G.R. No. L-28869. June 29, 1968
PANTALEON V. PELAYO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The decisive issue raised in this, a petition for certiorari,[1]
turns to the validity of the Commission on Electionsā (Comelec)
February 7, 1968 resolution annulling petitioner’s proclamation of January 13,
1968 as the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City and
directing the “new City Board of Canvassers of Davao
City x x x to canvass and
proclaim the 10th councilor-elect,” and its March 14, 1968 resolution
ruling out petitioner’s move to reconsider, and ordering the “new City
Board of Canvassers of Davao City to continue and
complete the canvass of all the votes cast in all the precincts in the City of Davao, but to hold in abeyance the proclamation of the
winning candidate until further orders of this Commission.”
The problem the petition posits exacts articulation of the
controlling facts.
On December 4, 1967,
the board of canvassers of Davao
City convened and proceeded to
canvass the November 14, 1967
election returns of Davao
City for the positions of, amongst
others, Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Councilors.
On December 19, 1967,
the board issued a “Certificate of Votes of Candidates” – upon
canvass terminated on December 18 – to inform the public of “the status of
votes cast for each candidate.” This certificate shows: Petitioner Pantaleon
V. Pelayo, Jr., official Liberal Party candidate,
garnered 16,541 votes as against 16,495[2]
of respondent Gaudioso M. Tiongco
of the Nacionalistas.
The margin is only 46 votes.
Seven days afterwards, that is, on December 26, 1967, the board
of canvassers proclaimed: Mayor-elect
Elias B. Lopez; Vice-Mayor-elect Manuel C. Sotto; and nine councilors-elect
Manuel M. Garcia, Cornelio MaskariƱo, Felicidad C. Santos, Cipriano Villafuerte, Domingo R. Vidanes,
Tomas Monteverde, Jr., Benigno
S. Bangoy, Antonio S. Castillo, and Bonifacio Tamayo.
Readily seen is that the 10th councilor was left out. And this, because on December 23, 1967, the Court of First Instance of Davao,
in Election Case 1571,[3]
stopped the board from proclaiming the 10th councilor-elect.[4]
Directing attention to Election Case 1571, we find that reĀspondent
Tiongco, on December
11, 1967, lodged with the Davao
court a petition for the correction of returns under Sections 154 and 163 of
the Election Code. He there averred that
votes reading “David Pelayo” were erroneously credited for petitioner Pantaleon
V. Pelayo, Jr., David Pelayo,
it turns out, is a brother of petitioner, and an independent candidate who ran
for councilor. David Pelayo
was however previously ruled out as a nuisance candidate by Comelec;
and Comelec’s view was sustained by this Court.[5] Tiongco’s petition in the above case, as finally amended,
contained three causes of action, thus:
(1) correction of election returns of precincts where David Pelayo’s votes were allegedly credited for petitioner; (2)
judiĀcial recount of votes allegedly upon discrepancies in the election returns
of Precincts 314, 88 and 120; and (3) mandamus to compel the canvassing board
“to credit petitioner fifty-nine (59) votes in Precinct 74
and not to credit Pelayo, Jr., with any vote in Precinct
No. 421.”[6]
Except for the fact that 10 votes were added to those of
respondent Tiongco, as a result of the judicial
recount of the votes in Precincts 421, 314, 120 and 74 (one vote
in Precinct 120 and nine votes in Precinct 314),[7]
the petition did not give any substantial advantage to Tiongco. For, per the court’s decision of January 10, 1968, Pelayo’s
lead was merely reduced to 36 votes; the petition was denied in all other
respects; and the restraining order lifted and set aside.
The restraining order out of the way, the board of canvassers, on
January 13, 1968,
proclaimed petitioner Pantaleon V. Pelayo, Jr., the 10th councilor-elect with 16,531 votes.[8]
On January 15, 1968,
respondent Tiongco returned to court in Election Case
1571 with a petition praying not only to reconsider the decision of January 10, 1968, but also to annul petitioner’s
proclamation. This he amended on January 18, 1968. In said amendment, Tiongco
raised for the first time the issue of the validity
of the comĀposition, and the legality of the actuations, of the city board of
canĀvassers. Tiongco’s
gripe was directed at Comelec’s order of November 23,
1967 appointing Judge Vicente Calanog of the City
Court of Davao in lieu of Acting City Fiscal
Raul B. Pichon.
