RIZAL CEMENT CO., INC., PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. RIZAL CEMENT WORKERS’ UNION (FFW), ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

On May 29, 1956, the petitioner, Rizal Cement Co., Inc., filed in the
Court of First Instance of Manila a petition seeking to enjoin the
respondents, Rizal Cement Workers’ Union, et al., from illegal
picketing conducted pursuant to a strike declared by the respondent
Union in the evening of May 27, 1956, against the petitioner. The court
thereupon issued an order restraining the respondents from the acts
complained of, it appearing that the allegations of the petition,
particularly paragraphs 5 and 6, sustained prima facie the petitioner’s claim.

On June 1, 1956, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss, alleging
that, in matters of injunction in labor disputes as provided in
Republic Act No. 875, the Court of Industrial Relations has
jurisdiction to the exclusion of the lower court, and that the
allegations in the petition clearly show, that the case falls
exclusively within the province of the Court of Industrial Relations.
The petitioner, however, argued that, assuming Republic Act No. 875 to
be applicable, the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations
was not intended to be exclusive.

After hearing, the court
issued on June 12, 1956, a lengthy order granting the preliminary
injunction prayed for upon the filing of a bond in the amount of
P5,000.00. The court adopting the ruling laid down in the case of Reyes
vs. Tan (99 Phil., 880; 62 Off. Gaz., [14] 6187), denied the respondents’ motion to dismiss.

On November 20, 1956, the respondents moved for the reconsideration of
the order and, in addition to their argument invoking Republic Act No.
875, they contended that the strike was an off-shoot of unfair labor
practices allegedly committed by the petitioner, with the result that
the case thereby fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations. On December 21, 1956, the strike involved in the
case was certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court of
Industrial Relations pursuant to Section 10 (h) of Republic Act
No. 875. Particularly in view of this development, the court sustained
the respondents’ contentions and forthwith ordered the case dismissed
and the preliminary injunction dissolved. From this order, the
petitioner has appealed.

The petitioner insists that the
Court of First Instance has jurisdiction under Section 44 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, the matter complained of being ordinary
violence, threats, intimidation and coercion which are cognizable by
ordinary courts. From the facts that, although the respondents in their
motion to dismiss alleged lack of jurisdiction, the lower court had
entertained the petition and directed the issuance of the preliminary
injunction; that it denied peremptorily the motion to dismiss after
consideration of the arguments and evidence of each party; and that it
set for hearing the motion for reconsideration of the order denying the
motion to dismiss, the petitioner also insists that the lower court
should have retained the jurisdiction thus already acquired and
exercised, because the same cannot be removed by any subsequent event
or even after the expiration of the law governing the case (Roxas vs. Sayoc, 100 Phil., 448; 53 Off. Gaz., [17] 5642; Luzon Brokerage Co. vs. Luzon Labor Union, et al., 92 Phil., 61; 48 Off. Gaz. [9] 3883).

The records show that the Clerk of Court of the Court of Industrial
Relations had certified to the existence of unfair labor practice cases
in said court between the parties, offshoots of the labor dispute
involved in the strike in question. During the pendency of the motion
for reconsideration in the lower court, the labor dispute was
admittedly certified by the President of the Philippines to the Court
of Industrial Relations. Following the decision in Reyes vs.
Tan, 99 Phil., 880; 52 Off. Gaz. [17] 6187, the Court of Industrial
Relations has exclusive jurisdiction when the labor dispute affects an
industry which is indispensable to the national interest and it is
certified thereto by the President of the Philippines. (See Sec. 10, R. A. No. 875.)

In not sustaining the jurisdiction of the lower court and in declaring
that the Court of Industrial Relations possesses exclusive
jurisdiction, this Court was guided by and has merely adhered to the
objectives of the Magna Charta of Labor. It is the intention of this
special law to make the Court of Industrial Relations the repository of
all actions involving labor disputes and, with more reason, unfair
labor practices. Confusion and delay would be avoided and the
settlement of labor disagreements would thus be expedited. The lower
court was correct when it concluded as follows:

“*
* *. After consideration of the law, the Court is impelled to sustain
the position of respondents on the second point; there is no question
that by virtue of the communications of December 29, 1956, and pursuant
to Section 10 of Republic Act No. 876, the strike was certified to the
Court of Industrial Relations; and that being the case, the only effect
should be that it is only the Court of Industrial Relations that should
have authority to go into the merits and consequences of the strike and
apply its coercive powers when necessary one way or the other; if this
Court were to proceed and try this case just the same notwithstanding
Exhibit ‘2’ the result would be to render nugatory the exclusive
jurisdiction granted to the Court of Industrial Relations; it is true
that Exhibit ‘2’ as interpreted by this Court would have the
consequence of depriving this Court of jurisdiction, but as we view
this case, it is one where when this case was presented, this Court had
jurisdiction but that jurisdiction was lawfully withdrawn pursuant to
Section 10, Republic Act No. 875, by virtue of Exhibit ‘2’; this is
more properly a case of abatement and there being no showing that the
President had no authority to certify the strike unto the Court of
Industrial Relations that authority must stand with the necessary
consequence of taking out this case from this Court; and this being the
result, there Would be no more need to go to the first point debated
between the parties.”

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.