G.R. No. L-45262. July 23, 1990
RUPERTO REYES AND REYNALDO C. SAN JUAN, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. LORENZO R. MOSQUEDA, JUDGE OF CFI, PAMPANGA (BRANCH VII), AND URSULA D. P…
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The instant petitions have been consolidated as they arose from
the same facts and involve similar issues.
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and
without issue on November 18, 1972. He was survived by his sister, Ursula Pascual and the children of his late sisters as
follows: (1) Maria Pascual
Reyes – Ruperto Reyes and Jose Reyes; (2) Ines Pascual Reyes – Jose P.
Reyes, Benito Reyes, and Marina Reyes Manalastas;
(3) Josefa Pascual Reyes – Augusto Reyes and Benjamin Reyes; and (4) Escolastica Pascual Dalusong (half-blood) – Pedro Dalusong.
On December 3, 1973,
the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings
No. 73-30-M in the then Court of First Instance of Pampanga
for the administration of his estate.
Atty. Marcela Macapagal, Clerk of Court of Branch VII was appointed special administratrix. Macapagal was, however, replaced by Reynaldo San Juan.
On February
12, 1976, Ursula Pascual filed a motion to exclude some properties from the
inventory of Pascual’s estate and to deliver the
titles thereto to her. Ursula alleged
that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime or on November
2, 1966 executed a
“Donation Mortis Causa” in her favor
covering properties which are included in the estate of Dr. Pascual (subject of Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M) and
therefore should be excluded from the inventory.
On August 1, 1976;
the trial court issued an order excluding from the inventory of the estate the
properties donated to Ursula, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing discussion, let the
properties listed in paragraph 2 of the motion of February 12, 1976 filed by
Ursula D. Pascual thru counsel be, as it is hereby
ordered, excluded from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio
D. Pascual, without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action.
Special Administrator Reynaldo San Juan is hereby ordered to return to
Court the custody of the corresponding certificates of titles of these
properties, until the issue of ownership is finally determined in a separate
action.” (G.R. No. 45262, pp. 23-24)
The Order is now the subject of G.R. Nos. 45262 and 45394.
On January 5, 1977, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial
court from enforcing the August 1, 1976
Order.
Among the properties included in the “donation mortis causa” in favor of Ursula was Lot 24, Block No. 15 of
the subdivision plan Psd-3231, located at 1109-1111 R. Papa St., Tondo, Manila as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 17854. The records show that on May 15, 1969, Emilio Pascual executed a deed of donation of real property inter vivos over the above-mentioned lot in Manila
in favor of Ofelia D. Parungao, petitioner in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 a minor
with her mother, Rosario Duncil, accepting the gift
and donation for and in her behalf. When
Parungao reached the age of majority or on December 20, 1976, she tried to have
the donation registered. However, she
found out that the certificate of title was missing from where it was supposed
to be kept, prompting her to file a petition for reconstitution of title with
the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The petition was granted in October 1977. Parungao registered
the deed of donation with the Register of Deeds of Manila who cancelled
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 17854 and issued in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao. She then filed a motion for exclusion in
Special Proceedings No. 73-30-M.
In the meantime, on September
23, 1976, Ursula Pascual executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of Benjamin, Oscar, Jose and
Emmanuel, all surnamed Reyes.
On May 2, 1978, Benjamin Reyes, private respondent in G.R. Nos.
73241-42 filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 129092, Register of Deeds of Manila and/or reconveyance
of deed of title against Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil with the then Court of First Instance of
Manila. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 115164.
In their answer with compulsory counterclaim Parungao
and Duncil denied Reyes assertion of ownership over
the Tondo property.
On November 6, 1978,
Ofelia Parungao filed a complaint for recovery of
possession over the Tondo
property against Benjamin Reyes and his nephew Oscar Reyes with the Court of
First Instance of Manila. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 119359. In her complaint, Parungao
also alleged that as early as 1973, the defendants occupied two (2) doors of
the apartment situated at the Tondo property by mere
tolerance of the previous owner, Dr. Emilio Pascual,
and later by her until April 8, 1978 when she formally demanded that the
defendants vacate the premises. Parungao prayed that the defendants be evicted from the
premises.
The two cases were
consolidated. On June 3,
1982, the then Court
of First Instance, Branch 8 rendered a joint decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
In Civil Case No. 115164 –
1) Declaring TCT No.
129092 in the name of Ofelia Parungao null and void;
and ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel said title and to
restore, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 17854 in the name of Emilio D. Pascual;
2) Ordering Ofelia D. Parungao to pay plaintiff Benjamin P. Reyes the sum of Two
Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, as and for attorney’s fees; and to pay the costs of
suit including all fees which the Register of Deeds may prescribe for the full
implementation of this decision.