Tiongco’s motion to reconsider, as was
his petition to annul the proclamation, was rejected by the court.[9]
Tiongco filed a “Second Motion for
Reconsideration Preparatory to Certiorari” dated February 20, 1968. To our knowledge, this second motion remains
unresolved.[10]
Even before the court in Election Case 1571 could act on
respondent Tiongco’s first motion to reconsider of January 15, 1968, said respondent
lodged with Comelec a letter-petition[11]
dated January 24, 1968
amplified by a supplemental letter-petiĀtion[12]
dated January 25, 1968.[13] Tiongco retraced the events which led to the filing of
Election Case 1571, the result thereof and the subsequent proclamation of
petitioner as the 10th councilor-elect.
He charged that that proclamation was “highly questionable and
irregular as it is a malicious and deliberate scheme to defeat the right of
petitioner to seek further remedies in Election Case No. 1571,” and was
made against standing orders of Comelec.[14]
He submitted, as he did in the Court of First Instance, that the board was
illegally constituted as Raul B. Pichon, the Acting
City Fiscal, was substituted by City Judge Vicente Calanog. He claimed, too, that the old board was
bereft of authority to proclaim petitioner for the reason that the new set of
elected city officials automatically became the members of and composed the
city board of canvassers and all the previous members ceased ipso facto
to be members of the board.[15]
He then prayed for the nullification of the proclaĀmation of petitioner; the
reconstitution of the city board of canvassers; and a directive to make them recanvass Pelayo’s and Tiongco’s votes and proclaim thereafter the 10th
councilor-elect.
Admittedly, petitioner was not served with a copy of the
aforesaid letter-petition and supplemental letter-petition before Comelec. Neither was
he notified of the hearing thereof.[16]
On February 7, 1968,
on the basis alone of Tiongco’s representations, Comelec came out with a resolution, viz:
“Considering that the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City which made the proclamation on January 13, 1968
was illegally constituted, in that it is contrary to the ruling of the Supreme
Court in Santos v. Comelec, L-16413, January 26,
1960, where it was held that ‘the municipal board of canvassers composed of the
members of the present municipal council shall constitute the board of
canvassers after January 1, 1959’, the Commission RESOLVED to annul, as it
hereby annul, the proclamation of Pantaleon Pelayo, Jr., as the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City made by the above-stated City Board of
Canvassers on January 13, 1968, and to direct the new City Board of Canvassers
of Davao City to be composed of the following to
canvass and proclaim the 10th councilor-elect of Davao
City in the November 14, 1967 elections:
1. City Fiscal Raul Pichon – Chairman
2. City Mayor Elias Lopez – Member
3. Vice-Mayor Manuel Sotto – Member
4. Councilor Bonifacio
Tamayo – Member
5. Councilor Domingo Vidanes – Member
6. Councilor Tomas Monteverde – Member
7. Councilor Benigno
Bangoy – Member
8. Councilor Felicidad
Santos – Member
9. Councilor Manuel Garcia – Member
10. Councilor Antonio
Castillo – Member
11. Councilor Cornelio
MaskariƱo – Member
12. Substitute
member to be appointed
vice the 10th City Councilor – Member
13. Councilor Cipriano Villafuerte – Member”
On February 16, 1968,
Pelayo moved to reconsider.
On February 19, 1968,
Comelec gave telegraphic instructions to the new
board “not to canvass the votes and not to proclaim the 10th
councilor-elect of said City.” Nonetheless, the new board started
canvass. On the day following, February 20, 1968 said board was
informed of the date set for the hearing of Pelayo’s
motion for reconsideration.[17]
On February 24, 1968,
Comelec resolved to give the parties until February
28 to submit their memoranda, and at the same time instructed its Law
Department to wire the chairman of the canvassing board that “suspension
of canvass and proclamation of the 10th councilor-elect of Davao City
is continued until further orders of this Commission.”[18]
On March 14, 1968,
Comelec resolved to overturn Pelayo’s
motion for reconsideration, and to order the new board “to continue and
complete the canvass of all the votes cast in all the precincts in the City of Davao, but to hold in abeyance the
proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders of this
Commission.”
Petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of March 23, 1968 before Comelec was withdrawn by a pleading dated April 16, 1968.[19]
But before this withdrawal, petitioner came to this Court on
certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction presenting mainly
the issue specified at the start of this opinion.
