PAZ M. GARCIA, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., RESPONDENT.

Administrative complaint
filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., formerly Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Just­ice, in his former
capacity as judge, for alleged “dishonesty, violation of his oath of
office as judge ….. gross incompetence, violation of
Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly) Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof, committed
(allegedly) as follows:

“2.  That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971
inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent herein, has not submitted his monthly reports containing the num­ber of
cases filed, disposed of, decided
and/or resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months,
together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day,
etc., as evidenced by the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio
D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice,
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’, Item No. 1, in violation of
Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which
is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’;

“3.  That
he has not submitted his
certificate of service (New Ju­dicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966) from July to
December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 in­clusive as evidenced by
the certi­ficate issued by Judge Pichay, Ju­dicial
Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex ‘A’, Item No. 2 there­of;

“4.  That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of
First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo
and knowing fully well that he has never
performed his official duties or dis­charged the duties appertaining to
his office, he has collected and was
paid his salaries from July to December, 1970 and from January to
February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos
of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and the certificate
of Mr. Pichay Annex ‘A’, last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in
flagrant violation of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as a­mended which
provides as follows:

‘x x x District judges, judges of City
Courts, and municipal Judges shall cer­tify on their application for leave, and
upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon
which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications,
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more
have been determined and decided on or before the date of ma­king the
certificate and x x x no salary shall be paid without such certificate‘ (Underscoring supplied).

“5.  That his deliberate failure to submit the
monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from January, 1971 to February,
1971 stating there­in the number of hours of session that the Court holds
daily, the accom­plishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of
Section 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amend­ed.

“6.  That by his deliberate viola­tion of his Oath
of Office as a Dis­trict Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San
Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness
to perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.

“7.  That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote
to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing him that he was entering upon
the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:

‘I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the
performance of the duties of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance
of La­guna and San Pablo City
(Branch VI) today, June 29, 1970.’

“That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate
falsehood aggra­vates his moral bankruptcy incompatible to the requirements of
the highest de­gree of honesty, integrity and good moral character appertaining
to hold­ing the position of Judge in the admi­nistration of justice.”

Upon being so required, in due time, respondent filed an answer
alleging pertinently that:

“THE FACTS

“Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of La­guna and San Pablo City
with station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. 
The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches, had to be
orga­nized from scratch.  After consulta­tions
with the officials of the province of Laguna, the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Just­ice, respondent decided
to accept the offer of the Calamba Municipal
Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the court; to
utilize the financial as­sistance promised by the Laguna pro­vincial government for the purchase of the necessary
supplies and mate­rials; and to rely on the national government for the
equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative
Code, all these items must be furnished by the provincial government.  The provincial officials of Laguna, however,
informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).

“As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal
Mayor of Ca­lamba assured the respondent that the
court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba
municipal building as soon as the office of the municipal treasurer and his
personnel are transferred to another location. 
When the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer’s office was about
to be effected, the treasurer and several municipal
councilors objected.  The municipal mayor
then requested the respondent to look over some of the office spaces for rent
in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal
government will shoulder the payment of the rentals.  Respondent’s first choice was the second
floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the
nego­tiations failed when the owner of
the building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month.  The next suitable space selected by respondent
was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank.  After a month’s negotiations, the
municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on Oc­tober 26, 1970.  Another month passed before the municipal
government could release the amount necessary for the improvements to convert
the space that was rented, which was a big hall with­out partitions, into a
courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant
provincial fis­cal.  Thereafter, upon
respondent’s representations, the
provincial govern­ment appropriated the amount of P5,000
for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court.  Early in December, 1970 respondent also
placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property Officer of the Department
of Justice but, unfortunately, the
appropriation for the equipment of courts of first in­stance was released only on December 23, 1970 and
the procurement of the equipment chargeable against this allotment is still
under way (please see enclosed certification of the Financial Officer of the De­partment
of Justice marked Annex ‘A’).

“When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he
could actually preside over his court, he applied for an extended leave (during
the 16 years he had worked in the De­partment of Justice, respondent had, due
to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months
allowed by the law).  The Sec­retary of
Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead to
assist him, without be­ing extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was
not busy attending to the needs of his court.

“Charges
Have No Basis –

“Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation
of his oath of office, grave incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and
58 of the Judiciary Act.