For lack of merit, the counterclaim is dismissed.
In Civil Case No. 119359 –
1) Dismissing the
complaint for want of merit; and
2) On the counterclaim,
ordering Ofelia Parungao to pay defendants the sum of
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney’s
fees.”
Parungao appealed the decision to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court. The
decision was, however, affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
The Intermediate
Appellate Court decision is now the subject matter in G.R. Nos. 73241-42.
On January
29, 1986, we issued
a minute resolution denying the above petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and executory on March 10, 1986 and on this same day the entry of judgment was effected. The entry of judgment was however set aside
in the resolution dated January 19, 1987 on the ground that the January 29, 1986 resolution was not received by the
petitioners’ counsel of record. The
petitioner was granted leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the January
29, 1986 resolution.
The motion for
reconsideration is now before us for
resolution.
The issues raised in
these petitions are two-fold: (1) In
G.R. No. L-45394, petitioner Pedro Dalusong questions
the jurisdiction of the probate
court to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Pascual
in its Order dated August 1, 1976, and (2) In G.R. No. L-45262
and G.R. Nos. 73241-42 Ruperto Reyes, Reynaldo C. San
Juan, in his capacity as special administrator of the estate of Emilio Pascual (petitioner in G.R. No. L-45262), Ofelia Parungao and Rosario Duncil
(petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42) question the appellate court’s finding that
the “Donation Mortis Causa” executed by
Emilio Pascual in favor of his sister Ursula Pascual was actually a Donation Inter Vivos.
We first discuss the
issue on jurisdiction. The questioned August 1,
1976 order of the
then Court of First Instance of Pampanga in S. P.
Proc. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of
the estate of the deceased Dr. Emilio D. Pascual was
“without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.”
The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the
inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate
court. This was stressed in the case of Cuizon v. Ramolete. (129 SCRA 495 [1984]) which we cited in the
case of Morales v. Court First Instance of
Cavite, Branch V (146 SCRA 373
[1986]):
“It is well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge
of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine
title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally
claimed to belong to outside parties.
All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered
by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so (Mallari v. Mallari,
92 Phil. 694; Baquial v. Amihan,
92 Phil. 501).
Similarly, in Valero Vda.
de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, (91 SCRA 540) we held that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such
determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-449 and 473; Lachenal v. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262,
266).”
On the second issue, it may be noted that the Court of Appeals
did not pass upon the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao
because of its finding that the 1966 donation to Pascual
was inter vivos.
The petitioners do not press the authenticity of the 1969 donation as
their challenge centers on whether or not the 1966 donation was inter vivos. However, the trial court has a lengthy discussion
reflecting adversely on the authenticity of the 1969 donation to Parungao.
The petitioners assert that the 1966 donation was null and void
since it was not executed with the formalities of a will. Therefore,
the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45262 insist that
the donated properties should revert to the estate of Emilio Pascual while the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73241-42 insist
that the donation of real property inter vivos in
favor of Ofelia Parungao be given effect.
The subject deed of donation titled “DONATION MORTIS
CAUSA” duly notarized by a certain Cornelio M. Sigua
states:
“That Dr. Emilio D. Pascual,
Filipino, single of age and resident of Apalit, Pampanga, hereinafter called the DONOR and Ursula D. Pascual, Filipino, single, also of age, resident of and
with postal address at Apalit, Pampanga,
hereinafter called the DONEE, have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to the
following, to wit:
That the said DONOR, Dr. Emilio D. Pascual,
for and in consideration of the love and affection which he has and bears unto
the said DONEE, as also for the personal services rendered by the said DONEE to
the said DONOR, does hereby by these presents voluntarily GIVE, GRANT, and
DONATE MORTIS CAUSA, unto the said DONEE URSULA D. PASCUAL, her heirs and
assigns, all of my rights, title and interest, in and to the following parcels
of land with all the improvements thereon, situated in the Municipality of Apalit, Pampanga, and more
particularly described and identified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(Enumerated herein
are 41 parcels of land)
Also included in this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA are all personal
properties of the DONOR in the form of cash money or bank deposits and
insurance in his favor, and his real properties situated in other towns of Pampanga, such as San Simon, and in the province of Rizal, San Francisco del Monte and in the City of Manila.
That the said donor has reserved for himself sufficient property to
maintain him for life; and that the said DONEE does hereby ACCEPT and RECEIVE
this DONATION MORTIS CAUSA, and further does express his appreciation and
gratefulness for the generosity of said DONOR;” (Rollo of G.R. No. L-45262, pp. 12-16)
xxx xxx xxx
Considering the
provisions of the DONATION MORTIS CAUSA the appellate court ruled that the deed
of donation was actually a donation inter vivos
although denominated as DONATION MORTIS CAUSA.