We issued a cease-and-desist order.
Upon the petition, the separate returns of respondents (1) Gaudioso M. Tiongco, (2) Raul B. Pichon in behalf of the new city board of canvassers, (3)
Manuel C. Sotto, Manuel M. Garcia, Cornelio P. MaskariƱo,
Cipriano Villafuerte, Jr.,
and Antonio S. Castillo, and (4) Comelec, and after
hearing on oral arguments and the memoranda, the case is now before us for a
decision on the merits.
1. Was Acting City Fiscal
Raul B. Pichon unlawfully excluded as chairman of the
old board of canvassers? This question
cropped up because while respondent Tiongco
considered good and valid the appointment of substitutes in the formation of
the board of canvassers, he levelled a major attack against
the appointment of City Judge Vicente Calanog as
chairman of the board instead of Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon. His reason:
Fiscal Pichon was neither disqualified nor
incapacitated.
Fiscal Pichon, prior to his temporary designation
by the Secretary of Justice as Acting City Fiscal, was the Fourth Assistant
City Fiscal of Davao City. But under the Davao City
charter, the fiscal next in rank to the City Fiscal automatically “shall
perform the duties” of City Fiscal in the latter’s absence or sickness or
inability to act or for any other reason, or in case of temporary vacancy.[20]
Of course, one cannot easily tag Fiscal Pichon’s
designation as politically motivated.
But not to be so easily shunted aside are certain disturbing
circumstances. It was made on October 27, 1967 – 18 days before election day. He was
catapulted over the heads of three assistant city fiscals who outrank him. That designation was
temporary – “effective immediately and to continue until the date of the
adjournment of the regular session of the Congress of the Philippines next following these designations unless sooner revoked.”
To the unanointed, these facts could appear as out of
the ordinary.
To be adverted to is that in Comelec’s
disputed resolution of February 7, the new city
board of canvassers was created with Acting City Fiscal Pichon
as chairman. In the present proĀceedings,
Fiscal Pichon filed the answer on behalf of that new
board, although, of course, the Liberal members of the new
city board repudiated his representation before this
Court.[21]
They filed their own answer joining hands with petitioner. This is not unexpected. Party lines appear to have shaped up after Comelec annulled the January 13, 1968 proclamation. The tenth berth in the city council is hotly contested. The Liberals in the canvassing board have
some apprehension about Fiscal Pichon’s
impartiality. PetiĀtioner Pelayo charges that a majority of the said new board –
including Fiscal Pichon, its chairman – at the
meeting of February 19, insisted in defying Comelec’s
instructions – telegraphic and by long distance telephone – to suspend canvass
and proclamation in view of the pendency of his
motion for reconsideration. And this,
even before the substitute for the 10th councilor had been appointed.
On Fiscal Pichon’s right to sit in the
board, Comelec’s answer to the petition herein is
quite illuminating. It gives the reason
why Judge Vicente Calanog was appointed in lieu of
Acting City Fiscal Pichon, thus: “[i]t has been
the policy of the Commission on Elections not to allow appointees of the
Executive in an ‘Acting‘ capacity to sit as members of the canvassing
board.” Elaborating on the meaning of “acting” capacity, Comelec goes on to say the following: “[t]his kind of appointment is usually
done a few months before elecĀtion day, to ease out undesirable officials and
put in more favored ones, which is not conducive to the holding of free,
orderly and honest elections.” It really is beyond the bounds of accepted
candor to say that some such “actingā officials will always act
with fairness. No cause or reason exists
why we should downgrade Comelec’s opinion. The chairman of a canvassing board should be
removed from the temptation of falling into partiality. Especially so in the
present case where there is a tight fight for the tenth council berth and a
tight conĀtest for supremacy in the Davao City council. As
presently constiĀtuted, the city council of Davao City
is composed of five Nacionalista councilors, four
Liberal councilors plus one vice-mayor, also a Liberal, who is its presiding
officer.[22]
Fairness in the actuations of the chairman should not be subject to misgivings
or suspicion. That chairman should not
be beholden to anyone.
