G.R. No. L-29039. November 28, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF, VS. HON. FELINO D. ABALOS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, BRANCH II, 16TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND MOHAMMAD USSAM DAMBONG, RESPOND…
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory injunction, to annul an order of Honorable Felino D. Abalos, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Sulu, directing that the
testimony of a rebuttal witness for the prosecution in Criminal Case No. 3158
of said Court be stricken from the records.
Soon after the filing of the petition herein, We
issued a temporary restraining order directing that the continuation of the
trial of said case be suspended until further orders.
On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with said
court, presided over by respondent Judge, accusing Mohammad Ussam Dambong, Jikiri Dambong, Amiril Habissi and Ahmad Intoman, of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi, with multiple
frustrated murder upon the persons of Sarahani Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and Abdulrajik Maoludani, allegedly committed on February 6, 1961, in Guimba Asin, municipality of Panamao,
province of Sulu.
When the case was called for trial, the prosecution introduced evidence
tending to show that defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place
aforementioned, accompanied by his co-defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as
shot and wounded the other persons named in the information. After the reception of said evidence for the
prosecution, the defense proceeded with the presentation of its own evidence,
in the course of which, defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the casualties and the injuries
adverted to above were due to shots fired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi, because, as a
police sergeant in the performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had merely fired
into the air, to stop a fight between two (2) groups of persons, to one of
which the victims belonged. The defense
having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24,
1968, the prosecution called Madjid Andi as rebuttal witness.
After the preliminary questions propounded to him, the defense
objected to further questions, upon the ground that Madjid
Andi appeared to have witnessed the occurrence and
that his testimony should have been introduced when the prosecution presented
its evidence in chief. Respondent Judge
sustained the objection, but, later, reconsidered his resolution, as the
prosecution explained that it had discovered Madjid Andi sometime after the introduction of its evidence in chief
and that the testimony of said witness would merely rebut that of defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong. Thereupon, the prosecution resumed the
examination of Madjid Andi,
who said that he was present when the shooting involved in the case took
place, that Maoludani Habissi
and Abdulhadi Maoludani
were shot by defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong, not by Abdulkadil Habbisi, and that the latter was not even at the scene of
the occurrence. The prosecution then
asked Madjid Andi whether
Mohammad Ussam Dambong was
in the courtroom. The defense objected
to this question as improper for rebuttal, and one that should have been asked
during the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence in
chief. Respondent Judge sustained the
objection and ordered the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the record, as improper for rebuttal.
The prosecutor having announced that Madjid
Andi would be its last witness and that he
(prosecutor) would appeal from the resolution of the court as soon as copy
thereof had been furnished him, respondent Judge incorporated his aforementioned
resolution in an order, dated May 2, 1968, directing that the testimony of said
witness be “discarded from the records on the ground that the testimony
are answers to questions not proper in rebuttal” and stating that “from
the observation of the Court, the witness in rebuttal should have been
presented as a witness in the presentation of the evidence in chief of the
prosecutor”, and declaring that the case would be deemed submitted for
decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought permission to file
memoranda on or before said date.
Hence, this original action for certiorari and mandamus, with
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by the prosecution against said
respondent Judge and Mohammad Ussam Dambong, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this
decision. In his answer to the petition herein, respondent Judge reiterated
the views expressed by him during the trial, as well as in the resolution and
the order complained of. Respondent
Mohammad Ussam Dambong
filed an answer defending the position taken by respondent Judge. Such position is utterly untenable.
Referring particularly to the question whether or not respondent
Judge erred in ordering the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the records, We note that the
information alleges that defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong had fired at and killed Maoludani
Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well as wounded several other specified
persons. Naturally, the evidence for the
prosecution tended to prove that Mohammad had committed these acts. Upon the other hand, Mohammad was entitled to
establish the contrary – that he did not kill or wound said
persons. He, however, went further,
to which he was entitled, by testifying that it was Abdulkadil
Habbisi who killed and wounded the persons
above-mentioned. This was a new
matter, not covered directly by the evidence for the prosecution. It is true that, if, as testified to by its
witnesses, it was Mohammad Ussam Dambong
who caused the deaths and the injuries already adverted to, it would follow
that Abdulkadil Habbisi was
not the author thereof. The prosecution
was entitled, however, as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce
positive evidence to this effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference from
its evidence in chief. In fact, it was
to the interest of the trial court, in the discharge of its duty to find the
truth, to receive said rebuttal evidence for
the prosecution. What is more, a
failure to introduce it on rebuttal
could have been regarded as a sign of weakness in the evidence for the
prosecution. Then, too, it would have been ridiculous for the
prosecution, during the presentation of its evidence in chief, to try to prove
that the crimes charged in the information had not been committed by Abdulkadil Habbisi.