It is, now a settled rule
that the title given to a deed of donation is not the determinative factor
which makes the donation “inter vivos” or
“mortis causa.” As early as the case of Laureta v. Manta, et al.,
(44 Phil. 668 [1928]) this Court ruled that the dispositions in a deed of
donation – whether “inter vivos” or
“mortis causa” do not depend on the title
or term used in the deed of donation but on the provisions stated in such deed.
This Court explained in Concepcion
v. Concepcion. (91 Phil. 823 [1952]) –
“xxx But, it is a rule consistently
followed by the courts that it is the body of the document of donation and the
statements contained therein, and not the title that should be considered in
ascertaining the intention of the donor. Here, the donation is entitled and
called donacio onerosa
mortis causa. From the body, however, we find that
the donation was of a nature remunerative rather than onerous. It was for past
services rendered, services which may not be considered as a debt to be paid by
the donee but services rendered to her freely and in
goodwill. The donation instead of being
onerous or for a valuable consideration, as in payment of a legal obligation,
was more of remuneratory or compensatory nature,
besides being partly motivated by affection.
We should not give too much importance or significance to or be
guided by the use of the phrase ‘mortis causa‘ in a
donation and thereby to conclude that the donation is not one of inter vivos. In the case
of De Guzman et al. v. Ibea, et al. (67 Phil. 633),
this Court through Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña said
that if a donation by its terms is inter vivos, this
character is not altered by the fact that the donor styles it mortis causa.
In the case of Laureta v. Mata, et al.
(44 Phil. 668), the court held that the donation involved was inter vivos. There, the donor
Severa Magno y Laureta gave the properties involved as –
“’a reward for the services which he is rendering me, and as a
token of my affection toward him and of the fact that he stands high in my estimation,
I hereby donate `mortis causa’ to said youth all the
properties described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
‘”I also declare that it is the condition of this donation
that the donee
cannot take possession of the properties donated before the death of the donor,
and in the event of her death the said donee shall be
under obligation to cause a mass to be held annually as a suffrage in behalf of
my soul, and also to defray the expenses of my burial and funerals.’
It will be observed that the present case and
that of Laureta above cited are similar in that in
both cases the donation was being made as a reward for services rendered and being rendered, and as a token of
affection for the donee; the phrase ‘mortis causa‘ was used; the donee to
take possession of the property donated only after the death of the donor; the donee was under obligation to defray the expenses incident
to the celebration of the anniversary of the donor’s death, including church
fees. The donation in
both cases were duly accepted. In
said case of Laureta this Court held that the
donation was in praesenti and not a gift in futuro.”
In the
later case of Bonsato, et al.
v. Court of Appeals, et al. (95
Phil. 481 [1954]) this Court, distinguished the characteristics of a donation
inter vivos and “mortis causa” in this wise:
“Did the late Domingo Bonsato make
donations inter vivos or dispositions post mortem in
favor of the petitioners herein? If the latter, then the documents should
reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or
ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership
(full or naked) and control of the property while alive (Vidal v. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman v. Ibea,
67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death,
the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dipose of
the properties conveyed (Bautista v. Sabiniano, G.R.
No. L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer
should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.”
These principles were
repeated in the case of Castro v. Court
of Appeals (27
SCRA 1076 [1969]), to wit:
“Whether a donation is inter vivos
or mortis causa depends upon the nature of the
disposition made. ‘Did the donor intend to transfer
the ownership of the property donated upon the execution of the donation? If this is so, as reflected from the
provisions contained in the donation, then it is inter vivos;
otherwise, it is merely mortis causa, or made to take
effect after death.’ (Howard v. Padilla and Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. L?7064 and L-7098, April 22, 1955.”
Applying the above principles to the instant petitions, there is no doubt that the
so-called DONATION MORTIS CAUSA is really a donation inter vivos.
The donation was executed by Dr. Pascual in favor of
his sister Ursula Pascual out of love and affection
as well as a recognition of the personal services rendered
by the donee to the donor. The transfer of ownership over the properties
donated to the donee was immediate and independent of
the death of the donor. The provision as
regards the reservation of properties for the donor’s subsistence in relation
to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention
of the donor to give naked
ownership of the properties to the donee immediately
after the execution of the deed of donation.
With these findings we find no need to discuss the other arguments
raised by the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1) In G.R. Nos. 45262 and
45394 the petitions are DENIED. The
Temporary Restraining Order issued on January
5, 1977 is hereby LIFTED; and
2) In G.R. Nos. 73241-42,
the motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
This DENIAL is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.