Nor can we say that Comelec is without
authority to substitute Judge Calanog for Fiscal Pichon. For, Comelec’s powers are broad, both in the statutory and
constitutional sense. It is not to be
hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less
responsible organization. Great latitude
is accorded Comelec in adopting means and methods to
insure accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created – to
promote free, orderly and honest elections.[23] Comelec has the choice of means.[24]
As we have said in Uso Dan Aguam vs. Commission on Elections,
L-28955, May
28, 1968:
“By constitutional mandate, Comelec
āshall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions
which may be conferred upon it by law.ā The ConstiĀtution enjoins Comelec to ‘decide, save those involĀving the right to
vote, all administrative questions, affecting
elections.’ And, all of these are aimed at achieving an ideal: ‘free, orderly, and honest elections.ā Implementing the constitutional preĀcept,
Congress legislated in Section 3 of the Revised Election Code that, in addition
to the powers and functions conferred by the Constitution, Comelec
has ‘direct and immediate supervision over the provincial, municipal, and city
officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of
elections.'”
The present case is not to be considered as within the coverage
of our resolution in Campos vs.
Commission on Elections, L-28439, December 29, 1967. The factual configuration in the Campos
case will readily bring the present out of the reach of that resolution. In Campos,
the Acting Provincial Fiscal, Bienvenido Reyes, was
automatically entitled to sit in the board,[25]
for the reason that he was the first assistant provincial fiscal. There was no regular Provincial Fiscal. Fiscal Reyes stepped into the shoes of the
latter. So that in Campos,
we declared that Fiscal Reyes was entitled to sit. Not so here.
Fiscal Pichon would not qualify to act as City
Fiscal in the absence of the regular City Fiscal for the reason that he is
situated way below in the echelon of the assistant city fiscals. In this posture, Comelec
had no alternative but to effect a substitution, as it was done here.
We rule, therefore, that the substitution of Acting City Fiscal Pichon by City Judge Vicente Calanog
is proper.
2. But argument is here
advanced that the proclamation made by the old board of canvassers on January 13, 1968 is null and
void. It is said that the term of office
of the elected city officials who by law are members thereof had expired, and,
consequently, also their substitutes.
This argument dwindles in strength on the face of the fact that
the board of canvassers is a body entirely different and distinct from the city
council of Davao
City. The board of canvassers is created for a
specific purpose: canvass and
proclamation, and no more. Its term of
office does not coincide with the term of office of the officials
concerned. It terminates as soon as its
functions are finished. Only then does
it adjourn sine die and thus become functus
officio.[26]
As a corollary thereto, it normally retains its authority as a board until it
shall have completed its functions and accomplished its purposes. They may be public officers in another
capacity. Yet they are never functus officio as election officers until
they have totally discharged their duties.
They cannot be disrobed until then.
Public policy and interest prop up this position. For, they are agents of the State. They are purely and distinctly election
officers. Thus, in Aquino
vs. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29, 1968, this Court
clarified the role of a city board of canvassers in the following language:
“The city board of canvassers is an entity that is entirely
different and distinct from the city board or city council of a chartered
city. Similarly, a provincial board of
canvassers, or a municipal board of canvassers, is an entity entirely different
and disĀtinct from the provincial board of a province, or the municipal council
of a municipality, as the case may be.
While members of a city board (or city council), or a provincial board
or of a municipal council, are members also of a city board of canvassers, or
provincial board of canvassers, or of a municipal board of canvassers, as the
case may be, they do not act in the board of canvassers in the capacity of city
councilmen, or in the capacity of a member of the provincial board, or in the
capacity of a member of a municipal council, but as election officials
to perform functions specifically provided by law. The board of canvassers
exist for a specific function – that is, to canvass the results of the
election as shown in the election returns and to proclaim the winning
candidates. Once this specific function
had been performed the existence of the board of canĀvassers is ended and
terminated.”
The factual environment in the present case lends itself to the
view just expressed. There is no
question in our mind that were it not for the injunction issued by the Court of
First Instance of Davao in Election Case 1571,
petitioner could have been proclaimed with the nine other councilors on December 26, 1967. For, as early as the 18th of December, the
canvass had been made. And, on December
19, the results of the canvassing were published. It would not seem out of context to say that
petitioner’s proclamation was merely susĀpended by the court action, and
resumed when finally the decision came.
Would it be reasonable to take the remaining task of proĀclaiming but
one of the so-many candidates for city elective officials out of this board,
which task was after all performed by that board very shortly after the main
proclamation? A sense of justice
convinces us that this should not be done here.