“It is respectfully submitted that –

“A.  Respondent’s inability to perform his judicial
duties un­der the circumstances mentioned above does not constitute incom­petence.  Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets
his first appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid
himself of the stigma of being ‘a judge without a sala‘,
but forces and circumstances be­yond his control prevented him from discharging
his judicial duties.

“B.  Respondent’s collection of sa­laries as judge
does not constitute dishonesty because aside from the time, effort and money he
spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in
the Department of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos
marked Annex ‘B’).  Indeed, even if
respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he
could, as other judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without
being guilty of dishonesty.

“Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI
judge which po­sition then carried a salary of P19,000 per annum, he
automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of
Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he
was receiving P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively.  Also, in anti­cipation of the judicial duties
which he was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer’s du­ties in
the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.

“C.  Sections
5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Depart­ment of
Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial
duties.

“The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started to perform
their judicial du­ties to comply with the abovementioned statutory provisions and
circular (please see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio
D. Pichay, Judicial Su­perintendent, marked Annex ‘C’).

“Moreover, a reading of these sec­tions and circular makes
evident the folly of requiring a judge who has not entered into the performance
of his judicial duties to comply with them. 
Taking Section 5, how could a judge who has not started to discharge his
judicial duties certify that ‘all special proceedings, applica­tions,
petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases which have been under
submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more
have been deter­mined and decided on or before the date of making the
certificate.’ And how could such a judge hold court in his place of permanent
sta­tion as required by Section 55; observe the hours of daily sessions of the
court as prescribed by Section 58; and render the reports required by Circular
No. 10 when his court is not yet in physical existence.  Clear­ly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of
the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge.”

In view of the nature of the allegations of com­plainant and
respondent in their respective complaint and answer and considering, in the
light thereof, that the material facts
are more or less undisputed, the Court
feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.

After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be
dismissed.  To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations
of the respondent complained of.  As We see it,
the situation is not exactly as complainant
has attempted to portray it. 
Complainant’s theory is
that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has never acted as such, since the date he
took his oath up to the filing of the com­plaint.  In the sense that respondent has not yet per­formed any judicial function, it may be
admitted that respondent has not
really performed the duties of judge. 
What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his oath and formally assuming his position as
judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge
even in the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function
for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any
good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not
for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and,
instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must
be presumed, impair his position as a judge. 
This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or offi­cers
in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court
and the performance of his functions have failed to provide him therewith
without any fault on his part.  That
respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part
of the corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the Department of Justice to assist the
Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein for sixteen
years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit.  In the circumstances, it was certainly not im­proper
that he rendered some kind of service to the go­vernment, since he was
receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge
without any fault on his part.  As to
whether or not in doing so he placed in jeopardy the independence of the
judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a
judge should observe vis-a-vis ser­vice to the other
departments of the government will be discussed anon.  At this juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant’s theory of dishonesty can­not
hold water.

Admittedly respondent has not prepared and sub­mitted any of the
reports of accomplishments and sta­tus of cases in his sala
which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as
the correspond­ing circulars of the Department of Justice.  The rea­son is simple.  He has not yet started performing any
judicial functions.  None of those laws
and circulars apply to him, for all of them
contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making de­cisions
and orders.  On the other hand,
respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a
valid confirmed appointment in his favor. 
In other words, he simply made himself available for the purposes for
which he was appointed.  That he could
not actually hold office in the court to which he was appointed was not of his
making.  The other officials in charge of
providing him therewith seem to have been caught unprepared and have not had
enough time to have it ready. 
Conceivably, under the law, with the permis­sion of this Court, respondent
could have been assigned to another court pending all these preparations, but
that is something within the initiative and control of the Secretary of Justice
and not of the respondent.

Of course, none of these is to be taken as mean­ing that this
Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure, of judges
being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it
were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority
over the courts.  The line between what a
judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other
offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must
always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation
of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good
intentions in the inter­est of the public service.  The fundamental advantages and the necessity
of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by
the spe­cific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among
them, have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any
temporary or passing governmental conveniences or exigencies.  It is thus of grave importance to the
judiciary under our present constitutional scheme of government that no judge
of even the lowest court in this Republic should place himself in a position
where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or resolution would
be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they
can have legal ef­fect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or
this Supreme Courts, as the case may be. 
Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that
this practice is discontinued.

WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby
dismissed.  Let a copy of this resolution be
furnished the Secretary of Justice.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs fully and
in addition submits a brief separate opinion.

Ruiz Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion of J. Fernando.