of the case itself in the Court of First Instance, and this was what
prompted appellants to file the petition for the appointment of a receiver.
Respondent Judge Ceniza must have known these facts and circumstances, because
they took place and were presented in his own court. Why could he not properly
make use of this knowledge in deciding upon the advisability and propriety of
appointing a receiver, not exactly to favor appellants who asked for said
appointment but to preserve the property in litigation, including its fruits
during the whole period that the case was pending not only in his Court but also
in the Supreme Court?

The Court of Appeals also said that there was no evidence that the
counterbond of P2,000.00 filed by Atad for the lifting of the writ of
preliminary injunction was not sufficient to protect herein appellants. The
partial report of the receiver quoted in the very memorandum of counsel for
appellee Atad, in our opinion sufficiently shows the inadequacy of the P2,000.00
counterbond for the proper protection of herein appellants. According to said
partial report (page 9 of appellee’s memorandum) from May 11, 1953 to April 7,
1954, – a period of less than one year, from the copra made from the coconuts
harvested from the parcel under his custody, there was a gross sale of
P3,309.78. This does not include the value of other products such as coffee,
bananas, avocados, bamboos, etc. Neither does it include the alleged damage to
the coconut trees themselves because of the alleged picking of young and
immature coconuts. Even assuming that a receiver had not been appointed and that
this case had not gone to the Court of Appeals and to this Court, there is no
telling how long a time Civil Case No. 1484 would have taken for a final
decision, because the losing party in the trial court might have taken the case
to the appellate-courts, specially since the case involved a legal question,
namely, the conclusiveness and effect of an order of the Director of Lands dated
November 10, 1935, finally overruling the opposition and protest of herein
appellants and apparently adjudicating the entire area covered by the Homestead
application and entry, including the 17 hectares in question, to Atad, which
order apparently was not duly appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture, and
considering the order of the Secretary of Agriculture himself, issued several
years later (Sept. 2, 1941), excluding the 17 hectares from the Homestead
application of Atad, and adjudicating them to appellants, which 1941 order was
issued, presumably before any Homestead Patent was given to Atad for the entire
area, including the 17 hectares actually occupied by herein appellants. We
repeat that the P2,000.00 counterbond would have been clearly inadequate for the
protection of the appellants.

In view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of appeals is hereby
reversed, and the order of the trial court of February 17, 1953, appointing a
receiver is affirmed, with costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.