The pronouncement in Santos
vs. Commission on Elections, L-16413, January 26, 1960 – where the new members of the municipal council of Hagonoy, Bulacan, were directed
to properly complete the canvass of the votes for Mayor (by canvassing
the return in Precinct 7) – is out of focus here. There, the two boards of canvassers did not
perform their duties properly. Not so
here. More important is
that in Santos, the legality
of the constitution of the new board was never disputed by any
party. Here, petitioner questions
precisely the legality of the composition of the new board named by Comelec whose members – except for one – are the newly
elected officials. We are thus called
upon to squarely decide the problem. And
we do so now.
We hold that the old city board of canvassers lawfully proĀclaimed
petitioner as 10th councilor-elect of Davao City.
3. More to this. The injustice that may visit upon petitioner
by a change in the composition of the board of canvassers is easily discernible
here. Let us take a look at the composition
of the old board and the new board.
The old board, which proclaimed the City Mayor, the Vice-Mayor,
and the nine councilors was composed of the following:
1. Dominador ZuƱo – City Councilor
2. Crispina Principe – City Councilor
3. Zacarias Solon – City Councilor
4. Pedro Sanvicente – City Superintendent of Schools
vice
City Mayor
5. Samuel Dumlao – City Engineer vice City Vice Mayor
6. Vicente Albay – City Public Services Officer
vice
City Councilor
7. Patrocinio Quitain – Register of Deeds vice City Councilor
8. Pablo Piatos – City Agriculturist vice City
Councilor
9. Vicente Calanog – City Judge vice City Fiscal
10. Barbara Pioquinto – Clerk of Court vice City Councilor
11. Isidro Palacio – Chief, City Fire Department
vice
City Councilor
12. Amando Barbadillo – City Veterinarian vice City Councilor
13. Justiniano San Agustin – vice City Councilor
To be noted is that in this old board of canvassers, an overĀwhelming
majority are substitutes who are career public officials named pursuant to
Section 159 of the Revised Election Code; they are not card-carrying
party members. They carry the
presumption of being impartial.
Compare the old board to the new board created by Comelec in its February
7, 1968 resolution, as follows:
1. City Fiscal Raul Pichon – Chairman
2. City Mayor Elias Lopez – Member
3. Vice-Mayor Manuel Sotto – Member
4. Councilor Bonifacio
Tamayo – Member
5. Councilor Domingo Vidanes – Member
6. Councilor Tomas Monteverde – Member
7. Councilor Benigno
Bangoy – Member
8. Councilor Felicidad
Santos – Member
9. Councilor Manuel Garcia – Member
10. Councilor Antonio
Castillo – Member
11. Councilor Cornelio
MaskariƱo – Member
12. Substitute member
to be appointed
vice
the 10th City Councilor – Member
13. Councilor Cipriano Villafuerte – Member
A radical change in the composition of the board is obvious. In the line-up of the new board, with the
exception of Acting City Fiscal Raul B. Pichon, the
chairman, there are six Nacionalistas, namely, Mayor
Elias Lopez, and Councilors Tomas Monteverde, Jr., Felicidad Santos, Domingo Vidanes,
Benigno Bangoy, and Bonifacio Tamayo. The five Liberals, as heretofore mentioned,
are Vice-Mayor Manuel Sotto and Councilors Manuel Garcia, Cornelio MaskariƱo, Cipriano Villafuerte, and Antonio Castillo. The substitute for the 10th councilor has not
yet been named. There is a precarious
balance of power. That in all probability
they will vote in the canvass and proclamation along party lines, is a stateĀment
that reflects the temper of the times.
The act of the majority of the board during the February 19, 1968 canvass is, indeed, an
outcropping of this inclination. The
circumstances carry their own badge of unfairness to petitioner. He is at a distinct disadvantage. As to him, there is as of now adverse
superiority in numbers. In deliberations
where political fortunes are at stake, minority protesĀtations have rung
hollow. Power lends itself to
misuse. This is a situation which should
give pause to an impartial observer.
4. But if – as
respondent Gaudioso M. Tiongco
contends – the old board of canvassers was illegally constituted, then that
body could not canvass and proclaim any candidate as duly elected. The proclamation of petitioner necessarily is
null and void. And so also must the
proclamation of all the other city elected officials of Davao
City. On this assumption, these elected
members of the new board cannot then lay claim to the position they are now
holding; they are not entitled to be members of the new board of canvassers
constituted by Comelec in its February 7, 1968
resolution to canvass the votes for and proclaim the 10th councilor. Petitioner should not suffer from
discrimination.
