AMBO ALILAYA, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELA DE ESPAÑOLA, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND TEOPISTO ESPAÑOLA, THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRS…

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus
and damages stemmed from the decision of the City
Court of General
Santos City,
presided over by respondent Hon. Armie E. Elma, which
was appealed to the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato
presided over by respondent Hon. Pedro Samson C. Animas.

The decision of the City Court^[1]
was rendered in an action for forcible entry and damages in Civil Case No.
587-II^[2]
in favor of the plaintiff therein who is the petitioner in the instant
proceedings.  The decision also dismissed
the counterclaim of the defendants who are now the private respondents
herein.  The decision was appealed to the
Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, which held
the City Court to have acted without jurisdiction over the forcible entry case
because the issue of ownership was intertwined with that of possession, and
accordingly, reversed the appealed decision.^[3]

Invoking the provisions of Republic Act No. 5967, particularly
Sections 3 and 5 thereof which are quoted hereunder:

“SECTION 3.  Besides the
civil cases over which the City Courts have jurisdiction under section
eighty-eight of Republic Act numbered Two Hundred Ninety Six, as amended, it
shall likewise have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance
over the following:

“x x
x

“c) In ejection cases where the question of ownership is
brought in issue in the pleadings.  The
issue of ownership shall therein be resolved in conjunction with the issue of
possession.

“x x
x

“SECTION 5.  Except in
offenses punishable by arresto mayor or imprisonment
not exceeding six months or fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or both, or
violation of municipal ordinance or in civil actions falling under the original
exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court, proceedings in the City Court shall
be recorded and judgment of decision rendered shall be directly appealable to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, as the
case may be, in accordance with the Rules of Court applicable to appeal from
judgment of the Court of First Instance.”

petitioner moved for the reconsideration
and/or dismissal of the appeal, but the motion was denied for lack of merit.^[4]
However, before the order of denial could be issued on December 22, 1972,
petitioner filed with the City Court of General Santos City an “Urgent
Motion for Execution,” dated November 23, 1972^[5]
of its decision alleging that the said decision has become final and executory because appeal thereof was not taken to the
proper court, which should be the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, not
the Court of First Instance, since the City Court had concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of First Instance in ejection cases when the issue of ownership
is raised, as expressly provided in Republic Act No. 5967.  The motion was denied by the City Court on the ground that the case
having been appealed to the Court of First Instance where the appeal was then
still pending, it had lost jurisdiction over the case.  For the alleged error thereby committed by
the City Judge, Hon. Armie E. Elma, he was made party
respondent in the instant
proceedings.

The main issue posed for resolution is whether the Court of First Instance properly disposed of the
appeal by assuming jurisdiction thereon and reversing the appealed decision on
the ground that the City Court acted
without jurisdiction on the forcible entry case.  The issue of ownership having been properly
raised and became intertwined with the issue of possession, the primary and
basic issue in a forcible entry case.

The Court of First Instance itself found that from the pleadings
and the evidence presented, the issue of ownership was intertwined with that of
possession.  If this is so, as the
aforesaid Court had correctly observed, then the Court of First Instance was
indeed the wrong forum to which to elevate an appeal from the decision of the
City Court.  This is clear from the plain
and categorical provisions of Republic Act No. 1967 as quoted above. 
Respondent Judge Animas, therefore, involved himself in a manifest error
in holding that the issue of ownership was intertwined with that of possession,
which as a consequence, divested the City Court of jurisdiction to take
cognizance and decide the forcible entry case on the merits.  The City
Court of General
Santos City is
expressly vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case as it did.  It is, therefore, the Court of First Instance
that acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the appeal itself, instead of
dismissing it.  The error committed is
one of jurisdiction, not a mere error of judgment, as private respondent would
contend, to save the decision of the Court of First Instance from being
declared a nullity, which it is, for the reason just intimated.