Under the circumstances, it is obvious that, in directing that
the testimony of Madjid Andi
be stricken from the record and not allowing said witness to identify the
person who committed the crime aforementioned, respondent Judge had committed
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not
the parties should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolutions on these matters
are interlocutory in nature and will not generally be reviewed, except on
appeal taken from a decision rendered on the merits. Judicial discretion, however, is not
unlimited. It must be exercised
reasonably, with a view to promoting the ends of justice, one of which is to
ascertain the truth. Hence, whenever
discretion is vested, it must be understood to be a sound one, inasmuch as the
interest of justice, equity and fair play cannot be advanced otherwise. This is particularly true with respect to
rules of procedure, especially those governing the admission or exclusion of
evidence. As a matter of general
practice, it is deemed best to resolve doubts in favor of the admission of the
contested evidence, without prejudice to such action as the court may deem fit
to take in deciding the case on the merits.[1]
This practice has added importance as regards the evidence for the prosecution
in criminal cases, for, once the accused has been acquitted,
there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the
action of the lower court may have been.
Hence, We have been constrained to suspend the
proceedings in the criminal action involved in the case at bar, to forestall a
possible miscarriage of justice.
In issuing a writ of certiorari against a trial Judge who had
rejected, inter alia, certain rebuttal
evidence for the prosecution in a criminal case, We had occasion to point out,
in People v. Montejo[2],
that:
“Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the
lower court had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and in not permitting the same to propound
the questions already adverted to. It is
obvious to us that said direct and rebuttal evidence, as well as the
aforementioned questions, are relevant to the issues
involved in Criminal Case No. 672.
Although it is not possible to determine with precision, at this stage
of the proceedings, how far said exhibits may affect the outcome of that case,
it is elemental that all parties therein are entitled to a reasonable
opportunity to establish their respective pretense. In this connection it should be noted that,
in the light of the allegations of the amended information in said case and of
the records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the accused
therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the opposing witnesses
and the weight attached to their respective testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in the presentation of their evidence,
lest they may be so hampered that the ends of justice may eventually be
defeated or appear to be defeated. The danger
of leading to such result must be avoided, particularly in cases of the
nature, importance and significance of the one under consideration.”
We, likewise, called attention to the following view, expressed
in Prats &
Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co.3 as far back as February
21, 1929:
“In the course of long experience we have observed that
justice is most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where
trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding
evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality or technical objections to
the form of the questions should be avoided.
In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with any
certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no
indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the
court may as a rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney
that the proof offered will be connected later.
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over
which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in
judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact
shown. When such a mistake is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often
finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of the
error without returning the case for a new trial – a step which this court is
always very loath to take. On the other
hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the
question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never
result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to
know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to
distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the
material before it necessary to make a correct judgment.”
and commented
that:
“There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal
cases where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges, from which
the People can no longer appeal.”
as We granted a
similar writ, in People v. Yatco4, against
another trial court that had ordered the exclusion of an extra-judicial
confession sought to be introduced as part of the evidence for the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the order complained of is hereby annulled, and
respondent Judge, accordingly, directed to receive the aforementioned
testimony of Madjid Andi,
as well as to allow him to identify the person who caused the deaths and the
injuries involved in the criminal case already adverted to, with the costs of
this instance against respondent Mohammad Ussam Dambong.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Director of Lands v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 41 Phil. 120, 124; U.S. v.
Alviar, 36 Phil. 804; Thompson on Trials, Sec. 346;
Carver v. U.S., 164 U.S. 694, 41 L. ed. 602; French v. Hall, 119
U.S. 152, 30 L. ed. 375.
[2]
L-14595, May 31, 1960.
3
52 Phil. 807, 816-817.
4
L-9181, November 28, 1955.