5. Viewed from a different
direction, we believe that the intent and meaning imparted by Section 28 of the
Revised Election Code support the proposition that the newly elected officials
should not sit in the board.
Section 28 declares that any member of a municipal council
“who is a candidate for office in any election, shall be
incompetent to act in said body in the performance of the duties thereof
relative to said election.” If a mere candidate is
disqualified, then we should say that one who had been elected as such
candidate stands on no higher a level.
Because, in the first instance, membership in the board of canvassers
for a given election is mainly based on the political composition
of the city officials, namely, the Mayor and the city council, with the City
Fiscal to be excepted. The political
complexion of the board may change after the election – as is the case
here. And, prejudice to a candidate may
result, as is the case with petitioner.
That is good reason enough to say that the newly elected city officials
in a given election are disqualified to act as members of the board of
canvassers for any other elective city position in the same election. Since the eleven elected memĀbers of the new
board heretofore mentioned are disqualified, there is no new board to speak of
which may make the canvass of the votes and proclamation of the 10th
Councilor. It is well to remember that a
void proclamation is no proclamation at all.[27]
We accordingly hold that the new board named by Comelec’s resolution of February 7, 1968 is illegally
constituted and, therefore, cannot act as a city board of canvassers in the
present case.
For the reasons given –
The resolutions of the Commission on Elections of February 7 and March 14, 1968 are hereby set aside
and declared null and void;
The proclamation of petitioner as 10th councilor-elect of Davao City made by the board of canvassers on January 13,
1968 is hereby declared valid and in full force and effect; and
In consequence, the temporary restraining order issued herein is
hereby made permanent.
Costs against respondent Gaudioso
M. Tiongco.
SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., in the result.
[1]
We treat this case as an original special civil action for certiorari. See par. XXI, petition; Mutuc vs.
Commission on Elections, L-28517, February 21, 1968.
[2] See
Omnibus Reply, p. 4.
[3] Entitled “Gaudioso M. Tiongco, Petitioner, vs. Pantaleon
Pelayo, Jr., and the Board of Canvassers of the City
of Davao, Respondents.”
[4]
Annex D of Petition, p. 3.
[5] See
Annex D of Petition, p. 1; David V. Pelayo vs.
Commission on Elections, L-28233, November 8, 1967.
[6] See
Second Motion for Reconsideration, par. 2, Annex 1 of respondent Tiongco’s Answer.
[7] Annex G-1, par. 4 (Supplemental Letter-Petition to Comelec).
[8]
Annex E of Petition.
[9]
Annex F of Petition.
[10]
Annex 6 of respondent Tiongco’s Answer.
[11]
Annex G of Petition.
[12]
Annex G-1 of Petition.
[13] Comelec’s Case
Extra-7.
[14] Annexes E and E-1 of Annex G of Petition.
[15]
Annex G of Petition, pp. 5-6.
[16] Comelec’s Answer
herein, par. 9; Tiongco’s Answer, par. 10.
[17] Comelecās
Answer, par. 10.
[18]
Annex 1 of Comelec’s Answer.
[19]
Annex A of Omnibus Reply.
[20]
Section 19, Article IV, Revised Charter of the City of Davao.
[21] See
Manifestation filed on April 26, 1968 by respondents Manuel C. Sotto, Manuel M.
Garcia, Cornelio P. MaskariƱo, Cipriano
Villafuerte, Jr., and Antonio S. Castillo.
[22]
Section 11, Article III, Revised Charter of the City of Davao.
[23] Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 72 Phil. 278,
294-295. See Zaldivar
vs. Estenzo, L-26065, May 3, 1968; Espino vs. Zaldivar, 1967D
Phild. 670, 689; Estrada vs.
Navarro, 1967D Phild. 929,
937 (Concurring Opinion); Cauton vs.
Commission on Elections, 1967B Phild. 248,
255-256.
[24] Cauton vs.
Commission on Elections, supra.
[25] Section 158, Revised Election Code; Espino
vs. Zaldivar, supra at pp.
685-686.
[26]
Bautista vs. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389.
[27] Uso Dan Aguam vs. Commission on Elections, supra;
Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections, L-28517,
February 21, 1968, citing Demafiles vs.
Commission on Elections, L-28396, December 29, 1967.