The contention of private respondent that the action filed with
the City Court was not one for forcible entry but only for damages is without
merit.  The allegation of the complaint
that plaintiff was in actual, peaceful possession when defendants, private
respondents herein, forcibly entered the land is an undisputable recital of a
cause of action for a relief of restitution of possession or the ejectment of the defendant. 
This relief is deemed included in the general prayer of the complaint,
if it was not more specifically prayed for. 
If this is a defect, it could be one only of form which should not
defeat the ends of substantial justice, nor hamper the course towards its
attainment.^[6]

The designation of the nature of the action, or the manner it is entitled can, by no means, be
regarded as meaningless or of no effect at all in the determination of the
purpose and object of the action.  In the
present case, the action was entitled “For forcible entry and damages”
which clearly indicates two (2) separate reliefs
sought.  Verily, forcible entry is so
illegal that it should not be allowed to continue or be given any effect
favorable to the culprit, and prejudicial to the aggrieved party.  Consequently, the complaint must be read as
asking for the termination of the illegal act and the wiping out of its prejudicial
effects.  Lack of explicitness in the
decision of the City Court as to the specific act to make the complaint attain
its evident purpose should not be an obstacle to granting the proper
relief.  Undisputably,
the ejectment of the illegal entrant from the
property is but the logical and un­avoidable effect of a judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in a case for forcible entry.

From what has been said above, it should now be regarded as a valid and correct proposition to say
that in forcible entry and unlawful detention cases filed with city courts, it
will not avail the defendant to try to defeat the jurisdiction of the court by
raising the issue of owner­ship as is permissible or legally possible in
municipal courts.  Applying this
proposition in the present case, the City
Court of General
Santos City acted
with proper jurisdiction over the forcible entry case, despite that the issue
of ownership was inevitably raised, as respondent CFI judge himself held.  Its decision was, therefore, appealable to the Court of Appeals, questions of facts
being involved, not to the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato
which, accordingly acted without jurisdiction on the appeal taken to it from
the City Court decision.

It does not matter that the City Court decision may not have made
a pronouncement on the issue of ownership. 
The issue was raised by the defendants in the forcible and entry case
intending to make their alleged ownership the basis of their right of
possession of the law in question as against the plaintiff.  For this reason, the issue of ownership was
properly presented, such that without the express provisions of Republic Act
No. 5967, the City Court would have been without jurisdiction over the
case.  It is thus the jurisdiction vested
only on city courts in ejection cases under the aforecited
act that was exercised by the City Court
of General Santos
City, and by virtue of the said
statute, appeal from the decision of said City Court should be to the Court of
Appeals or to the Supreme Court.  In no
case, therefore, may the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato
be said to have properly assumed jurisdiction to take cognizance of the appeal
of the City Court decision other than to dismiss it for lack of
jurisdiction.  It may not certify the
appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the appeal not being in
such form as to make such action feasible, as appeals erroneously taken to the
Court of Appeals may be certified to the Supreme Court, as expressly so
directed by explicit provision of the Rules of Court.^[7]

Consequently, in denying the motion for reconsideration or to
dismiss appeal as filed by the petitioner in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato, respondent Judge Animas also acted with grave
abuse of discretion.

The decision of the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance must necessarily fall as without legal force and effect.  Ac­cordingly, the decision of the City Court
shall be held to stand, and by the non-perfection of a valid appeal therefrom within the reglementary
period, which is a requirement jurisdictional in character, the same has now
become final and executory, private respondents
having chosen to stand by the decision of the Court of First Instance which
they have sought to defend in these proceedings with this prayer for the
dismissal of this petition.^[8]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted, and the
decision and order of respondent judge, Hon. Pedro Samson C. Animas, complained
of are hereby set aside.  The order of
City Judge Armie E. Elma denying the motion for
execution filed while the appeal in the Court of First Instance was still
pending is hereby sustained, without prejudice to another motion for execution
being filed in the same court, based on the finality of its decision as is
hereby declared.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and Abad Santos,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex D, p. 24, Rollo.

^[2]
Annex C, Petition, p. 21, Rollo.

^[3]
Annex E, Petition, p. 39, Rollo.

^[4]
Annex F, p. 55, Rollo.

^[5]
Annex G. p. 56. Rollo.

^[6]
Concepcion vs. Payatas
Estate Improvement Co., 103 Phil. 1016; Lameo vs.
Workmen’s Compensation, 84 SCRA 401; Quibuyen vs.
Court of Appeals, 9 SCRA 741; Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. CIR, 15 SCRA
661; Consul vs. Consul, 17 SCRA 671; Clorox Company vs. Director
of Patents, 20 SCRA 965; Supio vs. Garde, 45 SCRA 429; Lajom vs.
Viola, 73 Phil. 563.

^[7]
Sec. 3, Rule 50, Rules of Court.

^[8]
Carreon vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
77 SCRA 297; Luzteveco vs. Reyes, 71 SCRA 655;
Phil. Virginia Tobacco Adm. vs. De Los Angeles, 60 SCRA 432; Reyes vs.
Carrasco, 38 SCRA 29.