MARLAN YOUNG, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE HILARIO I. MAPAYO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 19, DIGOS, DAVAO DEL SUR, RESPONDENT.
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Young versus Mapayo
The Case
This is an administrative complaint for grave misconduct filed by Marlan Young, an American national, against Judge Hilario I. Mapayo of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao del Sur. Young accused the judge of demanding and receiving ten thousand pesos for solemnizing his marriage, and of making him sign blank marriage contracts that were later filled in with a different date and place. The case matters because it shows how the Supreme Court polices the conduct of judges, and because it teaches two enduring lessons: that a complainant's desistance does not strip the Court of its power to investigate, and that charges in administrative proceedings must rest on positive evidence, not on suspicion.
Procedural History
On September 2, 1998, Young filed an affidavit complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao. The Ombudsman referred it to Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, who in turn referred it to Judge Mapayo for comment. The judge submitted his comment, denying all the allegations. The Office of the Court Administrator then endorsed the complaint to the Supreme Court, which resolved to refer the case to Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and recommendation. In her Final Report and Recommendation dated February 14, 2000, Justice Salazar-Fernando recommended that Judge Mapayo be absolved of the charges. The case was thus an original administrative matter resolved directly by the Supreme Court, which adopted the investigating justice's recommendation.
Facts
Young alleged that Judge Mapayo solemnized his marriage to Virginia Parba on March 15, 1993, demanded and received ten thousand pesos for the ceremony, and asked those present to sign six blank copies of the marriage contract. He claimed the judge later filled in the forms with "Digos" and June 9, 1993 as the place and date of the marriage, when he was supposedly out of the country. He also claimed the judge provided him a lawyer for an annulment case that dragged on for two years, and that the judge and Virginia threatened him with deportation.
Judge Mapayo denied everything. He attached the affidavit of Virginia Parba, who confirmed the marriage took place on June 9, 1993 in Digos, with the judge as solemnizing officer. She stated that no blank forms were signed, and that the ten thousand pesos went to her mother for wedding expenses and her trip to the United States, not to the judge. She added that her family had known the judge since 1987 and held him in high respect.
The Court Administrator asked Young for photocopies of his passport and sought travel records from the Bureau of Immigration. Young later executed an affidavit asking the Court not to pursue the case, and he refused to participate in the investigation despite due notice. The immigration records were ambiguous, showing a Marlan W. Young with a different birth date on some entries, and the photocopied passport was unauthenticated and barely readable. Meanwhile, the documents supporting the marriage application, including Young's affidavit of legal capacity sworn before the United States Consul on May 19, 1993 and pre-marriage counseling dated May 25, 1993, showed the marriage could not have taken place on March 15, 1993.
Issues
- Whether or not the withdrawal of the complaint by Marlan Young warrants the dismissal of the administrative case against Judge Mapayo.
- Whether or not Judge Mapayo is guilty of grave misconduct for demanding and receiving ten thousand pesos for the solemnization of the marriage.
- Whether or not Judge Mapayo is guilty of grave misconduct for changing the date and place of the marriage.
Applicable Provisions
The decision does not quote any statutory provision verbatim. It applies the settled rule on desistance, which the Court states through its own prior ruling in Marcelino versus Judge Singson, Junior:
The Court has held in a number of instances that mere desistance on the part of complainant does not warrant the dismissal of administrative complaints against members of the bench. The withdrawal of complaints cannot divest the Court of its jurisdiction nor strip it of its power to determine the veracity of the charges made and to discipline, such as the results of its investigation may warrant, an erring respondent. The Court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern that must not know bounds.
This rule bears on the case because Young withdrew his complaint, yet the Court still proceeded to determine the truth of the charges.
The Court also relies on the rule on official records, which it states as follows:
It is well-settled that entries in official records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
This rule bears on the case because the marriage documents, being official records, established that the marriage could not have been celebrated on March 15, 1993.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the withdrawal of the complaint does not warrant dismissal. The Court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary is a paramount concern, and it retains jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the charges and to discipline an erring respondent.
On the second issue, the Court found the charge unproven. Young himself later said the money was given to his former wife's aunt, not to the judge, and Virginia Parba said it went to her mother for wedding expenses. No positive evidence showed that the judge demanded or received the amount. In the absence of such evidence, the charge must necessarily fail.
On the third issue, the Court likewise found the charge unproven. The immigration records were unreliable, showing inconsistent birth dates and covering only computerized entries for two airports. The photocopied passport was unauthenticated and barely readable, and Young refused to produce the original. Moreover, in his own petition for annulment, Young admitted the marriage took place on June 9, 1993, and he was bound by that admission. The marriage documents, sworn months after March 15, 1993, made the alleged earlier date impossible. The Court also noted that Young refused to participate in the investigation despite due notice.
Doctrine
First, mere desistance by a complainant does not divest the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over an administrative complaint against a member of the bench, nor strip it of the power to determine the veracity of the charges and to discipline an erring respondent. Second, in administrative proceedings against judges, the charges must be established by positive evidence; absent such evidence, the complaint must be dismissed for lack of merit. Third, entries in official records made by a public officer in the performance of a duty are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, and a party is bound by his own admissions in prior judicial pleadings.
Disposition
The complaint for grave misconduct against Judge Hilario I. Mapayo was dismissed for lack of merit, and he was absolved of the charges.
Remember This
Remember the line that desistance does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction, because the Court's interest in the affairs of the judiciary must not know bounds. Examiners use this case to test the rule on withdrawal of administrative complaints against judges and the requirement of positive evidence in disciplinary proceedings.